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Abstract
It is commonly claimed that certain tenets and doctrines of the Christian faith are
paradoxical, that is, they give the appearance (at least) of logical inconsistency. In
addition to alleged conceptual problems with classical theism, certain distinctively
Christian doctrines — most notably, the doctrine of the Trinity and the doctrine of
the Incarnation — have frequently been thought to suffer from serious internal
logical difficulties. As such, questions are naturally raised about the rationality of
Christian beliefs.
Since the earliest days of the church, sceptics have marshalled such considerations
in defence of their stance of unbelief or outright disbelief with respect to the
Christian faith. More remarkable, however, is the number of Christian thinkers who
have concurred with their conclusions. Some have conceded not only the charge of
paradoxicality but also the charge of irrationality, shrugging it off or even
championing it as a virtue. Others have granted that certain doctrines are paradoxical,
but reject the accusation of intellectual impropriety. These differing stances indicate
that there are two key questions to be answered concerning paradox in Christian
theology. (1) Are any essential Christian doctrines genuinely paradoxical? (2) Can a
person be rational in believing a paradoxical doctrine?
In the first part of the thesis I develop a case for answering (1) in the affirmative,
arguing that the orthodox Christian doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation, as
reflected in the creeds and confessions of the early church, are indeed paradoxical.
This conclusion is supported by (i) the history of the early trinitarian and
christological controversies and (ii) the failure of contemporary theologians and
philosophers to identify interpretations of these doctrines which avoid paradox while
preserving orthodoxy. I also consider a range of strategies for responding to the
problem of theological paradox, concluding that each is inadequate on either
philosophical or theological grounds (or both).
In the second part of the thesis I develop a case for answering (2) in the
affirmative: even if certain Christian doctrines are paradoxical, Christians can
iii
nonetheless be rational in believing them. Building on Alvin Plantinga's model for
warranted Christian belief, I provide an account of how belief in Christian doctrines
in general can be rational. I then set out a model for understanding paradoxical
doctrines according to which belief in such doctrines will normally be rational for
Christians (both intellectually sophisticated and unsophisticated believers). Finally, I
defend the model against a range of theological and philosophical objections.
The thesis thus makes a novel contribution to studies in religious epistemology,
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1 Introduction: The Problem of Paradox
One should not think slightingly of the paradoxical; for the paradox is the source of
the thinker's passion, and the thinker without a paradox is like a lover without feeling:
a paltry mediocrity.'
S0ren Kierkegaard
1.1 Paradox in Christian Theology
Credo quia absurdum — as Tertullian probably never said. Still, the sentiment
behind the misquotation is a provocative one: that the Christian faith is absurd,
because it asserts the impossible event of a divine death, yet this very assertion
functions as a reason for belief rather than against. Few have been so bold as to
champion such a counterintuitive stance, but a somewhat weaker contention has
proven far more popular, namely, that certain tenets of the Christian faith are
paradoxical yet may be reasonably believed in spite of this feature (if not because of
it). It is this view that forms the subject of the present thesis.
The notion that traditional Christian conceptions of God and his relation to the
world suffer from internal logical difficulties has a long history, having enjoyed
currency among thinkers at every point on the scale of theological belief and
unbelief. These alleged logical conflicts have been denoted in various ways, from the
negatively connotative 'incoherence', 'self-contradiction', and 'absurdity', to the
more forgiving labels of 'paradox', 'antinomy', and 'mystery'. Terminological
differences aside, the significance of these difficulties lies in the potential
implications for the epistemic status of Christian beliefs. On the one hand, atheists
and agnostics have marshalled such considerations in support of their stance of non-
belief or outright disbelief. This strategy is typified by Michael Martin, who argues
that incoherences in the very idea of God, given the standard divine attributes of




exists.2 Richard Gale highlights further problems: the notion that God is immutable
seems to be inconsistent with the claims that God is omniscient and God created the
world, while the notion that God is timeless conflicts with the claim that God is
personal and interacts with his creatures.3 Beyond these conceptual difficulties with
generic theism, distinctively Christian claims have also come under fire; alleged
internal contradictions in the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation are
regularly cited as grounds for believing that Christianity, in its traditional forms,
cannot be true.4 Remarking on the profusion of paradoxes generated by the typical
claims of Christian theologians, Ronald Hepburn contends that such 'grave logical
difficulties' provide an insuperable obstacle for the 'religiously minded person' who
would like to embrace the 'religious orientation of life' associated with Christian
orthodoxy.5 Hepburn chides those theologians of paradox who refuse to take
seriously the complaints of analytical philosophers, arguing that such scholars are
obliged to provide excellent justification for their religious beliefs and claims, given
their paradoxicality.
Within the Christian camp, on the other hand, attitudes toward theological
paradox have ranged from abomination to near adoration. The conservative Calvinist
philosopher Gordon Clark warns that 'dependence on ... paradox ... destroys both
revelation and theology and leaves us in complete ignorance.'6 Similarly, the open
theist David Basinger (illustrating that antipathy toward paradox is represented at
diverse points on the theological spectrum) takes much the same view as Clark: there
is no good reason to affirm paradoxical doctrines in Scripture; indeed, the notion is a
'confusion that ought to be avoided.'7 Still other writers, operating on the assumption
that the intellectual propriety of the Christian faith requires the elimination of any
2 Martin (1990): 286-316. Further examples of this line of argument can be found in Martin and
Monnier (2003).
3 Gale (1991): 37-39, 52-55, 57ff.
4 Unitarians have made much hay out of apparent inconsistencies in the doctrine of the Trinity. For
recent examples, see Buzzard and Hunting (1998); Snedeker (1998). On conceptual problems with the
doctrine of the Incarnation, see Goulder (1979a); Martin (1991); Hick (1993).
5
Hepburn (1966): 2, 22.
6 Nash (1968): 78. Clark memorably dismissed paradox as 'a charley-horse between the ears that can
be eliminated by rational massage.' In keeping with this spirit, he attempted to articulate demonstrably




apparent logical inconsistencies, have laboured to set forth non-paradoxical
interpretations of its central theological claims.8
More remarkable, however, is the number of Christian thinkers who have
conceded the presence of paradox in Christian theology — some going so far as to
deem it an essential feature of the faith. Kierkegaard is well known for his conviction
that the Incarnation constitutes the 'absolute paradox' of Christianity.9 Donald
Bloesch asserts that 'the truth of faith cannot be translated into a finalized, coherent
system which denies the mystery and paradox in faith.'10 D. M. Baillie contends that
'the element of paradox comes into all religious thought and statement', identifying
the Christian doctrines of creation, providence, salvation by grace, the Incarnation,
and the Trinity as cases in point." J. I. Packer, addressing the perceived tension
between divine sovereignty and human responsibility, speaks of biblical
'antinomies': apparently conflicting revelational truths that are surely reconciled 'in
the mind and counsel of God' yet present us with 'a mystery which we cannot expect
to solve in this world.'12 Still more strident is the view of Cornelius Van Til:
Since God is not fully comprehensible to us we are bound to come into what seems to
be contradiction in all our knowledge. Our knowledge is analogical and therefore must
be paradoxical.13
For this reason, he remarks, 'while we shun as poison the idea of the really
contradictory we embrace with passion the idea of the apparently contradictory.'14
Other 'theologians of paradox' could be cited to reinforce the point.15 Yet
presumably each of these writers takes it that affirming certain paradoxical doctrines
8 For representative examples, see Swinburne (1977); Brown (1985); Morris (1986); Plantinga (1988);
Feenstra (1989); Sturch (1991); Swinburne (1994).
9
Kierkegaard (1962); Evans (1989).
10 Bloesch (1978): 18. He later adds, 'the mysteries of the faith defy rational comprehension and can
be expressed only in symbolic and paradoxical language.' Bloesch identifies the doctrine of the
Incarnation and the doctrine of salvation by grace as particular cases of theological paradox. Bloesch
(1978): 86, 126-27, 201.
" Baillie (1961): 108, 111-14, 144.
12 Packer (1961): 23. Cf. Hoekema (1989): 5-7.
13 Van Til (1967): 44.
14 Van Til (1972): 9, emphasis original. Van Til finds paradox in the doctrines of the Trinity and the
Incarnation, the necessity and freedom of God's will, the interplay between divine sovereignty and
human responsibility, the tension between God's goodness and his foreordination of evil, and the
notion that God is self-sufficient yet chose to create the world. For a survey of Van Til's claims about
theological paradox, see Frame (1979).
15 For further examples, see Hazelton (1949); Grounds (1964); Dahms (1978); Janz (1998); Holmes
(2002); also the authors discussed in §2.3.4 and §3.3.3.
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is acceptable, even reasonable in some sense. As such, the various attitudes toward
theological paradox mentioned thus far may be broadly divided as follows:
(PI) It is always irrational to affirm a paradoxical doctrine; and some central
Christian doctrines are unavoidably paradoxical; therefore, adherence to the
Christian faith is always irrational (on account of paradox).
(P2) It is always irrational to affirm a paradoxical doctrine; but no central Christian
doctrines are unavoidably paradoxical; therefore, adherence to the Christian
faith is not always irrational (on account of paradox).
(P3) It is not always irrational to affirm a paradoxical doctrine; and some central
Christian doctrines are unavoidably paradoxical; therefore, adherence to the
Christian faith is not always irrational (on account of paradox).
Each position has its problems, however. (PI) is intolerable for Christians who
believe they have good epistemic grounds for their religious convictions; (P2) faces
the difficulty of countering the widespread contention (among both believers and
non-believers) that there are unresolved paradoxes in traditional Christian theology;
and (P3) is problematic inasmuch as it fails to offer a satisfactory account of the
circumstances under which a paradoxical doctrine might be rationally believed (and
whether such circumstances ever obtain). While some advocates of (P3) have offered
sketchy defences of the intellectual propriety of paradox, none of these treatments
addresses in any depth the prior question of what constitutes rationality: what is
required for belief to be judged 'rational' and whether adherence to paradoxical
doctrines can ever meet the relevant epistemic requirements.
1.2 Paradox Defined
I trust that the particular concept of 'paradox' with which this thesis is concerned
will be evident from the discussion above, but since the term has historically carried
a number of distinct meanings, it would be remiss not to provide an explicit
definition at the outset. As I will be using the term, it is synonymous with apparent
contradiction. A 'paradox' thus amounts to a set of claims which taken in
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conjunction appear to be logically inconsistent.16 Note that according to this
definition, paradoxicality does not entail logical inconsistency per se, but merely the
appearance of logical inconsistency. Of course, what appears to be the case very
often is the case — but this definition is deliberately adopted so as not to beg any
crucial questions about the logical status of Christian doctrines.17
1.3 Outline of the Thesis
The three positions identified above indicate that there are two key questions to be
answered concerning paradox in Christian theology. (1) Are any essential Christian
doctrines genuinely paradoxical? (2) Can a person be rational in believing a
paradoxical doctrine? Answers to these questions will determine which of the
positions (PI), (P2), and (P3) is closest to the mark.
Part One of the thesis considers the first key question and concludes in the
affirmative. In Chapter 2, I argue that the Christian doctrine of the Trinity is
paradoxical. This conclusion is reached by way of (i) a survey of the early trinitarian
controversies leading up to the formulation of two definitive statements of
orthodoxy, the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed and the Athanasian Creed, and (ii) a
critical examination of contemporary interpretations of the doctrine, especially those
developed with an eye to avoiding paradox while preserving orthodoxy. In Chapter
3, I argue that the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation is also paradoxical using a
similar two-stage argument, considering both the early christological controversies
and contemporary interpretations of the doctrine. I have chosen to focus on these two
doctrines, first, because they have often been regarded as 'paradoxical', and second,
18because of their ecumenical appeal and early credal status. (For those readers not
16 For similar definitions in a theological context, see Austin (1967a): 366-67; Van Til (1967): 45;
Dahms (1978): 375; Goulder (1979b): 51-54; Astley (1984): 9; Basinger (1987): 205; Evans (1989):
353; Sturch (1991): 17; Ciocchi (1994): 397; Janz (1998): 6. According to Nicholas Rescher, 'a
paradox arises when a set of individually plausible propositions is collectively inconsistent', and
furthermore, 'the inconsistency at issue here must be real rather than merely seeming.' Rescher
(2001): 6. Thus what I and others call a 'paradox', Rescher would label an 'apparent paradox' — the
disagreement here being merely semantic.
17 This presupposes that a meaningful distinction can be made between apparent contradiction and
real contradiction, a distinction that I take up and defend in due course (see §6.2.1 and §7.4.1).
18 Thus the argument of the thesis will be of interest, I trust, to readers from all Christian traditions. I
believe that a case can be made for the paradoxicality of several doctrines distinctive to the Reformed
tradition, as I indicate in later chapters, but to focus on these would inevitably diminish the relevance
of the thesis to the wider Christian community.
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persuaded by the conclusions reached in these early chapters, I would ask that final
judgement be withheld until the end of the thesis, since my later analysis of the
epistemic status of paradoxical doctrines may render these conclusions somewhat
more palatable.) Chapter 4 considers a range of responses to the paradoxicality of
Christian doctrines: coping strategies for dealing with the epistemic anxieties
induced by the appearance of contradiction. Each of these strategies is inadequate on
philosophical or theological grounds, I contend, and thus the path is cleared for the
presentation of (what I take to be) a more satisfactory approach in Part Two.
Part Two considers the second key question and also concludes in the affirmative.
Chapter 5 lays the epistemological groundwork by providing an account of how the
affirmation of Christian doctrines in general can be rational. This chapter introduces
a number of important notions, such as epistemic warrant, proper function
rationality, and epistemic defeaters, which play central roles in the later argument.
Chapter 6 then sets forth a model for construing theological paradox according to
which believers, with varying degrees of intellectual sophistication, can be perfectly
rational in holding to paradoxical interpretations of Christian doctrines. In Chapter 7,
I defend this model against a range of potential objections.19 Chapter 8 concludes by
briefly highlighting the main implications of the thesis and suggesting some avenues
for further research.
19 Some material from Chapters 6 and 7 appears in Anderson (2005).
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Part One: The Presence of Paradox
The question 'How are you coping with your drink problem?' is hardly appropriate
for one who imbibes only in moderation. Likewise, the question 'How can Christians
be rational in holding to paradoxical doctrines?' is rather beside the point if no
Christian doctrines (at any rate, no essential doctrines) suffer from paradox. Hence
the question of the presence of paradox must precede the question of its propriety. In
the first part of this thesis, I argue that at least two major articles of the Christian
faith — the doctrine of the Trinity and the doctrine of the Incarnation — are indeed
paradoxical. If this is the case, the rationality of traditional Christian beliefs is cast
into some doubt. Still, a range of options are open to the Christian theologian in
response to this state of affairs, each of which purports either to eliminate or to
excuse the paradoxicality of the doctrines in question. In the closing chapter of Part
One, I consider the main contenders in the arena, arguing that each one fails to
provide a philosophically defensible and theologically satisfying solution to the
problem; thus the conclusions of Part One will pave the way for Part Two, in which I
develop a model for understanding paradoxical Christian doctrines according to




2 The Paradox of the Trinity
2.1 Introduction
The doctrine of the Trinity is one of the most debated teachings of the Christian faith;
but if both its defenders and its detractors can agree on anything, it is that the
doctrine is a mysterious one. In its briefest formulation, the doctrine asserts that there
is only one God who exists in three distinct persons. Although much more needs to
be said in order to fully specify the boundaries of orthodox trinitarian belief, as
dictated by the Christian scriptures and creeds, already this minimal statement raises
questions about the logical status of this defining doctrine. Is not God (at least in the
Judeo-Christian tradition) a personal being? Does this not suggest that if there is only
one God, there is only one divine person? How then can this one divine person also
be three divine persons? Put another way: if there are three numerically distinct
persons, each fully divine, does this not imply that there are three Gods, rather than
onelx
It is answers to questions such as these (or perhaps a lack of answers) that have
driven many thinkers, both inside and outside the church, to argue that the doctrine
of the Trinity is not merely mysterious: it is paradoxical, if not outright self-
contradictory. In this chapter, I propose to show that this conclusion is well justified.
Still, any such claims about trinitarian theology must recognise that while there may
be only one God, there is surely more than one doctrine of the Trinity; at any rate,
there is more than one interpretation of that distinctive Christian teaching expressed
in the ancient creeds and confessions of the church.
' 'Here one instinctively feels the point of the seventeenth-century antitrinitarian complaint that
trinitarians simply do not know how to count.'' Plantinga (1988): 41.
2 It is worth reiterating that as I have defined the term, 'paradox' entails only apparent contradiction
and not real contradiction. In other words, a paradoxical set of statements is one that strikes us as
inconsistent, but may or may not turn out to be genuinely inconsistent. Given this usage, my
conclusions in this chapter and the next should not be taken as entailing that the doctrines of the
Trinity and the Incarnation are (or must be interpreted as) logically inconsistent. The relevance of the
distinction between apparent contradiction and real contradiction is developed and defended in
Chapters 6 and 7.
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Consequently, sophisticated theses about the logical status of this doctrine usually
incorporate statements about the boundaries of orthodoxy regarding its interpretation.
Few scholars would deny that interpretations of the Trinity have been offered which,
under the closest scrutiny, appear to be free of any logical difficulty. However, many
more would question whether such interpretations are free of any theological
difficulty; that is, whether they pay sufficient heed to the religious concerns of those
who originally forged the early statements of trinitarian orthodoxy. As such,
criticisms of the doctrine of the Trinity based on its logical status are often presented
in the form of a dilemma: it is alleged that the trinitarian who wishes to remain
orthodox will inevitably face paradox, while the trinitarian who aims to banish
paradox will end up heterodox.
Given this framing of the problem, I propose to assess the validity of this
purported dilemma in two stages. In the first, I will chart the original development of
the doctrine of the Trinity from the decades of debate culminating in the Council of
Nicea in 325, through the decades of reflection following the Council of
Constantinople in 381, and closing with the formulation of the Athanasian Creed
some centuries later. The focus here will be not merely on the wording of the
trinitarian statements arising from this period, but also on the concepts associated
with that vocabulary and the theological concerns which conditioned the
development of orthodox doctrine. Although this historical survey will be somewhat
distilled, my aim is to secure an adequate understanding not only of the formal
specification of the doctrine of the Trinity, but also of the constraints placed on its
legitimate interpretation. In so doing, not only will we see how the contours of the
doctrine naturally give rise to paradox, but some indication will be gained as to what
extent the pioneers of trinitarian doctrine were prepared to tolerate paradox within
their theology.
If an orthodox interpretation of the trinitarian creeds does raise acute logical
difficulties, the next question to ask is whether these difficulties have been resolved
in the centuries following their formulation. In the second stage of my analysis,
therefore, I will review various representative contemporary explications of the
doctrine, with a particular focus on those which purport to avoid, in part or in full,
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the charge of paradox or self-contradiction.3 Each treatment will be assessed
according to two criteria: (i) its fidelity to orthodoxy, in light of the conclusions
reached in the first stage, and (ii) its success in avoiding paradoxical formulations of
the Trinity. In addition, a selection of Christian writers who concede that the doctrine
is unavoidably paradoxical will be examined, before drawing some final conclusions
about the present-day status of the trinitarian dilemma.4
2.2 Early Trinitarianism
2.2.1 The Road to Nicea
As most historians have acknowledged, the seeds of trinitarian theology were present
in Christian thought from the earliest times. Leaving to one side the question of the
New Testament witness to the triune nature of God, the established practice of the
church — for example, baptism in the threefold name of God (following Matthew
28:19) and worship directed toward Jesus as 'God' — strongly suggests that at the
heart of newborn Christian faith lay the conviction that Jesus Christ was, in some real
sense, divine.5 Even so, a precise theological formulation of this conviction was
lacking and would not be brought to maturity for several centuries to come.
The first steps towards a definitive trinitarian theology came in response to
various Monarchian teachings arising in the third century. The driving axiom of
Monarchian theology was the numerical unity and absolute sovereignty of God as
required by a robust monotheism. From this axiom it appears to follow with seamless
logic that no substantial distinction can be made between the Father and the Son; for
if Christ is deemed to be God in any literal sense, then he cannot be any other God
3 Of the writing of books on the Trinity, there is no end. The reader should therefore note that my
selection is guided by the relatively narrow remit of this thesis.
4 Due to space constraints, the discussion in this chapter will not incorporate either exegesis of key
biblical texts or analysis of significant contributions to the interpretation of trinitarian doctrine
between the 5th and 20th centuries. I hope that reference to the former will be implicit in my treatment
of the debate among the Fathers, while the latter will be taken into account (again, implicitly) by my
examination of contemporary contributions (most of which are sensitive to, and seek to advance the
achievements of, their historical predecessors). The direct biblical support for a paradoxical doctrine
of the Trinity, and its relationship to the creeds, is discussed in Chapter 7.
5 Jaroslav Pelikan cites various evidences for this, concluding that 'clearly it was the message of what
the church believed and taught that "God" was an appropriate name for Jesus Christ.' He notes that
the strength of this conviction is further underlined by the existence of early docetic heresies. Pelikan
(1971): 173-74. For an exhaustive treatment of early Christian devotion to Jesus, and its foundational
contribution to later doctrinal developments, see Hurtado (2003).
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than the Father (whom all parties agreed was to be identified with the 'Yahweh' of
the Old Testament). Thus Praxeas of Rome and Noetus of Smyrna declared at the
turn of the third century that the Father and the Son were the same person,6 while
Sabellius would later appeal to texts such as Isaiah 44:6 to support the same basic
thesis, albeit with the greater sophistication of allowing for a threefold distinction
between the names and activities of God.7
The response of the church to these teachings is instructive insofar as it indicates
the theological constraints within which trinitarian doctrine would be forced to
develop. Although it may seem obvious, it is important to note that apologists such
as Tertullian and Hippolytus at no point challenged the basic monotheistic axiom of
Monarchian thought; after all, it enjoyed such impeccable support from Scripture and
tradition. Instead, they took a threefold approach to countering Monarchianism. In
the first place, they sought to rebut the ultimate conclusions of their opponents by
appealing to other biblical texts. Pelikan identifies four categories of scriptural
passages which played key roles in the debates over the relation between Christ and
God: passages of adoption (suggesting that divinity was conferred on Jesus by the
Father at some point in time); passages of identity (positing a simply identification of
Christ with God); passages of distinction (supporting a real distinction between the
Father and the Son); and passages of derivation (suggesting that Christ derived his
o
divinity from the Father, perhaps with some subordinationist overtones). The tactic
of the Fathers in refuting the modalism of the Monarchians was to try to meet the
force of the monotheistic texts and the passages of identity with the force of the
passages of distinction and of derivation.9 In short, these theologians challenged the
validity of the modalist inferences, not by questioning their monotheistic premises or
by correcting their understanding of logic but by appealing to the authority of
Scripture — an authority acknowledged at least formally by their opponents.
6
Lonergan (1976): 38, 43.
7
Lonergan (1976): 39; Pelikan (1971): 179.
8 Pelikan (1971): 175.
9 It is commonly acknowledged that overemphasis of the latter led ante-Nicene authors such as
Tertullian and Origen perilously close to ontological subordination, although a charitable assessment
need conclude no more than that further elucidation and precision was required of trinitarian thinking.
Cf. Lonergan (1976): 40-42.
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Secondly, borrowing heavily from Hellenist philosophy, the anti-Monarchians
offered accounts of the ontological relationship between the Father and the Son that
sought to make clear the distinction between them whilst striving to avoid the charge
of 'dividing the monarchy' and thus abandoning biblical monotheism. Tertullian,
whose approach was typical of the ante-Nicene writers,10 spoke of the Son being a
distinct substance 'emitted' from the substance of the Father, but maintained that the
motivating concerns of the Monarchians could be satisfied by emphasising the
intimate union and non-separation of the Father and the Son." Origen likewise
posited the distinct substantiality of the Son, designating him the 'invisible image of
the invisible God' and related to the Father by something akin to Platonic
participation, such that the Son shares the divine nature of the Father. On this
account, thought Origen, the unity of God is preserved.12 Although the proffering of
such ontological models proved effective to a degree, they invariably suffered from
ambiguity and dubious coherence, leading their proponents to fall on occasion into
either self-contradiction or subordinationism. These weaknesses would later return to
haunt the church, most notably in the championing of Origen by the Arians.
Thirdly, the Fathers drew attention to the unpalatable (since patently unbiblical)
implications of the Monarchian position. Thus Tertullian famously wrote that 'in
Rome, Praxeas accomplished two things for the devil: he expelled prophecy and
brought in heresy, drove out the Paraclete and crucified the Father.'13 The line of
reasoning illustrated here is instructive once again: although the Monarchians began
with theologically impeccable premises, their conclusions were heretical; therefore,
argued the Fathers, their inferences — however seemingly logical — could not be
valid.
It thus appears that even in the earliest stages of trinitarian development,
defenders of orthodoxy were struggling with limited success to hold fidelity to
Scripture and tradition together with the demands of logic. And although this first
wave of defence against the Sabellian heresy and its stable-mates was successful up
10
Lonergan (1976): 50.
11 'This conception of the trinity ... is in no way opposed to the monarchy, and it preserves the order
of the divine economy.' Tertullian, Against Praxeas, 7-8; in Roberts and Donaldson (1867), Vol. 3.
12
Origen, De Principiis, I, 2.6; in Roberts and Donaldson (1867), Vol. 4. See also Origen, In Joan., II,
2, quoted in Lonergan (1976): 61.
13 Tertullian, Against Praxeas, 1.
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to a point, the problems raised by inferences from the defining axiom of
Monarchianism would before long arise in a new form, that of Arianism, forcing the
church to an even more sophisticated and nuanced defence of orthodox
trinitarianism.
2.2.2 The Nicene Settlement
The debate over the deity of Christ that eventually culminated in the formulation of
the Nicene Creed was sparked off by the rise of Arianism at the beginning of the
fourth century.14 Arius, a presbyter of the church in Alexandria, had garnered
attention by his controversial teaching that only the Father was truly God, and that
the Son was an ontologically inferior being created by the Father. The details of
Arius's theology and the later arguments of his followers are well documented,13 but
the important point to note here is this: Arius, along the same lines as the
Monarchians, grounded his theology on a perfectly orthodox premise; namely, 'the
affirmation of the absolute uniqueness and transcendence of God, the unoriginate
source (dyevvirroq dp%ri) of all reality.'16 From this premise Arius reasoned that God
(the one whom Jesus called 'Father') could not possibly fully communicate his
divine essence to another being and thus Christ must be less than fully divine: hence
the Logos was demoted to the status of a created being (albeit more than a mere
human) having a beginning in time.
The parallels between the argument of the Arians and the argument of the
Monarchians should not be missed. Both parties began with the orthodox conviction
of absolute monotheism.1' Both parties conjoined this premise with another
uncontroversial theological tenet: for the Monarchians, the affirmation that Christ is
God; for the Arians, the affirmation (previously defended by the a/rh-Monarchians)
14
Kelly (1977): 223; Stead (1977): 223-24.
15
Lonergan (1976): 68-87; Pelikan (1971): 191-200; Kelly (1977): 226-31.
16 Kelly (1977): 227.
17 Moltmann rightly observes that both Sabellianism and Arianism were driven by a commitment to
monotheism, although their strategies for safeguarding this axiom led to different conclusions. The
remarkable conclusion he draws from this is that trinitarians should distance themselves from
monotheism altogether — an approach which involves, so it would seem, rejecting the homoousios of
the Nicene Creed and the unus Deus of the Athanasian Creed. Moltmann (1981): 132-37, 149-50, 189-
90. This radical recommendation smacks of Wittgenstein's ladder, kicked away once it has been
climbed. An uncompromising commitment to monotheism was one of the central components in the
religious matrix of the early Christians, out of which developed the doctrine of the Trinity. See
Hurtado (2003): 29-53.
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that the Son is distinct from the Father. Both came to conclusions which, despite
their logical appeal, were ultimately deemed to be biblically and theologically
unacceptable. The very emergence of these two trinitarian heresies, not to mention
the degree to which their proponents persuaded others of the irresistible logic of their
position, serves as strong evidence that the emerging orthodox doctrine of the Trinity
was faced with the spectre of paradox from the outset. The three basic premises
involved in these formative debates appear to be such that one cannot consistently
1 8
affirm two without denying the third.
Seven years after Arius's influential teaching had first come to light, the Council
of Nicea condemned his view of Christ as heretical, based on the firm conviction that
both Scripture and tradition testified to the full divinity and immutability of the
Logos.19 The rebuttal of Arius consisted of both positive and negative arguments: the
former appealing to scriptural passages supporting the 'consubstantiality' of the Son
with the Father, and the latter refuting Arius's appeal to passages suggesting that the
Son was created by the Father. As I noted earlier concerning the response of the
Fathers to Monarchianism, it is worth remarking here that at no point did the Nicene
authors challenge the basic premises of the Arian theological argument. Both sides in
the debate adhered to a conception of deity as absolute, unique, and indivisible; both
sides held that, in some real sense, the Son was distinct from the Father. What the
Council challenged, on the basis of what they took to be unacceptable conclusions,
was the legitimacy of Arius's inferences from those premises. In short, the overriding
concern of the Fathers was not so much to develop a scrupulously coherent theology
(that was arguably the principle motivation of their opponents)20 but to be faithful to
Scripture and tradition. As a result, the Council resolved to maintain a classical
18
Using formal logical notation, Martinich (1978) sets out with admirable clarity the acute logical
difficulties faced by orthodox trinitarianism in its opposition to both Sabellianism and Arianism; as I
argue below, however, Martinich's proposed solution to the problem is unsatisfactory. For a similarly
clear formulation of the logical problems faced by trinitarians, see Tuggy (2003b).
19
Kelly (1977): 232-33. By this time, the terms 'Logos' and 'Son of God' had become standard
designators for the divine person in Christ as distinct from the Father, and as such were employed with
great effect to interpret and synthesise the four types of biblical passages mentioned previously. Cf.
Pelikan (1971): 191.
20 Thus Kelly describes Arius and his ilk as 'rationalists at heart', while Philip Schaff remarks of
Arianism and Athanasian orthodoxy, respectively, that 'the one made reasonableness, the other
agreement with Scripture, the criterion of truth.' Kelly (1977): 243; Schaff (1910), Vol. 3, Ch. 9,
§123. Cf. Lonergan (1976): 134-35; Hill (1982): 42.
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monotheist view of God in conjunction with an uncompromisingly high christology
despite the apparent logical tension between the two.
Further insight into the logical status of Nicene theology can be obtained by
considering more closely its famous declaration that the Son is 'of the same
substance' (homoousion) with the Father. There has been extensive debate over the
exact meaning of this term, both as employed at the time of the Council and as
interpreted by subsequent defenders of Nicene orthodoxy. A particular concern is
whether it expresses merely a generic identity (such that the divinity of the Son is the
same as the divinity of the Father, just as the humanity of Peter is the same as the
humanity of Paul) or something akin to numerical identity (such that the Son is one
and the same divine being as the Father). The latter view has tradition heavily in its
favour, but has been challenged more recently on the basis of the common usage of
homoousios prior to Nicea (which most frequently reflected the generic sense) and
its technical usage within post-Nicene Christian theological writings (which made
21
use of both senses).
There is legitimate doubt, therefore, as to whether the Nicene Fathers consciously
and unanimously intended for the term to bear the connotation of numerical
identity.22 Nevertheless, it is clear that its employment at Nicea was at the very least
designed to outlaw Arianism and to uphold the full divinity of the Son and his co-
21 See the discussion in Kelly (1977): 234. Kelly expresses some reservations about the traditional
view, but remarks that homoousios 'in the last resort requires' the stronger numerical sense. Pelikan
(1971) and Schaff (1910) both suggest that the original Nicene usage was ambiguous, although Schaff
concurs with Kelly that on theological grounds that it should be (and later was) taken in a sense
connoting numerical identity. Lonergan (1976) contends that while the latter sense is not explicit in
the Nicene statement, it follows implicitly from the theology expressed therein. Gerald O'Collins
expresses little doubt: 'It is clear from the whole tenor of the Nicene Creed that the former meaning
[i.e., numerical identity rather than generic identity] was intended.' O'Collins (1999): 117. Basil
Studer remarks that the term homoousios 'had not been closely defined' at Nicea and suggests that it
was originally intended only to express equality of essence (and thus to uphold Christ's true divinity
against the Arians) rather than unity of essence. This deficiency, however, was remedied by the post-
Nicene theologians with the introduction of the 'mia ousia, treis hypostaseis' formula. Studer (1993):
106, 109-10, 140ff.
22 On the basis of a detailed historical investigation, Christopher Stead concludes that the word does
not signify the triumph of Western theology (which tended toward a stronger view of the unity of the
divine hypostases) over Eastern theology; rather, its original ambiguity made it suitable as a formula
of compromise that could be defended by bishops of either persuasion. Nevertheless, he agrees that
the 'ultimate effect' of the Nicene settlement was to assert 'not merely the equality, but also the
essential unity, of the three Persons.' Stead (1977): 251. One might say, then, that the Nicene Fathers
spoke better than they knew.
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eternality with the Father.23 Moreover, a strong case can be made that in light of the
other theological commitments of the Fathers — namely, their strict adherence to
monotheism, divine simplicity, and divine indivisibility — the Nicene homoousion
ought to be taken to imply something akin to identity of substance between the
Father and the Son if orthodoxy is to be upheld.24 On such grounds as these, Schaff
concludes that
the homoousion ... must be understood as identity or numerical unity of substance, in
distinction from mere generic unity. Otherwise it leads manifestly into dualism or
tritheism.25
Lonergan likewise asserts, on the basis of Athanasius's commentary on the Nicene
declaration, that
the affirmation of a single substance is logically contained in the Nicene decree. ...
Athanasius thus testifies to the fact that the Nicene decree is intended to go beyond the
affirmation of a mere similarity between the Father and the Son, to an affirmation of
identity.26
Now if this understanding of consubstantiality is correct, being demanded by
Christian orthodoxy, then it has direct implications for the paradoxicality (or
otherwise) of the doctrine of the Trinity. For it has long been recognised that the
numerical identity view of the homoousion relation between the Father and the Son
leads to logical perplexities that do not trouble the generic identity view. Given the
predominantly neo-Platonist philosophical atmosphere in which these early doctrinal
debates were played out, to say merely that the Father and the Son share the same
divine 'form' or 'genus' would invite no charge of incoherence; indeed, had it been
considered consistent with biblical monotheism, this solution would have sufficed to
remove the sharpest teeth from the Arian argument (hence the fact that it was not
unambiguously advocated by the Nicene theologians is instructive). In contrast, the
claim that both the Father and the Son are numerically identical with the divine
essence, while yet distinct individuals, is considerably more difficult for a
23 A point reaffirmed by the Council of Constantinople in 381.
24 Further evidence is provided by the fact that the term homoousios suffered more from suspicion of
Sabellian connotations than from suspicion of tritheistic or subordinationist connotations, both at the
time of the council and subsequently. Pelikan (1971): 207-10, 220; Prestige (1952): 222-23; O'Collins
(1999): 117. Eusebius of Caesarea, in particular, was apparently hesitant to accept the term on account
of its potentially modalistic implications.
25 Schaff (1910), Vol. 3, Ch. 9, §127.
26
Lonergan (1976): 95, emphasis added.
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rationalistic mindset to digest. Nonetheless, the insistence of the Fathers on the
97
indivisibility of God, and their frequent charge of 'polytheism' levelled the Arians,
naturally inclined them toward a stronger understanding of consubstantiality, logical
9R
difficulties notwithstanding.
The road to Nicea marked a real progression in the church's understanding of the
triune God as revealed in the biblical witness to Jesus Christ, not least in its
identification of the boundaries of orthodoxy. Still, this increase in conceptual clarity
came at a price, namely, the advocacy of a paradoxical doctrine. As Lonergan
observes,
[The emergence of the Nicene dogma] marks a transition from the mystery of God as
hidden in symbols, hinted at by a multiplicity of titles, apprehended only in a vague
and confused manner in the dramatico-practical pattern of experience, to the mystery
of God as circumscribed and manifested in clear, distinct and apparently contradictory
affirmations.29
2.2.3 The Post-Nicene Fathers
A distinct tendency toward a stronger, paradoxical understanding of the relationships
within the Trinity can be clearly seen in the most prominent of the post-Nicene
writers, beginning with the influential writings of Athanasius. Kelly remarks:
[Athanasius's] theology represents the classic exposition of the Nicene standpoint. As
a Christian thinker he stood in complete contrast to Arius and even to Eusebius of
Caesarea. Rationalists at heart, they started from a priori ideas of divine transcendence
and creation. The Word, they held, could not be divine because His being originated
•from the Father; since the divine nature was incommunicable, He must be a creature,
and any special status He enjoyed must be due to His role as the Father's agent in
creation. In Athanasius's approach philosophical and cosmological considerations
played a very minor part, and his guiding thought was the conviction of redemption.20
Athanasius's primary concern, then, was not to avoid any apparent logical difficulties
in his theology but to be faithful to the theological constraints placed upon him by
preceding Christian orthodoxy regarding the nature of God and Christ's redemptive
work. While his opponents rested heavily on 'philosophical and cosmological
considerations', coupled with seemingly impeccable inferences, Athanasius's greater
27 Pelikan (1971): 199-200.
2SI have not addressed here the post-Nicene debate over homoiousion as an alternative to homoousion;
a debate that, while important in some respects, arguably bears only tangentially on my concerns here.
See Pelikan (1971): 210; Studer (1993): 140-41.
29




commitment was to 'the conviction of redemption' and thus to the strongest
affirmations of Christ's divinity and unity with the Father.
As a consequence of this theological outlook, Athanasius was compelled in his
opposition to the Arian heresy to emphasise that the Son is of the very same
substance and nature as the Father. I have already noted Athanasius's understanding
of the Nicene homoousion, insisting that the identity between the Father and the Son
is stronger than mere generic identity and is tantamount to identity of substance.31
Even so, Athanasius could by no means compromise his equally strong commitment
to a genuine distinction between the Father and the Son, resulting in a considerable
tension within his thought. On the one hand, he insisted that 'the Monad of the
Godhead is indivisible'32 and that 'the Godhead of the Son is the Father's' such that
there is 'identity of Godhead'33 — as clear an indication of numerical unity of
substance as one might hope to find.34 On the other hand, he was also resolutely
opposed to the Sabellian heresy of denying the distinctions between the Father and
the Son.35 With two such seemingly incompatible commitments in his theology, it
comes as little surprise to find Lonergan concluding that although Athanasius derived
his understanding of the consubstantiality relation from various creaturely images
employed in Scripture, when reflecting on the divine homoousion as it truly is, he
31
Prestige (1952): 213-18; Kelly (1977): 245; Hill (1982): 46. It should be noted that Athanasius's
conception of consubstantiality apparently involves more than an identity claim, not least because he
viewed the relation as asymmetric (the Son is homoousios with the Father, but not vice versa). Still,
given how he characterizes the relation, it certainly seems to imply identity of substance.
32 Athanasius, Four Discourses Against the Arians, Discourse 4, 1 -2; in Schaff and Wace (1890), Vol.
4.
33 Athanasius, Four Discourses, Discourse 3, 4.
34 It would be misguided to object that Athanasius could be speaking here only of a generic unity,
since this would suggest that the Godhead is a third entity, an abstract nature distinct from the Father
and the Son in which both participate.
35
E.g., Athanasius, Four Discourses, Discourse 4, 2. Stead offers correctives to both a 'rationalistic'
misreading of Athanasius, which interprets him in line with the 'generic unity' view discussed
previously, and a 'romantic' misreading, 'which represents him as leading an advance towards an
unrestricted view of the unity of the Persons, and as upholding their "numerical identity of
substance"...' Stead (1977): 265-66. Certainly Athanasius's view of the triune unity was not
unrestricted, given his stalwart opposition to modalism. Nevertheless, his characterisation of
homoousion is hard to square with anything weaker than numerical identity. Stead's analysis thus
supports my view that there was a considerable logical tension within Athanasius's trinitarian
theology. If Athanasius did indeed hold to a paradoxical doctrine of the Trinity, then it would not be at
all surprising to find such diametrically opposed misreadings of him.
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conceded that 'there is nothing imaginable in which it can be grasped or
understood.'36
The debate culminating in the declarations of Nicea had been focused on the
divinity of Christ. It was not until afterwards that much thought was concentrated on
the divinity of the Holy Spirit and thus on formulating a full-orbed trinitarian
theology. Athanasius had started the ball rolling with his argument that the Holy
Spirit is also homoousion with the Father.37 His lead was followed and further
developed by the Cappadocian Fathers, to whom I now turn.
It is often remarked in contemporary discussions of the Trinity that the
Cappadocians were the intellectual forebears of modern 'social trinitarians', who
favour the weaker, generic understanding of the unity of the Persons within the
Godhead.38 Such suggestions often rely in great measure on (i) the 'three men'
analogy employed by Gregory of Nyssa, by which he compares the sharing of one
divine essence by Father, Son, and Spirit with the sharing of one human nature by
Peter, James, and John;39 and (ii) a mistranslation of the word koinonia, used
frequently by the Cappadocians to describe the unity of the Godhead, as
'community' rather than the more accurate 'communion'.40
A closer examination of the writings of the Cappadocians in their historical and
philosophical context leads to a different conclusion. In the first place, as Gregory
indicates in the opening paragraphs of Ad Ablabium, the 'three men' analogy
originated not with him but with his opponent, who demands to know how
trinitarians like Gregory can avoid falling into tritheism. Secondly, in discussing the
analogy Gregory takes a rather idiosyncratic view of the commonality of nature
between three human persons, leading him to argue that strictly speaking Peter,






E.g., Brown (1985): 243; Morris (1986): 212; Plantinga (1989): 31-32.
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Gregory of Nyssa, Ad Ablabium (also known by the title 'Not Three Gods'); in Schaff and Wace
(1890), Vol.5.
40 This analysis is argued by Sarah Coakley in an article in which she provides ten textual evidences
against the idea that the Cappadocians can be fairly claimed for the 'social trinitarian' camp. She
concludes that Gregory's trinitarianism, at least, is more in line with the Western, Augustinian
tradition with its stronger expression of identity between the each hypostasis and the one ousia.
Coakley (1999).
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of language.' His understanding of unity-in-plurality is thus not straightforward even
in the creaturely case, let alone the divine case.
Thirdly, the Cappadocians were frank in admitting that their illustrations of the
relationship between the Persons and the Godhead were only approximations to the
truth and did not fully capture the reality of the intratrinitarian relations. Basil of
Caesarea, for example, writes as follows:
Yet receive what I say as at best a token and reflection of the truth; not as the actual
truth itself. For it is not possible that there should be complete correspondence
between what is seen in the tokens and the objects in reference to which the use of
tokens is adopted.41
Significantly, Basil notes that such illustrations, while imprecise, are nonetheless
easier on the mind than more abstract statements of doctrine whose literal meaning is
beyond human understanding:
My argument thus teaches us, even by the aid of the visible creation, not to feel
distressed at points of doctrine whenever we meet with questions difficult of solution,
and when at the thought of accepting what is proposed to us, our brains begin to reel.
In regard to visible objects experience appears better than theories of causation, and so
in matters transcending all knowledge, the apprehension of argument is inferior to the
faith which teaches us at once the distinction in hypostasis and the conjunction in
essence.42
In a similar vein, Basil denies that ordinary arithmetic applies to the persons of the
Trinity such that they can be 'added up' in the way that (say) Peter, James, and John
can be counted as numerically three individuals.43 This is evidently not the case for
contemporary 'social' conceptions of the Trinity.
Finally, like all orthodox (and indeed unorthodox) theologians of their day, the
Cappadocians were firmly committed to the indivisibility and simplicity of God, a
stance requiring a considerably stronger ontological union than that offered by mere
commonality of nature (even when strengthened by emphasising unity of purpose
and activity).44 Thus the trinitarian theology of these Fathers ought to be located
nearer to the paradoxical views of Athanasius before them, and Augustine after them,
41 Basil of Caesarea, Letter 38; in Schaff and Wace (1890), Vol. 8. Some scholars now attribute this
letter to Gregory of Nyssa; its authorship remains a matter for debate.
42
Basil, Letter 38.
43 Basil of Caesarea, On the Spirit, 18.4; in Schaff and Wace (1890), Vol. 8.
44
Prestige (1952): 229, 242-44; Kelly (1977): 268-69. According to David Coffey, the Cappadocians
'had reached the point of realizing that the divine persons were each identical with the single concrete
essence of God' — a conception of divine unity far stronger than that posited by modern social
trinitarians. Coffey (1999): 68.
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than many modern scholars would wish to grant.45 The logical tensions within the
expositions of the Cappadocians, despite their pioneering appropriation of the terms
ousia and hypostasis to explicate the relationship between the One and the Three, is
frankly admitted by Pelikan:
Formulas such as homoousios, three hypostases in one ousia, and mode of origin were
metaphysically tantalizing; but the adjudication of their meaning was in many ways a
defiance not only of logical consistency, but of metaphysical coherence. How, for
example, could the Father be the source of Son and Spirit within the Trinity and yet
fatherhood be a property not only of his hypostasis, but of the divine ousia as such?
Or, to put it in liturgical terms, was the Lord's Prayer addressed only to the hypostasis
of the Father as 'our Father' and the Father of the Son, or to the entire ousia of the
Godhead? Basil's answer to this and to any such difficulty was to declare that what
was common to the Three and what was distinctive among them lay beyond speech
and comprehension and therefore beyond either analysis or conceptualization,46
Athanasius and his Cappadocian successors were representative of doctrinal
development in the East, but among the Western theologians, the tendency toward
paradox in expositions of the Trinity is clearer still. The treatise On the Trinity by
Hilary of Poitiers provides a prime example, in which we find its author striving to
maintain the distinct individuality of the Father, Son, and Spirit, while nonetheless
insisting in the strongest terms on their absolute unity and ontological
interpenetration (perichoresis).47 Hilary's exposition of trinitarian doctrine is not
particularly novel, aligning for the most part with those of Athanasius and Augustine.
Of greater interest are his candid comments on the antagonism between the
orthodoxy he defends and 'human logic', which surely reflect a certain self-
consciousness regarding the paradoxical character of his theology:
The words of the Lord, I in the Father, and the Father in Me, confuse many minds,
and not unnaturally, for the powers of human reason cannot provide them with any
intelligible meaning. It seems impossible that one object should be both within and
45 One notable exception is Noble (1993), who documents Gregory Nazianzen's 'deliberate embracing
of paradox' and argues that this should be seen as 'an expression of his apophaticism'. Gregory states,
for example, that 'Monad is worshipped in Triad, and Triad in Monad — a paradox both in division
and union' (Oration 25.17) and elsewhere prays that 'one illumination may come upon us from the
one Godhead, unitedly divided and dividedly united, which is a paradox' (Oration 28.1). In fact,
Gregory sees two paradoxes in the doctrine of the Trinity: first, that the Three are One; and second,
that the Father as apxp (Origin) and ccixioq (Author) of the Son and the Spirit is the greater of the
three Persons, yet they are nonetheless equal in essence, deity, glory, power, and dignity. Cf. Studer
(1993): 145.
46 Pelikan (1971): 223-24, emphasis added.
47 The notion ofperichoresis or circumincession — the deep mutual indwelling of the Persons of the
Trinity — is also to be found in the Cappadocians, although Hilary's treatment is more developed and
exegetical.
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without another, or that ... these Beings can reciprocally contain One Another, so that
One should permanently envelope, and also be permanently enveloped by, the Other,
whom yet He envelopes. This is a problem which the wit of man will never solve, nor
will human research ever find an analogy for this condition of Divine existence.48
To human logic it may seem ridiculous and irrational to say that it can be impious to
assert, and impious to deny, the same doctrine, since what it is godly to maintain it
must be godless to dispute; if it serve a good purpose to demolish a statement, it may
seem folly to dream that good can come from supporting it. But human logic is fallacy
in the presence of the counsels of God, and folly when it would cope with the wisdom
of heaven; its thoughts are fettered by its limitations, its philosophy confined by the
feebleness of natural reason.49
The last post-Nicene theologian to be reviewed here is Augustine of Hippo, in
whose writings, according to one commentator, the predominant Western
understanding of trinitarian theology found 'its mature and final expression'.50 One
of the first points to acknowledge regarding Augustine's treatment of the Trinity is
that he follows prior Christian tradition in affirming the absolute indivisibility and
simplicity of God; indeed, he is perhaps more explicit and self-conscious in this
regard than any previous writer.51 As such, he was bound to reject a 'generic unity'
view of the relation between the Persons of the Trinity, even though he doubtless
appreciated its appeal in alleviating the logical problems inherent in orthodox
doctrine. The majority of contemporary scholars are therefore comfortable endorsing
the traditional view that Augustine posited numerical identity between each divine
person and the divine essence: a view usually deemed to be paradoxical if not
outright incoherent.53
Nevertheless, like Athanasius before him, Augustine refused to allow his
unwavering commitment both to the unity and indivisibility of the Godhead, and to
the identity of substance between the Persons, to undermine his equal commitment to
the real distinctness of the Persons, as demanded by Scripture and the church:
48
Hilary of Poitiers, On the Trinity, 3.1; in Schaff and Wace (1890), Vol. 9.
49




See, for example, Augustine, On the Trinity, Bk. 1, 4.7; Bk. 7, 1.2; in Schaff (1886), Vol. 3.
Augustine's reliance on neo-Platonic thought at this point, rather than catholic tradition grounded in
Scripture as he professes here, is often overstated. For a re-evaluation of this common reading of
Augustine's trinitarian theology, see Barnes (1999).
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Augustine, On the Trinity, Bk. 7, 6.11.
53
Kelly (1977): 272; Coffey (1999): 68-69; Plantinga (1988): 45-46. David Brown favours a weaker
interpretation of Augustine, primarily on the ground that the numerical identity view suffers from
'complete incoherence'. Even on this more charitable reading, however, he concludes that
Augustine's theology 'bristles with difficulties'. Brown (1985): 243, 301.
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All those Catholic expounders of the divine Scriptures, both Old and New, whom I
have been able to read, who have written before me concerning the Trinity, Who is
God, have purposed to teach, according to the Scriptures, this doctrine, that the Father,
and the Son, and the Holy Spirit intimate a divine unity ofone and the same substance
in an indivisible equality; and therefore that they are not three Gods, but one God:
although the Father hath begotten the Son, and so He who is the Father is not the Son;
and the Son is begotten by the Father, and so He who is the Son is not the Father; and
the Holy Spirit is neither the Father nor the Son, but only the Spirit of the Father and
of the Son, Himself also co-equal with the Father and the Son, and pertaining to the
unity of the Trinity. ... This is also my faith, since it is the Catholic faith."'4
While Augustine infamously expressed a lack of enthusiasm for the word 'person' as
applied to the hypostases,55 and has been charged with modalism for his alleged
overemphasis on the divine unity,56 he is nonetheless forthright in his condemnation
of Sabellianism and in his defence of the distinctness of the Persons, both by
appealing to Scripture and by offering analogies for the diversity-in-unity of the
Trinity.
One final aspect of Augustine's treatment to observe is that the driving motivation
behind his dogged adherence to such a logically awkward set of beliefs is simply
fidelity to Scripture and to received orthodoxy. Much has been made of the influence
of neo-Platonic thought in Augustine's theology, but the fact remains that the earlier
books of De Trinitate, not to mention his earlier writings on the Trinity, are replete
57
with appeals to biblical texts and to the 'Catholic' faith inherited from Nicea.
In my survey of the development of trinitarian orthodoxy, it remains only to
examine the last major classical statement of trinitarian doctrine, the Athanasian
Creed.5S The creed dates to the early fifth century, if not before, and represents the
catholic consensus in the West concerning trinitarian and christological belief.
Despite the name, the theology of the creed is more Augustinian than Athanasian;
indeed, some of its statements are taken almost verbatim from Augustine's De
54
Augustine, On the Trinity, Bk. 1, 4.7, emphasis added.
55
Augustine, On the Trinity, Bk. 7, 6.11.
56 Hamack (1898): 130; Rahner (1970): 17-18.
57 Barnes (1999); Hill (1982): 61. Hill defends Augustine from the charge of modalism and from
being held hostage to neo-Platonism, but still finds his theology to be underdeveloped in such a way
as to render it susceptible to modalist tendencies.
58 The creed is held as an authoritative statement of orthodoxy by Roman Catholicism, Anglicanism,
and most conservative Protestant denominations. The Eastern Orthodox church does not regard the
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Trinitate.59 Its statements regarding orthodox trinitarianism are a model of simplicity
and completeness. But as might be expected given the discussion thus far, many
subsequent readers have found them to be the quintessential expression of a
paradoxical doctrine of the Trinity.60 Its offending statements in this regard read as
follows:
3. And the catholic faith is this: That we worship one God in Trinity, and Trinity in
Unity;
4. Neither confounding the persons nor dividing the substance.
5. For there is one person of the Father, another of the Son, and another of the Holy
Spirit.
15. So the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God;
16. And yet they are not three Gods, but one God.
Statement 3 reflects a commitment to classic monotheism: there is only one deity,
although that one deity exists as a triunity. The fourth statement expresses both a
rejection of Sabellianism and an affirmation of something close to the 'numerical
identity' conception of consubstantiality (consistent with Augustinian thought), while
the fifth statement reinforces the anti-modalist stance. Statement 15 establishes the
full and equal deity of Father, Son, and Spirit.61 Statement 16 denies what would
otherwise be a natural inference from its predecessor taken in isolation, namely, that
there are three deities.62 Thus, the creed carefully rules out three anti-trinitarian
heresies: modalism, subordinationism, and tritheism.
The difficulty of conceiving an ontology in terms of which these statements may
be logically reconciled, while preserving the theological intentions of its authors,
should be apparent.63 Yet this creed is the culmination of a trinitarian orthodoxy
59
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refined through centuries of debate by the premier theologians of the church and
bequeathed to subsequent generations of Christians. In the Athanasian Creed, one
finds the clearest and boldest expression of the trinitarian paradox.
With this focused historical survey complete, it will be appropriate to summarise
the main points established regarding the constraints of trinitarian orthodoxy and
their implications:
(Tl) An orthodox doctrine of the Trinity must uphold biblical monotheism: there can
be only one absolute, transcendent, indivisible, sovereign God. (Hence, all
forms of polytheism should be excluded.)
(T2) An orthodox doctrine of the Trinity must maintain the full and equal divinity of
each of the three persons: the Father is fully God, the Son is fully God, and the
Spirit is fully God. (Hence, all forms of ontological subordinationism should be
excluded.)
(T3) An orthodox doctrine of the Trinity must posit genuine distinctions between the
three persons: the Father is not the same as the Son or the Spirit, and the Son is
not the same as the Spirit. (Hence, all forms of modalism should be excluded.)
(T4) On the one hand, the conjunction of (Tl) and (T2) seems to require that the
consubstantiality relation between the divine persons be construed in terms of
numerical identity rather than generic identity: the Father is identical with, not
distinct from, the one divine ousia (essence, substance, Godhead); likewise for
the Son and the Spirit. This understanding is implicit in the Nicene Creed and
became increasingly explicit in the writings of those who subsequently
defended and expounded Nicene orthodoxy.
(T5) On the other hand, (T3) seems to require that each divine person is numerically
distinct from (i.e., not numerically identical to) each of the other two persons.
(T6) Consequently, any interpretation of the doctrine of the Trinity that seeks to fulfil
requirements (Tl), (T2), and (T3) will be paradoxical, given our natural
intuitions about the concepts employed.
If these conclusions are correct, then trinitarians face an awkward dilemma: an
apparent choice between orthodoxy and clear logical consistency. Still, a number of
contemporary writers have maintained that interpretations of the doctrine of the
26
Trinity are now available which uphold orthodoxy whilst minimising, even
eliminating, any hint of incoherence. In the remainder of this chapter, with the
concerns and presuppositions of those who defined orthodoxy in mind, I propose to
assess these claims.
2.3 Recent Trinitarianism
The last fifty years or so have seen a formidable number of theologians and
philosophers offering defences, explications, and novel interpretations of the ancient
doctrine of the Trinity. Many of these treatments are proffered on the basis that
previous accounts have been lacking in one or more respects, often with regard to
their logical coherence. The implicit or sometimes explicit assumption is that
paradoxical formulations of trinitarian doctrine are inherently unsatisfactory and
therefore in need of conceptual clarification or alteration. In what follows I will
examine some representative and influential contributions to this field, with a view to
determining whether interpretations of the doctrine of the Trinity are now available
which fully uphold the concerns of Christian orthodoxy whilst avoiding any charge
of apparent contradiction; that is, whether the problems faced by the Fathers are now
behind us.
My survey is divided under four headings so as to bring out the common themes
in the interpretations reviewed. (1) Modalistic interpretations of the doctrine of the
Trinity are those that emphasise the ontological unity of the Godhead to the extent
that (so critics argue) they tend unacceptably toward modalism. (2) Social trinitarian
interpretations are those schemes that for the sake of logical consistency eschew the
'numerical identity' understanding of consubstantiality in favour of the weaker
'generic identity' understanding, resulting in a conception of the Trinity as
something like a 'society' or 'community' of divine individuals (albeit one with a
great degree of unity among its members than any creaturely community). Whereas
modalistic interpretations run the danger of lapsing into modalism, social
trinitarianism is often thought to insufficiently distinguish itself from tritheism. (3)
Relative identity interpretations are those that attempt to secure both orthodoxy and
logical consistency by offering an account of the intratrinitarian identity relations that
avoids positing an 'absolute' or 'numerical' identity between each divine person and
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the Godhead by appealing to the notion of 'relative' identity. (4) Finally, I conclude
by reviewing a selection of contemporary authors who admit to holding a
paradoxical interpretation of the doctrine.
2.3.1 Modalistic Interpretations
Credited by many as the most influential theologian of the last century, Karl Barth
has also been criticised for propounding a modalistic doctrine of the Trinity.64 It will
therefore be appropriate to examine his trinitarian theology to determine (i) whether
the charge of modalism is a fair one, and (ii) if Barth avoids falling into heterodoxy,
whether he also avoids paradox.
In my judgement, it should be acknowledged from the outset that Barth is no
modalist in the original, Sabellian sense.65 Barth explicitly rejects modalism as
'heresy', remarking that it 'entails a denial of God' insofar as it denies the existence
of the true God who has revealed himself to us.66 Moreover, this disavowal of
modalism is no empty protest, for Barth clearly affirms that the threefoldness of God
is 'an unimpaired differentiation within Himself which is 'irremovable and ...
ineffaceable'67 — an affirmation no third-century Sabellian would be prepared to
echo. His rationale for insisting on the immanent reality of this threefold distinction
follows from his belief that the triunity of God is bound up in his self-revelation. For
Barth, if God's unity is to be upheld then he must be identified not only with his act
of revelation but also with the effect of that act: the one God is thus at once
'Revealer', 'Revelation', and 'Revealedness'.68 Yet it is just this identification that
secures the reality of his inner differentiation, Barth maintains, for such distinctions
are no less real than the distinction between the subject, object, and predicate
involved in the very concept of 'revelation'.69
Why then should Barth have attracted the label of 'modalist' (or the slightly less
damning 'modalistic')? The main reason for the charge comes from Barth's
unhappiness with the term 'person' applied to the divine hypostases. He maintains
64 Most notably in Moltmann (1981): 139-44.
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66 Barth (1975): 368,382.
67 Barth (1975): 299, 361.
68 Barth (1975): 296, 299.
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that personality, in the modern sense of the term, 'belongs to the one unique essence
of God' and therefore to ascribe personality to each hypostasis would imply 'the
70
worst and most extreme expression of tritheism'. For Barth, then, God is strictly
speaking one person and it is therefore theologically safer to speak of God as
existing in three 'modes (or ways) of being'.71
This denial of three personalities, subjectivities, or consciousnesses in God has
prompted some writers to complain that Barth's doctrine of the Trinity contradicts
the testimony of the New Testament and undermines the economy of salvation that
Barth himself affirms. Even if these criticisms have weight, however, it is not
altogether clear that the orthodox creeds require that personality (in the modern
sense) be ascribed to each of the divine persons. For this reason, it cannot be said
72with confidence that Barth is less than credally orthodox.
Given that Barth's explication of the unity and the plurality of the Godhead falls
within the limits of orthodoxy, the question remains as to whether it also avoids any
apparent inconsistency. Insisting as he does on the simplicity of God and the identity
of substance between Father, Son, and Spirit,73 as well as their real differentiation,
Barth would seem hard-pressed to escape the charge of paradox in his trinitarian
theology. Indeed, he appears to admit as much:
The great central difficulties which have always beset the doctrine of the Trinity at this
point apply to us too. ... We, too, are unable to say how in this case 3 can really be 1
and 1 can really be 3. ... None of the terms used, whether it be essence or mode of
being or relation of origin, whether it be the numeral 1 or the numeral 3, can
adequately say what we ought to say and are trying to say in using it. If we pay
attention only to what the terms as such can say in their immanent possibility of
meaning; if we are unwilling or unable to accept the indication they are supposed to
give, we shall only cause ourselves endless vexation.74
Barth thus concedes that while the opposing heresies of tritheism and modalism must
be avoided at all cost, steering a 'middle course' means that the 'mysterium trinitatis
remains a mystery.' Against those who might be tempted to rationalise this mystery,
Barth warns that there can be 'no question' of doing so, for 'rationalisation is neither
70 Barth (1975): 350-51.
71 Barth (1975): 355.
72 Alan Torrance goes further in his defence of Barth, drawing attention to affirmations of
interpersonality in his trinitarian theology, such as his discussion of 'mutual knowing' within the
Godhead and his exposition of the 'perichoretic "fellowship"'. Torrance (2000): 82.
73 Barth (1975): 350.
74 Barth (1975): 367.
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theologically nor philosophically possible here.'75 Barth's treatment of the doctrine
of the Trinity provides further support for the notion that on this issue, one must
choose between heterodoxy and paradox.
The second most influential contemporary trinitarian theology to be labelled
'modalistic' is that of Karl Rahner.76 Rahner criticises Barth for suggesting that we
abandon altogether the word 'person' in our formulations of trinitarian orthodoxy,
but he nevertheless concurs with Barth's warning that its modern connotations, if
77carried over into the doctrine of the Trinity, would lead to tritheism. He therefore
recommends the expressions 'relative concrete ways of existing' and 'distinct
manners of subsisting' as more theologically precise and less prone to misleading
■JO
inferences. It is this uneasiness with speaking of 'one God in three persons', and his
denial of 'three centres of consciousness and activity' in the Godhead, that have led
critics to categorise Rahner's view as modalist or neo-modalist.79
In Rahner's case, however, the charge of outright modalism appears to be even
less warranted than when laid at Barth's door. Rahner quite clearly wishes to
emphasise the reality of the threefold distinction within God and thus to distance
orv
himself from Sabellianism. On this count, then, one would be hard-pressed to
maintain that Rahner falls beyond the boundaries set by the Nicene and Athanasian
Creeds. He is careful to avoid modalism and meticulous in his eschewal of tritheism.
The question, however, is whether his middle course directs him into the path of
paradox.
Like Barth, Rahner acknowledges that if tritheism is to be excluded then the
consubstantiality relation must be construed as something far stronger than mere
generic identity, lest the 'absolute unity' of the Godhead be compromised. As we
have seen, however, this presents him with an acute logical problem insofar as he
wishes to maintain the real distinctness of the hypostases — a problem Rahner
openly acknowledges. He therefore presents a 'negative defence' of this 'basic
logical difficulty' following from the Thomistic approach of construing the divine
75 Barth (1975): 368.
76 Rahner (1970).
77 Rahner (1970): 42-44, 56-57.
78 Rahner (1970): 74, 109.
79 Moltmann (1981): 144-48; Hill (1982): 145; Plantinga (1988): 39.
80 Rahner (1970): 38.
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persons as relations: specifically, as the 'opposed relations' by virtue of which the
threefold differentiation arises.8' From this vantage point, Rahner argues that the
divine persons should be treated as 'relative realities' rather than 'absolute realities'.
The crucial difference between these two species of reality is just this: while
identifying each of two absolute realities with a third would entail the identity of the
first two, it is possible for two relative realities (such as the Father and the Son) to be
identical with an absolute reality (such as the Godhead) without being 'really
identical' with each other. By making this crucial distinction, Rahner believes, the
charge of formal contradiction can be deflected.82
Does Rahner's strategy relieve him from having to admit to a paradoxical doctrine
of the Trinity? While his distinction enables him to avoid formal contradiction — as
indeed any formal contradiction may be dissolved by positing a distinction on those
terms that give rise to the inconsistency — it is far from clear that Rahner renders the
identity relations within the Godhead logically unproblematic. The problem, in a
nutshell, is that the distinction introduced here is no less formal than the
contradiction it serves to remove. As Stephen Davis has noted, it is far from clear
how Rahner's 'relative reality' differs from an 'absolute reality' (i.e., our standard
notion of an individuated entity).83 Neither is it clear how the identity relation
obtaining between a relative reality and an absolute reality differs from our basic
concept of numerical identity — except, of course, that it conveniently exhibits the
lack of transitivity required to avoid a contradictory doctrine of the Trinity! Rahner's
defence smacks of special pleading, amounting as it does to little more than the
question-begging insistence that the laws of logic which apply to everything else in
our experience should not be applied to the persons of the Trinity. As such, this
proposal does not carry us very far along the path of paradox elimination — a fact
that Rahner seems to concede, as this later caution about the relational view of the
hypostases indicates:
81 Rahner (1970): 68-69.
82 Rahner (1970): 72.
83 Davis (1983): 139-40.
This relationality should not be considered first of all as a means for solving apparent
logical contradictions in the doctrine of the Trinity. As such a means, its usefulness is
quite restricted.84
I conclude that Rahner's trinitarian theology no more avoids the problem of paradox
than of Barth. Although both treatments of the doctrine of the Trinity scrupulously
avoid the heresies excluded by the creeds, in favouring the stronger interpretation of
the homoousion relation — correctly, if my earlier conclusions hold — both face
logical difficulties that their advocates cannot fully resolve. In the next section, I turn
to consider several authors who prefer a weaker construal of homoousion in order to
allow a more obviously consistent interpretation of the doctrine of the Trinity.
2.3.2 Social Trinitarian Interpretations
The motivation to find an interpretation of divine triunity that avoids any hint of
paradox is far more evident with so-called 'social views' of the Trinity than with the
modalistic views just examined (a fact evidenced not least by the willingness of
Barth and Rahner to concede a residue of apparent contradiction). A typical example
comes from an article by Cornelius Plantinga, Jr.85 Plantinga begins by correctly
noting that 'many of the church's central doctrinal claims have traditionally been
stated in ways that look paradoxical or else mysterious in some other way', the
doctrine of the Trinity being a pre-eminent example. For this reason, he suggests,
'the attempt to work out a relatively coherent account of major doctrinal claims ...
O r
ranks high on the agenda of traditional systematic theology.'
Plantinga locates as the object of his analysis the formulation of the doctrine
expressed in statements 15 and 16 of the Athanasian Creed:
15. So the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God;
16. And yet they are not three Gods, but one God.
This formulation, he remarks, 'is a statement of daunting ambiguity and paradox.'87
He then proceeds to distinguish three options for interpreting these statements: (1)
the 'standard Western Latin' option, which he attributes to Augustine; (2) the
84 Rahner (1970): 103.
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'modalist' option; and (3) the 'social view' option. He rightly defends Augustine
against the charge of modalism, recognising that Augustine clearly acknowledged the
scriptural affirmations of real plurality within the Godhead and in so doing carried on
'the Johannine tradition of referring to Father, Son, and Spirit as wholly divine
oo
entities yet distinct.' However, Plantinga considers it unfortunate that Augustine
complicated this biblical view of the Trinity with the doctrine of simplicity, the
consequence being that Augustine is forced to say that each divine person is identical
OQ
with the divine essence. These two trinitarian tenets, Plantinga argues, are logically
incompatible:
The proper conclusion on the first option, I believe, is that it is impossible to hold. The
threeness part of it is biblical and plausible; the oneness part of it is both implausible
and unbiblical, and is, in any case, inconsistent with the threeness part. ... To say [that
each divine person is identical with the divine essence] is to say something both
unbiblical and — because self-contradictory — necessarily false.90
Plantinga thus takes the view that Augustine's doctrine of the Trinity is paradoxical
and, moreover, that it is mistaken for just that reason.
Dealing relatively briefly with the second option, Plantinga rightly notes that
modalist theories, which 'reduce three divine persons to modes or roles of one
person', are incompatible with both orthodox dogma and the New Testament witness
regarding the interrelation between Father, Son, and Spirit.91
Having rejected the first option as inconsistent and the second as heterodox,
Plantinga turns to the third option in the hope that this will prove immune to both
ailments. Recognising that this view requires a weaker, generic understanding of the
homoousion relation, such that the divine essence is taken to be a set of attributes
fully possessed by each divine person rather than a substance with which each person
is identical, Plantinga also admits that such a view has been historically susceptible
to the charge of tritheism. He therefore proposes various ways of bolstering the
social model of the unity between the persons, specifically by highlighting the
88
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89 Whether the doctrine of simplicity was the primary motivation for Augustine's conclusions is
debatable, but even so, Plantinga's characterisation of Augustine's conclusions is uncontroversial.
More significantly, Plantinga overlooks the fact that Augustine's commitment to the notion of divine
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familial relationships between the members of this divine community and the notion
that the personal essences (i.e., those three distinct natures which individuate the
divine persons) unify just as much as the generic essence by ensuring that the three
92'relate each to the other two in unbroken, unbreakable love and loyalty.'
Even with these qualifications in place, the question still arises as to why
Plantinga's scheme should not be thought tritheistic, since it remains that the social
view posits three numerically distinct divinities. Plantinga therefore considers how
the Athanasian Creed's denial of 'three Gods' should be understood according to
advocates of the social view:
We could mean any or all of three things: (1) If God is used as the peculiar name of
the Father, as much of the New Testament uses it, then Father, Son, and Spirit are all
divine persons, but there is only one fount of divinity, only one Father, only one God
in that sense of God. (2) Or suppose God is the name of the divine essence, as it is in
much Latin Christianity; then there are three divine persons but only one generic
divinity, one divinitas or deitas, one Godhead, or Godhood, or Godness — only one
God in that sense of God. Or (3), following Augustine's usage, we could say that God
is the designation of the whole Trinity. Without falling for Augustine's simplicity
program, we could then mean by the Athanasian formula that the Father is a divine
person, the Son is a divine person, and the Holy Spirit is a divine person; yet there are
not three ultimate monarchies, but only one, the holy Trinity.93
Let us first observe that what Plantinga, or any other social trinitarian, means by the
phrase 'not three Gods' is much beside the point in the present context, unless one is
prepared to embrace a postmodernist free-for-all on credal interpretation. The
question at hand is whether the creed as intended and understood by the Fathers is
compatible with Plantinga's social view of the Trinity. It is fairly clear that on
examination each of Plantinga's suggested readings fall short.
While the monotheism of the creed's formulators no doubt involved the belief that
there is but one 'fount of divinity', Plantinga's reading (1) requires a conspicuous
equivocation between statements 15 and 16 of the creed, for neither the Son nor the
Spirit are to be identified with the 'fount of divinity'. Reading (2) raises an
immediate question: why would anyone want to deny that there is one divine
essence, one generic divinity? Surely countering such a bizarre idea was not an
immediate concern of those wishing to delineate trinitarian orthodoxy. A similar






Trinities — a troublesome heresy in Christian circles during the fourth and fifth
centuries? If so, it has gone unrecorded.
The fundamental inadequacy of Plantinga's suggested readings of the Athanasian
Creed may be brought out in two ways. The first is to recall the Augustinian origins
of the creed. Its authors were almost certainly thinking in terms of what Plantinga
dubs the 'standard Western option' and thus would have rejected outright these
weaker readings of statements 15 and 16 along with the degree of ontological
distinctness between the divine persons that such readings aim to accommodate.
Secondly, Plantinga's approach simply fails to do justice to the two small words 'and
yet' with which the sixteenth statement begins.94 This phrase reflects a strong logical
connection between this statement and the previous one, the thought being that
statement 16 serves as an important qualification to statement 15. Read in isolation,
the first of the two statements might naturally lead one to think that the creed speaks
of three ontologically distinct beings, each of which is divine', the second statement,
however, is intended to immediately scotch such an inference as heterodox. This
crucial grammatical and conceptual connection between the two statements renders
inadmissible the degree of equivocation in the term 'God' that Plantinga needs to
introduce, and thus, when read carefully and in its historical context, it is hard to
avoid concluding that the Athanasian Creed effectively outlaws the social
trinitarianism championed by Plantinga.
A second example of social trinitarianism in contemporary philosophical theology
is provided by Richard Swinburne.95 By far the greater proportion of Swinburne's
works are devoted to the rational defence of Christian theism. Part of that project, as
Swinburne understands it, is to rebut charges of incoherence against the Christian
conception of God by explicating it in ways that are (as best one can tell) logically
and metaphysically harmonious. In keeping with this general programme, Swinburne
unashamedly opts for a view of the Trinity as a unique group of divine individuals:
three distinct persons each possessing the full set of attributes required for divinity.
He spends many pages explaining just how it can be that multiple divine beings
could still enjoy such traditional attributes as necessity and omnipotence, not to
94 Latin, et tamen: otherwise translatable as 'even so', 'however', or 'nevertheless'.
95 Swinburne (1994).
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mention spelling out the metaphysics of generation (of the Son by the Father) and
procession (of the Holy Spirit by the Father and the Son), even going to far as to
develop an argument for why there should be specifically three divine individuals.
As far as I can tell, Swinburne's trinitarian model is indeed logically consistent.
However, my concern is not whether his interpretation of the doctrine of the Trinity
succeeds in avoiding paradox, but whether that interpretation is faithful to the
demands of orthodoxy. In the course of his exposition, Swinburne directly addresses
this question, first by considering how the credal statement 'there is only one God'
ought to be understood:
If 'there is only one God' meant 'there is only one divine individual', then the doctrine
of the Trinity would be manifestly self-contradictory. So clearly Church councils in
affirming both must have understood 'there is only one God' in a somewhat subtler
sense — since no person and no Council affirming something which they intend to be
taken with utter seriousness can be read as affirming an evident contradiction. What in
denying tritheism, the view that there are three Gods, were Councils ruling out? I
suggest that they were denying that there were three independent divine beings, any of
which could exist without the other; or which could act independently of each other.96
Unfortunately, Swinburne provides no historical evidence for what he takes to be
'clearly' the case, namely, that the Fathers shared the same rationalistic mindset as
certain 20th-century philosophers of religion. As my earlier survey indicated, the
situation is not nearly so straightforward as Swinburne's effortless deduction
suggests. Even if the Fathers took 'there is only one God' to mean 'there is only one
divine individual', it is rather doubtful that they would have found themselves guilty
of flagrant self-contradiction, since their unwavering concern to uphold a robust
biblical monotheism would have inclined them even less to speak of three 'divine
beings' or 'divine individuals' in the sense that Swinburne recommends.97 While the
original formulators of trinitarian orthodoxy were careful to avoid explicit
contradiction (i.e., stating that something both is and is not the case), they held to a
far stronger notion of God's unity and indivisibility than Swinburne is inclined to
grant them — so much so that the most prominent post-Nicene theologians naturally
inclined toward saying that each divine hypostasis is numerically identical with the
divine ousia. In contrast to their Arian and Sabellian opponents, the orthodox were
96 Swinburne (1994): 180.
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less concerned with avoiding charges of implicit contradiction or irrationality than
with defending the theological boundaries prescribed by Scripture and tradition.
Swinburne also attempts to reconcile his social model with the credal
identification of each divine person with 'God', suggesting that it should be
understood 'simply as the claim that each is divine — omnipotent, perfectly good,
98etc.' He argues that the Greek and Latin words for 'God' (Geoq and deus) are
ambiguous in a way not evident from the English translation, such that the one word
can be used in either a predicative sense (i.e., 'divine') or a referring sense (i.e.,
'God'). 'Given this ambiguity,' Swinburne writes,
it is not implausible to read the creeds as asserting that three divine individuals (in my
sense) together constitute one God (in my sense). The creeds are less paradoxical in
Greek or Latin than their English translation makes them."
Swinburne's proposal certainly removes the paradox. But even granting this
ambiguity at the individual word level, it by no means follows that Christians are
therefore at liberty to choose whichever sense suits their own theological agendas.
The meanings of the credal statements are not as flexible and indeterminate as
Swinburne seems to suggest: the immediate literary, historical, and theological
contexts of those statements also bear crucially on their proper interpretation — and
we have seen that those contexts support a meaning quite at odds with Swinburne's
preference. Moreover, it is evident throughout his discussion that Swinburne's
guiding hermeneutical criterion is the notion that the authors of the creeds could not
have meant to affirm anything that would appear logically problematic. As he writes
in the conclusion of his discussion:
I derived the traditional formulas by reading the deus (0eoq), which the Father, Son,
and Spirit are each said to be, differently from the deus (Geoq) which is used when it is
said that there are not three dei but one deus. Unless we do this, it seems to me that the
traditional formulas are self-contradictory.100
The idea that evident logical consistency trumps all other considerations when
interpreting the theology of the creeds is dubious, to say the least. I have already
noted not only that the writings of the Nicene and post-Nicene Fathers favour an
interpretation of homoousios which leads to the trinitarian paradoxes that Swinburne
98 Swinburne (1994): 181.
99 Swinburne (1994): 182.
100 Swinburne (1994): 186.
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is so keen to avoid, but also that the Fathers themselves simply did not manifest the
kind of rationalistic concerns that would warrant a hermeneutic such as this.
The upshot is that Swinburne's weaker interpretation of the credal denial of
tritheism faces the same objections as Plantinga's: although necessary to
accommodate his own agenda, it fails to square with the theological outlook of those
who formulated the creeds (and thus with the original intention of their affirmations
and denials). No doubt various interpretations can be attached to the key terms of the
Nicene and Athanasian Creeds so as to permit a theology that posits three
numerically distinct divinities, none of which is numerically identical to 'God'; but
unless that interpretation aligns with the authorial intentions of the Fathers (insofar as
we can reconstruct them from surviving documentary evidence) the notion of credal
orthodoxy becomes altogether worthless.101
The third social trinitarian interpretation I propose to consider is that of David
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Brown. Brown devotes a chapter of his work The Divine Trinity to a defence of the
coherence of the doctrine of the Trinity, focusing on what he takes to be, historically
speaking, the two most reputable interpretations of the doctrine. The first he labels
the 'Unity Model' (UM), which he ascribes to Augustine and Thomas Aquinas; the
second he dubs the 'Plurality Model' (PM), for which he takes the Cappadocians,
especially Gregory of Nyssa, to be representative. Brown summarises the basic
difference in outlook of the two models thus:
UM may be characterised as the belief that what is ultimately a unity, the Godhead, is
also fundamentally a trinitarian plurality; PM as the belief that what is fundamentally
a trinitarian plurality is also ultimately a unity in the Godhead.103
It is not entirely clear how Brown means to distinguish between the two qualifiers
'ultimately' and 'fundamentally', but the idea seems to be that the approach of the
Unity Model is to begin with a conception of the Trinity as a metaphysical unity and
then to consider how this unity may be further understood as a plurality, while the
101 One might argue that since the Athanasian Creed is so problematic, and does not command the
level of ecumenical assent enjoyed by the earlier creeds, it should simply be jettisoned (or at least
revised). Cf. Tuggy (2003a): 454. If my earlier conclusions are correct, however, then the line of
paradox was crossed well before this venerable creed was composed. In any case, the triple of errors
excluded by the Athanasian Creed — modalism, subordinationism, tritheism — must still be avoided
by any trinitarian theology worth its salt.
102 Brown (1985). See also Brown (1989b).
103 Brown (1985): 243.
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approach of the Plurality Model is to start with a conception of the Trinity as a
metaphysical plurality before turning to explain how this plurality may be also
thought of as a significant unity.104
In his assessment of the Unity Model, Brown focuses on Augustine's theology,
noting that Augustine explicitly rejects the notion that the relation between the divine
essence and each divine person should be construed in terms of 'genus' or 'species'.
Even so, he suggests that Augustine himself did not write consistently on whether he
took this relation to be one of numerical identity or the weaker notion of
constitution,105 Believing as he does that the former view is altogether incoherent,
Brown charitably takes Augustine to be committed only to the weaker construal of
consubstantiality.106 Nevertheless, his final assessment is that UM 'bristles' with
conceptual problems to the degree that a defence of its coherence is all but
impossible.107
Brown's defence of the coherence of the Plurality Model, on which he grounds his
hopes for a rationally tenable doctrine of the Trinity, follows the same basic
approach as Plantinga. On this view, the persons of the Godhead are 'essentially and
permanently distinct' individuals.108 Indeed, the term 'person' is to be understood in
something like the modern psychological sense: the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit
should be thought of as 'three distinct centres of consciousness, each with its own
distinctive mental content.'109 Brown recognises that while PM avoids the logical
problems that plague its rival, its greatest challenge is to turn aside the theological
104 There is some ambiguity here as to whether these two models differ merely in terms of
epistemological priority or also in terms of a corresponding metaphysical priority. It certainly seems
that our thinking about the Trinity must at any one time proceed either from the unity to the plurality
or vice versa, but it does not follow that one must thereby affirm a corresponding metaphysical
priority in the Trinity. It is possible for one to hold that neither the unity nor the plurality of the
Godhead is 'more ultimate' than the other. Cf. Coffey (1999): 25. If this is the correct position to take,
then the paradoxicality of the doctrine of the Trinity is all too apparent.
105 Brown (1985). Put crudely, this latter relation reflects something like the idea that the Father, Son,
and Holy Spirit are constituted by the same 'divine stuff. A contemporary defence of the coherence
of the Trinity mounted along similar lines will be considered shortly.
106 Brown (1985): 243, 291. As my earlier historical survey suggests, I would take issue with Brown's
analysis on three points: (i) the understanding of homoousios required to uphold the concerns of
orthodoxy; (ii) the claim that the Cappadocians were the forefathers of the social model; and (iii) the
alleged ambiguity in Augustine's view of the consubstantiality relation. Brown seems inclined to
employ the same hermeneutic as Swinburne in interpreting early expressions of trinitarian theology.
107 Brown (1985): 301.
108 Brown (1985): 280.
109 Brown (1985): 244,289.
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charge that it amounts to tritheism. Thus, like Plantinga, he accepts the burden of
showing that a unity between the divine persons can be identified which allows us to
speak of 'one God' in an intelligible and religiously adequate way.
One cannot help but admire Brown's candidness in his treatment of this difficulty.
He concedes that, if the Plurality Model is correct, then strictly speaking it would be
accurate to speak of the Trinity as being 'three gods' — although such frank
expressions should be avoided when dealing the 'ordinary layman'!110 His case for
harmonising PM with Christian monotheism involves arguing that the superlative
degree of intimate relation and mutual comprehension between the divine persons is
sufficient to sanction talk of'a single reality, the Godhead'.111 Furthermore, evidence
from anthropology and sociology supports the coherence of a notion of 'group
consciousness' which, in cases of communities enjoying a high degree of intimacy
112
and union, can assume primacy over the individual consciousnesses of members.
Although space forbids a full critique of Brown's trinitarian theology, this brief
exposition should be sufficient to show that while evading the charge of incoherence,
his conception of divine unity no better staves off the spectre of tritheism than
Plantinga or Swinburne. As Brown's own admissions suggest, his trinitarian
theology diverges significantly from the theological sentiments and concerns of those
whose thinking shaped the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds.
Indeed, the expositions of these three contemporary writers bring out clearly the
essential inadequacy of all social trinitarian interpretations, inasmuch as they weaken
the ontological unity within the Godhead to the point where a collapse into tritheism
is unavoidable. After a rigorous examination of the various strategies available to
advocates of social trinitarianism, Brian Leftow concludes that the prospects for
defending such a view against heterodoxy are bleak:
110 Brown leans heavily on his interpretation of the Cappadocians in defending the orthodoxy of the
Plurality Model, an interpretation that I have challenged. Even so, Brown acknowledges that none of
these Fathers would countenance talk of 'three gods' — a fact that sheds further doubt on whether,
given the 'degree of logical rigour' in their discussions, they truly represent the PM position. Brown
(1985): 276, 293.
111 Brown (1985): 293.
112 This line of defence is elaborated in Brown (1989b), where the author concludes that while
consciousness is still to be attributed to the individual persons of the Trinity, se/f-consciousness is
better thought of as residing in the Godhead as a whole. The fact that Brown feels obliged to speak of
the Godhead 'as a whole' further distances him from the mindset of the Fathers.
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[0]ne basic problem for ST [i.e., social trinitarianism] is showing that it is a form of
monotheism, and I have examined three broad ways ST's friends have tried to show
this. 'Trinity' and 'group mind' monotheist moves try to treat the sum of the Persons
as the 'one God' of the Creed. I have argued that these moves denigrate the Persons or
are unorthodox even on ST's reading of the Creed. ST's third strategy is functional
monotheism. I have raised a variety of problems for this; my overall claim has been
that merely functional monotheism is not enough for Christian purposes. So if my
arguments are sound, it is not clear that ST can be orthodox or truly monotheist."3
I concur with Leftow's assessment. The besetting problem of social trinitarianism
interpretations is that their advocates pay mere lip service to Christian monotheism.
All will argue that in some sense they can affirm that 'there is only one God'. But as
Daniel Howard-Snyder notes, 'academic trinitarians cannot mean whatever they like
when they insist that they are monotheists.'114 The proper interpretation of the creeds
is constrained both by grammar and by historical context; and as such, they demand a
commitment to monotheism that social trinitarian interpretations, however
sophisticated, simply cannot satisfy.115
2.3.3 Relative Identity Interpretations
It should be evident from the foregoing discussion that the logical difficulties faced
by the doctrine of the Trinity boil down to a question of identity, specifically, how to
interpret the identity claims in statements such as 'the Father is God' and 'the Son is
God'. If one interprets such statements in terms of numerical identity, with a concern
to uphold monotheistic convictions, then it is hard to avoid either modalism or
paradox; and if one interprets them in terms of mere generic identity, with a view to
preserving the ontological equality but genuine distinctness of the divine persons,
then the spectre of tritheism looms large. What is needed here, so it would seem, is a
via media: some other kind of identity relation that could be used to express the
113 Leftow (1999): 249. Dale Tuggy raises a separate, but closely related, problem. On any normal
understanding of the terms, being a deity or divinity entails being a person; yet according to Plantinga,
Swinburne, and Brown, God is not a person but a community of persons. It thus follows that God is
not a deity or divinity — a conclusion both counterintuitive and hard to reconcile with Scripture.
Tuggy (2003b). Elsewhere, Tuggy mounts two 'biblical-moral' arguments against social trinitarian
interpretations, to the effect that if social trinitarianism is true then God was deliberately deceptive in
his (or rather their) self-revelation in the Old and New Testaments. Tuggy (2004). I highlight some of




Howard-Snyder puts the historical point particularly well. 'After all, when the early Christians
were accused by their Jewish contemporaries of being polytheists, they responded by insisting that,
like their accusers, they too affirmed that there exists exactly one God. They agreed with them. What
they agreed to was what the Jews themselves believed, that there exists a certain number of Gods, and
that that number is one.' Howard-Snyder (2003): 402. Cf. Leftow (1999): 236-37.
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doctrine of the Trinity in a formally consistent way yet without falling into either
modalism or tritheism. In this section, I consider two approaches that purport to
dissolve the paradox of the Trinity by appealing to the notion of 'relative' identity.
The first, and more straightforward, of these approaches has been presented with
admirable clarity by A. P. Martinich."6 Martinich begins by framing the problem
presented by the Christian doctrine of the Trinity and quickly dismisses metaphysical
solutions such as those offered by modalistic and social trinitarian interpretations:
All theologians understand that the central problem involving the mystery of the
Trinity is to explain the possibility that there is one God but three persons in God
without falling into contradiction. Many, if not most, contemporary theologians who
write about the Trinity believe that the key to the solution of this problem lies in
adequately analyzing one or more of the concepts of a person, a nature, a substance, or
God, or in constructing some new concept, say, that of "persons in community" or "a
society of persons." ... Worse, such discussions mislocate the source of the problem,
which is that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are somehow identical and yet not
identical. As the notion of identity is generally construed, this is incoherent no matter
how "person," "nature," or what-have-you is analyzed."7
Statements typically taken to express the core claims of the doctrine, such as those of
the Athanasian Creed, 'seem to form an inconsistent set' and as such are
'paradoxical' when interpreted according to standard first-order logic."8 According
to Martinich, this explains how heresies such as Arian and Sabellianism gain rational
support, for 'if faced with the alternatives of being a heretic and asserting a
contradiction, the rational person will always choose heresy and trust himself to the
mercy of God.'119 If self-contradiction is to be avoided, it seems one or more of the
statements of orthodoxy must be denied: thus Arianism rejects the claims that 'the
Son is God' and 'the Spirit is God', while Sabellianism rejects the claims that 'the
Father is not the Son or the Spirit' and 'the Son is not the Spirit'.120
Martinich's proposed solution to this trinitarian dilemma, with its apparent choice
between rationality and orthodoxy, is to interpret the credal identity statements in
terms of relative identity as opposed to absolute identity. In general, a relative
identity claim always takes the qualified form lA is (or is not) the same O as B\
116 Martinich (1978).
117 Martinich (1978): 169.
118 Martinich (1978): 170.
119 Martinich (1978): 172.
120 The 'irrational' solution of denying that the laws of logic apply to God, or to our doctrine of God,
Martinich dismisses as inexcusable.
42
where O is a sortal term — that is, a term designating a particular kind of thing.
Examples of such claims would include 'Cicero is the same man as Tully' and 'Mars
is not the same planet as Venus'. Moreover, Martinich wishes to go further by
insisting that there is no really such thing as absolute identity, since the meaning of
an identity claim of the form 'A is the same as B" is indeterminate until the particular
respect in which A and B are said to be identical is specified. As such, 'there is no
bare self-identity' and thus 'numerical identity is a fiction'.121
Once this position is taken, a solution to the trinitarian problem immediately
presents itself, for the 'indeterminate' identity claims of the creeds can be expanded,
as explicit statements of relative identity, without any formal contradiction: the
Father is the same God as the Son, but the Father is not the same person as the Son,
and so forth. Thus, argues Martinich, abandoning the misguided notion of absolute
identity (along with a few dispensable logical principles which go hand in hand with
it) enables the orthodox trinitarian to deflect with ease the arguments of the Arian
and the Sabellian.
Martinich's proposal for avoiding paradox is elegant and appealingly simple, but
must ultimately be judged untenable, both on philosophical and historical grounds. In
the first place, his rejection of absolute (i.e., numerical) identity is highly
controversial, inadequately supported, and philosophically problematic. Martinich's
cavalier dismissal notwithstanding, the reality of absolute identity — roughly, the
notion that the world is constructed of distinct things such that each thing is the same
thing as itself and no other thing — has considerable intuitive support, such that a
defence of the rationality of orthodox trinitarianism built upon its denial will hardly
attract widespread acceptance. Moreover, Martinich does little more than assert that
non-relative statements of identity are always semantically underdetermined; in
comparison, persuasive arguments have been proffered in defence of absolute
identity. David Wiggins argues that the relativity of identity is inconsistent with
Leibniz's Law, which in turn undergirds the principle of substitutivity, according to
which natural inferences such as the following are valid: 'Cicero denounced Catiline;
Cicero is identical to Tully; therefore, Tully denounced Catiline.'122 Martinich
121 Martinich (1978): 175.
122 Wiggins (2001): 24-28.
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openly admits that his scheme requires one to abandon these logical principles, but
the counterexamples he raises against them can be satisfactorily explained without
recourse to relativizing the identity relation.123 Frederick Doepke contends that our
concept of absolute identity is a necessary precondition of our capacity to individuate
objects in the world.124 Michael Rea, meanwhile, has recently argued that a denial of
absolute identity goes hand in hand with an anti-realist metaphysic, according to
which the distinctness of objects in the world is not independent of our thoughts
about them but depends on the way in which we 'carve up' the world by our
theorizing about it (such that alternate theories will lead to different ontological
inventories).125 Metaphysical anti-realism is not every philosopher's cup of tea, but
for an orthodox Christian its implications are simply intolerable: it would follow that
the very existence of the Trinity depends on our theorizing about the Trinity, thus
turning the Creator-creature dependence relation on its head.
In my judgement, Martinich's solution faces insurmountable philosophical
objections. Yet even if it were philosophically defensible, his proposed interpretation
of the orthodox creeds is quite untenable. The modern distinction between absolute
and relative identity was certainly not familiar to the Christian theologians of the
fourth and fifth centuries; if it had been readily available to them, it is reasonable to
suppose they would have evidenced that by disambiguating any identity statements
of the creeds which they viewed in a relative, and not absolute, sense. As my earlier
historical survey indicated, however, the authors of the creeds appear to have
understood those identity claims in precisely the paradoxical fashion that Martinich
finds so unpalatable.
Relative identity interpretations such as Martinich's are clearly too radical a
means of circumventing paradox, but perhaps a more plausible appeal to relative
identity can be found nearby. Michael Rea has helpfully distinguished between
'pure' and 'impure' strategies for defending the doctrine of the Trinity via relative
identity.126 Both strategies propose that the crucial identity and distinctness claims
123 See the treatment in Wiggins (2001): 34-50.
124
Doepke (1996): 191-92. Richard Swinburne argues similarly in his assessment of Peter van
Inwagen's relative-identity interpretation of the doctrine of the Trinity. Swinburne (1994): 13-16, 187-
88.
125 Rea (2003).
126 Rea (2003): 437-38.
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required by the doctrine of the Trinity be interpreted as relativized identity and
distinctness claims (e.g., 'the Father is the same God as the Son' yet 'the Father is
not the same person as the Son') rather than as absolute ones. However, while the
pure strategy involves an outright denial of absolute identity, the impure strategy
does not. The weighty objections to solutions that employ the pure strategy (such as
Martinich's) have already been rehearsed. The weakness of the impure strategy, on
the other hand, is that taken alone it offers an incomplete solution to the problem; for
by remaining neutral on the question of whether absolute identity exists, it does not
adequately rule out polytheism. After all, the doctrine of the Trinity involves a clear
affirmation of monotheism: that there is numerically exactly one God. It seems that
the trinitarian must therefore deny that the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are
numerically distinct, which is to say, he must affirm that they are absolutely
(numerically) identical — and thus that there really is such a thing as absolute
1 97
identity. All this is to say that advocates of the impure strategy for dissolving
paradox cannot simply dodge the question of whether absolute identity exists and, if
it does, whether it holds between the divine persons: whichever way they choose to
jump, they need to provide some plausible metaphysical account of the identity
relations within the Trinity according to which one can meaningfully say 'there is
only one divine being' (contra polytheism) but also 'the Father is distinct from the
Son' (contra modalism).128
It so happens that Rea, in collaboration with Jeffrey Brower, believes that there is
just such an account.129 The context for their proposal is the infamous philosophical
problem of material constitution. Consider a statue made of bronze; let the statue and
the lump of bronze be labelled 'Athena' and 'Lump', respectively. Intuitively, we
would want to say that there is only one object here, for Athena is just the same thing
as Lump. Thus, if one wanted to purchase the statue, one would not expect to have to
pay twice: once for the statue and again for the lump of bronze. According to
Leibniz's Law, however, ifA is identical to B then whatever is true of A must also be
true of B; in which case, if Athena could be destroyed by melting then Lump could
127 It is for this reason that the proposal in Van Inwagen (1988) must be judged inadequate, given its
agnosticism on the question of whether absolute identity exists. Rea (2003): 438-41.
128 Rea (2003): 441-42.
129 Brower and Rea (2004). (Subsequent page numbers refer to a pre-publication online version of this
paper, available at http://www.nd.edu/~mrea/papers.html.)
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also be destroyed by melting. Yet common sense also tells us that after melting, it
would be correct to say Athena no longer exists but that Lump remains. Is Athena
identical to Lump or not? Depending on which intuitions we privilege, different
answers follow.
No particular solution to this metaphysical conundrum has attained universal
acceptance. Brower and Rea recommend an Aristotelian solution according to which
there exists a unique and irreducible relation, distinct from absolute identity, which
they call 'accidental sameness without identity'. On this view, Athena is not
absolutely identical to Lump (and thus violations of Leibniz's Law are avoided) but
stands in the relation of accidental sameness to Lump. In general, this relation holds
between a 'hylomorphic compound' (i.e., a form-matter complex, such as a statue or
a horse) and the material or 'stuff of which it is constituted. It is a relation of
'sameness' because one may properly say that the statue is 'the same as' the lump of
bronze; and it is 'accidental' because the latter might have existed without the former
1 T/V
existing (and could continue to exist after the former has been destroyed). The
'form' of a hylomorphic compound is only contingently instantiated by its 'matter'.
On this scheme, one must be careful how one goes about counting things.
Counting is normally taken to proceed in terms of absolute identity: A and B count as
one object just in case A is absolutely identical to B. If there is such a relation as
accidental sameness, however, then our enumerative method will depend on what it
is we take ourselves to be counting (i.e., what sortal we are employing). Specifically,
when counting 'material objects' we should proceed in terms of accidental sameness
and not absolute identity: A and B count as one material object just in case A is
accidentally the same as B. Thus while Athena and Lump are distinct, they only
count as one material object (which seems intuitively correct).
How does this bear on the coherence of the doctrine of the Trinity? Brower and
Rea suggest that some metaphysical relation akin to accidental sameness holds
between the divine persons and the divine essence:
[Ljike the familiar particulars of experience, the Persons of the Trinity can also be
conceived of in terms of hylomorphic compounds. Thus, we can think of the divine
essence as playing the role of matter; and we can regard the properties being a Father,
130 Brower and Rea (2004): 6-9.
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being a Son, and being a Spirit as distinct forms instantiated by the divine essence,
each giving rise to a distinct Person.
As in the case of matter, moreover, we can regard the divine essence not as an
individual thing in its own right but rather as that which, together with the requisite
'form', constitutes a Person. Each Person will then be a compound structure whose
matter is the divine essence and whose form is one of the three distinctive Trinitarian
properties. On this way of thinking, the Persons of the Trinity are directly analogous to
particulars that stand in the familiar relation of material constitution.131
Clearly the relation in question cannot be accidental sameness itself, for it would
follow that each divine person exists only contingently; rather, it should be thought
of as something like 'essential sameness without identity'. In this way, both relations
can be considered species of a more general relation of 'numerical sameness without
identity' — a relation such that if it holds between A and B then A and B are distinct
and yet can be treated as numerically one. So according to the authors' proposal, the
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are distinct (i.e., not absolutely identical) and yet they
are all the same God; hence, there is numerically one God (since the sortal 'God'
functions like 'material object') and monotheism is saved.
Brower and Rea claim that their solution 'seems to us to be the most
132
philosophically promising and theologically satisfying solution currently on offer.'
It is certainly ingenious and I am inclined to agree with their bold claim. Explicating
the homoousios relation in terms of 'numerical sameness without identity' offers an
attractive middle path between generic identity (which invites tritheism) and absolute
identity (which invites modalism). Nevertheless, it still faces some serious, perhaps
even fatal, problems. In the first place, the Aristotelian solution to the problem of
material constitution, to which their trinitarian model appeals, is controversial in its
own right. The authors admit that the notion of numerical sameness without identity
is initially 'hard to swallow', but counter that every solution to the problem is
counterintuitive. This may be true; however, it remains that defending the coherence
of the Trinity by positing a sui generis metaphysical relation on analogy with another
counterintuitive metaphysical relation smacks of explaining a mystery with a
mystery. Moreover, one wonders how much disanalogy can be admitted before the
argument is weakened beyond all plausibility. Is it really appropriate to think of each
131 Brower and Rea (2004): 20.
132 Brower and Rea (2004): 23.
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divine person as consisting of some kind of 'immaterial stuff?133 And doesn't the
very idea of a constituting substance that can take on multiple 'forms' suggest at
least the potential for alternative instantiations? Such would be at odds with the
essentiality of God's triunity (which Brower and Rea are careful to affirm); yet if this
'divine stuff is not susceptible to counterfactual instantiations, the analogy with
matter is rather questionable.134
A further difficulty arises with respect to the mw/fi-personality of the Godhead.
Even if one is prepared to grant that a statue can be distinct from a lump of clay
while also being the same material object, it seems obvious that three statues cannot
be distinct from a lump of clay and distinct from one another whilst all being one and
the same material object.135 Yet according to the Brower-Rea model, 'person'
functions analogously to 'statue' and 'God' functions analogously to 'material
object'. If three distinct statues cannot be one and the same material object, the
appeal to analogy would suggest that three distinct persons cannot be one and the
same God.
Finally, it is difficult to know just what the proper name 'God' or 'Yahweh' is
supposed to identify on this proposal. In the Athena-Lump scenario, according to the
authors, a definite description such as 'the material object' is ambiguous and
indeterminate as it stands; it must be disambiguated as either referring to Athena or
to Lump.136 Yet when Christians make general statements about 'God' (e.g., 'God
exists' or 'God is good') the term is not normally intended to refer to one of the
divine persons and not the other two. On the other hand, if 'God' is taken to refer to
the divine essence, it is hard to make sense of claims that a non-personal 'immaterial
stuff can be omnipotent, omniscient, all-good, all-merciful, and so forth.
Instinctively one would like 'God' to mean something like 'the Deity' or 'the
133 Brower and Rea (2004): 20. It is worth noting that a number of key figures in the development of
trinitarian doctrine — Origen, Eusebius of Caesarea, Athanasius, Hilary, and Basil — maintained that
the divine ousia, and thus the homoousios relation, should not be understood on analogy with material
constitution, as if it were some kind of 'divine stuff. Lonergan (1976): 60, 89-91; O'Collins (1999):
119.
134 After all, the logical independence of matter as such from its potential forms is arguably one of its
most distinctive properties.
135 Cf. Wiggins (1968); Oderberg (1996).
136 Brower and Rea (2004): 16.
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uniquely divine being'; but on this view, there is no such thing in any determinate
sense.
Given these difficulties, I must conclude that the scheme presented by Brower and
Rea does not offer an adequate resolution to the logical problem of the Trinity. The
fact that it comes closer than any alternative solution, yet still falls short, perhaps
tells us something about the intractability of trinitarian paradox.
2.3.4 Concessions to Paradox
In this final section, I draw attention to a number of contemporary writers whose
treatments of the doctrine of the Trinity appear to concede its inherent paradoxicality.
For brevity's sake, I do not propose to discuss in detail the Trinitarian theology of
each writer; in keeping with the narrow focus of the chapter, my purpose here is
simply to draw attention to their concessions to paradox and their rationales for so
doing.
Stephen Davis's Logic and the Nature of God provides a particularly telling
example of such a stance. As an analytic philosopher standing in the Protestant
tradition, Davis offers his monograph as a defence of the coherence of the Christian
conception of God. Like Swinburne, Davis is not reluctant to adopt less traditional
and more controversial interpretations of Christian doctrines where such
interpretations best suit his aim of avoiding logically problematic descriptions of
God. On this basis he rejects the traditional doctrines of divine immutability and
necessary goodness, for example, and advocates a kenotic model of the Incarnation.
Even so, when he finally comes to examine the doctrine of the Trinity, Davis not
only notes its 'inherently paradoxical character' but also resists the temptation of
137
advocating either a modalistic or a social trinitarian interpretation. He expresses
dissatisfaction with the proposals of Rahner and Martinich, considered above, before
concluding that the doctrine is a 'mystery' — to be carefully distinguished from a
real contradiction, but nonetheless deemed 'an apparent contradiction which there is
good reason to believe'.138 In short, Davis is forced to concede that the orthodox
137 Davis (1983): 132.
138 Davis (1983): 141.
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doctrine of the Trinity is a paradox, though he maintains that can be rationally
1 "JQ
believed nonetheless.
A second example comes from David Coffey, who has provided a book-length
treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity in which he aims to do justice both to the
New Testament expressions of the triune nature of God and also to the orthodox
creeds.140 His own contribution to the vast literature on this subject is particularly
notable for seeking to combine insights from the Western and Eastern traditions in
order to provide an ecumenical resolution to the debate over the filioque clause. In
dealing with the Threeness-Oneness problem, Coffey endorses the standard
Augustinian-Thomist approach of understanding the persons of the Trinity as
'subsistent relations'. On this view, while the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are each
identical with the divine substance, they are distinguished at root by their opposing
relations toward one another. In order to uphold the simplicity and essentiality of the
divine nature, furthermore, these relations must be thought of as identical with the
persons and thus with the divine substance itself.141
Coffey's starting point for addressing the problem is thus that 'in God there are
one absolute and three relative subsistences.'142 From this he reasons that, if we
understand 'personhood' as something communicated (like the other divine
attributes) from the Father to the Son and to the Spirit, we should think of God as
being 'one absolute and three relative persons' — a result he considers sufficient to
reconcile 'the one person of God of the Old Testament with the three persons of the
New.'143 Even so, it is another question whether this explication of the Trinity is free
from paradox. As with Rahner, Coffey avoids formal contradiction by employing an
'absolute/relative' distinction, but he concedes nevertheless that
there is no known philosophical principle that can be used to integrate absolute
personhood and relative personhood in God in a single vision. All we can do is to
proceed on the basis of the negative principle that they are not contradictory.144
139 As it turns out, Davis's defence of paradox, though far less developed, is similar in direction to the












In other words, although we can state that our conception of the Trinity is not
contradictory, we are at a loss to specify or explain just how it is not contradictory.
Coffey later confirms the merely formal adequacy of his Thomistic distinction by
admitting that it fails to 'bestow positive intelligibility on the situation under
consideration.'145 The point is clear: while we are able to introduce distinctions in
order to avoid literal contradiction, we must admit that we have effectively no grasp
of how these distinctions cash out in metaphysical terms. Hence any attempt to
conceive a concrete state of affairs in which all the orthodox statements regarding the
Trinity are true is bound to lapse into paradox.
William Hill, who takes a similarly conservative stance to Coffey in his concern
to uphold Catholic orthodoxy and tradition, is even more forthright about the
presence of paradox within his historical and theological exposition of the doctrine of
the Trinity.146 In his account of the historical development of credal trinitarianism, he
reaches similar conclusions to those I presented earlier: the Arian heresy was
'rationalistic in doing away with apparent contradictions'; Athanasius came to see
that the Godhead must be 'numerically one in concrete being or essence
(homoousiosy; and the Cappadocians conceived of the divine oneness not merely in
terms of three substances sharing an abstract nature but as 'a matter of ontological
identity on the level of ousia.,]47
Hill's own interpretation of the Trinity, set out in the final chapters of his book,
aims to be faithful both to this tradition and to the developments that followed in
Augustine and Aquinas. Accordingly, he chides social trinitarians for downgrading
the unity between the divine persons to the level of generic, rather than numerical,
identity.148 Hill's straightforward admission that such a stance inevitably results in
paradox is evident from the following passages:149
The Scylla and Charybdis of trinitarianism are modalism on one side and
subordinationism on the other. ... There is, after all, no dead center here; no theology
entirely succeeds in holding the two horizons in focus at once, and the most that seems
possible is a dialectical move of the mind shuttling between the two, maintaining a




147 Hill (1982): 43,46, 48-49.
148 Hill (1982): 218.
149 Hill (1982): 235,256, 269.
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[T]he Christian theologian is aware at the very outset ... that the reality of God is at
once One and Three. Thus, any critical dealing with this paradox (which has no
parallel in the phenomenal order) calls for the mind to distinguish what faith confesses
as in reality beyond all such distinction.
[The notion of 'appropriation'] is a language device of believers that seeks in a
paradoxical way to suggest the personal identity of the members of the Trinity, but
one that has always functioned in tradition. [Such a device] violates to a degree the
logic of ordinary discourse ...
In a now familiar fashion, Hill maintains that formal contradiction can be avoided by
means of introducing distinctions, but nonetheless all attempts to flesh out the
content of those distinctions by drawing from our immanent experience lead to
seeming violations of logic.
The three contemporary trinitarians considered above are not the only writers to
concede that their desire to stay unambiguously within the bounds of orthodoxy leads
them into paradoxical discourse regarding God's triune character. I have already
noted the admissions from Barth and Rahner regarding the logic of trinitarian
theology. Similar concessions, both explicit and implicit, can be adduced from the
writings of other conservative Christian thinkers.150 For those who do not consider
the Christian theologian to be bound by a yoke of rationalism, obliged to formulate
every cardinal doctrine with perspicuous logical consistency, there is little doubt
about the paradoxicality of the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity.
2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter I have sought to examine the question of whether the Christian
doctrine of the Trinity, interpreted in an orthodox fashion, is paradoxical in the sense
that its metaphysical affirmations appear to be logically contradictory. I proceeded in
two stages. In the first, I surveyed the historical development of the orthodox
doctrine of the Trinity, as expressed particularly in the Nicene and Athanasian
Creeds, reaching the conclusion that these definitive statements of orthodoxy appear
to be logically inconsistent when interpreted in a way faithful to the theological
intentions of those who originally formulated those statements.
This result was further confirmed by the conclusions of the second stage of my
investigation, in which I examined a selection of contemporary interpretations of the
150 Baillie (1961): 142-44; Van Til (1974): 229-31; Lonergan (1976): 92-93; Torrance (1994): 87, 121-
22, 142; Torrance (1996): 172-73; Cunningham (1998): 7-8.
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Trinity from writers for whom alignment with orthodoxy is a significant concern. In
fact, I suggest that if the doctrine of the Trinity were to be placed in the dock and
charged with the crime of apparent contradiction, nearly all of the writers I have
considered might profitably be called as witnesses for the prosecution (regardless of
their own views on the guilt of the defendant). By tacitly dividing the witnesses into
two groups — those whose trinitarianism properly observes the boundaries of credal
orthodoxy and those whose trinitarianism does not — an astute counsel for the
prosecution could effectively play off the testimonies of the former against the
testimonies of the latter in order to secure a conviction. For what one invariably finds
is that the former are accused of paradox or self-contradiction by the latter (and, as I
have noted, are often prepared to concede the point), while they themselves accuse
the latter (for whom the avoidance of paradox is paramount) of deviating from
orthodoxy.
As the debate stands today, no writer from the first century to the twenty-first
century has offered an explication of the doctrine of the Trinity that is both clearly
orthodox and free from apparent contradiction. It seems that the careful theologian
inevitably faces a dilemma: that of embracing either paradox or heterodoxy. In the




3 The Paradox of the Incarnation
3.1 Introduction
In the last chapter, I examined the claim that the traditional Christian doctrine of the
Trinity is paradoxical; the conclusion reached was that its metaphysical affirmations
indeed appear to be logically inconsistent. Adherents of the doctrine are thus
presented with a dilemma: either the doctrine must be abandoned in favour of some
revised (but unorthodox) interpretation, or else its paradoxicality must be accepted
and the awkward questions that follow regarding the rationality of believing it must
be squarely faced.
The doctrine of the Trinity is by no means the only article of Christian faith to
have been charged with being paradoxical or outright incoherent; the doctrine of the
Incarnation, no less central to the church's witness, has been likewise summoned into
the dock to defend its logical credentials. The very idea that God — an eternal,
infinite, immortal, transcendent spirit — could become a human being — a temporal,
finite, mortal, material creature — is one that seems prima facie impossible, if not
altogether absurd. Secularists and theological liberals have made much hay from the
apparent conceptual problems inherent in the traditional doctrine,1 while a good
number of conservative believers have conceded that such difficulties defy rational
explanation, some going so far as to suggest that this should be reckoned a virtue
rather than a vice. Kierkegaard famously held that the Incarnation was the 'absolute
paradox' of the biblical religion.2 In similarly superlative terms, Donald Baillie
considered the doctrine to be the 'supreme' and 'central' paradox of the Christian
faith.3 Philip Schaff conceded that the biblical teaching on the person and nature of
Jesus Christ 'cannot be exhaustively set forth by any formulas of human logic.'4
1
See, for example, Martin (1991): 125-46; Hick (1977).
2
Kierkegaard (1962): 46-67.
3 Baillie (1961): 106, 110.
4 Schaff (1910), Vol. 3, Ch. 9, §142.
55
Evidently the idea that this central Christian doctrine defies rational penetration
enjoys some considerable sympathy and thus merits close examination.
In this chapter, I therefore ask the same questions of the traditional Christian
doctrine of the Incarnation as I asked previously of the doctrine of the Trinity. What
are the boundaries of orthodoxy for interpreting the defining claims of the doctrine?
Is it possible to affirm an orthodox doctrine of the Incarnation whilst avoiding any
apparent contradiction in one's affirmations? In short, is the Christian faced here
with a similar dilemma to that presented by the doctrine of the Trinity, to wit, a
choice between paradox and heterodoxy?
As before, my investigation will proceed in two stages. In the first, I chart the
development of the doctrine of the Incarnation in the early church, beginning with
the definitive affirmations of the Councils of Nicea and Constantinople regarding the
divinity of Christ, following through the christological debates which culminated in
the Council of Chalcedon, and concluding with a review of the Athanasian Creed. As
before, my historical survey will be concerned not merely with the wording of the
doctrinal statements arising from these decades of debate but also with the key
theological concerns which motivated those statements and provide the context for
their proper interpretation. Having thus identified the boundaries of orthodoxy, I will
review a selection of contemporary treatments of the doctrine of the Incarnation, with
a particular focus on those expositions developed as responses to the charge of
incoherence. Each one will be assessed with respect to (i) its theological acceptability
in light of the conclusions reached in the first stage, and (ii) its success in avoiding
paradoxical formulations of the Incarnation.5
5 As in the previous chapter, my treatment will not incorporate either exegesis of key biblical texts or
discussion of significant contributions to the interpretation of christological doctrine between the 5th
and 20th centuries. I trust the reader will accept that such factors are acknowledged at least implicitly
in my treatment of the christological debates within the early church and in my critique of
contemporary interpretations of the Incarnation (the most influential of which have been self¬
consciously formulated as defences, refinements, or replacements of their historical predecessors).
The direct biblical support for a paradoxical doctrine of the Incarnation, and its relationship to the
creeds, is discussed in Chapter 7.
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3.2 Early Christology
3.2.1 The Road to Chalcedon
With the formation of the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed, a line had been drawn in
the sand regarding the divinity of Jesus Christ, the Son of God. The Son was declared
to be homoousion or 'consubstantial' with the Father; that is to say, the divine
essence, by virtue of which the Father is God, is also fully possessed by the Son.
Consequently, whatever may be truly said of the Father qua God may likewise be
truly said of the Son. This historic statement of Christian orthodoxy would inevitably
serve as the baseline for the subsequent debates within the church regarding the
nature of the Incarnation.6 However, although the Nicene decree had settled the issue
of the divinity of the Son of God, the question of the precise relationship between the
human and the divine in Jesus Christ remained open. Since the first issue is logically
prior to the second, and was the more pressing given the various aberrant views
being propounded at the time, this is understandable. Nevertheless, it was inevitable
that once the absolute divinity of Christ had been established as a non-negotiable
article of faith, it would only be a matter of time before the implications for his
humanity would have to be considered and clarified.
The aphorism that orthodoxy owes a debt to heresy is no less apt for the doctrine
of the Incarnation than for the doctrine of the Trinity. Just as the controversy
culminating in the Council of Nicea was sparked off by the controversial teaching of
Arius, so the heated debate prior to the Council of Chalcedon was precipitated in the
first instance by the teaching of Apollinarius.7 To be fair, Apollinarius had not
brought something entirely novel to the theological table; rather, he was merely
working through the logical implications (as he saw it) of a certain framework for
understanding the Incarnation, one already incipient in the christological writings of
several bastions of orthodoxy.
6 That this proved to be so is evidenced by a common complaint made by each of the parties in the
subsequent christological debates, namely, that their opponents were deviating from Nicene




Kelly dubs this christological framework the 'Word-flesh' view and identifies
o
Athanasius, that champion of Nicene trinitarianism, as its classic representative.
This view, associated with the Alexandrian school, tended toward seeing Jesus Christ
as the divine Logos inhabiting a human body. Accordingly, we find Athanasius
writing that the Word of God 'fashioned His body for Himself from a Virgin'; the
Logos 'takes unto Himself a body, and that of no different sort from ours' and
'prepares the body in the Virgin as a temple unto Himself, and makes it His very own
as an instrument, in it manifested, and in it dwelling.'9 Consistent with this tradition,
in which the Logos is treated as the sole centre of consciousness, Athanasius could
comfortably speak of one and the same Word as performing miracles, suffering on
the cross, and expressing ignorance of the date of the Parousia. Nonetheless, he was
careful to qualify those statements attributing human weakness and mortality to the
Word as applying to him only 'in the flesh' and not in his divine nature.10 Convinced
that the divine Logos could not truly lack knowledge of any matter, Athanasius
argued that Christ's professions of ignorance were effectively feigned; he was
speaking as a man, that is, as any normal human in his position would speak.11
It should be clear from this summary of Athanasius's christology that it is open to
an obvious line of criticism. While scrupulous in avoiding any denigration of Christ's
divinity (as evidenced by his insistence that the Word remained omnipresent and
continued to uphold the universe during his incarnation), he is rather more liberal in
his willingness to play down his humanity. This problematic imbalance of the Word-
flesh framework was never worked through to its logical conclusions by Athanasius,
perhaps due to the restraining influence of his commitment to the biblical data.
However, the same degree of moderation cannot be attributed to his friend
Apollinarius of Laodicea.
Apollinarius arguably took the Alexandrian perspective to its logical endpoint in
his declaration that the 'man' Jesus of Nazareth was merely a human body animated
by the divine Logos. On this model, the Word effectively substituted for an absent
8
Kelly (1977): 284. Kelly's analysis is based on the influential work by Grillmeier (1965).
9
Athanasius, On the Incarnation ofthe Word, 18.5, 8.2, 8.3; in Schaff and Wace (1890), Vol. 4.
10 'But these affections were not proper to the nature of the Word, as far as He was Word; but in the
flesh which was thus affected was the Word...' Athanasius, Four Discourses Against the Arians,
Discourse 3, 55; in Schaff and Wace (1890), Vol. 4.
''
Athanasius, Four Discourses, Discourse 3, 42ff.
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12human soul. For Apollinarius, this position was the only one consistent with three
theological convictions: (i) the full divinity of Christ as demanded by Nicene
orthodoxy; (ii) the unity of Christ's person; and (iii) the a priori impossibility of the
fullness of deity and the fullness of humanity residing in one person.13 (The last of
these axioms, as we shall see, arose again in connection with other christological
heresies.) Apollinarius and his followers were careful to posit the closest possible
connection between Christ's divinity and his human flesh, such that they were keen
to affirm along with other Alexandrian thinkers the communicatio idiomatum: the
principle that the names and attributes of divinity may be properly applied to Christ's
flesh and vice versa.14 Nevertheless, his unambiguous teaching concerning the extent
to which Christ may be considered 'human' caused a furore and invoked a host of
criticisms. The chief objections to Apollinarius's christology concerned its denial of
a rational soul in Christ (an essential component, so it was argued, of genuine
humanity) and its failure to properly uphold the human psychology of Christ as
presented in the Gospels.
It is fair to say that the driving force behind such criticisms was fundamentally a
soteriological concern: if Jesus Christ were less than truly human, as Apollinarianism
seemed to imply, then how could he serve as the redeemer of humanity?15 As
Gregory of Nazianzus famously put it, 'What has not been assumed cannot be
restored; it is what is united with God that is saved.'16 The immediate question,
however, was an anthropological one — what is it to be human? — albeit one whose
answer carried the gravest soteriological implications.
Apollinarianism served to bring the 'christological problem' into sharp relief. The
Cappadocians recognised early on the theological errors invited by this extreme
variety of Alexandrian thought and sought to counter it with a precursor of the
Chalcedonian 'two natures' formula, so as to emphasise that whilst Jesus Christ was
fully divine, he was also fully human. Gregory of Nazianzus declared that the
incarnate Word possessed 'two natures (5uo xi/byeu;) concurring in unity'; at the
12
Kelly (1977): 292; Pelikan (1971): 248.
13
Kelly (1977): 290, 296; Schaff (1910), Vol. 3, Ch. 9, §136.
14 Sellers (1953): 142.
15 Sellers (1953): 166-67. It is only fair to note, however, that Apollinarius's position was also driven
in part by soteriological concerns. Studer (1993): 194.
16
Gregory of Nazianzus, First Letter to Cledonius\ quoted in Kelly (1977): 297.
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same time, he was careful to insist that Jesus Christ was not thereby two persons, but
one.17 Still, despite availing himself of this useful distinction Gregory exhibited a
tendency to speak of these two natures being 'fused' or 'mixed' within one
individual (a turn of phrase that would later be considered misleading if not
altogether heterodox). Moreover, like Athanasius before him, Gregory was evidently
uncomfortable with directly attributing human experiences to the Logos, preferring
instead to explain away such phenomena as Jesus' childhood learning. Although
these problems would have been more naturally dealt with by ascribing a human
mind or soul to Christ (distinct from his divine mind or soul), at no point did Gregory
of Nazianzus resort to such a solution.
In contrast, rather more credit is given to the New Testament statements about
Christ's humanity in the writings of Gregory of Nyssa. While likewise distinguishing
between a divine nature and a human nature, Gregory resisted the tendency of his
namesake both to combine and confuse the two natures and to play down the reality
of Christ's human experiences.18 By keeping Christ's two natures separate, Gregory
thought it legitimate to ascribe those experiences only to his humanity and thus to
avoid the theologically unacceptable conclusion that the immutable, impassible God
had suffered on the cross. On the same basis, he held that one should identify both a
divine will and a human will in Jesus. Moreover, unlike others in the Alexandrian
tradition, Gregory was even prepared to speak of a human soul in addition to the
divine Word. As such, he could go so far as to describe the Incarnation in terms of
God entering into a man (not merely a human body); at one point, for example, he
refers to Jesus as 'the Man in whom [the Only-begotten God] tabernacled, taking to
Himself humanity in completeness.'19
Gregory's christology marks the furthest point of reaction in the Alexandrian
school away from the extreme of Apollinarianism. The predominant christological
matrix in this period was that of the Word-flesh framework, with its resistance to
positing a human soul in Christ and a concomitant reluctance to take at face value the
biblical statements regarding Christ's human psychology and limitations. It was thus






Gregory of Nyssa, Against Eunomius, 5.4; in Schaff and Wace (1890), Vol. 5.
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Theodore of Mopsuestia, to redress the balance by promoting a 'Word-man'
christology over against the Word-flesh approach of the Alexandrians. This
contrasting view unashamedly affirmed Christ's possession of a human soul, which
functioned alongside the divine 'soul' of the Logos. The basic argument for such a
view was straightforward, arising as it did from dissatisfaction with the reductionist
tendencies of the Alexandrians: the New Testament speaks of Jesus as having
distinctly human experiences (of suffering, ignorance, temptation, etc.); a divine
mind or soul could not, by its very nature, be the subject of such experiences; ergo,
Jesus must have also possessed a human soul to serve as the bearer of those
experiences. Given this Word-man scheme, in which the Logos is conjoined with the
fullness of humanity, body and soul, it is hardly surprising to observe the popularity
of the metaphor of indwelling among the Antiochene theologians. Thus, according to
Theodore, God the Son 'assumed' and 'indwelt' the man Jesus of Nazareth, uniting
himself with that one man and accomplishing his redemptive purposes through
him.20
By its very design, the Word-man framework was far better equipped to
accommodate the reality and comprehensiveness of Christ's humanity. But the price
to pay was the awkward question of whether it adequately preserved the unity of his
person; and the Alexandrians were all too eager to point to the grammar of a
21
christology of 'indwelling' in order to dismiss it as heterodox. Theodore was
evidently aware of this difficulty, straining as he did to point out that Scripture itself
emphasises the unity of the two natures by often attributing to Christ 'as a whole'
what properly belongs only to his divinity or his humanity. He further insisted that
Christ, despite possessing two distinct natures, was 'one prosopon\ that is, one
22
subject who can be addressed both as God and as man.
Needless to say, this defence of Word-man christology did not persuade the
Word-flesh theologians to concede the debate — a fact due in no small part to the
intellectually gifted but somewhat pig-headed patriarch Cyril of Alexandria, who by
the early decades of the fifth century had inherited the mantle of Athanasius as the
20
Kelly (1977): 305.
21 Sellers (1953): 169. No doubt the awkward pronouns of the final sentence of the preceding




champion of the Alexandrian cause. Despite his protestations to the contrary,
Theodore was charged by Cyril with the heresy that would later be associated with
the name of Nestorius: that of overemphasising the humanity of Christ to the point of
dividing him into two persons, one human and one divine. From our detached
perspective, it is not difficult to see that this attack on Theodore's theology was
uncharitable and unfair. The worst that can be said of Theodore is that his exposition
of Christ's humanity logically implied a duality of persons, which in turn conflicted
with his insistence on the unity of Christ's person; in other words, Theodore may
have been illogical, but he was no heretic. As Kelly remarks, 'Theodore was no
Nestorian, and the doctrine of the "two Sons" repelled him.' Nevertheless, the
tremors from Cyril's assault would resurface over a century later in Theodore's
condemnation by the Fifth General Council of Constantinople in 553.
Theodore had rightly resisted the undeniable tendency within his theology toward
a two-person view of Jesus Christ, just as Athanasius had resisted the tendency
within his own theology toward denying Christ's full humanity. Yet just as the
Alexandrian camp had to accommodate an Apollinarius as well as an Athanasius, so
the Antiochenes were to find in their ranks an outspoken bishop who could not resist
carrying the arguments of Theodore to a seemingly more consistent endpoint.
3.2.2 The Chalcedonian Settlement
If Apollinarianism was the spark that ignited the fire of christological debate, it was
the ascendance of Nestorianism that fanned it into the furnace that would prove to be
a make-or-break period in the Christian church. Nestorius, patriarch of
Constantinople, came to prominence in the debate over the person of Christ through
his vehement opposition to the liturgical use of the title Theotokos (lit. 'God-bearer'),
which was commonly ascribed in Alexandrian circles to Mary the mother of Jesus.
The term had already become something of a shibboleth for Alexandrians,
emphasising as it did the unity of the person of Jesus Christ. As Theotokos, Mary was
deemed not merely to have borne Christ with respect to his 'flesh', but to have given
birth to the incarnate Logos, God the Son. For an Antiochene like Nestorius,




blasphemous; after all, one of the chief motivations for favouring a Word-man
christology had been the desire to avoid having to attribute such creaturely
characteristics to God. Although his opponents no doubt shared this theological
concern, Nestorius was not prepared to compromise (as he saw it) the biblical
testimony regarding Christ's genuinely human life of growth, temptation, and
suffering.
If the rejection of Theotokos represented the negative dimension of Nestorius's
christology, the positive dimension was expressed in his teaching on Christ's two
natures. Whereas Theodore had insisted that Jesus Christ was but one prosopon,
Nestorius took his distinctively Antiochene convictions further and found himself
unable to affirm a moderate position such as that of his predecessor. In conscious
opposition to Cyril's doctrine of the 'hypostatic union' of Christ's divine and human
natures, he emphasised not only that the two natures retained their individuality and
independence in the Incarnation but furthermore that each should be thought of
concretely rather than as a set of abstract qualities.
As he explained, he could not think of two natures except as each having its prosopon
(i.e. its external aspect, or form, as an individual) and its hypostasis (i.e. concrete
subsistence). By this he meant to convey, not that each nature was an actually
subsistent entity, but that it was objectively real.24
Although it is now widely acknowledged that Nestorius never went so far as to claim
that Christ was two persons or individuals, and thus strictly speaking was not guilty
of 'Nestorianism' as commonly defined,25 his speaking of multiple prosopa and
hypostases was hardly liable to endear him to his Alexandrian adversaries.
Nestorius's error was not so much that he divided the persons, but that he neglected
to guard against the implicit inference of this conclusion by stating in unambiguous
terms just how Christ's single personhood was to be affirmed and expounded. If not
a heretic himself, Nestorius had at least prepared a bed for heresy.
Cyril's response to Nestorius was two-pronged, both theological and political. In
the face of what he perceived to be Nestorius's dangerous separation of Christ's two
natures, he vigorously promoted a 'one nature' christology in which Christ's divinity
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and soul in an ordinary human person. In addition, he secured the support of Pope
Celestine and subsequently engineered the anathematisation and deposition of
Nestorius (in absentia) via a general council convened at Ephesus in 431. Cyril's
polemics not only ensured the downfall of Nestorius, but also raised the hackles of
more moderate Antiochenes who found his 'one nature' formula to be an
unacceptably extreme expression of Alexandrian christology.
In the two decades following Nestorius's condemnation at Ephesus, the debate
veered back and forth with vehement recriminations on both sides and little sign of
progress toward a compromising position (or even of a desire to attain one). Just as
Nestorius had become the scapegoat for the extremes of two-nature christology, so
the archimandrite Eutyches became the whipping-boy for extremist Antiochenes
reacting against the one-nature view. Nevertheless, despite the hindrances of human
pride and obstinacy, an agreement was eventually reached amidst this controversy
between the two Eastern parties — although in the end it required the mediating
assistance of the West.
Before turning to the definitive statement of orthodoxy forged at the Council of
Chalcedon in 451, it will be worthwhile to pause and recall the context of this
historical survey — the question of the paradoxicality of the doctrine of the
Incarnation — and, in light of it, to reflect on the acute challenge faced by those who
sought to combine the equally valid insights of both the Word-flesh and the Word-
man perspectives into one biblically and theologically faithful doctrine.
In the first place, it should be emphasized that all parties in the debate (just as in
the disagreements that had precipitated the formulation of trinitarian doctrine) were
firmly committed to the highest view of divine transcendence and perfection. As
Pelikan comments,
the early Christian picture of God was controlled by the same self-evident axiom,
accepted by all, of the absoluteness and the impassibility of the divine nature.
Nowhere in all of Christian doctrine was that axiom more influential than in
christology, with the result that the content of the divine as revealed in Christ was
itself regulated by the axiomatically given definition of the deity of God. No one
wanted to be understood as setting forth a view of Christ in which this definition was
in any way compromised or jeopardized.26
26 Pelikan (1971): 229.
64
The central metaphysical problem faced by the disputants, given this non-negotiable
axiom and the Nicene homoousios confession, was simply that of explaining how
creaturely limitations and experiences — temporality, ignorance, suffering, and so
forth — could be attributed to the Logos. The solutions variously proposed, however,
diverged in accordance with whatever additional theological or biblical restraints
were considered by their advocates to be of comparable importance.
For the Alexandrian school, from Athanasius and Apollinarius through to Cyril
and Eutyches, the prominent concern was to preserve the unity of Christ's
personhood. If this meant that the Gospel record of Christ's human experiences had
to be played down or explained away, then that was the price to be paid for
protecting the undiminished deity of the Son.27 Likewise, whilst formally
acknowledging Christ's full participation in two natures, godhood and manhood, the
unity of his person seemed to require the union of those natures into one.
For the Antiochene school, meanwhile, a greater premium was placed on securing
the genuineness and distinctness of Christ's humanity. Conjoined with an axiomatic
commitment to the impassibility and immutability of God, it followed that Christ
must possess a human mind or soul, as well as a human body, to serve as the seat of
those human experiences incompatible with divinity.28 Jesus Christ was no mere
man, but neither was he less than a man. And if this stance required one to concede
that in Christ there are two prosopa or hypostases, with the risk of encouraging the
inference of dual personhood, then so be it.
As I noted earlier, soteriological and liturgical concerns were also prominent in
the arguments on both sides. In order for God to raise man to himself, contended the
Alexandrians, the redeemer and mediator must be none other than the incarnate Son,
27 There are indications that the more moderate Alexandrians were less than satisfied with this
rationalistic policy. '[T]he question was: "In what sense does not [the impassible Logos] himself
suffer?" Cyril replied that it was "by suffering in his own flesh, but not in the nature of his deity," in a
manner that transcended all reason and all language.' Pelikan (1971): 231, emphasis added. Cyril
was thus prepared to assert that 'the Word suffered impassibly', a claim which could hardly be more
paradoxical and which earned him sustained criticism from Nestorius. The methodological difference
between Nestorius and Cyril is informative. Paul Gavrilyuk remarks that while the former 'dissolved
the paradox of the incarnation', the latter 'carefully preserved it, by keeping the tension between
Christ's undiminished divinity and his suffering in the flesh at the center of his theology.' Gavrilyuk
(2003): 207. Cf. O'Keefe (1997).
28 Sellers (1953): 172. As R. P. C. Hanson comments, 'The chief reason why any of the ancients
wanted to acknowledge a human mind in Christ was that it could sluice off the human passions which
can only with danger (they thought) be ascribed to the Godhead.' Hanson (1984): 476.
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whose divinity is in no way compromised by his human condition. Yet in order for
Christ to fulfil that redemptive, mediating role, retorted the Antiochenes, he must be
fully human and genuinely suffer on our behalf— and that requires a distinct human
psyche in addition to the divine psyche.
Both perspectives represented entirely valid concerns, being based on impeccable
theological and biblical considerations, yet each faced the danger of serving as a
seed-bed for heretics bent on forcing their various christological distinctives to
seemingly more consistent conclusions. I suggest that this christological dilemma
provides a strikingly parallel to the trinitarian dilemma faced at the turn of the fourth
century. In the earlier case, all of the pre-Nicene parties were firmly committed to the
monotheistic tradition inherited from Judaism. Yet the Sabellians, rightly
emphasising the deity of Christ, illegitimately inferred that the Son must be
essentially the same divine person as the Father, while the Arians, rightly
emphasising the distinctness of the Son, illegitimately inferred that Christ must be
less than fully divine.29 Similarly, in the debates leading up to the Council of
Chalcedon, all parties were equally committed to the same monotheistic tradition
with its doctrines of absoluteness and immutability. Yet the Apollinarians and
Eutychians, rightly emphasising the unity of Christ's person, illegitimately inferred
that his human nature and experiences were less than distinct and comprehensive,
while the Nestorians, rightly emphasising the full humanity of Jesus, leaned toward
(if not actually embracing) a two-person christology in which the divine Word
'indwelt' a complete human person. Just as the heresies on either side of trinitarian
orthodoxy may be seen as evidence of its inherent paradoxicality, so the heresies on
either side of christological orthodoxy can be taken as confirmation of its own
paradoxical character.30
29 As I noted previously, Moltmann makes much of this point in his critique of 'Christian
monotheism'. Moltmann (1981): 129-37.
30 Sellers analyses the early christological debates in terms of two fundamental principles: 'the
principle of Christological confession' (which amounts to the identity claim that Jesus Christ is the
Son of God) and 'the principle of Christological enquiry' (which amounts to the predicate claim that
Christ is genuinely and fully human, as well as genuinely and fully divine). His thesis is that all three
schools — Alexandrian, Antiochene, Western — were ultimately committed to these principles, but
differed from one another in their emphases and preferred expressions; thus, the Definition of
Chalcedon (which balances and cements these two principles) fairly represents an underlying, if rarely
acknowledged, theological consensus. Sellers (1953): xiii-xvi, 203, 211. Of course, the fact that the
disputants were not so far apart as they perceived, and that Chalcedon sought to do equal justice to
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Nevertheless, to the extent that the church required a definitive doctrinal statement
serving to exclude decisively the anti-trinitarian heresies, so it also needed such a
statement designed to exclude heterodoxy regarding the nature of the Incarnation. A
way forward to such an achievement, without simply favouring one party over the
other, was provided the theology of the Westerns. Adopting a formula found in
embryonic form in the writings of Tertullian,31 Hilary of Poitiers had spoken of 'one
Person, God and man ... being in two natures united'.32 On the one hand, Hilary was
concerned (in Antiochene fashion) to uphold the comprehensiveness of Christ's
humanity, writing of the 'full reality of each nature' and arguing that Jesus had not
only a human body but also a human soul.33 In keeping with this concern, he insisted
that in his human life Christ 'passed through all the circumstances of our nature'
while yet retaining all his divine attributes.34 Nevertheless, at the same time, Hilary
was equally careful (in Alexandrian fashion) to stress the unity of the personhood of
Christ:
Yet it was not another and a different Person Who emptied Himself and Who took the
form of a servant. ... The emptying of the form does not then imply the abolition of
the nature: He emptied Himself, but did not lose His self: He took a new form, but
remained what He was. Again, whether emptying or taking, He was the same
Person.. ,35
For Hilary, the fullness and distinctiveness of the Christ's natures could not be
•5 z:
allowed to divide his person, 'for the whole Son of Man is the whole Son of God'.
Rather than allowing one christological truth to annul the other, Hilary was content
to rest with their dual affirmation, a position he described repeatedly as a 'mystery'.
Acknowledging that this approach gives rise to paradoxes which defy rational
penetration, he nonetheless believed this to be the only theologically acceptable path
to take.37
these two axiomatic principles, does not remove any of the logical perplexities from the resultant
christological confession.
31 Tertullian, Against Praxeas, 27; in Roberts and Donaldson (1867), Vol. 3.
32
Hilary, On the Trinity, 9.3; in Schaff and Wace (1890), Vol. 9.
33
Hilary, On the Trinity, 9.3, 10.22.
34
Hilary, On the Trinity, 9.7.
33
Hilary, On the Trinity, 9.14.
36
Hilary, On the Trinity, 10.22.
37 Of particular interest are Hilary's discussions of Christ's suffering ('He willed to suffer what He
could not suffer') and the seeming incompatibility of his pre-existence and his birth. According to
Hilary, the latter paradox 'transcends thought'; it 'cannot be determined under the conditions of our
thought' and 'ever eludes the grasp of our thought.' Hilary, On the Trinity, 9.7, 12.31-32.
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In Augustine's writings, practically the same formula can be found: 'the one
person, Jesus Christ, [is] the Son of God and the Son of man ... one personality as
consisting of two substances, the divine and the human'.38 On the one hand,
Augustine affirmed that Christ's humanity is comprehensive: against the
Apollinarians, 'there was also in Christ a human soul, a whole soul; not merely the
"1Q
irrational part of the soul, but also the rational, which is called mind.'" On the other
hand, he insisted that this assumption of the fullness of conscious human life by the
divine Word does not result in a duality of personhood:
He Himself unites both natures in His own identity, and both natures constitute one
Christ ... not two Sons of God, God and man, but one Son of God: God without
beginning; man with a beginning, our Lord Jesus Christ.40
Like Hilary, Augustine was scrupulous in avoiding both the errors of an unrestrained
Word-flesh christology and those of an unrestrained Word-man christology.
This Western strain of theology made its decisive contribution to the Definition of
Chalcedon by way of its expression in the Tome to Flavian, a letter from the pen of
Pope Leo. This short treatise on the Incarnation contained little original material, but
was rather a polemical yet perspicuous restatement of the christology developed by
earlier Latin theologians.41 Although it vehemently opposed the one-nature doctrine
of Cyril in favour of the 'one person in two natures' formula, it was by no means a
defence of Antiochene christology over against its Alexandrian rival. As Pelikan
remarks,
when its polemically conditioned overtones have been subtracted from it, this theology
is seen to have manifested a concern for the oneness of Jesus Christ in his person and
saving acts that sets it apart from the [Antiochene] theology of the indwelling Logos
no less than its stress upon the distinctness of the natures sets it apart from the
[Alexandrian] theology of the hypostatic union.42
As such, Leo's Tome opened the door to a compromise position that sought to do
justice to the legitimate concerns of both Eastern parties. In due course, an
ecumenical council was called at Chalcedon in 451, by the authority of the Eastern
and Western emperors, with the remit of settling the controversy over christological
38




Augustine, Enchiridion, 35; in Schaff (1886), Vol. 3.
41
Kelly (1977): 337; Pelikan (1971): 256.
42 Pelikan (1971): 259.
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orthodoxy once and for all. After several weeks of heated discussion, and not a little
pressure applied to those factious parties less inclined to come to agreement, the
following definitive statement of christology was formulated and ratified:
In agreement, therefore, with the holy fathers, we all unanimously teach that we
should confess that our Lord Jesus Christ is one and the same Son, the same perfect in
Godhead and the same perfect in manhood, truly God and truly man, the same of a
rational soul and body, consubstantial with the Father in Godhead, and the same
consubstantial with us in manhood, like us in all things except sin; begotten from the
Father before the ages as regards His Godhead, and in the last days, because of us and
because of our salvation begotten from the Virgin Mary, the Theotokos, as regards His
manhood; one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, only-begotten, made known in two
natures without confusion, without change, without division, without separation, the
difference of the natures being by no means removed because of the union, but the
property of each nature being preserved and coalescing in one prosopon and one
hupostasis — not parted or divided into two prosopa, but one and the same Son, only-
begotten, divine Word, the Lord Jesus Christ, as the prophets of old and Jesus Christ
Himself have taught us about Him and the creed of our fathers has handed down.43
This classic formulation of Christian orthodoxy was for the most part a synthesis
of excerpts from Leo's Tome, two influential letters by Cyril, and the Symbol of
Union (the last being a statement drawn up in 433 as an attempted compromise
which affirmed a union of two natures in one person). It clearly reflects the Western
'one person in two natures' formula, whilst aiming to satisfy both the concerns of the
Antiochene school (by declaring that the two natures are united 'without confusion,
without change', preserving their distinctive characteristics) and those of the
Alexandrian school ('without division, without separation', avoiding any duality of
personhood). Nestorianism was ruled out decisively by the use of Theotokos and the
insistence on 'not ... two prosopa, but one and the same Son', just as Eutychianism
was excluded by the endorsement of 'two natures' whose difference is 'by no means
removed because of the union'. The Definition of Chalcedon remains to this day the
standard of orthodox doctrine for all conservative Christian denominations:
Protestant, Roman Catholic, and Eastern Orthodox.
Despite its achievements, the settlement has been criticized for failing to solve (or
worse, ignoring altogether) the knotty metaphysical problems faced by a
harmonization of the two warring schools of christological thought.44 But then it was
never intended to accomplish such. It is best understood not as an attempt to set forth
43
Kelly (1977): 339-40.
44 Pelikan (1971): 266; cf. 256.
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a detailed exposition of incarnational metaphysics, but as a reaffirmation of Nicene
orthodoxy with the additional prescription of two further essential christological
principles: (i) the unity of Christ's personhood and (ii) the genuineness and fullness
of his humanity. Negatively, it was designed to exclude all relevant heterodoxy
whilst refraining from taking a particular line on just how the content of orthodoxy
might be systematically elucidated. In short, it laid down the ground rules for future
christological theorizing. This restricted goal was, naturally, a far easier one to
achieve; even though it would thereafter leave the church open to the charge of
committing herself to a statement of doctrine which, by attempting to synthesis the
essential tenets of two fundamentally incompatible theologies, cannot be rationally
explicated.45
3.2.3 Post-Chalcedonian Developments
It would be a historical gloss to suggest that the Council of Chalcedon put an end to
the controversy. Although the bulk of the church was prepared subsequently to stand
by its conclusions, pockets of dissent remained for many years to follow.
Monophysite groups in the East continued in their opposition to the 'two natures'
formula, believing that Leo's Tome sailed too close to the shores of Nestorianism.
Likewise, Nestorian sects lived on beyond Chalcedon and extend to the present day.
Notwithstanding these exceptions, the mainstream Christian church has
acknowledged that the essential parameters of a theology that properly upholds
Christ's untarnished deity, unrestricted humanity, and unity of personhood, are all
reflected in and secured by the Chalcedonian statement.
It remains to review briefly several significant refinements and reaffirmations of
this christological orthodoxy in the centuries following Chalcedon. The Second
Council of Constantinople in 553 provided both reaffirmation and refinement: it
formally endorsed Chalcedon as a 'holy synod' but further added, in an attempt to
appease certain Monophysite bishops still opposed to its doctrine, a condemnation of
anyone who denied that God the Son had suffered on the cross. This arguably added
nothing of substance to the theology of Chalcedon, which had already settled the
issue of Christ's unity of person; moreover, the council failed in its immediate goal
45 Cf. Hick (1993): 45.
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of bringing the dissenters into the fold (although, over time, the two parties would
steadily converge in their interpretation of the Incarnation).46
A second refinement resulted from the Monothelite controversy during the
seventh century. In short, a dispute arose as to whether or not Christ possessed two
wills (one associated with each nature) or only one (associated with his singular
person). The issue was settled — formally, at least — by a general council at
Constantinople in 680, which ruled that Christ's full humanity necessitated that he
have a human will distinct from his divine will. While this may strike some as a
rather abstract and trivial point of doctrine, unworthy of such ecclesiastical posturing,
it nevertheless serves to underline the commitment of orthodoxy to two suppositions:
(i) that Jesus Christ was human in every essential respect, psychological as well as
physical; and (ii) that his divinity must not be confused with, or compromised by, his
humanity.
Finally, I turn to consider the contribution of the Athanasian Creed. Its
endorsement of Chalcedonian christology is as unmistakable as its reaffirmation of
Augustinian-Nicene trinitarianism:
Furthermore it is necessary to everlasting salvation that he also believe rightly the
incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ. For the right faith is that we believe and confess
that our Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is God and man. God of the substance of
the Father, begotten before the worlds; and man of substance of His mother, born in
the world. Perfect God and perfect man, of a reasonable soul and human flesh
subsisting. Equal to the Father as touching His Godhead, and inferior to the Father as
touching His manhood. Who, although He is God and man, yet He is not two, but one
Christ. One, not by conversion of the Godhead into flesh, but by taking of that
manhood into God. One altogether, not by confusion of substance, but by unity of
person. For as the reasonable soul and flesh is one man, so God and man is one
Christ...47
All the essential components of Chalcedonian orthodoxy are present here: (i) Christ
participates perfectly in two natures, divine and human; (ii) he possesses the fullness
of human life in all its physical, mental, and spiritual components; (iii) his two
natures are not combined into a third kind of nature; but (iv) they are nonetheless
united in one person.48
46 Pelikan (1971): 274-77. Cf. Sellers (1953): 269-70; Sturch (1991): 7, fn. 3.
47 Schaff (1910), Vol. 3, Ch. 9, §132, emphasis added.
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Kelly observes that Apollinarianism is ruled out by statement 32 of the creed, which affirms that
Christ is a 'perfect (i.e., complete) man' possessing a 'human rational mind', and that Nestorianism is
ruled out by statements 31, 35, and 36. Kelly (1964): 91-108.
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One further detail of both the Definition of Chalcedon and the Athanasian Creed
should be noted: the use of the present tense throughout. This seemingly minor
grammatical point reflects a significant theological point, for it was the conviction of
the theologians who drafted those statements that Jesus Christ not only had been
fully human during his earthly life, but continued to be fully human following his
ascent to the Father, remaining so eternally.49 This easily overlooked element of
credal orthodoxy will prove relevant in my assessment of contemporary models of
the Incarnation.
Arriving at the end of this survey of the development of the doctrine of the
Incarnation, the constraints of christological orthodoxy (as indicated by a historically
and theologically contextualized reading of the Definition of Chalcedon and the
Athanasian Creed) and their implications may be summarised as follows:
(11) An orthodox doctrine of the Incarnation must protect the personal unity of Jesus
Christ: the redeemer of mankind is none other than the Son of God.
(12) An orthodox doctrine of the Incarnation must uphold the full divinity of Christ,
where divinity is construed in terms of undiminished transcendence and
perfection.
(13) An orthodox doctrine of the Incarnation must maintain the full humanity of
Christ, in all its essential physical and psychological respects, along with the
concomitant experiences and limitations.
(14) An orthodox doctrine of the Incarnation must affirm that even now Christ
remains fully human as well as fully divine.
(15) On the one hand, (II) and (12) imply that Christ was omniscient, omnipotent,
omnipresent, immutable, impassible, etc.
(16) On the other hand, (II) and (13) imply that Christ was limited in knowledge and
power, was spatially constrained, underwent change, suffered pain, etc.
49 Baillie (1961): 151-52.
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(17) Consequently, any interpretation of the doctrine of the Incarnation that seeks to
fulfil requirements (II), (12), (13), and (14) will be paradoxical, given our natural
intuitions about the concepts employed.
It is hardly surprising then that the doctrine of the Incarnation has been considered by
many to be irremediably paradoxical, given the central theological concerns that
directed its formulation and constrain its interpretation. For it apparently requires
believers to affirm that one individual, one person, is the bearer of two sets of
attributes, many of which appear to be directly incompatible.
Without wanting to kick a doctrine when it is down, a further logical problem may
be noted in passing. If the doctrine of the Trinity is inherently paradoxical, as I
argued earlier, then the doctrine of the Incarnation necessarily inherits that
paradoxicality. Here is the argument: if the Son assumed a human nature, and the
Son is God, then God assumed a human nature; but if the Father did not assume a
human nature, and the Father is God, then God did not assume a human nature;
therefore, God both did and did not assume a human nature.50
To sum up: the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation is expressed definitively in
the Definition of Chalcedon and the Athanasian Creed, but any interpretation of these
statements faithful to the historical and theological context in which they were
formulated appears to lead to irreconcilable metaphysical claims. Still, it would be
premature to conclude at this point that an orthodox view of the Incarnation
inevitably involves paradox, since numerous attempts have been made in the last two
centuries to set forth interpretations of the traditional doctrine that avoid any
appearance of incoherence. In the remainder of the chapter, I evaluate the most
promising of these attempts.
3.3 Recent Christology
In Chapter 2, I noted that the twentieth century has enjoyed a plethora of defences,
explications and original interpretations of the doctrine of the Trinity. The doctrine of
50 It might be objected that this presupposes an Augustinian model of the Trinity, whereas alternative
models (e.g., social trinitarianism) would render the argument obviously invalid. Cf. Brown (1985):
251. This observation is correct. However, it was earlier argued that Augustinian trinitarianism
comports best with (i) the most natural interpretation of the creeds and (ii) the theological concerns
which motivated their authors. In any case, my conclusions in this chapter do not stand or fall on this
point.
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the Incarnation has garnered no less attention. A good proportion of these works on
the Incarnation are presented either as improvements on previous expositions
considered to be lacking in clarity or coherence, or as responses to the charge that the
doctrine suffers from unavoidable confusion and contradiction. As with works on the
Trinity, the operative assumption often seems to be that paradoxical formulations of
the doctrine of Christ's two natures are inherently unsatisfactory and therefore in
need of either life-saving theological surgery or (less radically) a thorough
conceptual makeover. In the second part of this chapter, I will assess a selection of
representative and influential contributions to this field with a view to determining
whether interpretations of the doctrine of the Incarnation are now available which
maintain conformance to orthodoxy whilst adequately dissolving any alleged logical
difficulties.
I have divided my survey of contemporary treatments of the doctrine of the
Incarnation into three sections, corresponding to three basic approaches to the
christological problem. (1) Kenotic interpretations, in which the drive for clear
logical consistency is arguably most conspicuous, hold in common that God the Son
had to divest himself of certain divine characteristics, such as omniscience and
omnipotence, in order to become incarnate. (2) Dual-psychology interpretations are
offered by writers who, dissatisfied with the kenotic solution, suggest instead that the
incarnate Christ possessed two distinct minds or consciousnesses: one serving as the
subject of his divine attributes and experiences, the other serving as the subject of his
human attributes and experiences. (3) Finally, I review a selection of contemporary
theologians who have effectively acceded to a paradoxical interpretation of the
doctrine of the Incarnation.
3.3.1 Kenotic Interpretations
Kenotic theories of Christ's nature derive their label from the Greek word kenosis
('emptying') and their chief biblical support from Philippians 2:7 in which a variant
of the word features.51 The common theme of such theories is that God the Son, in
order that he might appropriate a full human nature and thus accomplish mankind's
redemption, was required to divest or 'empty' himself of various divine attributes
51 For a brief overview of the history and theological character of kenoticism, see Foster (1988): 364.
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thought to be metaphysically incompatible with being genuinely human. The
motivation for this relatively novel approach to christology lies not only in a desire to
avoid the charge of incoherence but also in a concern to uphold the genuine
humanity and personal integrity of Jesus. Kenoticism is associated historically with
certain German and British theologians in the mid- 19th to early-20th centuries, such
as Gottfried Thomasius, Charles Gore, and P.T. Forsyth. However, my focus here
will not be on these early proponents but on the expositions of three recent defenders
of kenotic theory: David Brown, Ronald Feenstra, and Stephen Davis. These writers
are of particular relevance to my present concerns, not only because they have sought
to defend and refine earlier kenoticism in the face of subsequent criticisms, but also
because they have offered their treatments in the explicit context of developing
logically consistent interpretations of the doctrine of the Incarnation.
In his 1985 work The Divine Trinity, David Brown devotes three chapters to
defending the logical coherence of the traditional doctrines of the Trinity and the
Incarnation. Concerning the latter, Brown reviews six historically significant models
for explicating the incarnation of the Son of God. These are: (1) the two-nature
christology endorsed at Chalcedon (TNC); (2) Apollinarianism (emphasising Christ's
unity of personhood but at the expense of his human nature); (3) Nestorianism
(emphasising Christ's complete humanity but at the expense of his personal unity);
(4) the kenotic model (KM); (5) the model of grace (attributed to Donald Baillie and
John Robinson);53 and (6) the mythological model (advocated by John Hick and
similarly minded revisionists).54
Brown's first question concerns the orthodoxy of each of these models. He argues,
somewhat controversially, that the ultimate criterion for the orthodoxy of any
incarnational model is its conformance to the Definition of Chalcedon rather than to
the Bible.55 Whether or not Brown is correct in his prioritizing of ecclesiastical
authorities, it can be agreed that conformance to Chalcedon is (either directly or
derivatively) a necessary condition of orthodoxy. On this basis, Brown states that any
orthodox christology must involve the following two propositions:
52 Brown (1985): 224-39. The abbreviations TNC and KM are Brown's.
53 Baillie (1961); Robinson (1973).
54 Hick (1977).
55 Brown (1985): 226.
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(a) the identity claim that Christ was a single person, and (b) the constitutive claim
that he possessed both a fully human and a fully divine nature.56
Despite the impression given by his labelling of TNC as 'Chalcedonian', Brown does
not believe that this characterisation of orthodoxy eliminates all but the first of the
six proffered models. The reason, he suggests, is that TNC involves a third
proposition, one that distinguishes it from KM:
(c) that the two natures were simultaneously present in the one person.""
Brown's contention is that the Chalcedonian definition does not explicitly require
this third proposition to be an ingredient of any orthodox view of the incarnate
Christ. Whilst conceding that the Fathers would not have given any consideration to
any alternative to (c), Brown counters that their soteriological motivation for holding
it is in fact adequately secured by (a) and (b) without recourse to (c). This third
proposition, he further remarks, was 'simply the most natural reading of the
Scriptures at the time.'
Brown's defence of the Chalcedonian credentials of kenoticism is inventive and
charitable, but nonetheless cannot reasonably be sustained. In the first place, the
question arises as to what extent the theological convictions of those who author a
doctrinal statement should be brought to bear on its legitimate interpretation. Brown
admits that the Chalcedonian theologians would not have given any thought to the
negation of proposition (c); but surely he understates the matter here, for there is
little doubt that they would have defended it in the strongest terms. Thomas Morris
rightly complains that a kenotic perspective is hard to reconcile with Leo's Tome, to
which the Definition of Chalcedon is indebted, and with Athanasius's view that the
incarnate Christ was limited in neither power nor knowledge. It is no secret that a
strong doctrine of divine immutability was common to both the Alexandrian
theologians and their Antiochene opponents; both parties were concerned not to
compromise this conviction in their christological writings.59 It would have been
inconceivable in such a theological environment for the notion that the Logos shed
several of his divine attributes to have been given serious consideration.
56 Brown (1985): 228.
57 Brown (1985): 228.
58 Morris (1989): 119-21.
59 Pelikan (1971): 229, 270-71.
76
Be that as it may, however, it does not immediately follow that Chalcedonian
orthodoxy requires modern theologians to share that conviction. Adherence to a
particular creed does not commit one to endorsing every identifiable theological
presupposition of its authors. Nevertheless, where such presuppositions bear directly
on the connotation of key phrases and formulations (such as 'one person in two
natures') then surely adherents to the creed are not free to simply dismiss their
contribution to the meaning of the document. Neither of these two extremes reflects a
reasonable view of authorial intention in hermeneutical practice. One must ask, then,
just what did the authors of the Definition have in mind when they wrote of Christ
being 'made known in two natures'? Is it most likely that they thought of him
existing in two natures at one time — or, as some kenoticists would prefer, that they
wished only to say that he existed with a divine nature at one time, a human nature at
another, and may or may not have possessed both simultaneously?
It might be said that we in the 21st century are hardly in a position to read the
minds of numerous 5lh-century theologians as they penned the Chalcedon statement.
Even if this were granted — and that in the face of ample documentary evidence of
their theological presuppositions — there is no need to rely on inferences based on
external data, since the convictions of the authors on this point are perfectly explicit
in the text of the Definition itself. A careful reading of the statement is enough to
confirm that Brown's claim is untenable. According to the text, Christ is (present
tense) 'the same perfect in Godhead and perfect in manhood'; he is 'made known in
two natures ... without change [and] without separation'\ the differences between
the natures are 'by no means removed because of the union', the properties of each
nature being 'preserved and coalescing' in his singular person; and so forth. It is
difficult, to put it mildly, for such expressions to accommodate the idea that Christ
possessed his two natures successively rather than simultaneously.
As if this were not enough, a further problem arises for the kenotic model (as
Brown constructs it) with respect to Christ's post-ascension state. Brown
acknowledges this difficulty in his response to D. M. Baillie's criticisms of
kenoticism: if the kenotic model grants that the fullness of divinity is incompatible
with Jesus' humanity during his earthly ministry, then it cannot allow that humanity
to continue once his full divinity is recovered in his glorification and return to the
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Father (John 17:4-5; Phil. 2:9-11).60 Brown's solution to this dilemma is to suggest
that Christ could have retained his humanity, not as the possession of a metaphysical
nature, but as 'a remembered experience of the second person of the Trinity'.61 This
compromise would hardly have appealed to the Fathers, probably ranking on a par
with the suggestion that the immutable Logos abandoned various divine attributes in
the act of incarnation.
Nevertheless, the decisive difficulty of Brown's kenotic model is its contradiction
of the most straightforward reading of the Definition. The grammar of the
christological statement clearly reflects the indisputable conviction of its authors that
Jesus Christ continues to possess the same human nature that he appropriated at the
first advent. Thus the three points I have identified — the theological context of the
Definition of Chalcedon, its expressions regarding the post-incarnation divinity of
Christ, and its assumptions regarding his post-ascension humanity — combine to
undermine Brown's case for the orthodoxy of a kenotic interpretation of the
Incarnation.
Ronald Feenstra has also offered a contemporary defence of kenotic christology.62
Feenstra, like Brown, professes the twin constraints of orthodoxy and logical
consistency. As to the first, he concurs that the standard of christological orthodoxy
is to be found in the Definition of Chalcedon. As for the logical conundrum, he
argues that a kenotic theory need not be committed to denying that the incarnate Son
of God lacked omnipotence or omnipresence; the really thorny problem, he
maintains, is whether or not Christ lacked omniscience (and in what sense).
The foil for Feenstra's defence is provided by the anti-kenotic arguments of
Thomas Morris. Approaching from the standpoint of Anselmian perfect-being
theology, with its strong modal claims about the divine attributes, Morris concludes
that the kenoticist is committed to saying that God is (by virtue of his divinity)
omniscient-unless-freely-and-temporarily-choosing-otherwise rather than omniscient
60 Sturch also identifies this as a serious difficulty faced by kenoticism. 'We seem to be driven to
conclude either that our Lord ceased to be human after the Ascension or that His divinity has
remained limited from that day to this, and will remain so for all eternity. Neither alternative is very
attractive...' Sturch (1991): 255; cf. 27.
61 Brown (1985): 234.
62 Feenstra (1989).
63 These arguments appear in Morris (1986): 88-101.
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simpliciter. The problem with this revision of classical theism, Morris suggests, is
that it 'fails to be true that any divine person is logically or metaphysically immune
to states of extensive ignorance concerning important truths about the world.'64
Feenstra's response to this objection is that no such problem arises once we say
that (i) omniscience-unless-kenotically-incarnate is the relevant divine attribute; (ii) a
divine person can only become kenotically incarnate for the purpose of redemption;
and (iii) once one divine person has become kenotically incarnate, it is impossible for
any other of the three to do so.65 Leaving aside the suspiciously artificial and ad hoc
complexity of this metaphysical construction, flying as it does in the face of
Anselmian intuitions about divine knowledge, one might ask at this point how well
Feenstra's kenoticism accords with his acknowledged standard of orthodoxy. Is it
plausible that the Chalcedonian theologians would have accepted as compatible with
their conciliar confession a conception of deity that can accommodate divine
ignorance, however cautiously qualified? As I have noted, it would be unreasonable
to suppose that adherence to the Definition of Chalcedon requires one to embrace the
particular understanding of divinity held by all (or most) of its authors, but the
possession of omniscience simpliciter by the incarnate Logos nonetheless played a
determinative role in the christological debates leading up to Chalcedon and as such
must be given all due weight when interpreting the Definition. The Alexandrian
commitment to the omniscience of the Word inclined them to explain away Jesus'
professions of ignorance. Yet the Antiochenes, in their concern to do better justice to
Christ's humanity, were in no way tempted to permit a trade off against their
conception of his divinity; instead, they resorted to positing a human soul, distinct
from the divine soul, to accommodate Jesus' human ignorance. Not one of the
participants in the debate — Alexandrian, Antiochene, or Latin — went anywhere
near the kenotic escape hatch.66 Moreover, the fact that both the Definition of
64 Feenstra (1989): 140.
65 Feenstra (1989): 142.
66 Of all the parties, a kenotic solution would have been most useful to the Alexandrians, given their
emphasis on the unity of Christ's person and antipathy toward the notion of a distinct human soul that
could accommodate Jesus' noetic limitations. Nevertheless, their chief advocate, Cyril, explicitly
eschewed such a position: '[W]e confess that the Only begotten Word of God, begotten of the same
substance of the Father, True God from True God, Light from Light, through Whom all things were
made, the things in heaven and the things in the earth, coming down for our salvation, making himself
of no reputation, was incarnate and made man; that is, taking flesh of the holy Virgin, and having
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Chalcedon and the Athanasian Creed take care to state that God the Son assumed a
human soul, as well as a body, is further evidence that no attenuation of his divine
psyche was to be tolerated.
Feenstra attempts to address a further major problem for the kenotic view,
namely, the continued humanity of the exalted Christ. As Morris and other critics
have pointed out, kenoticists face a dilemma: if they deny the post-ascension
humanity of Christ, they face the charge of heterodoxy; but if they affirm the
doctrine, they must concede that being omniscient is not incompatible with being
human and thus disavow one of the chief motivations for adopting a kenotic view in
the first place. Feenstra volunteers three potential responses: (i) it is possible to
question whether orthodoxy requires one to hold that the exalted Christ remains
human; (ii) it could be argued that only becoming human, and not being human, is
incompatible with omniscience; and (iii) it may prove fruitful to distinguish the
Incarnation from the kenosis of Christ. Feenstra rightly expresses dissatisfaction with
the first option, and does not develop the second beyond deeming it 'at least worthy
of consideration'.67 He thereby implies that he considers the third to be the most
promising.
The thought behind Feenstra's third option is that the Incarnation and the kenosis
are conceptually distinct. Incarnation does not necessarily involve humiliation, but
redemption requires it; while the act of incarnation does not entail the divesting of
attributes such as omniscience, the act of kenosis does. The only relevant point to be
made here is that in advancing such a view, Feenstra has effectively abandoned all
resistance to the notion that a full human nature and a full divine nature (as
traditionally conceived) may be possessed simultaneously by one person. The irony
made it his own from the womb, he subjected himself to birth for us, and came forth man from a
woman, without casting off that which he was\ but although he assumed flesh and blood, he remained
what he was, God in essence and in truth. Neither do we say that his flesh was changed into the nature
of divinity, nor that the ineffable nature of the Word of God has laid aside for the nature offlesh; for
he is unchanged and absolutely unchangeable, being the same always, according to the Scriptures.
For although visible and a child in swaddling clothes, and even in the bosom of his Virgin Mother, he
filled all creation as God, and was a fellow-ruler with him who begat him, for the Godhead is without
quantity and dimension, and cannot have limits.' Cyril, Third Epistle to Nestorius, emphasis added; in
Schaff and Wace (1890), Vol. 14.
67 Feenstra (1989): 148. It is hard to see how this distinction could pay the necessary dividends. What
could it possibly be about changing from not being human to being human that would preclude a
person from being omniscient, once it is granted that being human simpliciter does not so preclude it?
Cf. Evans (2002): 264-65.
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is that kenoticism construed along such lines treats as irrelevant the very feature that
might be thought to offset its questionable orthodoxy, namely, its avoidance of the
perceived incoherence of a traditional two-natures christology. Feenstra's strategy in
defence of kenotic christology thus leads him into an awkward corner: the more
modifications and qualifications are introduced to kenoticism in order to bring it into
line with orthodoxy, the less it distinguishes itself as a logically superior alternative
to the traditional view.
The third and final defence of kenoticism I propose to consider here is that of
Stephen Davis in his monograph Logic and the Nature of God.68 As the title of his
book suggests, Davis's immediate concern is with the logical coherence of Christian
theism, and in his treatment of the doctrine of the Incarnation he identifies two routes
open to the defender of Chalcedonian orthodoxy: the 'classical' route (in which the
full gamut of divine attributes are ascribed to the incarnate Christ) and the 'kenotic'
route. In Davis's view, the first option is unavoidably paradoxical; he therefore
resolves to spell out the kenotic option and to defend it against charges of
incoherence and heterodoxy.69
Following typically kenotic convictions, Davis claims that Jesus as incarnate must
have lacked four divine attributes: omniscience, omnipotence, necessity, and 'being
the creator of the world'. This requires him to conclude that, contrary to classical
theism, these attributes are accidental and not essential for a divine being.70 Deeming
this to be a theologically tolerable price to pay, he concludes that
the sentence 'Jesus is truly God and truly man' is coherent. I can detect no
contradiction or other sort of incoherence here, at any rate. The basic idea is this:
Jesus Christ failed to have some divine properties but was still God and had some
divine properties but was still a human being, and he failed to have some human
properties but was still a human being and had some human properties but was still
God7'
68 Davis (1983), Ch. 8.
69 In light of this strategy, Davis's readers may be surprised to find him advocating what he admits to
be a paradoxical view of the Trinity in the same volume. One cannot help but ask: if, as he later
argues, some paradoxes are rationally permissible, why is the 'classical' route in christology unworthy
of further consideration?
70 I merely note in passing the philosophical difficulties involving in claiming (i) that necessary
existence can be a contingent attribute and (ii) that Jesus was not the creator of the world, yet (as
orthodoxy demands) Jesus is personally identical to the Logos.
71 Davis (1983): 129, emphasis original.
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Without reiterating the criticisms made of the kenotic interpretations defended by
Brown and Feenstra, it should be clear that Davis's view is sufficiently similar as to
suffer the same objections regarding its Chalcedonian credentials. Davis evidently
holds that there are some 'divine properties' that are not integral to divine nature and
some 'human properties' that are not integral to human nature. He does not specify
by virtue of what these accidental properties are distinctively divine or human, given
that they are essential to neither nature, but the upshot is that his conception of
divinity deviates significantly from that implicit in the Definition of Chalcedon.
Davis suggests in his defence that the Chalcedonian authors were offering a
guideline rather than an explanation of the Incarnation; that is, they were setting out
boundaries for orthodoxy rather than setting forth a particular metaphysical
explication of that orthodoxy. The kenotic solution, in his judgement, 'affirms the
divinity, the humanity and the unity of the person of Christ ... and so falls within the
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boundaries of Chalcedonic orthodoxy.' While Davis may be right about the
intentions of the Fathers, he surely overestimates the latitude of the boundaries that
they established. The Definition of Chalcedon does not merely affirm the divinity,
the humanity, and the unity of the person of Christ. It also reflects particular
conceptions of divine nature, human nature, the manner in which these natures are
united, and the chronology of their co-exemplification in the person of Christ —
conceptions quite at odds with Davis's kenotic view. Indeed, his interaction with the
Definition of Chalcedon seems to be typical of recent defences of kenoticism, which
invariably deal with a vague, minimalist summary rather than a close examination of
the full statement, considered in its original context.
I should mention one further problem of orthodoxy for kenotic interpretations
before moving on to consider alternatives. In his discussion of the kenotic model of
the Incarnation, David Brown points out that the model is 'heavily dependent' on a
social trinitarian view of the doctrine of the Trinity since it cannot be accommodated
by an Augustinian interpretation (in which each divine hypostasis is thought of as
numerically identical with the divine ousia).73 If Brown is correct on this point, then
so much the worse for kenoticism; for as I argued in the previous chapter, social
72 Davis (1983): 130.
73 Brown (1985): 251.
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trinitarianism is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile with the theology of the
Nicene and Athanasian Creeds.
I therefore conclude that kenotic interpretations face serious objections concerning
their faithfulness to credal orthodoxy. The reader will note that I have made no
assessment of the coherence of such interpretations. For my purposes, the success of
kenotic theories on this front may be granted. Few theologians or philosophers have
insisted that no logically consistent kenotic christology is possible.74 Nevertheless,
kenotic interpretations still fail one of the two requirements of a non-paradoxical
Christian doctrine of the Incarnation and thus offer no escape from a choice between
paradox and heterodoxy.
3.3.2 Dual-Psychology In terpreta tions
In the pre-Chalcedonian debates over the nature and person of Christ, one conviction
was held constant among both the orthodox and the unorthodox, namely, Christ's full
divinity. Moreover, the reigning conception of deity was that of absolute
monotheism. With this theological anchor in place, attempts to rationalise the
mystery of the Incarnation gave rise to two tendencies in christology: either toward a
reduction of the humanity of Christ or toward a division of his person. In
contemporary theology, however, the anchor has been relocated: the non-negotiable
component in modern christological debate is now the full humanity of Jesus.75 With
this shift in the parameters of the discussion, endeavours to formulate a doctrine of
the Incarnation free from any apparent contradictions have exhibited a tendency
either to reinterpret the divinity of the incarnate Son (as in kenotic theories and de-
mythologizing christologies) or, once again, to split Christ into two persons. In this
section, I propose to examine some prominent examples of christologies that have
invited the latter charge by favouring dual-psychology interpretations of the
Incarnation, according to which Jesus Christ possessed two minds or
consciousnesses: one divine, one human.76
74 One exception is John Hick, who seems inclined toward finding debilitating incoherence in any
relatively high christology. For a response to Hick's criticisms of kenoticism, see Davis (1999). In my
view, Davis adequately defends the coherence of kenotic theory, but the concerns about its theological
adequacy remain.
75 Baillie (1961): 11-20.
76 I use the label 'dual-psychology' because the models in question cover a wide range of mental
ascriptions: beliefs, experiences, desires, intentions, etc. Alternative descriptions, such as 'two-minds
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Thomas V. Morris, in his book The Logic of God Incarnate,11 has offered one of
the most thorough and philosophically sophisticated defences of the coherence of
Chalcedonian christology in recent years. By drawing what he takes to be three
plausible metaphysical distinctions — between individual-essences and kind-
essences', between essential properties and common properties; and between being
merely human and being fully human — Morris suggests it is possible to show that
one individual, Jesus Christ, could possess (simultaneously) both a divine nature and
a human nature.7S Furthermore, the concept of divinity with which Morris wishes to
work is far from being the pared-down, modally-flexible notion favoured by
kenoticists; rather, it is that exalted conception suggested by Anselmian perfect-being
theology.79 I will not embark on a full critique of Morris's strategy for defending the
coherence of Chalcedon here.80 Instead, I wish to focus on his advocacy of a dual-
psychology model of the Incarnation in order to resolve particular problems arising
from the co-instantiation of Christ's divine and human attributes.
Morris acknowledges that his basic strategy for reconciling Christ's divinity and
humanity runs the risk of ending up with a denuded concept of humanity that simply
fails to satisfy the soteriological axiom that Jesus fully shared our 'human
O 1
condition'. The problem is particularly acute with respect to omniscience, which
Morris takes to be essential to any divine being conceived along Anselmian lines.
How could Jesus grow in knowledge and exhibit ignorance on some subjects (as the
biblical record testifies) whilst also being omniscient? After rejecting the kenotic
solution as 'a real departure from what most theists, Christian as well as non-
Christian, have wanted to say about the nature of God',82 Morris offers an alternative
view in terms of which Christ's simultaneously unlimited and limited knowledge 'is
in no way at all even a paradox for faith' and thus provides us with 'an important
model' or 'dual-consciousness model', tend to direct attention toward specific features of a person's
mental life. Defences of the coherence of the Incarnation by appeal to a dual-psychology model can be
found in Morris (1986); Morris (1989); Sturch (1991); Brown (1985); Swinburne (1994); Senor
(1999); Richards (2001).
77 Morris (1986).
78 For an overview of his strategy in The Logic ofGod Incarnate, see Morris (1989): 113-17.
79 Morris (1986): 74-88.
80 For some notable criticisms of Morris's christology, see Brown (1989a); Flick (1989); Yandell
(1991).
81 Morris (1986): 70.
82 Morris (1986): 100.
84
ingredient in a solution to the single most difficult logical challenge to the doctrine of
83the Incarnation'. This is the 'two minds' view, according to which Jesus Christ
possessed 'something like two distinct ranges of consciousness':
We can view the two ranges of consciousness (and, analogously, the two noetic
structures encompassing them) as follows: The divine mind of God the Son contained,
but was not contained by, his earthly mind, or range of consciousness. That is to say,
there was what can be called an asymmetric accessing relation between the two
minds.84
In order to explicate this approach, Morris appeals in the first instance to the analogy
of 'two computer programs or informational systems, one containing but not
or
contained by the other.' Further analogies aimed at illustrating the basic coherence
of this approach are drawn from contemporary psychology: Morris appeals both to
the modern notion that there are various strata to the human mind as well as to cases
of brain dysfunction or artificial manipulation in which 'we are confronted by what
seems to be in some significant sense a single human being, one person, but one
person with apparently two or more distinct streams or ranges of consciousness,
distinct domains of experience.'
In a follow-up article, Morris bolsters his case with more detailed appeals to
analogies in artificial intelligence and human psychology, although he rightly admits
that such analogies are far from decisive in establishing the coherence of a union of a
divine mind with a human one.87 He also addresses two particularly difficult
problems introduced by his dual-psychology model: first, the question of how we
should speak of Christ's beliefs on particular matters; and second, the question of
what on this view constitutes the unity of Christ's person (since arguably God's mind
stands in an 'asymmetric accessing relation' to every human mind). In response to
the first, Morris suggests that we are forced to divide the question: we can only
strictly speak of Jesus' beliefs with respect to either his divine mind or his human
83 Morris (1986): 74, 107, emphasis added.
84 Morris (1986): 102-3.
85 Morris (1986): 103.
86 Morris (1986): 105. Morris addresses the concern that comparisons with cases of psychological
dysfunction hardly befit a man deemed by Christians to be the one historical example of a perfect
human life. He points out that the comparisons are merely analogical and, moreover, a state that
would be undesirable for a normal human person need not be undesirable for the special case of the
incarnate Son of God, given the goals he wished to attain. For my purposes here, I am willing to grant
the adequacy of his response.
87 Morris (1989).
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mind. Thus, Jesus believed with his divine mind that he would return on a particular
date, but did not so believe with his human mind. However, the situation is a
hierarchical one and therefore we should 'represent God the Son's ultimate doxastic
state as captured in his divine omniscience.'88
Morris's answer to the second question, briefly paraphrased, is that while my
human mental system was intended by God to define a person (distinct from other
persons), the human mental system of Jesus was not intended alone to define a
person. Consequently, if my mental system were subsumed and overridden by
another, my freedom would be abrogated; but since Christ's personhood was never
intended to be defined purely by a human mental system, no person's freedom is
abrogated through the Incarnation. In this way, Morris suggests, we can preserve the
genuineness of Jesus' human knowledge, will, and experiences without falling into
the heresy of dividing his person.
With this summary of Morris's christology in hand, we must ask two crucial
questions to determine whether Morris's christology succeeds in its claims to uphold
orthodoxy whilst avoiding paradox. First of all, is this dual-psychology interpretation
harmonious with the credal orthodoxy of Chalcedon? Secondly, does it offer a
coherent explication of Christ's divinity and humanity whilst maintaining the unity
of his person?
As to the first, the Definition of Chalcedon does not explicitly endorse a 'two
minds' or 'two consciousnesses' view of Christ, but neither does it explicitly rule out
such a view. No doubt something approximating Morris's view, albeit less clearly
articulated, was favoured by the Antiochene school of christology. Indeed, a dual-
psychology perspective is intimated by the Definition itself through its claim (echoed
by the Athanasian Creed) that Christ's humanity entailed the possession of a 'rational
soul'. Still, we should recall that certain phrases of the Definition were meant to
proscribe the extreme forms of this Antiochene way of thinking: Christ's two natures
are said to be united 'without division' and 'without separation'. The question here is
not so much whether such phrases were deliberately intended to exclude (among
other things) modern dual-psychology interpretations — that would be absurdly
anachronistic — but whether whatever degree of division and separation those
88 Morris (1989): 125, emphasis added.
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phrases were intended to exclude would also serve to render Morris's solution
unacceptable. It cannot be denied that Morris 'divides' the two natures in some
sense, partitioning as he does the consciousness, experiences, and beliefs of Christ
with respect to each nature. Even so, one would be hard-pressed to argue that
Morris's view falls outside the boundaries of orthodoxy laid down by Chalcedon,
given the difficulty of determining with sufficient precision how the strictures of the
Definition are to be understood. In contrast to the kenotic view, then, I conclude that
Morris's 'two minds' model is not clearly in violation of conciliar orthodoxy.89
Focus therefore turns to the question of coherence — and it is at this point that
difficulties are rather more apparent. My critique on this point will include both a
negative argument and a positive one: the former will conclude that Morris's
defensive strategy is unsuccessful inasmuch as it is mired in ambiguity at crucial
points, while the latter will contend that such defences are destined to failure in
principle.
As I earlier noted, Morris accepts that while his various analogies are helpful in
gaining an understanding of the 'two minds' model, they cannot serve as proofs of
coherence in the christological case. Analogies employed in this way possess only
illustrative and not argumentative force. Moreover, Morris's analogies appear to
differ from the incarnational case at just those points at which the charge of
incoherence is strongest: artificial intelligence systems, while exhibiting something
analogous to beliefs, do not possess consciousness or personhood in the way that
humans do, and cases of divided human psychologies do not (so far as we can tell)
involve the simultaneous possession of contradictory intentional propositional states
(e.g., belief in X and absence of belief in X; awareness ofX and lack of awareness of
X).90
89 Prof. Trevor Hart has suggested to me that views such as Morris's might be thought guilty of
Monophysitism, since they treat divine mentality and human mentality as if they were of the same
basic kind. This is an intriguing suggestion, but I am still inclined to think that dual-psychology
interpretations run a greater risk of lapsing into Nestorianism than into Monophysitism.
90 Hick makes similar points in criticising what he perceives to be a 'one-dimensional' view of
mentality suggested by Morris's computing analogies and 'belief-system' terminology. Hick (1989):
417. In a discussion of 'the paradox of Christ's omniscience', Bartel (1995) offers a thought
experiment, involving a 'split-brain' patient, which he believes provides a 'clear counterexample to
the claim that no-one can simultaneously believe and disbelieve the same proposition.' In fact, his
hypothetical scenario shows at most that one can simultaneously hold logically incompatible beliefs,
which is hardly a controversial conclusion. It would only follow that one can simultaneously believe
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Furthermore, Morris's ascription of two 'ranges of consciousness' to Christ, one
'contained within' the other, is sufficiently vague as to obscure whether the problem
of coherence has really been resolved rather than merely concealed. The most
plausible interpretation of this claim is that Jesus' human mind was only aware of a
subset of those things of which his divine mind was aware; thus, for example, Jesus'
human range of consciousness only included awareness of events occurring nearby
and not (as his divine range of consciousness encompassed) those events occurring
beyond the range of normal human senses. If this is so, the question arises as to
whether those items of awareness that coincide are also identical. To take a concrete
example: was the awareness in Jesus' human consciousness that (say) the wine had
run out at the wedding in Cana one and the same awareness as that present in Jesus'
divine consciousness? If they were not numerically identical, then it is hard to see
why they should be thought of as belonging to the consciousnesses of one person; for
even if you and I are aware of the same thing (and in the same manner), my
awareness of it is not identical to your awareness of it, which suggests that what
individuates instances of awareness is just the individuality of the persons exhibiting
those instances of awareness.91 Given this intuition, coinciding but non-identical
instances of awareness would naturally suggest a plurality of persons. Alternatively,
if Jesus' human awareness of the wine shortage was numerically identical to his
divine awareness, and likewise for all other points of coincidence, it is difficult to see
why we should think of him as possessing two distinct consciousnesses (or 'ranges of
consciousness') rather than one consciousness and a portion or region of that same
Q9
consciousness. The problem then returns as to how one might credibly maintain
and disbelieve the same proposition if believing p necessitated believing every proposition deducible
from p (in conjunction with one's other beliefs). But then it would also follow that one can believe
compound propositions of the form 'p and not p' — which Bartel explicitly denies. In any case, Bartel
goes on to argue that solutions to this christological paradox face other formidable difficulties, for
which there are no obvious answers.
91 Alvin Plantinga reflects this intuition in criticisms of the doctrine of divine impassibility: 'Can we
say that Christ qua human being (according to his human nature) suffered while Christ qua divine
(according to his divine nature) did not? ... I'm inclined to think this suggestion incoherent. There is
this person, the second person of the divine trinity who became incarnate. It is this person who suffers;
if there really were two centers of consciousness here, one suffering and the other not, there would be
two persons here (one human and one divine) rather than the one person who is both human and
divine.' Plantinga (2000): 319.
92 Tim Bayne raises a similar point in his critique of the Morris-Swinburne strategy. Bayne (2001):
130.
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that Jesus lacked awareness of certain things in a genuine (rather than Pickwickian)
sense.
However misleading the ambiguity of Morris's claims, this weakness is
overshadowed by a more serious conceptual problem concerning the logical
relationship between persons, minds, and experiences. In order to state this problem,
however, I must first review an intriguing line of argument presented in one of the
most important 20th-century contributions to analytical philosophy.
In his influential monograph Individuals, British philosopher P. F. Strawson
developed a transcendental argument for the indispensability and logical
primitiveness of our concept of a person, where 'person' is taken to denote that type
of entity to which both mental states (e.g., 'being in pain') and physical states (e.g.,
'lying down') may be simultaneously and unequivocally ascribed. Against the
Cartesian view that a human person is a composite of a material body and an
immaterial soul, and the anti-realist view that the metaphysical notion of a real 'ego'
or 'self (distinct from the body) is a mere linguistic illusion, Strawson contended not
only that the concept of a person is unavoidable and must be treated as referring to a
real entity, but also that it is a primitive concept — which is to say, our notions of
body and mind must be logically explicated in terms of our notion of person rather
than the reverse. Compressing his lengthy discussion, the argument may be
paraphrased as follows:
(1) The possibility of ascribing experiences to oneself presupposes the possibility
of ascribing experiences to others (of the same type as oneself).
(2) The possibility of ascribing experiences to others presupposes the possibility of
distinguishing (individuating) different subjects of experience.
93 Strawson (1959): 87-116. A transcendental argument is one that seeks to demonstrate the
preconditions of meaningful thought or experience, that is, those necessary concepts that make
possible our judgements regarding some domain of experience. Strawson's argument is that the
concept of a person, defined in a particular way, is one such concept; that is, we must think of others
and ourselves fundamentally as 'persons' (rather than merely 'souls' or 'bodies') if our commonplace
ascriptions of mental and physical states (e.g., 'I hope to play tennis this afternoon', 'John is planning
to go to London') are to be meaningful. A genuinely transcendental concept is an inescapable feature
of our human conceptual schemes.
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(3) The possibility of distinguishing different subjects of experiences presupposes
that those subjects are of a certain (logically primitive) type, such that both
mental and physical states may be ascribed to individuals of that type.
(4) Therefore, the possibility of ascribing experiences to oneself presupposes that
one is just that certain (logically primitive) type of entity: a 'person'.94
According to this argument, then, the logical subject or 'owner' of experiences is
fundamentally a person. States of consciousness are properly ascribed to a mind only
indirectly, by way of the person whose mind it is, and not vice versa. Furthermore, in
the preamble to his argument, Strawson pointed out that if our statements about
particular experiences are to be meaningful, they cannot be logically isolated from
the subjects of those experiences:
For if we think, once more, of the requirements of identifying reference in speech to
particular states of consciousness, or private experiences, we see that such particulars
cannot be thus identifyingly referred to except as the states or experiences of some
identified person. States, or experiences, one might say, owe their identity as
particulars to the identity of the person whose states or experiences they are.95
It should not be difficult to see that Strawson's argument presents grave
difficulties for a dual-psychology model such as Morris's. If claims about Jesus
possessing two distinct ranges of consciousness, two distinct sets of experiences,
beliefs, etc., are to be coherent then it must be possible to refer to those mental
features without those features being necessarily owned by any particular person. Yet
this is precisely what our concept of a person rules out. If experiences are necessarily
individuated with respect to persons, then at the most fundamental logical level it
makes no sense to speak of one person with two distinct consciousnesses (in the
sense that each consciousness might in principle be ascribed to a different person
than the other).96 On the same basis, Morris's answer to the question of how we
should think of Jesus' beliefs on any particular matter (namely, that we must 'divide
the question' and speak of his belief with respect to one or other of his minds) suffers
94 Cf. Strawson (1959): 104.
95 Strawson (1959): 97, emphasis original.
96 This application of Strawson's argument is confirmed by his later remarks on the concept of a
'group mind', i.e., a collection of individual consciousnesses so united as to function as 'one person'.
If we go so far as to speak literally of a group in this manner, he explains, we remove any basis for
distinguishing individual consciousnesses, or subjects of experience, within that 'person'. Strawson
(1959): 112-15.
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from a similar incoherence. If persons and not minds are the logically primary
subjects of experiences and other mental states then it makes no more sense to say
Christ believed that water is HjO with respect to his divine mind but did not believe
that water is H2O with respect to his human mind than it does to say Christ broke
bread with respect to his hands but did not break bread with respect to his feet. A
person either breaks bread or he does not; likewise, a person either believes that
water is H20 or he does not. To try to isolate two distinct minds or consciousnesses
within one person, as Morris seeks to do, is to kick against the goads of the very
concepts needed to formulate the christological problem in the first place.97
If this criticism of Morris's dual-psychology interpretation of the Incarnation is on
target then it sounds a death knell for all such interpretations, regardless of the details
and defensive strategies of each case. Nevertheless, I will briefly consider one other
prominent exposition of a dual-psychology model to see whether it fares any better.
Richard Swinburne offers his own defence of the coherence of the Incarnation in
qo
his masterful apologetic work, The Christian God. In keeping with the modern
mindset in christology, Swinburne is concerned to avoid compromising the genuine
humanity of Christ. Moreover, like Morris he wishes to uphold the standard of
orthodoxy represented by Chalcedon and he judges kenotic interpretations to be
unsatisfactory on this count. He suggests that 'with the aid of a modern idea, the
divided mind' we can interpret the Chalcedonian two-natures christology in such a
way as to do justice both to a traditional view of deity and to the biblical expressions
of Jesus' humanity (e.g., Luke 2:52 and Mark 13:32).99 His proposed solution to the
logical problem is therefore to attribute two distinct 'belief-systems' or 'belief-
acquisition systems' to Christ.100 On this view, some of Christ's actions are
performed on the basis of his divine belief-system, others on the basis of his human
belief-system. The overall picture is of 'a divine consciousness and a human
97 The transcendental character of Strawson's argument means that his conclusions trump any appeals
to human psychology in order to defend the cogency of a 'two minds' model. The latter amount to
fallible empirical claims about human consciousness, while the former identifies what must be so if
any meaningful claim about human consciousness can be made at all.
98 Swinburne (1994).
99 Swinburne (1994): 199-201.
100 Swinburne (1994): 201-2.
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consciousness of God Incarnate, the former including the latter, but not
conversely.'101
Swinburne does not develop and defend his dual-psychology model with the same
degree of detail and thoroughness as Morris, but his treatment evidently has much in
common with the latter's — including, it must be said, the same basic problem of
incoherence. Swinburne wishes to distinguish between a divine consciousness and a
human consciousness within one person; but as I have argued, such a distinction
cannot be cogently drawn, given the logical primitiveness of our concept of a person.
The same criticism applies to any attempt to attribute conflicting belief-states to a
single person. To his credit, Swinburne appears to recognise this latter point,
advising that it would be more accurate to speak of 'beliefs' only with respect to
Christ's divine perspective and mere 'belief-inclinations' with respect to his human
perspective: insofar as his beliefs determined his actions, 'it would be those
inclinations belonging to the human perspective which guided Christ's honest public
statements (honest, because guided by those beliefs of which he is conscious in his
human acting).'102 However, such qualifications simply cannot do the work that
Swinburne requires of them. Either Christ possessed genuine human beliefs (not
mere inclinations to belief) or he did not. If he did, then those beliefs cannot have
conflicted at any time with his divine beliefs (because beliefs are fundamentally
ascribable to persons, and a person cannot exhibit contradictory belief-states). If he
did not, then it is hard to see why Christ should be thought of as sharing our human
condition in every relevant respect. Likewise, Swinburne's defence of the honesty of
Christ's public statements cannot be sustained, because for Jesus to be conscious
only of some of his beliefs, he would have to be a logically distinct person from the
Son of God (who is presumably ever-conscious of all of his beliefs). The veracity of
the Gospels would also be called into question on this revised understanding of
Jesus' beliefs: Luke, for example, simply records that 'Jesus increased in wisdom', a
claim that can hardly be reduced to a mere change in Jesus' professions or actions.
The dual-psychology interpretations of Morris and Swinburne, although prima
facie plausible when explicated using analogies drawn from computing and
101 Swinburne (1994): 202.
102 Swinburne (1994): 202-3.
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psychology, must be judged on closer analysis to be indefensible — at least with
respect to their purported avoidance of paradox. No amount of qualification or
distinction can overcome the basic problem faced by non-kenotic Chalcedonian
christologies, namely, that of attributing logically incompatible mental states to a
single person.103 Even if such treatments are successful in reconciling other divine
and human attributes, I suggest that they face insurmountable conceptual difficulties
with regard to those attributes pertaining to personal states of consciousness. Dual-
psychology interpretations of the doctrine of the Incarnation ultimately disappoint in
their promise to supply a non-paradoxical explication of Chalcedonian orthodoxy.104
3.3.3 Concessions to Paradox
The kenotic and dual-psychology interpretations are without doubt the two most
popular approaches to developing a non-paradoxical explication of the doctrine of
the Incarnation along conservative lines. However, not all defenders of Chalcedonian
christology have felt compelled to avoid paradox at all costs. In this last section, I
review a selection of such writers.
No discussion of the paradoxicality of the Incarnation would be complete without
reference to the work of the Scottish theologian, D. M. Baillie. In his influential book
God Was In Christ, Baillie states provocatively that the Incarnation 'presents us
indeed with the supreme paradox, and I do not believe that we can ever eliminate
103 It might be objected that the conclusions of Strawson's transcendental argument apply only to our
concepts of human personhood, consciousness, belief states, and so forth; as such, they should not be
pressed into use when speaking of divine personhood, consciousness, belief states, etc. Even if correct,
such a reply would put defenders of a 'two minds' model in an equally undesirable predicament, for it
would imply an equivocation in every key statement regarding Jesus' divine and human minds.
Indeed, it would no longer be accurate to speak of it as a 'two minds' model, since we would not be
distinguishing two things of the same kind at all!
104 A further defence of a dual-psychology interpretation can be found in Sturch (1991): 121-41; see
also Sturch (2003) and the surrejoinder in Bayne (2003). In my view, Sturch does not escape the
objections I have raised against Morris and Swinburne. He appeals to the notion of a 'central self,
according to which God the Son is aware that the human experiences of Jesus of Nazareth are also 'his
own' experiences. But his account fails to alleviate the more fundamental problem of how one unified
subject or 'central self can possess seemingly contradictory mental states (e.g., awareness of X and
lack of awareness of X) in the first place. It will not do to say that God the Son 'owns' Jesus'
knowledge but not his ignorance! It is somewhat telling that Sturch appears to waver between a two-
person christology and outright incoherence in later remarks on Jesus' divine self-awareness: 'Jesus
the man cannot of Himself know that He is God in kenosis, even if He is; but others can. God the Son
can, for one. (He cannot say "I am God in kenosis", but He can say, "This man is I, the Son, in
kenosis".)' Sturch (1991): 259.
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from it the element of paradox without losing the Incarnation itself.'105 For Baillie,
paradox is inevitable in theological discourse 'because God cannot be comprehended
in any human words or in any of the categories of our finite thought.'106 Accordingly,
he considers there to be multiple paradoxes in the Christian faith, although the
paradox of God becoming man is the 'supreme' and 'central' instance.107
One finds in Baillie a striking example of a conservative Christian theologian
emphatically and unashamedly affirming the paradoxicality of the doctrine of the
Incarnation. However, it would be premature to appropriate his work as support for
the apparently contradictory character of Chalcedonian christology, for two reasons:
first, because Baillie does not locate the paradox in the same place as the other
writers discussed in this chapter, viz. the seeming impossibility of one individual
possessing both divine and human attributes; and second, because Baillie's own
christology is arguably non-Chalcedonian.
For Baillie, the paradox of the Incarnation ultimately arises from another paradox
in the Christian faith, namely, the 'paradox of grace'.108 The essence of this paradox
'lies in the conviction which a Christian man possesses, that every good thing in him,
every good thing he does, is somehow not wrought by himself but by God.'109 In
short, the paradox is that on the Christian view, God takes full credit for our good
deeds (even though we perform them freely and responsibly) while we are wholly
culpable for our wrongdoings. How then does the paradox of the Incarnation derive
from the paradox of grace? Just in this: Baillie wishes us to see Jesus Christ, the
God-man, as the supreme manifestation of the paradox of grace — for in Christ,
whose life consisted entirely of good deeds, the paradox of grace is lived out in a
human being 'at the absolute degree'.110
105 Baillie (1961): 106, emphasis added.
106 Baillie (1961): 108-9.
107 Baillie (1961): 106, 110. Baillie's understanding of the term 'paradox' accords with the sense used
throughout this thesis, namely, an apparent contradiction. Baillie makes clear that paradox arises 'not
because the divine reality is self-contradictory' but because of the limitations of our human thought
and language — a stance which accords with the model of paradox I defend in later chapters.
I0S Somewhat confusingly, Baillie explicates his notion of the 'paradox of grace' in a section entitled
'The Central Paradox' — despite having previously spoken of the Incarnation as the 'central' paradox
of Christianity.
109 Baillie (1961): 114.
110 Baillie (1961): 129.
94
Whatever the merits of Baillie's conception of the 'paradox of grace' and its
relationship to the paradox of the Incarnation, it should be clear that he does not see
the latter paradox as arising from the same theological constraints as those I
identified earlier (for example, the biblical witness to the simultaneous omniscience
and partial ignorance of Christ). Moreover, that Baillie's christology is at odds with
Chalcedon should also be evident from his suggestion that the uniqueness of Christ
among those in whom God works lies not in a difference of kind (i.e., that Jesus,
unlike us, was essentially a divine person) but one of degree (i.e., that Jesus, unlike
us, lived a perfect life and thus perfectly manifested the paradox of grace). If nothing
else, the fact that John Hick — a persistent critic of Chalcedonian christology —
considers his own 'metaphorical' view of the Incarnation to be of the same basic type
as Baillie's should alert us to the questionable orthodoxy of his analysis of the person
of Christ.111
Despite these problems, Baillie's interpretation of the doctrine of the Incarnation
is far from irrelevant to the question at hand. His discomfort with the traditional
doctrines of anhypostasia and enhypostasia, and his embracing what ultimately
amounts to a two-person view of Christ, further supports the argument of the
previous section regarding the conceptual problem of reconciling a divine
112consciousness and a human consciousness in one person.
Baillie fails to provide a genuine example of a theologian conceding the inevitable
presence of paradox in Chalcedonian christology, but there are other writers who do
represent such a stance. I have already noted the statement of Stephen Davis that the
'classical' interpretation of the Incarnation involves paradox. The biblical scholar,
Charles Moule, in dialogue with the authors of The Myth of God Incarnate, admits
that the biblical picture of Jesus Christ taken as a whole may well require the
acceptance of paradox by the orthodox:
111 Hick (1993): 106-10; see also Brown (1985): 234-39. The fundamental point of difference between
Baillie and Chalcedon concerns the personal identity of Jesus of Nazareth and God the Son. As a
result, Baillie's christology is closer in the final analysis to Nestorianism than to Chalcedonian
orthodoxy, despite his disavowal of the former. Baillie (1961): 89-91, 145, 152.
112 One might wonder why Baillie should take such a rationalistic stance here, effectively rejecting
traditional Chalcedonian christology on logical grounds, when he later enthusiastically embraces
paradox in theology over against the 'rationalization' of Christian doctrines. Cf. Baillie (1961): 131,
142,144,155.
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Language which seems to recognize in Christ both the human and the divine may
seem to constitute a threat to a fully personal conception of the relation of God to man;
but if the data seem positively to require the recognition of a transcendent figure in
Paul's experience, and the identification of this transcendent figure with the historical
Jesus, it may be that the paradox has to be accepted. ...
In the last analysis, this conflict concerns the question whether a fully theistic position
does not necessitate a decisive distinction between the Creator and the created, and
whether (despite this) the evidence from the beginnings of Christianity does not
necessitate a Christ who, paradoxically, is on both sides of that distinction. It is a
painful conflict. ... True, there is no merit in paradox for its own sake. True, paradox
is sometimes grandly invoked when straight nonsense ought to be admitted to. It is a
sacred duty for any thinking person to try to eliminate paradox. But if the data refuse
to let us escape a paradox, it may be necessary to entertain it.113
Whilst not employing the specific term 'paradox', Karl Barth admits that the
christology of Chalcedon faces irresolvable logical difficulties:
It is apparent at once that divine and human essence cannot be united as the essence
ofone and the same subject. Offence at the statement that Jesus Christ is the One who
is of divine and human essence, in whom the two are united, is quite unavoidable.
However we may define divine and human essence, unless we do violence either to
the one or the other we can only define them (with all the regard we may have for the
original divine reference of human essence) in a sharp distinction and even antithesis.
The statement that Jesus Christ is the One who is ofdivine and human essence dares
to unite that which by definition cannot be united.
Offence at the statement about the union of the two natures in Jesus Christ is
unavoidable only for a thinking which is unconditionally bound by certain general
presuppositions. This unconditional binding, whether by Church dogma or general
logic and metaphysics, is not proper to recta ratio, to a thinking which is basically
free. Recta ratio is reason as it is ready for the realism demanded of it in face of this
object, and therefore free reason — free in relation to this object."4
Karl Rahner, meanwhile, maintains that the hypostatic union is one of the three
mysteria stride dida of the Christian faith:
It is simply contradictory that something should belong completely to the order of
creation, by being created, and still belong to the strictly divine order, .by being strictly
supernatural. Supernatural reality and reality brought about by a divine self-
communication of quasi-formal, not efficient type, are identical concepts. Hence the
possibility of such self-communication of God to the creature is what constitutes the
theological mystery ... [It is a mysterium stride dictum] because it is only through
revelation (understood as salvific event and word in an indissoluble unity) that we can
know that such a thing is actual and possible.115
Brian Hebblethwaite, commenting on the debate over The Myth of God Incarnate,
does not shy away from talk of paradox:
113 Moule (1979): 134, 140, emphasis added.
114 Barth (1958): 60-61, emphasis added. Barth treats the terms 'essence' and 'nature' as equivalent.
115 Rahner (1966): 67.
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It is certainly difficult, indeed paradoxical, to suppose that a human life lived out
within the framework of first-century Jewish consciousness could actually be the
incarnate life of God himself in one of the modes of his infinite and eternal being. ...
[A]nd so it should be, if human words are to be used to precipitate our minds beyond
the natural into thought of the transcendent. ... It is not a matter of rejoicing in straight
contradiction at the single mundane level of talk about two human individuals. The
paradoxes are a sign that we have to stop thinking anthropomorphically; and they are a
tool for thinking theologically about the one who cannot be 'comprehended' with
clear-cut univocal terms.116
Similar admissions can be found in other writers."7 The conviction that the doctrine
of the Incarnation expressed in the ecumenical creeds is paradoxical and defies
consistent formalisation is not restricted to its foes, but finds favour among its friends
as well.
3.4 Conclusion
My aim in this chapter has been to assess whether the Christian doctrine of the
Incarnation, interpreted in an orthodox fashion, is paradoxical in the sense that its
metaphysical affirmations appear to be logically contradictory. After reviewing the
historical development of the orthodox doctrine of the Incarnation, as expressed
particularly in the Definition of Chalcedon and the Athanasian Creed, I concluded
that deep-seated logical difficulties arise when these standards of orthodoxy are
interpreted in light of the theological convictions of those who originally formulated
them and the writings from which their phraseology is derived. I then turned to
consider contemporary interpretations of the doctrine of the Incarnation from writers
for whom alignment with credal orthodoxy was a significant concern, arguing that
those interpretations purporting to avoid both paradox and heterodoxy inevitably fail
on at least one of the two counts. Finally, I cited a selection of conservative
theologians who concede that the doctrine of the Incarnation is a paradox.
At the conclusion of the last chapter, I invoked the image of a law court to
underline the situation faced by orthodox trinitarianism. I suggested that if the
doctrine were to be placed in the dock and charged with the crime of apparent
contradiction, each of the theologians considered during that investigation — despite
their own expressed opinions on the guilt of the defendant — might well be called as
116 Hebblethwaite (1987): 45-47.
117 Hazelton (1949): 326; Farrer (1964): 75-76; Knox (1967): 99-100, 103-4; Dahms (1978): 272-73;
Bloesch (1978): 126-27, 134; Bartel (1995); Macquarrie (1998): 17-21; Evans (2002): 272.
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a witness for the prosecution, for each one would testify (with good reason) that
opposing interpretations of the doctrine are either theologically deficient, or
apparently contradictory, or both. My assessment of the doctrine of the Incarnation in
its historical development, credal definitions, and contemporary interpretations,
indicates that it would face a comparable scenario were it to be put on trial for the
same crime. Kenotic theorists summoned to give testimony would charge defenders
of Chalcedonian dual-psychology interpretations with incoherence, while the latter
would retort that the kenoticists had stepped outside the boundaries of orthodoxy;
meanwhile, some advocates of a traditional Chalcedonian interpretation would
endorse the complaints of both parties, while the added testimony of various liberal
scholars would leave the members of the jury with little doubt left in their minds.
As with the Trinity, so with the Incarnation. There appears to be no option for the
Christian theologian but to grasp one or other horn of the dilemma: to abandon
orthodoxy or to embrace paradox and thereby face the charge of irrationality. In the
next chapter, I examine various strategies for handling such a dilemma.
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4 Responding to Paradox
4.1 Introduction
To this point, I have argued that the Christian doctrines of the Trinity and the
Incarnation are paradoxical; that is, they make claims which, taken in conjunction,
appear to be logically inconsistent. This in itself is not a novel thesis. Others writers
have made the same observation, many of whom have claimed as a consequence that
Christians are irrational to believe these doctrines and other similarly paradoxical
ones. In the second part of the thesis, I will explicate and defend a model of Christian
doctrinal belief according to which Christians can be rational in holding to doctrines
such as these, their paradoxicality notwithstanding. Before doing so, however, it is
incumbent upon me to consider various alternative approaches to dealing with the
problem of paradoxes in Christian doctrine. I do not propose anything so ambitious
as to refute decisively every alternative as a viable option; that would be an
exceptional feat indeed in the arena of philosophical theology. Rather, I hope to
explain why each approach is unattractive or problematic in important ways and
therefore unsatisfactory as a general solution to the problem of theological paradox.
If nothing else, this should prime the reader for a sympathetic consideration of the
solution to be advocated later on; for my argument in the long run will be that this
solution is less problematic than its competitors and is thus to be preferred.
Before turning to consider each approach, it will be helpful to identify those
logical and linguistic factors which give rise to the charge of irrationality in the first
place. It will then be possible to categorise the various approaches considered below
according to (i) the factor or factors each one attempts to modify or eliminate so as to
resolve the paradox, and (ii) how the proposed modification or elimination proceeds.
By grouping strategies in this way, I hope to ensure that all relevant bases are being
covered in my treatment of proffered solutions.
What factors, then, combine together to give rise to a genuine contradiction? The
word 'contradict' derives from the Latin contradicere: literally, to speak against or
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deny. Naturally, there is nothing objectionable per se about speaking against or
denying some proposition or claim; what is deemed unacceptable is for some person
to speak against or deny some proposition whilst also affirming that same
proposition. Such a practice is invariably viewed as the height of irrationality. This
widespread conviction is expressed in the second of the three classical laws of
thought, the principle of non-contradiction: no statement can be both true and false.1
Accordingly, if S claims (or believes) that some proposition is both true and false (or
alternatively, that some proposition and its negation are both true) then S is guilty of
flagrant irrationality; likewise, any body of teaching which contains such a
contradiction is deemed to be defective in that regard.
Although the basic concept of contradiction is straightforward, it is less clear that
the doctrines treated in the previous chapters are guilty of contradiction in quite so
blatant a manner. None of the ancient creeds state anything like 'There is only one
God and there is not only one God' or 'Jesus Christ is fully divine and Jesus Christ is
not fully divine'. Indeed, it is hardly plausible to think that the Christian faith would
have endured and flourished to this day had it authorized such patently illogical
statements of doctrine. It is therefore important to distinguish between three types of
contradiction: explicit contradiction, formal contradiction, and implicit
contradiction. An explicit contradiction arises when one affirms both a proposition
and its logical negation (e.g., 'The cat is on the mat' and 'It is not the case that the
cat is on the mat'). A formal contradiction occurs when one affirms some set of
propositions that includes no explicit contradiction but from which an explicit
contradiction may be logically deduced (e.g., 'Harry is a Labrador', 'All Labradors
are dogs', and 'Harry is not a dog').3 Finally, a set of propositions is implicitly
contradictory if and only if the addition of one or more necessary truths yields a
formal contradiction (e.g., 'The ball is red all over' and 'The ball is green all over')4
1
Copiand Cohen (1998): 389.
2
Plantinga (1975): 12-16. Cf. Plantinga (1974): 164-65.
3 In this context 'logical deduction' would typically be taken as inferences validated by first-order
logic with identity, although the choice of deductive system is rather a matter of convention. The
division between cases of formal contradiction and cases of implicit contradiction is therefore not
strictly defined.
4 In this example, the necessary truth would be something like, 'Nothing is both red all over and green
all over.'
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With these distinctions in mind, consider the two theological paradoxes on which
I have focused. Although there are no explicit contradictions in the doctrines of the
Trinity and the Incarnation, one might think that the doctrine of the Trinity seems to
constitute a formal contradiction, since the statements involved in articulating it
appear to yield an explicit contradiction merely on application of first-order logic
with identity: for example, from 'The Father is God' and 'The Son is God' one can
deduce 'The Father is the Son' (provided the copula in each case is interpreted as
numerical identity).5 Nevertheless, the trinitarian creeds nowhere state explicitly that
numerical identity holds between the Godhead and each of the Father, Son, and Spirit
(or even that numerical non-identity holds between each pair of divine persons). My
claim has been merely that numerical identity (or something very close) seems to be
required between each hypostasis and the divine ousia when the creeds are
interpreted so as to rule out heterodox views such as subordinationism and tritheism.
I suggest therefore that the type of contradiction, apparent or otherwise, involved
in paradoxical Christian doctrines is best characterised as implicit contradiction. The
problem is that certain statements of Christian doctrine seem to imply further claims
that in turn explicitly contradict other statements of Christian doctrine (or certain
natural implications of those statements). For example: while the Definition of
Chalcedon may not explicitly state that Jesus was aware of everything (including the
date of the Parousia) and also that Jesus was not aware of everything, it nonetheless
appears to imply those very claims by virtue of the balanced christology its authors
sought to articulate.
Given this understanding of the sense in which such doctrines are contradictory, it
is obvious that one of the factors which invites the broader charge of irrationality is
therefore logic, specifically, the logical law of non-contradiction and any other
principles of inference that allow us to deduce further propositions from statements
of Christian doctrine. Such laws of logic are considered to be canons of rationality: it
is irrational to affirm sets of propositions that do not abide by those laws. However,
in order to determine whether a contradiction has in fact arisen, one also needs to
grasp just what propositions are being affirmed; in other words, the presence of a
contradiction depends not only on logic but also on the meaning of the statements
5 Cf. Martinich (1978); Cartwright (1987); Tuggy (2003b).
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under consideration. For any set of doctrinal statements, one interpretation of those
statements could involve an implicit contradiction whilst another interpretation might
not.6 The question of whether credal statements regarding the Trinity and the
Incarnation are logically consistent thus depends on what one believes (or ought to
believe) that those statements affirm.
Given these paradox-generating factors, it is possible to distinguish two basic
types of strategy for avoiding the charge of irrationality levelled at paradoxical
Christian doctrines. The first type advocates some revision in our understanding of
those laws of logic normally assumed to be canons of rationality. The second type, in
contrast, assumes that all is well with logic and focuses instead on the meaning of the
doctrinal statements in question. Moreover, these two basic types may be further
subdivided. Within the first, there are strategies that aim to avoid contradiction and
others that advise us to allow contradiction. Within the second, there are strategies
that advocate revision of the doctrines in question (having accepted that the
traditional interpretations are logically problematic) while others favour retention of
those doctrines by arguing that traditional interpretations of the doctrinal statements
do not mean anything that necessarily implies a contradiction. In the remainder of
the chapter, I will examine examples of each of these four types of strategy for
deflecting the charge of irrationality. (For an overview of the divided field, see
Figure 4.1.) Before doing so, however, I wish to consider another type of approach
altogether — one that both accepts the classical laws of logic and grants that some
Christian doctrines do indeed violate these laws, but maintains nonetheless that this
should be no cause for concern.
6 For example, social trinitarians such as Plantinga and Swinburne claim that their interpretation of the
Athanasian Creed is logically consistent, where other interpretations (e.g., the Augustinian reading)
are not.
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STRATEGIES FOR RESPONDING TO DOCTRINAL PARADOX
Strategies advocating





















The notion that objects of human experience and discourse — birds, bicycles,
bridges, and the like — genuinely exist and have the properties they do
independently of what we think or state about their existence and properties is
commonly referred to as realism. This view is contrasted with anti-realism, which
holds that the way the world exists actually depends, in some essential way, on our
conceptualisation of the world.7 In fact, anti-realists advise that talk of 'the real
world' or 'the world as it actually exists' is altogether misguided, for the very notion
is incoherent; the only reality to which we have epistemic access is one shaped and
supported by the concepts and structures of our own thought and language.
Anti-realism of this type may be held either globally, with respect to all objects of
thought or discourse, or more modestly, with respect to some particular domain of
objects. Thus, a scientific anti-realist might hold that the kinds of entities referred to
by physical theories (e.g., 'quarks') should not be thought of as enjoying any 'reality'
or 'existence' other than that presupposed by the conventions of the language with
which those theories are expressed. According to this position, when a quantum
theorist states that 'a proton consists of three quarks', her words should not be taken
to imply that such things as protons and quarks 'really exist'. Rather, the statement
should be understood in a way that makes no 'nai've' ontological assumptions;
7 The form of anti-realism I am considering here may be more precisely termed alethic realism so as
to distinguish it from metaphysical realism. Used with respect to some type of entity (e.g., numbers,
properties, propositions), the latter refers to the view that entities of that type really exist. Cf. Alston
(1996): 65-73.
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perhaps something like, 'in the language of quantum theory, which physicists employ
to describe and systematise the phenomena under their study, the sentence "a proton
consists of three quarks" evaluates to true.' Along similar lines, a theological anti-
realism would hold that statements employing terms such as 'God' should not be
thought of as referring to some entity existing independently of our thought or
language; a fortiori they should not be understood as ascribing certain properties or
actions to any such entity. On the contrary, such talk serves quite another purpose: to
express one's commitment to a certain community or way of life, perhaps, or to
verbalise an attitude of worship. Anti-realism with respect to religious language has
been advocated by a number of prominent contemporary theologians and has
o
generated considerable interest and debate.
It might be thought that theological anti-realism can offer a straightforward
answer to the problem of paradox. Suppose that adherence to the Christian faith
involves the affirmation of certain statements of doctrine that are implicitly
contradictory. Why, given an anti-realist view of doctrine, should this be thought a
serious problem? In making such statements Christians would not thereby be
affirming that there 'really exists' some entity, God, who is both one and three in
some inherently incompatible sense. They would not be making the metaphysical
claim that some objective state of affairs, independent of our human minds, both
obtains and does not obtain. In short, Christians would not be guilty of suggesting
that some feature of reality is actually contradictory — for the simple reason that
within the domain of theological language the idea of 'reality' being 'actually'
anything is misguided from the outset.9 On this view, the creeds and doctrines of
Christianity are not making metaphysical claims at all; they serve quite another
purpose altogether, such as providing an identifying badge for a particular
community or set of religious practices.
8 For examples of a theologically anti-realist stance, see Cupitt (1984): 20, 265, 269; Phillips (1976):
100, 150, 169-81. Arguably the postliberalist school of thought, associated primarily with the work of
Hans Frei and George Lindbeck, reflects an anti-realist (or at least «o«-realist) interpretation of
Christian doctrine. According to such thinkers, doctrine is best thought of as the 'grammar' of
Christian discourse; rather than making first-order truth claims about God, the world, etc., Christian
doctrines make second-order claims about religious language, dictating what is and is not an
acceptable way for the church to verbalise the gospel. For a typical exposition of this view, see
Loughlin (1997).
9 As Phillips puts it, 'the confusion [of religious realism] resides in equating metaphysical and
religious beliefs.' Phillips (1976): 100.
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Although this route might seem attractive to some, it suffers from some serious
drawbacks. First of all, it is not clear that it actually addresses the problem of
paradox as I have constructed it. As I noted earlier, a contradiction pertains to a set of
statements, not to objects or states of affairs (whether construed realistically or
otherwise). So even if Christian doctrinal statements ought to be interpreted along
anti-realist lines, it would remain true that such statements appear to violate those
norms of logic and language relevant to their interpretation. In other words, an anti-
realist's contradiction is a contradiction nonetheless; and a contradiction is generally
thought of as rationally unacceptable. An enterprising anti-realist (taking a cue from
Wittgenstein) might insist at this point that the Christian community has its own
logical standards, according to which some contradictions are rationally legitimate.
Although this move is consistent with anti-realist sentiments, the idea that different
communities have different laws of logic raises a whole host of problems in itself.10
In any case, the active ingredient of this augmented response is its advocacy of
alternative logic rather than any basic anti-realist tenet (i.e., the denial of a mind-
independent or language-independent reality) and, as such, it succumbs to the
difficulties I discuss later in this chapter.
Secondly, and even more seriously, the anti-realist solution suffers from a
debilitating implausibility.11 If modern anti-realist theologians wish to claim that
when they recite (say) the Nicene Creed, they are merely identifying themselves with
a certain group or lifestyle rather than confessing beliefs about some thought-
independent reality, I am in no position to disagree. But it is hard to believe that the
same holds for the average man or woman in the pew today — let alone the Apostles,
the Fathers, and Christian believers throughout the centuries. I would wager that
most Christians, if questioned on this point, would give a distinctly realist
interpretation of their beliefs and confessions; they may be right or wrong about
whether their purportedly mind-independent references actually obtain, but
presumably they know best just what they mean by their own words. Hence, if the
anti-realist solution is to succeed its advocates must argue either that, contrary to first
impressions, Christian doctrines have historically been understood in an anti-realist
10 Harris (1992): 27-41; Markham (1998): 57-65.
" For a similar line of criticism, see Davis (1997): 50-56.
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sense or else that Christians should now reinterpret those doctrines so as to reflect an
anti-realist stance. The first option seems wildly optimistic; it would require
showing, among other things, that the substance of the early trinitarian and
christological debates was concerned not with theological metaphysics, as the history
books would suggest, but merely with what grammar Christians should use to
12
identify and distinguish themselves (or some similar linguistic concern). The
second option, on the other hand, amounts to doctrinal revisionism — a strategy for
coping with paradox that is by no means unique to religious anti-realism and which
suffers from problems of its own, as I will argue in due course.
For reasons such as these, theological anti-realism fails to provide a satisfying
solution to the problem of paradox in Christian doctrines. It is doubtful whether it
offers a unique answer to the problem; and even if it does, it is an answer that
orthodox Christians will be disinclined to embrace, on both historical and religious
grounds.
4.3 Anti-Deductivism
In this section and the following, I consider two strategies which propose to address
the problem of paradox by challenging our commonsense understanding of the laws
of logic. The first approach, which I will refer to as anti-deductivism, concedes that it
is irrational to affirm contradictory statements (or to hold contradictory beliefs) but
maintains that no contradiction arises from paradoxical doctrines such as the Trinity
and the Incarnation because it is invalid to deduce from one doctrinal statement the
negation of another statement.13 For example, in the case of the doctrine of the
Trinity, the anti-deductivist would claim that the following argument is unsound:
(1) The Father is God and the Father is not the Son.
12
Coakley (2002) counters Richard Norris's thesis that the Definition of Chalcedon was merely an
exercise in linguistic regulation, establishing a set of 'rules of predication'. Her criticisms could be
applied equally well to postliberal readings of the other early creeds.
13
Although I have on several occasions encountered unsophisticated expressions of anti-deductivism
in Christian circles, the only published defence of this position that I have uncovered is Good (1986).
Good's thesis is that the principle of 'good and necessary consequence' associated with the Reformed
theological tradition, which he identifies with logical deduction, is at odds with a commitment to sola
scriptura. In his view, Christian doctrine should consist solely of propositions explicitly stated in the
Bible; logically deducing further propositions from that stock is tantamount to a rejection of the
sufficiency of Scripture. The lack of enthusiasm for anti-deductivism among serious theologians is
reflected in the relative brevity of my treatment here.
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(2) If a is b and a is not c, then c is not b.
(3) Therefore, the Son is not God.14
It is important to note that the anti-deductivist rejects this argument specifically as
invalid; it is unsound not because any of the premises are false, but rather because
the inference of (3) from (1) and (2) is erroneous. Moreover, the invalidity is due not
to an equivocation of terms but to some formal law of inference being inapplicable in
this case. The likely culprit here is the classical rule of modus ponens: ifp then q\ p,
therefore q. In effect, the anti-deductivist is claiming that modus ponens is not
universally applicable; for some p and q, the truth that p and the truth that p entails q
do not together yield the truth of q. Once this door is opened, a general strategy for
handling theological paradox emerges: whenever logical deductions from doctrinal
statements lead to an explicit contradiction, one should conclude that this is one of
those instances where the rules of deduction employed do not apply.
This is certainly a radical solution to the problem. There are few certainties in life,
still less in philosophical theology, but elementary laws of logic such as modus
ponens are usually considered to be among the best candidates. Psychologically
speaking, at least, the rule of modus ponens strikes us as a self-evident, necessary
truth. When we reflect on it, the phenomenology of that proposition (roughly, the
way it 'feels' or 'strikes' us when considered) is indistinguishable from any other
commonly accepted logical or mathematical truism; we cannot see how it could ever
be false, regardless of what propositions are represented by p and q,15 Given the
strength with which most people who have considered the matter hold modus ponens
to be a necessary truth, not to mention the central role it plays in much of our
everyday reasoning, it is hard to imagine any rational grounds strong enough to
warrant abandoning that belief. So what grounds does the anti-deductivist propose?
They are presumably twofold: (i) the necessary falsity of explicit contradictions and
(ii) the truth of the doctrinal statements in question. Regarding the first, it is hard to
14 In these statements, each of the capitalized terms is a proper noun and the copula thus signifies the
relation of numerical identity (the operative assumption being that while the relationship between each
divine person and the divine essence may not be equivalent to that relation, it at least appears to imply
such a relation). This interpretation of the doctrine of the Trinity accords with the conclusions of
Chapter 2.
15 For a discussion of the phenomenology of a priori necessary truths, see Plantinga (1993a): 103-8.
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see why it shouldn't be thought arbitrary to reject one apparent necessary truth on the
basis of another apparent necessary truth. Why wouldn't one be as well to reject the
necessary truth of the law of non-contradiction instead of the necessary truth of
modus ponens, since both are known a priori if known at all and each exhibits much
the same doxastic phenomenology as the other when reflected upon? Still more
dubious, however, is the rejection of modus ponens in favour of (ii). Even granting a
strong view of divine revelation through Scripture or tradition, it stretches credibility
to breaking point to suppose that one's belief in Christian doctrines could be
warranted to such a degree as to compel one to reject otherwise impeccable laws of
deduction. If this approach could ever be justified, it must surely be considered a last
resort.
Abandoning modus ponens would not come without a price. Laws of inference,
being necessary truths, are known a priori if known at all.16 Moreover, we are
reassured about our belief in modus ponens by its phenomenology; all other
considerations aside, it strikes us on reflection as being a necessary truth. Yet if we
were to decide to reject its necessary truth, then the necessary truth of other
17
propositions with the same phenomenology could easily be cast into doubt.
Furthermore, one might well wonder how far the exceptions to modus ponens extend.
The anti-deductivist could insist that such exceptions are restricted to the domain of
theological propositions, yet once the necessary truth of this rule of inference has
been brought into question, it is difficult to see how one could justify such a
restriction. Even on the assumption that it does, the validity of religiously significant
inferences such as the following could no longer be taken for granted:
(4) Whoever believes in the Son of God has eternal life.
16
Necessary truths such as these cannot be known a posteriori, since no amount of 'positive
confirmations' based on experience could ever warrant the judgement that some proposition is true of
necessity rather than merely contingently. For a defence of a priori knowledge of necessary truths, see
BonJour (1998).
17 I am not suggesting that our knowledge of a priori truths is based upon their phenomenology, i.e.,
that they are justified or warranted via inference from some kind of doxastic experience. On the
contrary, I hold that such beliefs are held basically, not inferentially. My point is a psychological one:
assuming that I could bring myself to abandon my belief in modus ponens, if I were thereafter to
realise that its phenomenology had provided no assurance of its necessary truth then my assurance
about the necessary truth of other beliefs with the same phenomenology would tend to be eroded, with
potentially disastrous cognitive consequences.
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(5) I believe in the Son of God.
(6) Therefore, I have eternal life.
Clearly the anti-deductivist needs to identify some principled way of distinguishing
between valid and invalid inferences from theological propositions: between cases
where modus ponens applies and cases where it does not, etc. Of course, any
argument put forward for some particular criterion must scrupulously avoid begging
the question by applying modus ponens (or its revised substitute) in an indiscriminate
18
way. Perhaps such a project can be accomplished. Nevertheless, its prima facie
difficulty only serves to reinforce the conclusion that this strategy for defending
paradox is altogether unappealing.
4.4 Dialetheism
The first of the two identified strategies for resolving the problem of paradox by
revising our laws of logic — namely, the rejection of deductive rules such as modus
ponens — does not seem at all promising. The second option is to reject the law of
non-contradiction: the principle that no statement can be both true and false.
Understandably, this approach is not a popular one among those attempting to
address the problem of paradox in Christian theology, particularly those with a
professed concern to preserve both rationality and orthodoxy. The comments of
Thomas Morris typify the disdain of scholars for this escape route:
It should, however, be clear that the strategy of defending the doctrine [of the
Incarnation] by devaluing the status of logical consistency has very little to be said for
it from a philosophical perspective. It is just a desperation move which embraces
incoherence to avoid its sting.19
Even so, despite widespread disapproval the approach has been advocated by a
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handful of writers. A relatively recent example is provided by John Dahms in an
18
Imagine that such an argument takes the following form: 'IfX is the case, then modus ponens does
not apply to propositions of type T. X is indeed the case; therefore, modus ponens does not apply to
propositions of type T.' The argument itself employs modus ponens, either (a) in an unrestricted
manner or (b) in the restricted form advocated by the anti-deductivist. But the anti-deductivist rejects
(a) and cannot appeal to (b) without begging the question.
19 Morris (1986): 25.
20 The most famous of which is often said to be Soren Kierkegaard. It is questionable, however,
whether Kierkegaard understood the paradoxes of the Christian faith to be actual logical
contradictions. See Evans (1998): 80-83. A more recent example may be provided by David
Cunningham, who contends that theology 'should not be drawn into that realm of enterprises that must
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9 1
article challenging the 'unlimited applicability' of logic. Dahms' article is of
particular relevance because its author claims that his stance is motivated, at least in
part, by the paradoxicality of certain central Christian doctrines. In what follows, I
will explain why Dahms' specific proposal is unsatisfactory before turning to assess
the general philosophical view that contradictions can be true.
Dahms introduces his case by explaining what he means by the term 'logic':
The basic laws or principles of logic are commonly said to be three in number: the law
of identity, the law of contradiction and the law of excluded middle. ... [T]hese three
are at least the foremost of the laws of thought. Moreover, though the other two
apparently cannot be derived from it, writers often mention the law of contradiction
when they have logic generally in mind.22
Dahms notes that 'orthodox thinkers commonly believe that logic is of unlimited
applicability'; for example, they believe that for every propositionp, it is not the case
that p is both true and false.23 In the remainder of his article, Dahms focuses
primarily on the law of non-contradiction and argues, first, that there are good non-
theological grounds for holding that the law is limited in its applicability, and second,
that from a Christian perspective there are also good theological grounds for granting
the truth of some contradictions.
Concerning the non-theological grounds for rejecting the unlimited applicability
of logic, Dahms cites five reasons: (i) the problem of irrational numbers; (ii) Zeno's
paradox of Achilles and the tortoise; (iii) apparent exceptions to the principle that
'according to logic the whole is equal to the sum of the parts'; (iv) the ethical
problem according to which a virtuous action must be 'both determined and free,
which is a contradiction'; and (v) apparent exceptions to logic in the realm of
conform to the true/false dichotomies of Boolean logic.' Cunningham (1998): 35-36. Elsewhere in the
same volume, Cunningham seems inclined toward a form of anti-realism, suggesting as he does that
while the Trinity is problematic in 'conceptual worlds such as arithmetic, formal logic, and analytic
philosophy', there are nonetheless alternative conceptual schemes in terms of which threeness and
oneness are not incompatible. Cunningham (1998): 127. This suggests that there is no objective fact of
the matter regarding the logicality of the Trinity; it all depends on how one thinks about it. I will not
attempt to disentangle Cunningham's position here, since I argue that both anti-realism and
dialetheism are inadequate responses to the trinitarian paradox; thus whichever approach Cunningham
means to endorse, it is misguided.
21 Dahms (1978). See also Geisler (1979a); Dahms (1979); Geisler (1979b). My analysis of Dahms'
thesis differs in significant respects from Geisler's.
22 Dahms (1978): 369.
23 Dahms expresses the law of non-contradiction in terms of things rather than propositions or
statements, e.g., 'nothing can be both A and notM'. This difference does not affect my analysis,
however, since on realist assumptions it follows from Dahms' characterisation that the statement 'A is
A' cannot be both true and false.
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aesthetics (e.g., 'harmonic discord' in music).24 Whether any of these amount to
good reasons for rejecting the law of non-contradiction is debatable at best.25 But
rather than engaging in a detailed critique of this part of Dahms' case, I propose
instead to focus on his discussion of contradictions within Christian theology, for
even if Dahms were right about accepting contradictions in non-theological areas, it
would not immediately follow that he offers a satisfactory solution to the problem of
doctrinal paradox.
Turning to matters theological, Dahms writes:
It is especially surprising that orthodox Christians should hold to the universal
applicability of logic. Various doctrines of the faith provide problems for such a
view.26
He cites four examples: (i) the fall of Satan (according to which, evil must derive
from good); (ii) the biblical view of the cross (according to which, human sin is
necessary to God and therefore ultimately good); (iii) the doctrine of the Incarnation;
and (iv) the doctrine of the Trinity. In each case, Dahms suggests, the Christian who
affirms these doctrines must thereby implicitly affirm some contradictory truth.
Thus, 'it ought to be quite clear that the doctrines of historic Christianity are not
always compatible with the law of contradiction.'27
I will not contest Dahms' claim that these four Christian doctrines are paradoxical
(i.e., at least apparently contradictory); indeed, I have already indicated substantial
agreement regarding his third and fourth examples. The relevant question is whether
Dahms' recommendation that Christians revise their understanding of the law of non¬
contradiction constitutes a satisfactory solution to the problem. A number of
objections immediately suggest themselves. First of all, I observed in the preceding
section that elementary principles of logic are intuitively held to be necessary truths
with a high degree of certainty: psychological certainty, at the very least, if not
rational certainty (as many epistemologists would insist). As with modus ponens, so
24 Dahms (1978): 370-72.
25
Indeed, Dahms' reasoning here seems plagued by confusions. For example, in his first argument he
confuses irrational numbers (i.e., those which cannot be expressed as the division of one natural
number by another) with imaginary numbers (i.e., those which can be expressed as the square root of
a negative real number) — and in any case, the concept of irrational numbers has nothing to do with
logical violations. Dahms thus fails to show why accepting irrational (or imaginary) numbers forces us
to concede exceptions to any of the three classical laws of logic.
26 Dahms (1978): 372.
27 Dahms (1978): 375.
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with the law of non-contradiction: it lacks plausibility to claim that doctrinal
statements, however well supported, could be warranted to such a degree as to justify
abandoning belief in these intuitive laws of logic. Dahms might counter that the
Christian's policy of belief revision should be contextualized by the particular
religious convictions and faith commitments of the church community; whether or
not this line would persuade Christian scholars, it hardly satisfies as a response to the
extra-mural charge that orthodox Christian beliefs are irrational.
Secondly, it might be objected that Dahms' position is self-refuting since, as he
himself concedes, he has assumed the laws of logic by way of arguing for their
limited applicability:
It is to be emphasized that we have not stated that logic is valueless, only that it is not
always applicable. Logical argumentation is frequent in the Bible. Logic was one of
the things that made it possible to put men on the moon. We have used logic in this
28
paper.
Although this objection might initially seem decisive, matters are not so
straightforward. For while Dahms has clearly assumed some logical principles — he
would presumably insist that his arguments are valid and his stated conclusions about
the use of logic are not both true and false — it is difficult to show that he has
assumed the unlimited applicability of the laws of logic. However suspicious, it is
entirely consistent with his thesis for Dahms to maintain that logic applies to the
9Q
statements contained within his article, but not to certain other statements. One
might then object that it is incumbent on Dahms to provide and justify some set of
criteria, which can be reliably and concretely applied, so as to distinguish those
instances where logic is applicable from those where it is not. As it turns out, Dahms
anticipates this obligation and proposes the following rule of demarcation:
It would appear that [logic] is thoroughly reliable when dealing with the nominal
(being) but not when dealing with the verbal (becoming) or the aesthetic. Our reliance
on logic in this paper is justified by the fact that we only use it of the existential and
the aesthetic when we are considering them in the abstract.30
It is not wholly clear what distinctions Dahms means to draw with his categories of
'nominal', 'verbal', and 'aesthetic'. The idea seems to be, roughly, that the following
claims hold:
28 Dahms (1978): 375.
29
Indeed, this is Dahms' own defence against Geisler's charge of self-defeat. Dahms (1979): 141-42.
30 Dahms (1978): 378.
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(7) Logic is always applicable to statements describing some static state of affairs
(e.g., 'God is good') but not to statements describing some dynamic state of
affairs (e.g., 'the Spirit proceeds from the Father') or expressing some aesthetic
judgement.
(8) Logic is always applicable to statements concerned with any of these three areas
in the abstract — in other words, statements about the statements referred to in
(7).
Regardless of how Dahms' distinctions cash out, his position (and variations on the
same theme) can be expressed more generally as follows:
(9) The law of non-contradiction applies to all statements except those concerned
non-abstractly with subject matter M.
The qualifier non-abstractly is essential to avoid self-refutation. Although (9) itself is
concerned with subject matter M, it is only concerned with M in the abstract. One
who affirms (9) is not thereby committed to holding that the law of non-contradiction
does not apply to (9) and hence is not vulnerable to the objection that the negation of
(9) cannot be excluded.
This general position on the limited applicability of the law of non-contradiction
may be immune to a straightforward reductio ad absurdum, but I suggest that it is
untenable because the criterion it recommends cannot be applied in practice. If the
stance expressed by (9) is to be viable, then it must be possible for one to judge, for
any statement S, whether or not S is concerned non-abstractly with subject matter M
(whatever M may be). However, in order to determine that S is concerned non-
abstractly with M, one must also be able to judge whether or not claims of the
following two forms are true (where X identifies some non-linguistic, non-conceptual
item, e.g., Socrates, the Atlantic Ocean, or my favourite shirt):
(10) S is about X.
(11) A falls under subject matter M.
It should be evident, however, that if both (10) and (11) are true, then they are both
concerned non-abstractly with subject matter M (since they both direct statements
about X). Therefore, according to (9), it is possible for (10) to be both true and false
and likewise for (11). But if that is so, then one cannot make a reliable judgement
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about whether (10) and (11) are true or not — and thus one cannot make a reliable
judgement about whether or not S is concerned non-abstractly with M.
If we consider Dahms' position as a specific instance of (9), we can see how this
cashes out in practice. Consider the claim, 'Madrid is in Spain.' Does the law of non¬
contradiction apply to this statement? As a precondition of answering this question, it
must be possible in principle to judge (i) that the statement is about Madrid and (ii)
that Madrid falls under either the verbal or the aesthetic.31 Yet if Madrid does fall
under either the verbal or the aesthetic then, on Dahms' view, (i) and (ii) are not
subject to the law of non-contradiction, in which case they could be false as well as
true. And if one cannot establish that both (i) and (ii) are not false, then one could
never in principle determine that the law of non-contradiction is not applicable to the
claim 'Madrid is in Spain' — or to any other non-abstract claim.
It appears that Dahms' thesis that logic applies only to statements concerned with
particular subject matters cannot be observed in practice, even if theoretically
correct. Nevertheless, the general thesis that some contradictions can be true,
irrespective of subject matter, has been seriously considered and competently
defended by a number of philosophers in the last two decades. This view, dubbed
dialetheism by Graham Priest and Richard Routley, holds that there are true
32
contradictions; that is, there are statements that are both true and false. The
paradigm example of a dialetheia is the so-called Liar paradox:
(12) This sentence is not true.
Is (12) true or not? If it is true, then (by its own testimony) it must be not true; if it is
not true, on the other hand, then it must be true (since what it says to be the case is
the case). The Liar paradox has proven remarkably resistant to explanations as to
why it does not force us to concede that some statements are both true and false (and
thus that some contradictions are true).33 Self-referential paradoxes of this kind have
31 I am not claiming that these judgements must always be consciously made when evaluating the
applicability of logic to the target statement; my claim is merely that if these judgements could not be
reliably made in principle then neither can the overall evaluation of the target statement.
32 Priest et al. (1989): xx. This neologism is a compound of the Greek words for 'two' and 'truth'. A
dialetheia is thus a 'two-way truth': a statement that evaluates to both true and false.
33 For an analysis of attempts to resolve the Liar paradox and its close relatives, see Sainsbury (1995):
107-29; Rescher (2001): 193-215.
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been taken by some philosophers as a compelling reason for embracing
dialetheism.34
Dialetheism itself is surprisingly difficult to refute, not least because attempted
refutations frequently presuppose the principle they purport to prove, viz. that no
statement can be both true and false. Similarly, objections based on the principle that
anything whatsoever can be inferred from a contradiction (ex contradictione
quodlibet, as the Scholastic maxim put it) fail to unseat the dialetheist since they
merely take for granted a classical rule of inference which (as Priest has shown) can
be rejected without any intolerable consequences; the persistent dialetheist will
cheerfully advocate a paraconsistent logic in place of classical logic so as to avoid
the spectre of'logical explosion'.
Another argument sometimes raised against dialetheism runs as follows. A
statement is only meaningful if it rules something out; but if the law of non¬
contradiction does not hold, then no statement automatically rules out its negation or,
a fortiori, any other statement; therefore, the meaningfulness of language
presupposes the law of non-contradiction. In reply, the dialetheist can point out that
the statement 'everything is true' is clearly meaningful (even if obviously false) and
yet it rules nothing out (by virtue of ruling everything in).
After sympathetically considering the various objections levelled at dialetheism,
R. M. Sainsbury laments:
With some distress, I come to the conclusion that none of the objections I review
ought to force a resourceful rational dialetheist to admit defeat.35
However distressing this conclusion, it would seem to be a fair assessment of the
debate. As such, it would be foolhardy for me to attempt a decisive refutation of
dialetheism simpliciter, when others better equipped and more determined have
failed. Nevertheless, it should not be thought that this concession thereby opens the
door to embracing dialetheism as a satisfactory solution to the problem of paradox in
Christian theology. On the contrary, I suggest that there are at least three good
34
Sainsbury (1995): 135; Priest et al. (1989): 503-10. Dialetheism has also been advocated on the
basis of theological considerations; in this respect, Dahms is preceded by Peter Damiani, Meister




reasons for rejecting this application of dialetheism: two are of considerable weight,
while the third is weightier still.36
The first is simply this: theological dialetheism has the odd consequence that God
believes some falsehoods (about God, no less) and invites us to do likewise. This
criticism may not be decisive, but it seems hard to reconcile this outcome with the
biblical emphasis on promoting truth and eschewing untruth (e.g., Ps. 52:3; Eph.
4:25; 1 John 4:6).
The second reason is the observation, made several times previously, that the law
of non-contradiction enjoys considerable prima facie support by way of the
phenomenology and ubiquity of belief in it. If nothing else, this indicates that a
rejection of the law should serve only as a last resort in attempting to address the
problem of paradox. Moreover, this solution is likely to endear itself only to those
standing within the Christian faith (and even then will be deemed a bitter pill); as a
defensive strategy to counter the charge of irrationality levelled at Christian
doctrines, it lacks plausibility and smacks of special pleading.
The third argument for rejecting theological dialetheism runs as follows. If
dialetheism were to be adopted by Christians as a response to the problem of paradox
in doctrines such as the Trinity and the Incarnation, then presumably the desire to
preserve an orthodox interpretation of those doctrines would feature as a significant
motivation. After all, if one were unconcerned about maintaining orthodoxy, then
one would be more inclined to revise or reject the problematic doctrines themselves
than the laws of logic. Yet for believers such as these, embracing dialetheism would
have a direct and quite unacceptable consequence, namely, that one could no longer
object to heterodox theological statements. For example, an orthodox explication of
the doctrine of the Trinity would likely include the following statements:
(13) The Father is God.
(14) The Son is God.
(15) The Father is not the Son.
36 It should be noted that all three points count also against the 'limited applicability' thesis of Dahms,
in addition to the specific objections raised earlier.
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The paradox arises because on the most natural interpretation, the conjunction of (13)
and (14) implies the negation of (15). Now, the Christian dialetheist would
presumably concede this entailment but would argue that affirming (13), (14) and
(15) is not irrational because some contradictions are true — including, one assumes,
the following statement:
(16) The Father is not the Son and the Father is the Son.
However, even on a paraconsistent logic such as that preferred by the dialetheist, one
can logically infer from (16) this heterodox modalist claim:37
(17) The Father is the Son.
The problem is obvious: advocating dialetheism in order to preserve orthodoxy
ironically ends up making its preservation irrelevant, since it involves the joint
affirmation of both orthodox and heterodox theological claims. It should go without
saying that this solution would hardly have appealed to those Christian thinkers who
were responsible for forging statements of orthodox doctrine in the fires of the
trinitarian and christological controversies. It follows on a theological dialetheist
view that these debates were all so much wasted breath: Athanasius and Arius should
simply have concluded that they were both right about the deity of Christ, in spite of
the logical incompatibility of their views; likewise Cyril and Nestorius on the
relationship between Jesus and the Logos. As a solution to the problem of paradox,
dialetheism only saves rationality at the expense of trivialising orthodoxy.
4.5 Doctrinal Revisionism
As a solution to the problem of paradoxical Christian doctrines, revising the laws of
logic — either standard rules of inference such as modus ponens or classical laws
such as the principle of non-contradiction — is a highly unsatisfactory strategy. If
justifiable at all, it must remain a last refuge. This conviction appears to be shared by
the considerable majority of theologians and philosophers. In the remainder of this
chapter, I therefore turn to consider instances of the second basic type of strategy:
responses to paradox which focus on the meaning of doctrinal statements, rather than
37 The rule of inference in question, one shared by classical and paraconsistent logics, is the 'Rule of
Simplification': p and q, therefore q.
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the logical relations obtaining between them. The first of these strategies, which I
will call doctrinal revisionism, maintains that the best response to the problem of
paradox is to revise the offending doctrines so as to avoid all discernible elements of
logical contradiction. This revision involves not merely a clarification or a
refinement of the traditional statements of the doctrine, but rather a rejection of at
least some of those statements (as originally intended) in favour of alternative
38
statements.
For those Christian theologians and philosophers who acknowledge the charge of
contradiction levelled at Christian doctrines and attempt to defend the rationality of
those doctrines without questioning the laws of logic, doctrinal revisionism is not
easily embraced. Across the board, there is a desire to retain where possible the
traditional formulations and interpretations of doctrines, especially those stated in the
ecumenical creeds and considered historically to express the boundaries of
orthodoxy.39 What accounts for this sentiment? It is due in part, one suspects, to the
conserving principle that tradition should be respected and given the benefit of the
doubt. This tendency is not merely a psychological phenomenon, nothing more than
a consequence of peer pressure and the natural human inclination to avoid attracting
alienating labels such as 'heterodox' or 'heretical'. On the contrary, this is a perfectly
rational policy, generally speaking, since tradition is precisely that which is
considered worthy of being handed down (Latin: traducere) from one generation to
the next because it represents the culmination of the wisdom of our predecessors. If
certain beliefs or claims have survived the scrutiny of previous scholars within one's
religious community, then they arguably merit prima facie acceptance. Given this
perspective on the rationality of retaining traditions, it follows that the classical
doctrines of the Christian faith ought not to be abandoned unless there is very good
reason to do so.
3S For typical examples of doctrinal revisionism with respect to the doctrines of the Trinity and the
Incarnation, see Buzzard and Hunting (1998) and Hick (1977). In a recent article on the Trinity, Dale
Tuggy makes a plea for doctrinal revision in the face of paradox: Tuggy (2003b). (Cf. Tuggy (2003a):
454-55, where he argues that the Athanasian Creed should not be endorsed by Christians on account
of its apparent self-contradiction.) To be fair, Tuggy thinks that his recommended revision is
compatible with Scripture and a certain reading of the Nicene Creed. For a response to his proposal,
see Anderson (2005).
39
Examples include Davis (1983): 1-3, 118; Hill (1982): xi-xii; Morris (1986): 16, 44; Plantinga
(1988): 40-41; Swinburne (1994): 180-91; Van Inwagen (1988): 245-46; Van Inwagen (1994): 205-7.
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Still, it is also eminently reasonable to suppose that the logical incoherence of
traditional doctrines is just the sort of good reason that would warrant revision of
those doctrines. The bare fact that those doctrines are part of a religious tradition is
not, in itself, sufficient to overturn the force of sheer logic. Nevertheless, I wish to
argue that there are two weighty reasons — considerations that arguably go hand in
hand with the notion of tradition — for Christians to strongly resist the temptation to
revise paradoxical doctrines and to seek instead a less radical solution to the
problem.
The first reason pertains to the question of authority. Christian doctrines,
particularly those featuring in the ecumenical creeds, are normally thought — by
Christian believers, at any rate — to enjoy some kind of authority: if not a moral
authority (e.g., 'It is obligatory to believe X) then at least a significant degree of
epistemic authority (e.g., 'It is reasonable to believe W) 40 The details of how such
authority arises diverge across denominational lines, but the issue is invariably tied
up with the notion of divine revelation through some specified channel or channels.41
Protestants have historically held that the authority possessed by Christian creeds and
other doctrines is a derivative one: a particular creed or teaching is deemed to be
authoritative insofar as it faithfully expresses the affirmations of Scripture, which is
itself taken to be supremely authoritative by virtue of being divinely inspired. For
Roman Catholics, the relevant authority is invested supremely in the church
(specifically the papacy and the council of bishops) as the preserver and interpreter
of Scripture and tradition,42 while in Eastern Orthodoxy the authority of the church's
doctrines ultimately resides in various forms of ecclesiastical tradition (pre-eminently
the Bible, the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed, and the decrees of the ecumenical
councils)43 According to Catholicism and Orthodoxy, the authority possessed by
certain doctrines (such as those of the Trinity and the Incarnation) is not derivative
but original, arising by virtue of the ecclesiastical source of the teaching. Whatever
the differences here, however, it is clear that the notion of religious authority,
40 As examples of the stronger claim of moral authority, consider (i) the first and last statements of the
Athanasian Creed and (ii) canons 750-754 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law (Codex Iuris Canonici).
41 To use the Scholastic terminology: there is agreement across all traditions regarding the principium
essendi, but fundamental disagreement between traditions over the principium cognoscendi.
42
Allgeier(1967).
43 Ware (1997): 196-97.
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grounded in divine revelation, stands behind the formulation and propagation of
Christian doctrines throughout the history of the church. As a consequence, the
credibility of those doctrines is inextricably bound up with the credibility of the
religious authority in question.
This situation poses a considerable problem for the doctrinal revisionist. Suppose
a certain traditional doctrine D is deemed to be unacceptable due to apparent logical
contradiction and therefore replaced with another doctrine D' (presumably close to
the original but substantially modified so as to eliminate the logical difficulties). This
is not merely a matter of adjusting one doctrine among many so as to improve the
overall epistemic health of one's belief system. On the contrary, the abandonment of
the original doctrine D will have serious ramifications for the status of other
doctrines — perhaps for all of them. For if D was previously held on the basis of
some religious authority, then the rejection of D amounts to bringing that authority
into question, thereby bringing into question every other doctrine held on the basis of
that same authority. Thus, for example, if a Protestant believer were to hold that the
Niceno-Constantinopolitan doctrine of the Trinity is authoritative because it
faithfully expresses God's self-revelation in Scripture, but later were to reject that
doctrine on account of its apparent incoherence, she ought to conclude that Scripture
is in some sense defective and misleading as a channel of God's self-revelation;
moreover, the authority of every other doctrine held on the basis of its biblical
support would subsequently be subject to doubt.
In addition to the questioning of the religious authority on which the traditional
(but paradoxical) doctrines are based, the doctrinal revisionist must also be asked on
what basis the revised doctrines should be considered authoritative — if at all.44 If no
adequate alternative ground can be provided, one might as well conclude that
eschewing doctrine altogether is the most reasonable course. Now perhaps an
adequate religious authority can be found as an alternative to that on which the
traditional Christian doctrines are based; my claim here is not that the task is
44 Natural reason might be considered one such basis. Swinburne, for example, has formulated an a
priori argument for the doctrine of the Trinity (given the truth of theism). Swinburne (1994): 170-80.
Even so, he acknowledges the tentativeness of his conclusions, and in any case, it is hardly plausible
to suggest that all of the orthodox doctrines of the Christian faith could be established in this manner.
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impossible but that it is surely a tall order, which thus explains the unattractiveness
of doctrinal revisionism.
A second reason why the revision of orthodox Christian doctrines should be
avoided if possible concerns the identity of a religious body or community. The
Christian church is a society — a very special society, no doubt, but a society
nonetheless. As such, it possesses a certain identity and there must be corresponding
criteria by which it can (at least in principle) be identified and recognised to be the
same society as one existing previously. Indeed, the basic contention of any present-
day claimant to the title of 'Christian church' — be it Protestant, Roman Catholic,
Eastern Orthodox, or otherwise — is that it stands at the end of a historical line of
continuity, defined in terms of societal identity, which can be traced back to the
original institution established by Christ and the apostles.
What then are the criteria by which a society may be identified? Swinburne
plausibly argues that there are two: continuity of aim and continuity of
organization.45 Moreover, with respect to ecclesiastical identity, fulfilment of the
first criterion 'is dictated by continuity of doctrine.'46 Substantial continuity of
doctrine, with respect to the apostolic church, is therefore a necessary condition for a
present-day religious body being considered part of the Christian church: 'The
teaching of a body wildly out of line with the teaching of all earlier Christian bodies
with which it can claim any continuity of organization cannot be the Church.'47
Clearly not just any doctrinal discontinuity is sufficient to disqualify a religious
body from claiming continuity with the apostolic church. If a local congregation
were to modify its statement of belief on some relatively minor point of eschatology,
say, it would not thereby cease to be part of the Christian church. However, matters
are rather more serious when the discontinuity in question concerns those teachings
that have historically been held as central to the faith — in particular, those
expressed in the early creeds — and evidently this presents a difficulty for the
45 Swinburne (1992): 120-22.
46 Swinburne (1992): 123. Alister McGrath makes essentially the same point: 'Doctrine defines
communities of discourse, possessing a representative character, attempting to describe or prescribe
the beliefs of a community. ... Doctrine may thus be provisionally defined as communally
authoritative teachings regarded as essential to the identity of the Christian community.' McGrath
(1990): 10-13.
47 Swinburne (1992): 124.
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doctrinal revisionist. Would a religious body that opts to revise the orthodox doctrine
of the Trinity still qualify as part of the 'one holy catholic and apostolic church'?
Would a denomination that resolves to reject the orthodox doctrine of the Incarnation
in favour of a less logically problematic alternative still be entitled to label itself
'Christian'? If the answer to such questions is yes, then one has to question whether
doctrine should be thought to play any role at all in the identity of the church.
Perhaps, though, there is some room for manoeuvre even with respect to such
central Christian doctrines as the Trinity and the Incarnation. A believer standing in
the Protestant tradition might argue, for instance, that the creeds are valuable but
40
fallible, being always subject to revision in the light of Scripture. In any case, the
two objections I have raised here, however significant, should not be extrapolated
into the dogmatic claim that any ecclesiastical body rejecting the interpretations of
Christian doctrine defended in the previous two chapters clearly stands outside the
boundaries of the Christian church. But the point should be clear: one does well to
avoid pushing the envelope of Christian orthodoxy. Doctrinal revisionism is a path
over unstable ground, theologically speaking, and its advocates should be prepared to
accept that their proposals could well involve nothing less than a change of religious
identity.
I conclude that doctrinal revisionism, whilst perhaps a suitable strategy for dealing
with paradox in more peripheral doctrines, is far from satisfactory as a wholesale
solution. It may offer a last resort for those who privilege logical orthodoxy over
theological orthodoxy, but any approach that promises to preserve both desiderata is
naturally to be preferred.
4.6 Semantic Minimalism
For those reluctant to abandon a traditional Christian doctrine on account of its
paradoxicality, a more attractive option might be to argue instead that even on an
orthodox interpretation the doctrine need not necessarily involve actual logical
contradiction. There are several ways of mounting such an argument; in this section,
4S For those standing in the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox traditions, matters are somewhat
more restrictive. Even so, the overwhelming consensus within the Protestant tradition has been that
the trinitarian and christological doctrines expressed in the ecumenical creeds are indeed accurate
expressions of the biblical witness.
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I assess a particular strategy that I will call (for want of a better label) semantic
minimalism,49 According to the semantic minimalist, the interpretations of the
doctrines of the Trinity and of the Incarnation for which I have argued in the
previous two chapters are excessively meaningful, they attribute too much semantic
content to the doctrinal statements in question and in so doing needlessly give rise to
implicit logical contradictions. Rectifying the problem is thus straightforward: the
proper policy of the Christian theologian should be to ascribe only the minimum of
semantic content to those doctrinal statements, so as to avoid inviting the charge of
apparent contradiction in the first place. No more content should be ascribed to
statements of Christian orthodoxy, such as the Nicene Creed and Athanasian Creed,
than is absolutely necessary to maintain their functions as statements of orthodoxy.
On this view, if a certain doctrine of the Christian faith appears contradictory to a
person then the fault lies with the person, rather than the doctrine, for investing
excessive meaning in the statements of that doctrine.
Before considering various ways in which a semantic minimalist view might be
articulated, I should specify just what it might mean, in the present context, to ascribe
'too much' semantic content to a statement. For the purpose of characterising (and
later criticising) the response of the semantic minimalist, we can explicate the
meaning or content of a doctrinal statement in terms ofpossible world semantics.50 A
possible world may be defined as a maximally consistent state of affairs, that is, a
state of affairs to which no further state of affairs can be conjoined without logical
inconsistency.51 Expressed in terms of possible worlds, the content of a doctrinal
statement can be thought of as the set of worlds in which that statement is true and
the set of worlds in which it is false.52 So, for example, the content of the statement
'God created the world' is defined as the set of possible worlds in which God created
49
Again, while I have encountered variations of this position in conversation with Christian
academics, I can find no scholarly defence of the strategy in print. Nonetheless, 1 believe that it has a
prima facie plausibility that makes it worth acknowledging and assessing here. Coakley (2002) seems
to gesture in this direction, with her defence of a moderate apophatic reading of the Definition of
Chalcedon and the suggestion that defenders of the coherence of the Incarnation (such as Morris,
Brown, and Swinburne) who are concerned to take the Definition 'literally' may have read too much
into its statements.
50 Cf. Sainsbury (1995): 137.
51 Cf. Plantinga (1974): 44-45.
52 On the assumption that dialetheism is false, these two sets will always be disjoint. Sainsbury (1995):
137.
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the world along with the set of possible worlds in which he did not (because in those
worlds either God does not exist, or the world does not exist, or both exist but the
latter is not created by the former).
One important qualification is in order, however. The notion of consistency
employed in our definition of a possible world must be that associated with strict or
53
narrow logical consistency, rather than broad logical consistency; in other words, it
must be a consistency defined in terms of formal logic alone without any reference to
metaphysical necessities or possibilities (if indeed there are such things). Otherwise,
all doctrinal statements deemed to express metaphysically necessary truths — for
example, claims about God's triunity — would, on this understanding of content,
have identical content (namely, the set of all possible worlds paired with the empty
set).
With this scheme in hand, it is a relatively easy task to explicate the notion of
'excessive semantic content': to ascribe too much content to a doctrinal statement
would be to suppose that the first set of worlds (those in which that statement
evaluates to true) is smaller than it really is and that the second set is larger than it
really is. It amounts to supposing that the statement 'rules out' more states of affairs
than it actually does.54
Let us now turn to consider some ways in which doctrinal semantic minimalism
might be plausibly expressed. A first candidate would be something akin to the
theological method of apophasis — a view of religious language with a respectable
historical pedigree — according to which our statements about God can only assert
what he is not and never what he is. As traditionally understood, apophasis is
primarily concerned with predicating qualities of God, such as 'wisdom' and
'goodness'; thus to make statements such as 'God is wise' and 'God is good' is to do
nothing more than to deny that God is foolish and evil. However, there is no
53 Cf. Plantinga (1974): 1-2.
54 Readers familiar with contemporary philosophy of language will recognise that I am focusing
exclusively on the extensional aspects of declarative content and ignoring any intensional aspects. As
an analysis of statement meaning in general, this understanding of content is deficient inasmuch as it
ascribes the same content to all analytically true statements and to all analytically false statements.
However, since the doctrinal statements being considered here are rarely (if ever) thought of as being
analytically true (i.e., true by definition), this deficiency does not affect my analysis. Moreover, while
I grant that intension is an important and irreducible component of sentential meaning, the focus on
extension is appropriate in this discussion given that the extensional content of a set of statements is
sufficient to determine whether that set is logically consistent.
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immediate reason why this theological sentiment could not be extended to cover all
doctrinal statements. For example, on this view the trinitarian monotheistic tenet
'There is only one God' should be understood only as a denial that there exist
multiple divine beings, not as a positive assertion about anything.
How would such a view avoid the problem of paradox? Presumably just in this:
the apophatic semantic minimalist will claim that because doctrinal statements such
as those enshrined in the early creeds are only denying, and not affirming, that
certain things are the case, they cannot be properly charged with contradiction. After
all, a contradiction only arises when one both affirms and denies the very same thing.
In order to contradict oneself, one must affirm at least something — yet the creeds
and other statements of Christian theology do no such thing.
While inventive, this strategy hardly stands up to scrutiny. In the first place, it is
far from clear that doctrinal statements such as 'The Father is God' or 'Jesus Christ is
fully human' should only be understood in a negative sense, as merely denying some
state of affairs.55 Moreover, it seems obvious that contradictions can arise from
denials alone. For example, if one were to deny both of the following statements, one
would normally be thought of as guilty of logical contradiction:
(18) There are some coins in the bag.
(19) There are no coins in the bag.56
The reason behind this charge is simply that the denial of some state of affairs is
usually taken to imply the affirmation of the negation of that state of affairs (which is
itself a state of affairs). Indeed, this natural understanding of declarative language is
encapsulated in the notion of semantic content explicated above: the content of a
doctrinal statement concerns not only the set of worlds in which the statement is
false, but also the set of worlds in which it is true. One cannot make a meaningful
doctrinal statement without thereby affirming that some states of affairs obtain.
55 Sellers, for one, is insistent that the Definition of Chalcedon makes positive metaphysical
assertions. Sellers (1953): xii-xiv, 210, 350.
56 The assumption made here, of course, is that the bag referred to in these statements actually exists.
If the bag were thought not to exist, then denying both statements would not involve any
contradiction. This qualification does not affect my point. No apophatic theologian is likely to claim
that his position is underwritten by atheism!
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A purely apophatic version of semantic minimalism lacks plausibility and flies in
the face of how language is normally understood. Nevertheless, the semantic
minimalist need not be so unsophisticated. She could concede that making
meaningful doctrinal statements necessarily involves affirming some states of affairs,
but still insist that no real contradictions need arise, by the following argument:
although making some set of doctrinal statements involves affirming that something
is the case, it does not require us to say precisely what is the case, only that the truth
of the matter lies somewhere within a region circumscribed by the statements in
question. Since the Christian who affirms a paradoxical set of doctrinal statements is
under no obligation to specify the theological truth of the matter with any more
precision than the creeds dictate, the charge of contradiction cannot be made to stick
— at least, not conclusively. A genuine contradiction would involve simultaneously
affirming and denying some particular state of affairs, but the genius of semantic
minimalism is that no particular state of affairs is being affirmed — only the logical
disjunction of a range of acceptable possibilities.
In assessing whether this more plausible version of semantic minimalism provides
a satisfying response to the problem of paradox, it will be helpful to illustrate its
understanding of doctrinal statements diagrammatically, in terms of the possible-
worlds apparatus specified earlier. Figure 4.2 illustrates the situation (as the
semantic minimalist sees the matter) regarding the semantic content of a set of
doctrinal statements; for example, the Christian doctrine of the Trinity expressed
minimally in the following three statements (none of which in itself involves any
logical impropriety):
(20) There is only one God.
(21) The Father is God, the Son is God, and the Spirit is God.
(22) The Father is not the Son, the Son is not the Spirit, and the Father is not the
Spirit.
In the diagram, the outer circle represents the entire space ofpossible worlds (in the
sense defined previously). Each of the inner lines represents the demarcation of
possible-world space by one of the three doctrinal statements, and the shaded area on
one side of each line represents that portion of possible-world space ruled out by one
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of the doctrinal statements (with darker shading indicating portions of possible-world
space ruled out by multiple statements). The remaining unshaded area thus
represents that portion of possible-world space in which the truth of the matter, as
dictated by the entire set of doctrinal statements, must lie — which is simply to say
that if the conjunction of these statements is true, then the actual world (i.e., the one
possible world which actually obtains) lies somewhere in the unshaded area. Where
precisely, the Christian cannot say; but then neither can the critic who charges the
Christian with contradiction.
Figure 4.2 Figure 4.3 Figure 4.4
If Figure 4.2 were to represent accurately the situation faced by orthodox
trinitarians, then this stance would appear to have considerable promise. As it is,
however, things are not so fortunate, because this diagram simply fails to capture the
paradoxicality of the doctrines in question. It is crucial to realise that the very reason
the doctrinal statements are deemed paradoxical in the first place is because they
appear to exclude every possible world.51 As such, Figure 4.2 should be replaced
with something like Figure 4.3 — or, even more damningly, Figure 4.4. Recall the
interpretation of the doctrine of the Trinity established in Chapter 2. On this
interpretation, (20) apparently rules out all possible worlds in which there are no
deities or there are multiple deities; (21) apparently rules out all possible worlds in
which one (or more) of the persons of the Trinity is not numerically identical with a
deity; and (22) apparently rules out all possible worlds in which two (or three) of the
persons of the Trinity are numerically identical. Paradox therefore results because
taken together, and in orthodox fashion, the theological statements seem to rule out
57 This is true whether the conception of logical possibility in view is 'narrow' (as I have taken it here)
or 'broad' (as it is commonly taken).
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the entirety of possible-world space. The semantic minimalist defence, to the effect
that the doctrinal statements leave some ambiguity regarding the precise truth of the
matter, thus rings hollow; for these three statements appear to leave no room for
there to be any truth of the matter, precise or otherwise. Concisely put, the problem is
this: to insist on the minimum semantic content required to exclude heterodox views
such as modalism, polytheism, and subordinationism (and thus to preserve
orthodoxy) is to grant content that is not minimal enough to avoid the appearance of
contradiction.
I have taken the doctrine of the Trinity as an example in explaining why semantic
minimalism is inadequate as a solution to the problem of paradox. The same
difficulties apply mutatis mutandis with respect to the doctrine of the Incarnation and
indeed to any other similarly paradoxical doctrine. In general, semantic minimalism
may well represent a responsible approach to interpreting Christian creeds and
confessions, insofar as it serves to reign in both unwarranted speculation and
unnecessary exclusion. But as a response to the charge of irrationality levelled at
paradoxical doctrines, it takes us no further forward.
4.7 Complementarity
Small comfort though it may be, theologians have not been alone in suffering
perplexity at the hands of paradoxes. Ever since the pre-Socratics, philosophers (of
all religious persuasions) have also wrestled with a wide range of puzzles raised by
sets of seemingly impeccable statements from which contradictory or otherwise
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absurd conclusions can be deduced. Such difficulties may strike the non-
philosopher as somewhat contrived and unreal, detached from the concrete, empirical
facts of our experience and merely illustrative of the hazards of philosophical
abstractions. One might therefore imagine that the realm of modern science is
happily free from the sort of conceptual conundrums that have plagued philosophers
and theologians through the centuries. Even a cursory knowledge of 20th-century
science is sufficient to dispel this notion, however.59 The dawning of post-Newtonian
58 Rescher lists over 130 different philosophical paradoxes. Rescher (2001): xvii-xx.
59 It is worth noting that science could not function without relying on mathematics, and there are no
shortage of mathematical paradoxes; thus, science is no more immune to paradox than the
mathematical relations and principles on which it relies. Nonetheless, mathematical paradoxes still
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physics, of relativity theory and quantum mechanics, has given rise to a number, of
new paradoxes, the most prominent of which appear to be solidly grounded in
experimental results and thus cannot be simply dismissed as idle speculation and
irrelevant extrapolation.
One of the most infamous of such paradoxes is the apparent dual nature of light
(and electromagnetic radiation in general). Prior to the 20th-century, light was
generally considered to behave in an unambiguously wave-like manner.60 As a
matter of fact, in many experimental situations it does; for example, it can be shown
to exhibit those interference patterns that characteristically arise from the interaction
of waves. Scientists are now well aware, however, that in other circumstances light
appears to behave like a stream of discrete particles, as illustrated by the scattering of
X-rays on collision with electrons. Conversely, electrons and other subatomic
entities, hitherto thought of as simple particles, are now understood to exhibit wave¬
like behaviour under certain experimental conditions. In short, a wealth of empirical
data supports the conclusion that the fundamental building blocks of our physical
world can be described either as waves or as particles, depending on the manner in
which their behaviour is observed; indeed, there are even cases in which quantum
entities exhibit wave-like properties and particle-like properties at the same time.6]
This characterization of quantum physical entities is counterintuitive at best and
arguably incoherent. It is extremely difficult to see how one and the same entity can
exist both as a wave and as a particle, since these two types of entity have apparently
incompatible properties: for example, a particle is located at a point in space,
whereas a wave is distributed throughout space (e.g., between two points). Yet the
fact remains that electrons and other quantum objects behave as if they were both,
such that descriptions of their behaviour in terms of 'waves' and 'particles' are
inevitably paradoxical.
The striking parallel between this modern scientific paradox and one ancient
theological paradox, the doctrine of the Incarnation, has not escaped notice. In both
have an air of contrivance about them that many would consider so far removed from the
unproblematic practice of applied mathematics as to cause no undue discomfort. Whether this
confidence is well placed is an interesting question, but one beyond the scope of this work.
6U
Immediately prior, that is. Earlier still, light was understood in particle terms. For an overview of
the historical development of the wave-particle duality thesis, see Gribbin (1997).
61 Mizobuchi and Ohtake (1992).
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cases, one thing is said to exhibit two seemingly incompatible natures: just as an
electron exhibits a 'wave-particle duality', so Jesus Christ exhibits a 'God-man
duality'. Yet despite the apparent logical difficulties, physicists have learned to
accommodate the paradoxical character of quantum entities by appealing to the
notion of 'complementarity': descriptions of such objects in terms of 'waves' and
'particles' are deemed to be complementary rather than contradictory and can be
f\~)
affirmed in such a way that no norms of rationality are violated. Given this parallel,
an obvious question arises. Could not this notion of complementarity offer a solution
to the problem of theological paradoxes as well? In the remainder of this chapter, I
will address this question by assessing the contributions of two writers who have
tried to apply the same concept of complementary used in physics to logical
problems in the theological domain. After discussing Christopher Kaiser's
application of complementarity to the specific problem of the christological paradox,
I will examine Donald MacKay's influential explication of complementarity and
consider whether it can be fruitfully applied to the paradoxes of the Trinity and the
Incarnation.63
In his article 'Christology and Complementarity',64 Kaiser begins by remarking
that the notion of complementarity has been used by some writers to express the
relation between God and the world. This is misguided, Kaiser suggests, because
Christians have traditionally insisted on a fundamental ontological distinction
between the Creator and the creation; yet as Bohr understood and explicated the
term, complementarity 'can only properly be applied to different modes, or "levels",
of being that pertain to one and the same object and are preferential.'65 However,
this coreferentiality condition suggests that the principle of complementarity might
be more suitably applied in the area of christology:
62 The first use of the term 'complementary' in this technical sense is credited to Niels Bohr.
63 A third attempt to address the problem of theological paradoxes via the notion of complementarity
can be found in the writings of William Austin. However, of the two particular paradoxes on which I
am focusing, Austin considers only the doctrine of the Incarnation and concludes that orthodoxy
would not be satisfied by treating 'God' and 'man' as complementary models for speaking of Jesus
Christ in the same way that 'wave' and 'particle' are treated as complementary models. Austin
(1967b), esp. Ch. 5. Cf. Austin (1967a). See also Park (1967); Kaiser (1972).
64 Kaiser (1976).
65 Kaiser (1976): 37.
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[T]he central doctrine of Christian theology affirms than man is one mode of a 'higher
being' in Christ. That is, Christ is both man and God as man is both body and mind, as
body is both atom and organism, as atom is both wave and particle. Therefore, the
most natural area in which to compare Bohr's principle of complementarity with
theology is not the God-world relation, but the relation of the two 'natures' in Christ.
Christ is said to be one single being, one hypostasis, in a way that God and the world
are not, so the problem of 'one-ness' would not militate against an application of
complementarity to Christology as it does against the parallel application to general
providence.66
Kaiser notes the parallels between the problems faced by the disciples of the first
century and the physicists of the twentieth. Both groups were confronted with a 'new
thing' in their experience, incommensurable with traditional concepts; both were
warranted in applying each of two different categories to that 'new thing', despite the
fact that those categories were previously assumed to be 'incompatible (i.e. non-
coreferential) concepts'; consequently both were faced with the prospect of
communicating their discoveries (at least initially) in 'seemingly paradoxical
language.'67 Given these common experiences and difficulties, the potential utility of
the complementarity concept for reducing the sting of the christological paradox is
evident.
Kaiser continues his discussion by explicating Bohr's idea of complementarity in
the original context of wave-particle duality:
In Bohr's view, then, the classical concepts of 'wave' and 'particle' must be applied to
atomic objects in order to communicate their unique character. On the other hand, the
very act of applying classically incompatible terms to a single new reality entails a
radical shift in their meaning. In their common application to an atomic object, the
terms 'wave' and 'particle' become positively related to each other in an
unprecedented manner. They are no longer strictly incompatible, but coreferential and
'complementary'. Hence, there is a semantic displacement of the two terms. They
retain their classical senses, which are incompatible, in order to allow
communicability (and not to become 'dead metaphors'), but they also take on new
significance by virtue of their application to one and the same object in quantum
theory.68
He then proceeds to explain how an 'uninitiated enquirer' is able to gain an
understanding of the nature of quantum entities by means of the complementary
concepts of'wave' and 'particle':
He can 'get a handle on' the new discovery by understanding the terms 'wave' and
'particle' in their classical senses, but then he must 'see' and 'see through' the
66 Kaiser (1976): 38.
67 Kaiser (1976): 39-42.
68 Kaiser (1976): 40.
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resulting paradox by allowing the meanings of the two terms to shift as they enter a
new relation, a relation of 'complementarity', to each other in their coreferential
application to atomic objects.69
Thus, when physicists apply the terms 'wave' and 'particle' to quantum entities in a
complementary sense, the meaning of those terms is a modification of their classical
senses (indeed, a radical modification, according to Kaiser).70 According to these
new senses of the terms, certain properties that would be ascribed to quantum entities
by the classical senses are not to be ascribed; moreover, certain other properties not
associated with the classical senses are to be ascribed to the entities described by the
terms in their modified, complementary senses.71 In other words, the terms are
employed analogically in their quantum-mechanical senses; there is commonality (so
as to allow communicability) but also disparity (so as to allow coreferentiality).
Note then the following crucial features of Kaiser's explication of the
complementarity relation, as used in the context of quantum physics:
• The concepts denoted by the terms 'wave' and 'particle' in their classical senses
are strictly incompatible and therefore cannot be coreferential.
• The concepts denoted by the terms 'wave' and 'particle' in their complementary
senses are not strictly incompatible and therefore can be coreferential.
• The complementarity senses of the terms involve a significant modification of their
classical senses; as such, some of the properties ascribed to an object under the
classical senses are not ascribed under the complementary senses and vice versa.
It is not my intention here to evaluate whether applying the complementarity
principle is successful in resolving the paradoxes of quantum mechanics; for the sake
of argument, I shall assume that it is. The important question is whether the
complementarity approach can be applied in the same way toward a resolution of the
paradox of the Incarnation: whether the Chalcedonian claim that one person is both
'God' and 'man' can be treated in the same way as the Bohrian claim that one
quantum object is both 'wave' and 'particle'.
69 Kaiser (1976): 40.
70 The application is 'quasi-metaphorical', as Kaiser puts it.
71 Kaiser (1976): 40-41.
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It should be clear from the three features listed above that this approach faces
formidable objections. According to the complementarity principle, Christians who
claim that Christ is both 'God' and 'man' would not be using those terms in any
classical or literal sense, but rather in novel analogical senses.72 Moreover, those new
senses would, in one way or another, be deliberately stripped of any attributive
entailments which appear to preclude coreferentiality; thus whatever the terms 'God'
and 'man' connote when used in a new and complementary sense, they cannot
ascribe (say) simultaneous omniscience and ignorance to Jesus. Indeed, the very
purpose of employing the classical terms in modified complementary senses is so as
to eliminate paradoxes such as these.73
Against this construction, there is no evidence that when the authors of the
Definition of Chalcedon used the phrase 'truly God and truly man' they
acknowledged a radical shift in the meaning of the terms 'God' and 'man'. On the
contrary, every indication that is those words were understood to carry something
very close to, if not identical with, the classical senses of those terms at that point in
time — not least because so much theological weight was hanging on that very fact.
Modern physicists have no particular interest in preserving the traditional senses of
quantum theoretical terms and the property ascriptions associated with those senses,
provided the terms are useful for consistently expressing and communicating the
empirical results characterised and predicted by quantum theory. But for the
theologians involved in the early christological debates, it was effectively a given
that the crucial concepts involved were not susceptible to substantial revision and
manipulation. If anything, it was a dogmatic commitment to understanding the
ascriptions 'divine' and 'human' in the conventional way that kept the debates fired
72 Cf. James Park's response to Austin's treatment of complementarity: 'Contemporary physicists who
have pondered these matters at all realize that such experiments do not mean, as Austin suggests, that
an electron, for example, must be regarded as some kind of dialectical entity torn between being
impossibly both a wave and a particle. On the contrary, the electron is not both; it is neither.' Park
(1967): 383. If this understanding of complementarity were to be carried over directly into
christology, the Christian would be forced to say that, strictly speaking, 'Jesus is not both God and
man; he is neither.' Incidentally, it is not altogether clear that Austin is guilty of the error Park
ascribes to him; for example, he acknowledges that 'if we are going to mix the two models, we need
some entity which will function as a sort of compromise, combining approximations to the features of
both. Such entities exist; they are called "wave packets.'" Austin (1967a): 370.
73 This is certainly how Park sees the matter: 'Present-day quantum mechanics, including its
philosophical structure of complementarity, contains no paradoxes. To believe otherwise is to
misunderstand complementarity.' Park (1967): 383. In other words, complementary descriptions
properly understood should not involve even the appearance of contradiction.
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for so long. Moreover, the notion that one or more of the attributes or characteristics
traditionally thought essential to 'divinity' or 'humanity' could simply be dropped or
modified in order to allow their co-exemplification in one person was evidently not
given serious consideration by the Fathers as a resolution to the problem.74 As Kaiser
explicates the principle of complementarity, the use of the terms 'God' and 'man' in
a complementary sense would be designed to avoid, rather than accommodate,
anything approaching a literal ascription of omniscience and ignorance to Christ. Yet
as I argued previously, it is the theological rationale for making that very ascription
(among others) which gives rise to the paradox in the first place. The
complementarity strategy thus understood does not provide a way of reconciling
orthodoxy with logical perspicuity; on the contrary, it self-consciously sides with the
latter at the expense of the former.
Kaiser appears reluctant to acknowledge this point. In considering the application
of complementarity to the Incarnation he suggests that the disciples, given their
paradoxical experiences of Jesus, were faced with a choice. On the one hand, they
could have opted to 'discard the categories of "God" and "man" and devise an
entirely new terminology'; but this would have made the task of communicating
those novel experiences all but impossible. The alternative, in Kaiser's view,
parallels the course plotted by the quantum theorists:
So for the purposes of communication, if nothing else, the O.T. categories of 'God'
and 'man' had to be retained, yet in their unprecedented application to a single
individual, Jesus, they were brought into a new relationship with each other and
shifted in meaning. They retained their 'classical' O.T. senses, yet they also took on
new significance in the context of the Incarnation. ... As in the case of quantum
theory, the uninitiated enquirer is presented with an acute problem of insight. He
begins by taking the terms 'God' and 'man' in their 'classical' senses, then applies
them simultaneously to Jesus, and, hopefully, comes to see them in a new light in
relation to each other.75
74 This strategy is effectively that advocated by kenotic theorists and critiqued in §3.3.1. It might be
objected that the Alexandrian scholars did in fact advocate a concept of 'humanity' which lacked
properties associated with it by the Antiochenes (specifically, possession of a distinct human soul).
However, is not at all clear that the Alexandrians took themselves to be advocating the application of a
new concept of 'humanity' over against the traditional concept; more plausibly, they held (contra the
Antiochenes) that Christ's being literally human did not in fact require possession of a distinct human
soul. In other words, there is no indication that either party understood themselves to be advocating
anything other than the regular senses of the key terms.
75 Kaiser (1976): 42.
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It is difficult to understand what Kaiser is claiming when he states that the
designations 'God' and 'man' retained their classical Old Testament senses despite
the fact that they also 'shifted in meaning' and 'took on new significance'.
According to Kaiser's account, one of the defining characteristics of terms used in a
complementary sense is precisely that they do not retain their classical senses, for the
very reason that they are strictly incompatible in those classical senses. The difficulty
remains: Kaiser's complementarity approach to resolving the paradox of the
Incarnation amounts to a semantic revision that strips the theological claims in
question of any implications that appear to logically conflict. His attempt to draw out
the historical and linguistic parallels between quantum theory and christology is
provocative, but ultimately fails to provide a real alternative to the approaches to
paradox considered already.76
Kaiser rightly comments in his article that the notion of 'complementarity' has
been understood in various ways, although he chooses to focus on the version
originally suggested by Bohr and endorsed by many quantum physicists today.77 I
have argued that this understanding, catered specifically towards quantum
mechanics, does not satisfactorily resolve the christological paradox. Nevertheless,
there exist more generic understandings of complementarity that may be better suited
for the task. One influential analysis of complementarity has been promoted by
Donald MacKay, who applies the concept to a number of logical problems in the
interface between science and theology including the mind-brain relationship, free
will and determinism, and the perceived conflict between evolutionary theory and the
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doctrine of creation. It will therefore be worthwhile to review MacKay's
understanding of complementarity and to consider whether it offers any hope for
defending the rationality of paradoxical Christian doctrines such as the Trinity and
the Incarnation.
The most comprehensive and relevant account of MacKay's understanding of
complementarity is found in his 1974 article, '"Complementarity" in Scientific and
76 The criticisms raised here apply equally well to attempts to excuse the doctrine of the Trinity by
appealing to wave-particle duality. For other objections to this line of defence, see Tuggy (2003b):
177-78.




Theological Thinking'.79 In this essay, MacKay carefully explains and illustrates his
understanding of genuinely complementary descriptions; he then clarifies how the
complementarity relation applies in the specific case of quantum physics before
discussing its application to three theological issues: creation, miracles, and
conversion. The first notable feature of MacKay's exposition is his insistence that the
concept of complementarity is a purely logical one and is therefore independent of
any application it might enjoy in the physical sciences:
Complementarity stands not for a physical theory, still less for a mystical doctrine, but
rather it stands for a particular kind of logical relation, distinct from and additional to
traditional ones like contradiction, synonymy, or independence; it demands to be
considered along with others whenever there is doubt as to the connection between
two statements.80
Descriptions taken to be complementary are never logically independent of one
another, although the dependence relationship may be unidirectional or bidirectional:
Complementary statements are not logically independent. By saying that they are
about the same situation we mean that there is at least one feature of one of the
statements whose alteration or absence would necessitate a change in the other(s).
They show correlations, or at least what might be called "existential covariance." As
logical relations go this is a weak constraint but not a negligible one. We shall see that
it can sometimes be asymmetrical, in the sense that the alteration or absence of a
feature in description A would necessitate a change in B, but not conversely.81
Thus, for example, the physical description of a printed page (the number and
location of ink molecules, etc.) could change without its semantic description being
affected (i.e., the message it conveys) although the reverse would not be true.
A third feature of MacKay's account is that properly complementary descriptions
pertain to one and the same referent but obtain with respect to different standpoints:
[Complementary views are by definition views of the same subject: In this sense
complementary descriptions must have a common reference, although they need not,
and in general will not, refer to the same aspects of it. ... [Tjhere could be no excuse
for claiming that two disparate views of the same subject were complementary rather
than contradictory unless in some respect (of position or time, for example) they were
different in standpoint.82
As MacKay sees things, the difference in the standpoints of complementary










dimension that does not feature in the conceptual frame of either descriptions (as in
the example of the two disparate two-dimensional images that together constitute a
binocular view); or (ii) by virtue of representing two or more hierarchically-arranged
'logical levels' (as in the example of an exhaustive electronic description of a
computer and an exhaustive mathematical description of that same computer).83 In
the first case, the logical relationship between complementary descriptions is
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symmetrical; in the second, it is asymmetrical.
MacKay's account of complementarity has two other important features. The first
is that truly complementary descriptions of some state of affairs are not
intertranslatable without loss of meaning; which is just to say that while such
descriptions pertain to the same object, they do not simply say the same things about
that object albeit with different terminology.
1 have suggested as a necessary condition (which applies both in hierarchic and
nonhierarchic cases) that two (or more) descriptions must, respectively, employ terms
whose preconditions of precise definition or use are mutually exclusive if they are to
be termed complementary in a sharp sense. This rules out, for example, logically
equivalent expressions of the same statement in different languages or idioms, for
which we already have the term "synonymous."85
The second is that the standpoints from which the complementary descriptions are
valid must be specifiable'.
To call two or more accounts of the same situation complementary is to imply that
each becomes valid from a specifiably different logical standpoint. Chronologically,
what comes first may be the discovery in brute experience that each is necessary,
which then initiates attempts to specify the presumed differences in standpoint; but
logically it is only those differences that legitimize any disparity between the
accounts. The apologist who invokes complementarity incurs a corresponding
obligation to indicate those differences in his own casef
With these five features of MacKay's account of complementarity before us, we may
summarise his understanding as follows:
• The concept of complementarity is a purely logical one and is not dependent on
any scientific theories or observations.
83






MacKay (1974): 241, emphasis added.
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• Complementary descriptions may be related hierarchically or non-hierarchically;
in the former case there is an asymmetrical dependency relationship, while in the
latter there is a. symmetrical dependency relationship.
• Complementary descriptions refer to one and the same object (or state of affairs)
but from different logical standpoints', furthermore, those different standpoints
must be specifiable if an appeal to complementarity is to be legitimate.
• Complementary descriptions are incommensurable', they do not merely say the
same thing but with alternative vocabulary.
Let us then consider what prospects this account of complementarity holds for
resolving the problem of theological paradoxes. Can the rational offence of apparent
contradiction be removed by claiming that conflicting statements should be thought
of as complementary rather than contradictory? Take first the doctrine of the Trinity.
The immediate problem faced is that of identifying just what the relevant
complementary descriptions should be. Whatever the answer here, those descriptions
must (i) pertain to the same object and (ii) taken together say everything that the
ecumenical creeds require us to say. The most plausible candidate for the referent of
such descriptions would seem to be the Deity or Godhead, rather than any individual
Person. Moreover, since the paradox arises from the difficulty of reconciling God's
oneness and God's threeness, one might expect the complementary descriptions to
characterise these two counterpoised aspects of the divine existence. Let us therefore
take the candidate descriptions to be something like the following:
(Tl) There is one God: Father, Son, and Spirit. The Father is God, the Son is God,
and the Spirit is God.
(T2) God exists as three persons: Father, Son, and Spirit. The Father is not the Son,
the Father is not the Spirit, and the Son is not the Spirit.
Neither of the two descriptions, taken alone, would appear to be incoherent.
Considered in isolation, (Tl) would tend to invite a heterodox modalist conception of
the Trinity, while (T2) would likely suggest a heterodox tritheistic conception of the
Trinity. Taken together, however, can (Tl) and (T2) be legitimately treated as
complementary, rather than contradictory, descriptions that conjointly express the
whole truth of the Christian doctrine?
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The first question to ask, in light of MacKay's account, is whether (Tl) and (T2)
represent hierarchical or non-hierarchical descriptions. This question is a difficult
one to answer: there has been no majority opinion within the Christian tradition as to
whether God's unity is at a 'higher logic level' than his plurality, such that the
former is grounded in and emerges from the latter, or whether the reverse is true, or
whether neither is in fact the case. According to MacKay, the issue can be settled by
considering whether the logical dependency of the complementary descriptions is
unidirectional or bidirectional; however, it is hard to see how either of (Tl) or (T2) is
logically dependent on the other, in the sense that if one were modified then the other
would also need to be modified (in order for both to remain valid descriptions). If, as
many Christian theists might hold, (Tl) and (T2) are necessarily true if true at all
(because God is essentially triune) then there is a symmetrical logical dependence
between the descriptions, but only in the trivial sense that there is such a dependence
between any two necessary truths (e.g., 2 is the square root of 4 and every red object
is a material object).
Even if this initial hurdle were surmountable, a greater one follows: namely, the
problem of specifying the different logical standpoints from which (Tl) and (T2) —
or whatever complementary descriptions are taken to express the doctrine — are
meaningful and true. The difficulty is made acute by the very nature of the trinitarian
paradox: to avoid tritheism, one must insist that the relation between the Godhead
and each Person is something very like numerical identity; yet to avoid modalism,
one must also insist that each Person is numerical distinct from every other. It is not
easy to see (and no one has thus far succeeded in showing) how one might specify
different standpoints from which each description is literally true, without
compromising the theological constraints on the doctrine. Unlike, for example,
complementary two-dimensional descriptions of a three-dimensional object,
statements involving relations of numerical identity and distinctness do not possess
the conceptual wiggle room that might legitimise an appeal to complementarity over
against contradiction. There is no known or imaginable 'logical dimension' in terms
of which the claim that P is numerically identical to Q can be reconciled with the
claim that P is numerically distinct from Q. As such, the prospects for recasting the
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doctrine of the Trinity in terms of MacKay's complementarity scheme are not
promising.
Turning to the doctrine of the Incarnation, the initial indications are more
favourable with regard to relieving the paradox with the medicine of
complementarity. The common referent of any purportedly complementary
descriptions would clearly be, as the Council of Chalcedon demanded, the singular
person of Jesus Christ. Moreover, the two obvious candidates for complementary
descriptions would be the following:
(11) Jesus Christ is fully God.
(12) Jesus Christ is fully human.
This much is reasonably straightforward, although clearly these two statements need
to be unpacked in such a way that (i) orthodoxy is satisfied and (ii) the
complementarity relationship between them is explicated. Once again, the first
question to ask is whether (II) and (12) are related hierarchically or not. If related
non-hierarchically, then there must be a two-way logical dependence between them;
accordingly, if a true description of Jesus Christ from one standpoint were to change,
so would a true description from the other. Orthodoxy christology holds that Christ is
only contingently human, since he existed prior to the Incarnation; moreover, his
taking on a human nature did not necessitate any change in his divine
characteristics.87 Thus, if there is any logical dependence between the (II) and (12) it
must be asymmetrical, specifically, (12) must be logically dependent on (II). This
analysis would, in MacKay's terminology, put the affirmation of Christ's divinity at
a 'higher logical level' than that of his humanity, a result that seems intuitively
correct. On the other hand, however, in each of MacKay's illustrations of
hierarchically-related descriptions — the physical and semantic descriptions of
writing; the electronic and mathematical descriptions of a computer; the physical and
mental descriptions of a person — the higher level description is true by virtue of the
lower level description being true. In such cases, no description would be possible at
the higher level unless there were some true description at the lower level. Yet this is
87 Kenoticists, of course, would demur. However, if kenotic theory were acceptable as an
interpretation of Chalcedonian orthodoxy — and I have argued that it is not — then there would be no
need to appeal to the notion of complementarity, for there would be no paradox.
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manifestly not the case with respect to (II) and (12). No orthodox theologian would
hold that Christ was fully God by virtue of being fully human and having those
particular creaturely characteristics that he did have during his earthly life.88
Determining how to construe the doctrine of the Incarnation in terms of MacKay's
understanding of complementarity is evidently no easy matter. There is no obvious
analogy with any of the examples MacKay gives of complementary descriptions of a
single referent.
Putting aside such difficulties, and having established that (II) and (12) are related
in a hierarchical complementarity relation if at all, the next question concerns the
specification of the different logical standpoints according to which each description
is meaningful and true. Whatever standpoints are specified, they must be such that
each description implies the sort of things that orthodox christology requires: for
example, that from the standpoint of (II) Christ knew all things, whereas from the
standpoint of (12) Christ did not know all things. One immediately appealing option
is suggested by the dual-psychology models advocated by Thomas Morris and
Richard Swinburne.89 The idea would be that since Jesus Christ possessed two
logically distinct levels of consciousness, the description Christ knew all things
would be true with respect to one level of consciousness, whereas the description
Christ did not know all things would be true from the standpoint of the other, and the
two would constitute complementary descriptions of one person. However, as I
argued previously, the notion of one person possessing two logically distinct minds
or consciousnesses is highly problematic, if not altogether incoherent, and therefore
cannot provide a plausible basis for specifying different logical standpoints for
complementary descriptions.90 Once this avenue is abandoned, there are no other
obvious candidates. As the history of christology testifies, it is extremely difficult to
88 Note that this claim, however odd, does not imply that when Christ was not human then he was not
divine either; it merely implies that when Christ was both human and divine, his being divine was on
account of his being human. If this were so, then presumably Christ's being preincarnately divine was
on account of being something else (where that 'something else' must be expressible from the same
logical standpoint as the description of Christ's humanity). At any rate, such implications seem hard to
reconcile with the doctrine of divine aseity.
89 See §3.3.2.
90
Furthermore, it is not clear that descriptions from such standpoints would qualify as complementary
in MacKay's sense, since there appears to be no logical dependence relation (either symmetrical or
asymmetrical) between the two descriptions. Is it the case that any change in the description of Jesus'
divine consciousness would necessitate a change in the description of his human consciousness, or
vice versa, or both?
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locate and specify two different logical standpoints from which descriptions of
Christ's divine characteristics and experiences, and descriptions of his human
characteristics and experiences, are conjointly true and together capture all that
orthodoxy christology requires believers to affirm.
In light of these formidable difficulties, I suggest that even if MacKay's concept
of complementarity is coherent and illuminating in some contexts (as I believe it to
be), it offers little promise as a general means of articulating the paradoxical
doctrines of the Christian faith in a way that is both faithful to orthodoxy and
rationally digestible. In the cases of the doctrine of the Trinity and the doctrine of the
Incarnation, two obstacles remain: (i) the problem of determining in each case what
the complementary descriptions of the relevant subject matter should be (and
whether they relate hierarchically or non-hierarchically); and (ii) the problem of
specifying in each case the logical standpoints from which each description can be
understood to be coherent, true, and faithful to the theological concerns of credal
orthodoxy (by properly excluding all heretical positions).
4.8 Conclusion
In this chapter I have considered a range of possible responses to the problem of
doctrinal paradox and have argued that each is unsatisfactory on either philosophical
or theological grounds. Taking refuge in anti-realism is far from appealing in light of
Christian tradition and practice; in any event, it would still leave unresolved the
problem of the logical impropriety of Christian discourse. Solutions that recommend
revising our understanding of classical laws of logic and rules of inference either
raise more philosophical problems than they answer, or clash with some of our most
firmly held logical presuppositions, or else simply fail to attain the goal of protecting
orthodoxy. The revisionist strategy of modifying or replacing traditional Christian
doctrines so as to attain logical perspicuity amounts to waving a white flag in the
face of paradox; given the troubling questions it raises about religious authority and
identity, any advance it offers may be no better than a leap from frying pan to fire.
The semantic minimalist claim that paradox is an unnecessary artefact arising from
over-interpretation of the ecumenical statements of orthodoxy cannot be sustained in
light of the conclusions reached in Chapters 2 and 3. Finally, the notion of
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'complementary descriptions', despite its prima facie utility for defending the
rationality of paradoxical doctrines, has been found unsuitable for the specific cases
of the Trinity and the Incarnation; it follows that it cannot provide Christian
theologians with a general solution to the problem of paradox.
Of the various strategies surveyed in this chapter, I would venture that the
complementarity approach offers the greatest promise, despite its inadequacy in the
final analysis. In the remaining chapters, I develop an alternative model for
understanding theological paradox that is similar in several ways — for example, it
advocates neither logical revisionism nor doctrinal revisionism and focuses attention
on the meaning of the doctrinal statements — but in contrast is able to accommodate
the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation, along with various other doctrines
often viewed as paradoxical, without sacrificing either the rationality or the
orthodoxy of Christian beliefs.
143
 
Part Two: The Propriety of Paradox
Returning to the analogy I used in my introduction to Part One, it would seem that
the loaded question — 'How are you coping with your drink problem?' — is
appropriate after all. Christianity does have a problem: a problem with paradoxes.
Two cardinal doctrines in particular, the Trinity and the Incarnation, suffer from the
appearance of internal contradiction (at least implicitly) when interpreted in such a
way as to clearly avoid the heresies proscribed by the early creeds and confessions.
Moreover, after surveying a range of possible 'coping' strategies, I concluded that
none provides a solution that is both philosophically and theologically satisfying.
Thus a question mark remains over the rationality of Christian belief in such
conceptually problematic doctrines: the presence of paradox forces us to consider the
propriety of paradox.
The stage is therefore set for Part Two of the thesis, in which I argue that belief in
paradoxical Christian doctrines can be rational, contrary to received wisdom on such
matters. Chapter 5 lays the epistemological foundation for the argument by
explaining (with a heavy debt to Alvin Plantinga's theory of epistemic warrant) how
Christian doctrines in general can be known to be true. Chapter 6 then sets forth a
model for understanding theological paradox according to which assent to
paradoxical Christian doctrines will be rational for most believers (whatever their
level of intellectual sophistication) provided that the central Christian narrative is, in
fact, true. Finally, Chapter 7 addresses various objections to the model motivated by
a range of biblical, theological, and philosophical concerns.
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5 Warranted Christian Doctrines
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 1, I stated that I would be working throughout with a definition of
'paradox' as a set of claims which, taken in conjunction, appear to be logically
inconsistent. I argued in Chapters 2 and 3 that the orthodox doctrines of the Trinity
and the Incarnation, as reflected in the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed, the
Definition of Chalcedon, and the Athanasian Creed, are paradoxical in precisely this
sense. Since apparent contradictions are commonly deemed an affront to reason, it is
natural that Christians have explored various strategies for resolving the intellectual
problem presented by doctrinal paradoxes. Six such strategies were assessed in
Chapter 4; it was concluded that none of them offers a resolution that is both
theologically and philosophically satisfying (at least with respect to the doctrines of
the Trinity and the Incarnation).
In this second part of the thesis, I propose to consider whether a person can be
rational in believing the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation, despite the
conclusions reached earlier. And the first question to address, I suggest, must be
whether the component claims that together constitute such doctrines are individually
worthy of assent. For if these individual theological claims — for example, that there
is only one God and that Jesus Christ is fully God — lack any rational foundation,
then the epistemic problem of paradox becomes an irrelevant sideshow. The
compound claim that the moon is made entirely of green cheese and the moon is
made entirely of pink marshmallow is paradoxical, in the strict sense, but the
intellectual propriety of believing the claim hardly turns on that fact, given that
neither conjunct has any epistemic merit whatsoever. In this chapter, I therefore
consider whether any Christian doctrines, paradoxical or otherwise, invite or enjoy
rational assent in the first place — and if so, in what way and to what degree. By
addressing this question, I will be constructing a platform from which to obtain a
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clear view of the consequences of paradoxicality on the rationality of belief in
Christian doctrines.
Before doing so, however, one important preliminary issue must be settled, in
order to properly frame the question at hand. Exactly what positive quality is it that
Christians wish to ascribe to the doctrines of their faith and that would make the
problem of paradox worth examining in the first place? On the traditional assumption
that doctrines are the sort of things that invite belief, the quality in view is
presumably some kind of epistemic property such as being rational rather than (say)
a mere psychological or historical property such as being comforting or being
popular. After all, what is usually deemed problematic about paradoxical claims is
that the overall phenomenon — a combination of individual credibility and mutual
incompatibility — runs up against certain epistemic norms, certain standards for
'acceptable' or 'respectable' belief. Having thus narrowed the field to epistemic
virtues, the question becomes this: precisely which epistemic property should we
focus our attention on? As anyone familiar with contemporary epistemology will be
aware, there are a whole host of candidates here, ranging from relatively weak
qualities such as credibility, plausibility, and rational entitlement to stronger
properties of belief such as justification (of which there are numerous competing
1 2
conceptions), rationality (also susceptible to various understandings), and warrant
(defined as that elusive property which, in sufficient degree, distinguishes knowledge
•5
from mere true belief).
For several reasons, I propose to focus primarily on the last of these candidates:
warrant. If nothing else, targeting a relatively strong epistemic quality will make my
subsequent conclusions all the more interesting — after all, many people might find
certain Christian doctrines to be credible or plausible without being in the least bit
inclined to go so far as to believe them. (As a resident of Scotland, I think it plausible
that it will rain next Saturday; but I do not consider that a sufficient basis for
believing that it will.) Secondly, since several important types of rationality turn out
to be necessary conditions of warrant, it follows that if a belief is warranted then it
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indirectly addressing various types of rationality. Thirdly, it is prima facie likely that
the more exalted the epistemic status of Christian doctrine, the better equipped it will
be to deal with epistemic challenges such as those raised by the problem of paradox.4
Finally, the epistemic quality known as warrant appears to be the one that Christians,
from the earliest times, have most commonly ascribed to their beliefs and doctrines.5
It is not that the apostles and their followers merely found plausible the claim that
Jesus rose from the dead, or that they considered themselves rationality entitled to
believe it. They professed to know that Jesus was alive again. Likewise, Christians
throughout the centuries (those with any degree of confidence in their faith, at any
rate) have maintained that the cardinal doctrines of the faith express things that are
known about the nature and works of God — that God is one but exists in three
persons, that Jesus Christ is both fully divine and fully human, that Christ died for
our sins so as to reconcile us to God, and so forth. The heated trinitarian and
christological debates of the early centuries would hardly have arisen had there not
been a widespread assumption that the answers to the theological questions raised
could actually be known by those engaged in the controversies. Why would anyone
waste time and energy defending claims that, even if true, would never amount to
more than weakly supported beliefs?
I will therefore be concentrating in this chapter on the question of whether
Christian doctrines can be epistemically warranted; in other words, whether belief in
some Christian doctrine (the principal claims of which happen to be true) can ever
amount to knowledge. Answering this question will pave the way for discussing the
narrower question with which this thesis is directly concerned, namely, whether
belief in paradoxical Christian doctrines can ever be warranted. Does the
paradoxicality of the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation mean that belief in
those doctrines cannot be warranted — or, less strongly, are probably not warranted?
This latter question will be taken up in the following chapters. In addition, while I
propose to focus on warrant in this chapter and the next, I will consider in Chapter 7
4 A non-theological illustration: even if I find the proposition that it is raining outside to be plausible,
a report from a colleague that it is not raining will likely lead to my believing that is it not raining; yet
if that proposition is warranted for me (e.g., because I can actually see the rain through the window)
then such a report is very unlikely to lead me to believe otherwise.
5 For some particularly strong New Testament affirmations regarding the epistemic status of Christian
teaching, see Luke 1:3-4; Acts 2:36; 1 Thess. 5:2.
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some alternative notions of rationality to assess whether the problem of paradox can
be raised in other potentially troubling forms.
5.2 What is Warrant?
My aim in this chapter is to explain how the cardinal doctrines of the faith can be
warranted for Christian believers, where warrant is understood to be that epistemic
quality enough of which transforms mere true belief into knowledge.6 Indeed, I
propose to argue that such doctrines can enjoy a substantial degree of warrant: if true,
they can be known to be true, with considerable confidence if not with unshakable
certainty. However, simply defining warrant as that which distinguishes knowledge
from mere true belief sheds little light on the criteria for knowledge. Just what is it
about knowledge that sets it apart from mere true belief? What are the necessary and
sufficient conditions for warrant? Without an adequate answer to this question, one
cannot begin to assess whether certain beliefs — in the present case, Christian
doctrinal beliefs — can, or do, enjoy warrant. Therefore, in this section and the next,
I will set out and defend a particular account of warrant that I take to be very close to
the truth, if not the whole story, about what constitutes knowledge. I will thereafter
assume, in this and subsequent chapters, that this particular analysis of warrant is
substantially correct. Although I suspect that my conclusions about the rationality of
theological paradox can be sustained on the basis of alternative accounts of warrant,
it will not be my burden to argue the point here; I leave it as an exercise for
interested readers who share the concerns motivating this project but find themselves
inclined toward a different analysis of epistemic warrant.
Numerous competing analyses of warrant exist in contemporary epistemology and
it would be foolish to attempt to reinvent the wheel in the context of a thesis such as
this. Instead, I propose to adopt the account developed by Alvin Plantinga in his
influential Warrant trilogy.7 There are two good reasons for this. The first is that, as I
have indicated, I consider his account of the conditions of warrant to be substantially
accurate and more defensible than any competing theory. Furthermore, Plantinga has
6 Some epistemologists, particularly those of an internalist bent, prefer to use the term 'justification' to
refer to the third necessary component of knowledge (besides truth and belief). For the sake of
consistency and clarity, 1 will use the term 'warrant' exclusively for this purpose in the subsequent
discussion.
7
Plantinga (1993b); Plantinga (1993a); Plantinga (2000).
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himself already applied his analysis to the debate over whether theistic beliefs in
general, and Christian beliefs in particular, are warranted; he concludes that such
beliefs can indeed be warranted, even strongly warranted, provided one important
assumption is granted (to be discussed in due course). As such, Plantinga's account is
well suited for the purpose of assessing the reasonableness of paradoxical Christian
doctrines. In what follows, I will review Plantinga's theory of knowledge,
summarising the arguments he marshals in support of his analysis of warrant, before
turning to discuss the application of his theory to theistic beliefs (e.g., that God exists
and possess certain attributes) and to specifically Christian beliefs (e.g., that Jesus
Christ died to save sinners). Although much of this material will consist of a
summary exposition of Plantinga's writings, I will draw attention at points to what I
perceive to be ambiguities or shortcomings in his epistemology of Christian belief
and attempt to remedy these problems. Moreover, as will become clear, although
Plantinga purports to show how the main lines of Christian belief— 'the great things
of the gospel' — can be warranted, he does not supply an account of how those
ecumenical doctrines not explicitly articulated in the Bible (such as the trinitarian
and christological statements bequeathed to us by Nicea and Chalcedon) can also be
warranted. I will therefore take up the task of extending Plantinga's account of
warranted Christian belief to encompass this important element of the Christian
tradition. Finally, in the closing section of this chapter, I introduce the topic of
epistemic defeaters, an understanding of which will prove crucial to my treatment of
paradox in the remaining chapters.
5.3 Warranted Belief
In presenting Plantinga's analysis of warrant, it will be helpful to locate his theory on
the epistemological map. There are various of ways of dividing up the territory, but
one fruitful approach would be to categorise Plantinga's epistemology in terms of
two prominent debates in contemporary epistemology: the debate over internalism
versus externalism and the debate over coherentism versus foundationalism. In fact,
since Plantinga spends much of the first volume of his Warrant series interacting
with these questions, it makes considerable sense to frame his conclusions in light of
them and to examine why he comes down on the latter side in both cases.
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5.3.1 Internalism and Externalism
According to Laurence BonJour, one well-known defender of internalism in
epistemology, the distinction between internalist and externalist theories may be
characterised as follows:
The most generally accepted account of [the distinction between externalism and
internalism] is that a theory of justification is internalist if and only if it requires that
all of the factors needed for a belief to be epistemically justified for a given person be
cognitively accessible to that person, internal to his cognitive perspective; and
externalist, if it allows that at least some of the justifying factors need not be thus
accessible, so that they can be external to the believer's cognitive perspective, beyond
his ken.8
There are two points to note here. The first is the basic underlying conviction of
internalism, which is that one can know that some proposition p is true only if one is
in a position to identify appropriate grounds for believing that p is true, merely by
reflecting on one's own mental states: that is, roughly, only if one can see on
reflection just why it is reasonable or acceptable to believe that p. The second point is
that BonJour, in common with most internalists, inclines toward the classical analysis
of knowledge as justified true belief, the tripartite formula dating back (so it is said)
to Plato's Theaetetus. According to this analysis, the mere fact that a certain belief is
true is insufficient for it to constitute knowledge, since it could be true by sheer
coincidence. Genuine knowledge also requires justification-, the believer must be able
to justify her belief by supplying an adequate account (e.g., one or more reasons)
explaining why it should be thought true.
In Plantinga's view, post-Enlightenment epistemology has been dominated (at
least until very recently) by strongly internalist convictions, even if those convictions
have not been self-consciously recognised and explicitly articulated. He plausibly
suggests that this tradition is closely tied to the 'justified true belief view of
knowledge, and that this connection becomes especially clear when the notion of
epistemic justification is construed along deontological lines.9 On this understanding
of what it means be justified in one's beliefs, an understanding reinforced by the
connotations of the word itself, epistemic justification is primarily a matter of
fulfilling certain doxastic duties or obligations. According to epistemic
8 BonJour (1992): 132.
9
Plantinga (1993b): 3-29; Plantinga (1993a): v-vi.
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deontologism, as Plantinga characterises it, one is justified in holding some belief
provided one has not flouted any relevant epistemic duties in so doing (e.g., the duty
not to believe something contradicted by immediate sense experience). One is thus
permitted or entitled to hold that belief; in short, one is justified in so believing.
Plantinga finds that this deontologist theme features prominently in the
epistemologies of Descartes and Locke (albeit with some important qualifications in
the latter) as well as in the writings of numerous modern epistemologists.10
Furthermore, the affinity between internalism and deontological justification is not
difficult to discern. For if being justified is a matter of meeting certain epistemic
obligations, it follows naturally enough that one must be in a position to fulfil those
obligations; therefore those factors determining whether a particular belief is
permissible must be internally accessible to the mind of the believer.
While appreciating the internal coherence of this 'triumvirate' of justification,
internalism, and epistemic deontology, Plantinga finds it to be utterly inadequate as a
basis for understanding warrant. In the first place, it is clear that deontological
constraints do not square well with our normal epistemic practices, for belief
formation and sustenance is not, in the main, under our direct control. I cannot
simply will to believe one thing and not another. Moreover, even if such belief
control were available, Plantinga argues that justification construed along these lines
is nowhere near sufficient to transform mere true belief into knowledge.
Deontological justification is not sufficient for warrant because even if one is doing
everything possible to meet one's relevant epistemic obligations vis-a-vis some
belief, that belief may still lack warrant due to cognitive dysfunction. Consider, for
example, the poor victim of Descartes' deceiving demon, who is caused to perceive
the external world in an entirely coherent and credible, yet almost wholly fictional
manner. A person deceived in this way about the world may be fulfilling to the letter
every epistemic obligation with respect to belief evaluation and revision, even




Plantinga also argues, though with less emphasis, that justification is also not necessary for warrant.
Plantinga (1993b): 45; Plantinga (1993a): vii. Since justification is neither necessary nor sufficient for
warrant, it is misguided to make it the centrepiece of one's account of epistemic warrant.
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Plantinga's critique of internalist epistemologies has been criticised for relying too
12
heavily on the association of internalism with deontological notions ofjustification.
Internalist theories of knowledge have been defended that do not rely on any such
notions; one common approach is to focus on some form of evidentialist
requirement, e.g., that beliefs are justified only insofar as one possesses adequate
evidence of their truth. Still, by challenging deontologism, Plantinga has certainly
called into question one prominent motivation behind internalism in epistemology.13
Moreover, as the problem of Descartes' demon illustrates, Plantinga's basic
objection to the sufficiency of justification for warrant, where justification is
understood in wholly internalist terms (e.g., in terms of evidence available to the
believer via introspection alone), still stands. Even if some belief B is wholly
justified with respect to S's other beliefs and experiences — for example, B is
rendered highly probable with respect to everything else S believes — B could still
lack warrant on account of large-scale dysfunction in S"s cognitive apparatus. The
important point here is that internalist factors are insufficient: there must be
significant external constraints on warrant and some of these constraints need to
address the possibility of dysfunctional belief-formation. Plantinga thus appears to be
entirely correct in rejecting an analysis of warrant dominated by internalist
justification, whether construed deontologically or otherwise.14
Nevertheless, the last decade or so has seen some convergence in the debate over
internalism, which requires further comment in defence of Plantinga's position. Few
self-professed internalists today would maintain (as BonJour's earlier
characterisation suggests) that every warrant-contributing factor needs to be
internally accessible to the believer — not least because of so-called Gettier
counterexamples, which purport to show that external factors beyond the believer's
ken can result in a justified true belief falling short of knowledge (where 'justified' is
construed along typically internalist lines).15 For this reason, many internalists who
wish to preserve the classical picture of knowledge argue that a fourth condition is
12 Conee and Feldman (2001).
13
Bergmann (2000): 159.
14 For various criticisms of Plantinga's case against internalism, along with Plantinga's response, see
Kvanvig (1996).
15 Gettier (1963); Moser (1992).
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required for knowledge if Gettier problems are to be successfully circumvented.16
The upshot of these recent developments is that if warrant is taken to encompass
every factor required for knowledge other than truth and belief, then few
contemporary epistemologists would insist that the necessary and sufficient
conditions of warrant are wholly internal.17 Consequently, the current debate over
internalism is more usefully characterised as engaged between 'moderate' internalists
who maintain that warrant always involves some significant internal component (i.e.,
epistemic conditions that can be evaluated by a person via introspection alone) and
externalists who reject this requirement.18 The playing field is further complicated by
the fact that some externalists, Plantinga included, grant that there is one negative
internal constraint on warrant: specifically, that a belief B is warranted for S only if
on adequate reflection S would not be aware of any sufficient reason to reject B.19
Thus, while externalists of all stripes deny that there are always positive internal
constraints on warrant (i.e., that S must have introspective access to grounds for
thinking B is reasonable to hold), one can distinguish 'moderate' externalists who
accept that there is a negative internal constraint (i.e., that S must lack introspective
access to grounds for thinking B is unreasonable to hold) from 'strong' externalists
90
who reject even this latter condition.
How then does Plantinga's analysis of warrant fare in this more refined debate
between internalists and externalists? As I have noted, his conclusion that there must
be some significant external constraints is now conceded by nearly all
epistemologists, and he readily accepts the most plausible of proposed internal
constraints on warrant (the negative condition mentioned above). The remaining
16 One common account of this fourth condition involves specifying a defeasibility criterion, such as
the following:
(D) 5 knows that p only if there is no true proposition q such that if S were to believe q, then S
would not be justified in believing that p.
A condition like (D) is clearly not internal, for it requires only that there be no justification-defeating
truth; it does not require that whether or not p is defeasible is something that can be determined by S
via introspective assessment of S"s own cognitive states. Cf. Klein (1996); Swain (1996). See also
Plantinga's critique of various attempts to save the classical internalist account of knowledge by
adding a fourth, externalist constraint. Plantinga (1996).
17 Even BonJour has practically conceded this point more recent discussions. See BonJour (1996): 55.
18
Bergmann (1997).
19 This negative constraint on warrant is commonly referred to as a no-defeater condition. Bergmann





question concerns whether he is correct to hold (against the 'moderate' internalists)
that the necessary conditions of warrant do not include any positive internal
constraints. Suffice it here to say that claims made in support of such constraints are
controversial and typically open to counterexample. Furthermore, Michael Bergmann
has recently developed a powerful argument against moderate internalism, by
showing that any epistemology which places one or more positive internal
constraints on warrant either faces infinite regress problems (thus implying that
knowledge is impossible) or else offers no advantage over an externalist
epistemology which rejects those constraints.21 It seems therefore that Plantinga is on
firm ground in advocating, as he does, a moderate externalist analysis of warrant.
5.3.2 Coherentism and Foundationalism
The second debate in epistemology addressed head-on in Plantinga's Warrant series
is that between coherentism and foundationalism. Foundationalism, as Plantinga
characterises it, is the view that (i) some of our beliefs are held basically, that is, not
on the evidential basis of other beliefs, and (ii) basic beliefs can (at least in principle)
be held rationally or with warrant. On a foundationalist picture of our noetic
structures, warranted beliefs are either held basically (thus serving as the
'foundations' of our knowledge) or by way of warrant transfer from other warranted
22beliefs (e.g., on the basis of deductive or inductive inference). One important
feature of foundationalism is its rejection of circular reasoning: a belief cannot be
warranted by virtue of warrant transfer alone.
Plantinga's analysis of coherentism is initially confusing in that, as he explicates
the two competing views, coherentism turns out to be a 'special case' of
foundationalism.24 Coherentism arises from the conviction that no belief is an island;
beliefs can enjoy warrant only by virtue of their relation to other beliefs (and
ultimately to the overall coherence of a person's belief system). However, Plantinga
takes pains to explain that, contrary to prevalent opinion, coherentists need not be





23 For example, 5"s belief that propositions p, q and r are true cannot be warranted solely on the




(provided the circle is sufficiently large). Rather, coherentism is most charitably
defined as holding that the basic source of warrant is coherence itselfand, moreover,
that coherence is the only source of warrant in a person's noetic structure.25 This
thesis is quite compatible with a distinction between basic and non-basic beliefs and
therefore with epistemic foundationalism (as Plantinga defines it). The important
point is that for coherentists, basic beliefs can enjoy warrant only by virtue of their
coherence with a person's overall belief system; for non-coherentist foundationalists,
basic beliefs can be warranted in others ways as well.26
Although Plantinga maintains that coherentism cannot be summarily dismissed by
charging it with an untenable reliance on circular reasoning, he still considers it to be
'clearly mistaken.'27 The root of the problem is that it suffers from the same
inadequacy as the theories of warrant based on internalist notions of justification: in
each case, the favoured epistemic property is neither necessary nor sufficient for
warrant. Plantinga marshals a battery of counterexamples to establish both points; I
will repeat only one here, since it is particularly illuminative with respect to
Plantinga's later conclusions about warrant.28 To show that coherence alone can
never be sufficient for warrant, Plantinga invites us to consider the 'Case of the
Epistemically Inflexible Climber'. This individual, we are to imagine, is enjoying the
sensuous experience of scaling a rock-face in the Grand Tetons. His beliefs,
grounded in his present experiences, are entirely coherent and thoroughly warranted.
Unfortunately, the climber
is struck by a wayward burst of high-energy cosmic radiation. This induces a cognitive
malfunction; his beliefs become fixed, no longer responsive to changes in experience.
No matter what his experience, his beliefs remain the same.29
Having been rescued from the mountain, a friend tries to shake the climber out of his
chronic belief-fixity by taking him to an opera, yet despite fully experiencing the




Plantinga notes that we can further distinguish between 'pure' coherentism, which rejects the idea
of warrant transfer altogether (and therefore takes all beliefs to be basic), and 'impure' coherentism,
which allows that beliefs can be warranted either directly, by way of coherence, or indirectly, by way
of transfer from other warranted beliefs. Either way, the defining axiom of coherentism remains that








climbing experiences. Plantinga's point is clear: although his beliefs are now no less
coherent than when they were first formed, they are surely no longer warranted.
Coherentism not only severs the connection between beliefs and experiences,30 it
also fails to account for lack of knowledge due to cognitive dysfunction. Plantinga
continues his critique of coherentism by turning from 'coherentism iiberhaupf to
consider two sophisticated versions of coherentism — the theory of knowledge
defended by Laurence BonJour and a model for rational belief regulation based on
Bayesian probability — but finds that both suffer, as one might expect, from the
same shortcomings as generic coherentism.
Plantinga thus rejects coherentism in favour of a less restrictive foundationalism
according to which basic beliefs can obtain their warrant by a variety of means, not
merely by way of coherence with other beliefs. It would be a mistake, however, to
think that Plantinga therefore endorses the narrow form of foundationalism that seeks
to ground all human knowledge on a platform of indubitable and indisputable truths
— an optimistic project launched by Enlightenment thinkers but now treated with
almost universal scepticism (if not outright scorn) by modern philosophers. On the
contrary, Plantinga utter repudiates what he refers to as 'classical foundationalism':
the thesis that basic beliefs must be either self-evident, or incorrigible, or
immediately evident to the senses, in order to be rationally acceptable.31 On this
view, most of our commonsense, everyday beliefs turn out to be unwarranted; more
embarrassing still, so does the belief that classical foundationalism is true.
5.3.3 Reliabilism and Proper Function
Plantinga's analysis of warrant leads him to reject both internalism and narrow forms
of foundationalism, such as coherentism and 'classical' foundationalism. Moreover,
for each of the theories considered thus far, Plantinga enlists the notion of cognitive
dysfunction to show that some necessary component of warrant has been overlooked.
After an analysis of John Pollock's theory of knowledge — 'a sort of uncomfortable
halfway house, an uneasy compromise between internalism and externalism'32 —
Plantinga turns to consider various unashamedly externalist epistemologies. He
30 'This is the source of a fatal consequence: on the coherentist view, a belief acquires no warrant by
virtue of its relation to experience.' Plantinga (1993b): 80.
31




assesses the theories of William Alston, Fred Dretske, and Alvin Goldman, each of
which is form of reliabilism, according to which (roughly) a belief is warranted if
and only if it is formed by a reliable belief-forming mechanism or process.33 The
difference between the theories of these three externalists lies in the way in which the
central reliability constraint is spelled out. While Plantinga believes reliabilism is
heading in the right direction — it avoids the misdirection of internalism (especially
in its deontologist incarnations) and goes some way toward accounting for the
commonsense view that our memory beliefs and perceptual beliefs can be both basic
and warranted — it still does not give us the whole truth about warrant. One
relatively minor problem is presented by the fact that warrant comes in degrees',
some beliefs are more warranted than others, even among beliefs of the same basic
type (such as memory beliefs), but difficulties arise when trying to account for this
feature simply in terms of what type of cognitive process or faculty is responsible for
producing or sustaining those beliefs.
More seriously though, no matter how one construes the reliability condition, the
mere fact of a belief originating from a cognitive source that is reliable (with regard
to producing true beliefs) is not sufficient for that belief to be warranted. Plantinga
argues this point by way of a barrage of counterexamples to reliabilist accounts. The
most illuminative one (and surely the best named) is the 'Case of the Epistemically
Serendipitous Lesion', a version of which he employs for each of the three varieties
of reliabilism in order to highlight its inadequacy.34 The basic form of this
counterexample runs as follows. Suppose that S is suffering (unbeknown to him or to
anyone else) from a rare type of brain lesion. The pathology of this lesion is such that
it induces a number of belief-forming processes in the cognitive apparatus of S.
While most of the beliefs thus formed are absurdly false, one of these processes
results (by ironic coincidence) in the belief that S suffers from a brain lesion. Now,
this process (we may stipulate) is a reliable one: the resulting beliefs are
predominantly true. Moreover, a causal connection (often included in reliabilist
33
Plantinga notes that while reliabilism is the 'new boy on the block' in contemporary epistemology,
its roots can be traced to the writings of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and Thomas Reid.
34 A precursor of the Case of the Epistemically Serendipitous Lesion appears in the discussion of
Alston's reliabilism. Plantinga (1993b): 192. It is formally introduced as a counterexample to
Dretske's account; modified versions are then enlisted against Goldman's earlier and later reliabilism.
Plantinga (1993b): 195, 199, 207.
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accounts of warrant) is also present: the belief that S suffers from a brain lesion is
caused by 5"s suffering from a brain lesion. Nonetheless, 5"s true belief hardly
amounts to knowledge. The reason for this, Plantinga suggests, is obvious: the belief-
forming process is only reliable by accident, by sheer dumb luck. The process itself
is a consequence of cognitive dysfunction and therefore cannot be a source of
warranted beliefs.
The Case of the Epistemically Serendipitous Lesion can be thought of as just one
illustration of a general recipe for generating counterexamples to reliabilist accounts
of warrant.35 All that is required to reveal the insufficiency of the proposed reliabilist
conditions of warrant is to concoct a scenario in which a belief-forming process is
instigated or substantially affected by some cognitive dysfunction yet the resultant
beliefs turn out, by happy accident, to be predominantly true. The conclusion is clear:
reliability may be a necessary condition of warrant, but it is far from sufficient.36
Plantinga's central strategy in his critique of the various contemporary accounts of
warrant is to show, by way of counterexample, that the proposed conditions of
37
knowledge are either not necessary, or not sufficient, or both. Moreover, whatever
the other failings of each account, Plantinga emphasises that the notion of cognitive
dysfunction can be introduced to secure its downfall. Thus, in the various
counterexamples he marshals against internalism, deontologism, coherentism, and
reliabilism, this element proves to be a recurring theme — whether due to a Cartesian
lO TQ
demon, interfering Alpha Centaurian scientists, brain envatment, disruptive
cosmic radiation,40 pathological obsession or gullibility,41 or epistemically
serendipitous brain lesions. The conclusion Plantinga draws from this pattern is that
the notion ofproper function in our belief-forming faculties or processes must be an
35 Cf. Plantinga (1993b): 192.
36
Plantinga refines his critique of reliabilism, as a response to Alston (1995), in Plantinga (1995).
Whereas Plantinga had only targeted specific versions of reliabilism in Plantinga (1993b), here he
argues that generic reliabilism falls short as an account of warrant.
37 Cf. Plantinga (1993a): v-x.
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essential element of a satisfactory account of warrant. Any account that lacks this
feature will inevitably fall foul of the sort of counterexamples that Plantinga wields.42
In Warrant and Proper Function, Plantinga turns from the negative task of
identifying the deficiencies in existing accounts of warrant to the positive task of
developing his own account of warrant, centred on the notion of proper function.
According to this account, a belief is only warranted if it results from a cognitive
faculty or process that is functioning properly. The notion of proper function leads
naturally to the concept of a design plan: a 'blueprint' for our cognitive apparatus in
terms of which any particular belief-forming faculty may be judged to be functioning
properly or otherwise.43 Moreover, for any particular belief produced by cognitive
faculties in accordance with the design plan, the relevant portions of the design plan
must be aimed at truth. It is conceivable that beliefs might be formed in order to
support some other goal than truth-attainment (e.g., survival or psychological
comfort) but such beliefs would not be warranted (since warrant is an epistemic
concept and thus aligned with truth-conducivity). Furthermore, the design plan must
be a good one; those faculties geared toward furnishing us with true beliefs must, on
the whole, do just that in practice. This amounts to a 'reliabilist constraint on
warrant' corresponding to 'the important truth contained in reliabilist accounts of
warrant.'44 Among other things, the design plan will also include one or more
'defeater systems', which govern how beliefs will be accepted or revised in light of
truth-relations with other beliefs.45
Beside these factors internal to the cognitive apparatus of the knower, there are
also external constraints on warrant: specifically, the need for belief-forming
faculties to operate in an environment conducive to their proper function. For




Plantinga remarks that the concept of design here can be taken literally, as might a theist, or
analogically (perhaps in terms of evolutionary goals), so that no controversial metaphysical questions
are being begged. Plantinga (1993a): 13. This might be thought somewhat misleading, since he later
argues (194-215) that there are no naturalistic accounts of proper function available that would
satisfying the conditions of warrant. Although the matter cannot be pursued here, it is worth noting
that these arguments, conjoined with the arguments for a proper function account of knowledge,
provide the resources for an intriguing piece of natural theology.
44
Plantinga (1993a): 17. Plantinga has pointed out, however, that his account should not be thought of
as merely 'reliabilism plus'. The extent to which a belief-producing faculty needs to be reliable will
depend on the details of the design plan and its execution. See Plantinga (1995): 428, fn. 2.
45
Plantinga (1993a): 40-42. For more on epistemic defeaters, see §5.8.
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a red object before me, that belief would be warranted. Yet if I perceive the object
illuminated (unbeknown to me) by red lighting, that same belief would not be
warranted. It is not that my belief-forming faculties are malfunctioning in the second
case; it is merely that the reliability of the beliefs produced is contingent on certain
environmental factors.46 Combining these internal and external constraints, Plantinga
presents the following basic analysis of warrant:
According to the central and paradigmatic core of our notion of warrant (so I say) a
belief B has warrant for you if and only if (1) the cognitive faculties involved in the
production of B are functioning properly (and this is to include the relevant defeater
systems as well as those systems, if any, that provide propositional inputs to the
system in question); (2) your cognitive environment is sufficiently similar to the one
for which your cognitive faculties are designed; (3) the triple of the design plan
governing the production of the belief in question involves, as purpose or function, the
production of true beliefs (and the same goes for elements of the design plan
governing the production of input beliefs to the system in question); and (4) the design
plan is a good one: that is, there is a high statistical or objective probability that the
belief produced in accordance with the relevant segment of the design plan in that sort
of environment is true.47
One further detail is required in order to account for the fact that warrant comes in
degrees', while I may know many things, some of my beliefs are more warranted than
others. On Plantinga's account, then, 'the degree of warrant is given by some
monotonically increasing function of the strength of S's belief that 5.' As such,
warrant depends on a certain psychological feature, viz. the firmness with which a
belief is held. Even if a true belief satisfies all of Plantinga's conditions (1) through
(4), if it is not held with enough conviction it will not be sufficiently warranted to
constitute knowledge.
Armed with this basic paradigm, Plantinga explores in some detail the various
kinds of knowledge that we are normally thought to possess — self-knowledge,
memorial knowledge, perceptual knowledge, testimonial knowledge, a priori
knowledge, inductive knowledge — and argues that each can be plausibly
understood in terms of the proper function of cognitive faculties.
In later publications, Plantinga has refined his account of warrant in response to
objections and alleged counterexamples.48 Most notably, he has recognised the need






Plantinga (1995); Plantinga (1996).
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environmental conditions) and m/m'environments (i.e., narrow or 'local'
circumstances, of which the believer is likely unaware) in order to handle certain
Gettier-type examples involving accidentally true beliefs.49 Despite these
adjustments, however, the basic contours of Plantinga's analysis of warrant remain,
and it is this account that he carries forward to his lengthy treatment of theistic and
Christian belief in Warranted Christian Belief.
5.4 Warranted Theistic Belief
From the late 60s to the early 80s, Plantinga invested considerable effort in
defending the thesis that belief in God (as traditionally conceived by theists) can be
properly basic, that is, theistic belief can be rationally held without relying on
evidential support from other, more fundamental beliefs. In God and Other Minds,50
he critiqued the classical arguments for God's existence and a selection of
contemporary arguments against God's existence, concluding that there are no
compelling arguments either for or against theism.51 The most promising is the
teleological argument, he suggests, although it still falls short of providing adequate
inferential support for belief in God. However, in a ingenious move Plantinga
proceeded to argue that belief in the existence of other minds (human or otherwise) is
in precisely the same predicament, there being no compelling arguments to support
or contradict it. The best hope in this case is some form of analogical argument, but
such an argument suffers from the same difficulties afflicting the teleological theistic
argument. Nonetheless, few people would seriously contend that belief in other
minds is less than rational. Plantinga thus arrived at the following parity thesis: 'if
my belief in other minds is rational, so is my belief in God. But obviously the former
is rational; so, therefore, is the latter.'52
In his later essay 'Reason and Belief in God',53 Plantinga developed this line of
thinking by taking aim at what he dubbed the evidentialist objection to theism,













support it.54 Plantinga suggested that this objection is invariably motivated by a
commitment (indigenous to both medieval and modern epistemology) to a classical
foundationalist epistemology. Classical foundationalism maintains that in order to be
rationally acceptable, beliefs must either be held on the evidential basis of other
(rationally acceptable) beliefs or else be properly basic, where properly basic beliefs
are either self-evident, evident to the senses, or incorrigible. According to Plantinga's
devastating critique, while classical foundationalism may condemn belief in God as
irrational, it also rules as epistemically deficient a whole range of commonsense
beliefs (such as the belief that the world has existed for longer than five minutes).
Worse still, belief in classical foundationalism is itself irrational, by its own lights.
Plantinga concluded that the criteria for properly basic belief must be far less narrow
than classical foundationalism would have us believe and, moreover, that there is no
good reason to assume belief in God would not fall into this category — in which
case, the evidentialist objection quite misses the mark. Furthermore, this suggestion
is by no means original to Plantinga; in fact, something close to the idea that theistic
belief is properly basic featured in the theology of John Calvin and the subsequent
Reformed tradition. The essay closed with a consideration of various objections to
this basicality thesis, none of which Plantinga found compelling.
In Warranted Christian Belief, the third volume of his Warrant series, Plantinga's
defence of the rationality of theistic belief reaches its most mature form. The main
question he proposes to consider is whether or not classical Christian belief is
'intellectually acceptable' — even for 'educated and intelligent people living in the
twenty-first century, with all that has happened over the last four or five hundred
years'.55 This is the de jure question of Christian belief (concerning whether such
belief is rationally acceptable, epistemically respectable, warranted, etc.), to be
distinguished from the de facto question (concerning whether such belief is true).
Since Christian belief involves belief in God, it follows that if generic theistic belief
is not rationally acceptable then neither is Christian theistic belief. Plantinga
therefore begins by addressing the de jure question with respect to theism simpliciter.
54 Bertrand Russell, when asked what he would say if he were brought into God's presence and asked





After rebutting some Kantian and neo-Kantian objections to the very possibility of
having beliefs about God, let alone rational ones, Plantinga considers various notions
of rationality and asks in each case whether theistic belief could be 'rational' in the
sense in question. He rehearses and extends his earlier rebuttal (in 'Reason and
Belief in God') of the 'classical picture' of justified beliefs: the evidentialism,
classical foundationalism, and deontologism typified by the writings of John
Locke.56 A more forgiving conception of justification, cashed out in terms of
fulfilling one's epistemic duties, fails to provide any philosophically interesting de
jure question; a Christian could be wildly mistaken in her beliefs, yet without falling
foul of any relevant epistemic obligations.57 Other assorted versions of rationality —
Aristotelian rationality, proper function rationality, compatibility with the
deliverances of reason, mean-end rationality, William Alston's 'practical rationality'
— suffer a similar fate: none provides an interpretation of the de jure challenge with
which the Christian should be at all troubled.58 The conclusion Plantinga draws is
that the truly interesting de jure question must be framed in terms of warrant — and
that understood in terms of properly functioning cognitive faculties. This
interpretation of the de jure objection to Christian belief accords well with criticisms
typically levelled by sceptics of the Marxian and Freudian schools: the former claim
that belief in God is a type of delusion (and is thus attributable to cognitive
dysfunction)', the latter contend that belief in God amounts to something like wish-
fulfilment (and thus results from cognitive faculties functioning so as promote some
psychological benefit, such as emotional well-being, but not aimed at truth).59
The interesting question, then, is whether the Christian's beliefs about God are
warranted: whether they are produced by cognitive faculties functioning properly in
a congenial epistemic environment according to a design plan successfully aimed at
truth. Plantinga approaches the question by offering a model, inspired by Aquinas






Plantinga (2000): 108-32. In his discussion of rationality in terms of proper function, Plantinga here
restricts himself to considering the notion of irrationality as pathological dysfunction, i.e., the kind of
cognitive malfunction that involves 'clinical psychoses.' In this sense, Plantinga remarks, most
Christians are surely not irrational. Plantinga (2000): 110-13. Subtler forms of cognitive malfunction




degree. According to this A/C model, human beings are by nature endowed with 'a
kind of faculty or a cognitive mechanism, what Calvin calls a sensus divinitatis or
sense of divinity, which in a wide variety of circumstances produces in us beliefs
about God.'60 These triggering circumstances would include such things as
the marvelous, impressive beauty of the night sky; the timeless crash and roar of the
surf that resonates deep within us; the majestic grandeur of the mountains (the North
Cascades, say, as viewed from Whatcom Pass); the ancient, brooding presence of the
Australian outback; the thunder of a great waterfall.61
Similarly, the beauty, delicacy, and intricacy of living organisms could also induce
the same response, as might certain common human experiences, such as guilt over
wrongdoing or intense fear in the face of grave danger. Whatever the details, the
point is that in a broad range of circumstances, typically experienced by all human
beings at some time or other, this sensus divinitatis functions to generate beliefs such
as that God exists, that he is powerful, good, transcendent, just, and so forth.
Furthermore, Plantinga explains, because (according to the A/C model) the sensus
divinitatis has been placed in us by a God who possesses the aforementioned
attributes, these theistic beliefs are produced by a cognitive faculty functioning
properly in a congenial epistemic environment according to a design plan
successfully aimed at truth; which is just to say, they are warranted 62 In accordance
with Plantinga's earlier contentions, these beliefs are also properly basic: they are
held with warrant, though not by way of inference from other beliefs.63
According to the A/C model, then, theistic beliefs can be warranted to a degree
sufficient for knowledge. But is the model true — or at least close to the truth? The
question of whether theistic beliefs are warranted ultimately depends on whether
those beliefs are true. If theism is false, then it goes without saying that human





62 Some reviewers have questioned whether Calvin conceived of the sensus divinitatis as a faculty or
disposition toward true belief in God or as the resultant knowledge of God itself. See Oliphint (2001);
Sudduth (2002). These criticisms are probably justified. However, this is partly a matter of
terminology and partly a matter of tweaking the model. Plantinga's main contention — that theistic
beliefs can be easily meet the conditions of warrant — is substantially unaffected.
63
Plantinga (2000): 178-79. Since warrant requires that two important types of rationality be
exemplified — external rationality (that is, proper function with respect to the formation of
experience, whether sensuous or doxastic) and internal rationality (that is, the proper function of all
belief-forming processes 'downstream from experience') — it follows that warranted theistic beliefs
also enjoy external rationality and internal rationality. Plantinga (2000): 110, 179.
166
are unlikely to be warranted. But on the assumption that theism is true, it is entirely
natural to suppose that God has equipped us with cognitive faculties designed to
furnish us with true beliefs about our Creator; in which case, our beliefs about God
(at least, those produced via such faculties) will normally be warranted.64 This
analysis leads Plantinga to a very significant conclusion, namely, that the de jure
question concerning belief in God (i.e., whether theistic belief is justified, rational,
warranted, etc.) is not logically independent of the corresponding de facto question
(i.e., whether theistic belief is true). Furthermore, an important corollary of this thesis
is that one cannot object to the rationality of theism without also objecting to its
truth. As Plantinga puts it:
[Atheologians] can't any longer adopt the following stance: "Well, I certainly don't
know whether theistic belief is true — who could know a thing like that? — but I do
know this: it is irrational, or unjustified, or not rationally justified, or contrary to
reason or intellectually irresponsible or ..." There isn't a sensible de jure question or
criticism that is independent of the de facto question. There aren't any de jure
criticisms that are sensible when conjoined with the truth of theistic belief; all of them
either fail right from the start (as with the claim that it is unjustified to accept theistic
belief) or else really presuppose that theism is false.65
Despite the many virtues of Plantinga's A/C model, its logical cogency and the
support it enjoys from certain streams of Christian tradition, one objection
immediately presents itself. How does all this square with the phenomenon of
widespread disagreement about God and even outright unbelief? Is this not
compelling evidence against the existence of a sensus divinitatis (or at least, against
its proper function or successful design)? Plantinga has a ready response: according
to the A/C model, while all humans possess a faculty aimed at producing basic
theistic beliefs, the actual operation of the faculty can be hindered, or even halted, by
the presence of sin in a person's life. Among other things, sin involves an element of
'cognitive disease' that affects (to one degree or another) the operation of the sensus
divinitatis,66 Consequently, for any particular person the faculty may produce true
beliefs but with insufficient strength, or fail to produce those beliefs at all, or even
produce some false beliefs. Either way, the result will be a lack of true beliefs with





66 Plantinga (2000): 184-86.
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notion of sin, however, anticipates Plantinga's extension of the A/C model so as to
cover not only theistic beliefs, but also specifically Christian beliefs — to which
subject I now turn.
5.5 Warranted Christian Belief
The basic A/C model supplies an account of warranted belief in God. Christian
belief, however, involves considerably more than mere belief in God (or beliefs
about God); among other things, it includes beliefs about the spiritual state of human
beings, about God's response to the human predicament, and about a historic
individual, Jesus of Nazareth. Plantinga's goal is to show that even these more
specific beliefs can be warranted to a degree adequate for knowledge; but rather than
concern himself with controversial denominational views (e.g., convictions about the
meaning and application of the sacraments) he proposes to restrict himself just to
those ecumenical Christian beliefs expressed in the early creeds and confessions (or
what C. S. Lewis dubbed 'mere Christianity').67 To accomplish this, Plantinga
develops an extended A/C model, according to which these beliefs are no less
warranted than the theistic beliefs of the basic A/C model.
Reflecting Plantinga's own approach, I will sketch out the extended model before
focusing in on the details. First of all, the extended A/C model posits those
propositions affirmed by the basic Christian narrative, just as the basic A/C model
posits the existence of God (as the author of the sensus divinitatis). According to the
extended model, God created us in his own image, as persons possessing both
intellect and will, endowed with the sensus divinitatis and therefore enjoying
knowledge of God. We are also capable of affections and were originally made so as
to share God's affections; to love what God loves and to hate what God hates.68
However, 'we human beings have fallen into sin, a calamitous condition from which
we require salvation — a salvation we are unable to accomplish by our own efforts.'
This sin affects not only our relationship with God, but also our knowledge of God;






furthermore] sin induces in us a resistance to the deliverances of the sensus
divinitatis'. But there is also good news:
God ... has provided a remedy for sin and its ruinous effects, a means of salvation
from sin and restoration to his favor and fellowship. This remedy is made available in
the life, atoning suffering and death, and resurrection of his divine Son, Jesus Christ.
Salvation involves among other things rebirth and regeneration, a process (beginning
in the present life and reaching fruition in the next) that involves a restoration and
repair of the image of God in us.69
Such are the basic theological contours of the extended A/C model; nothing that
ought to prove controversial for any orthodox Christian believer. However, the
extended model also makes some more specifically cognitive claims. In order to
inform human beings of his scheme of salvation, God has specially inspired a
collection of human writings, the Bible, in such a way as to be its principal author;
furthermore, he has commissioned the Holy Spirit, in accordance with the promise of
Christ, to produce faith in us, by which we are enabled to grasp and induced to
believe 'the truth of the central Christian affirmations.' While faith is certainly a
cognitive affair — it involves belief and assent to propositions — it is also a matter
of the will and the affections. Moreover, the way in which this faith arises has
important implications for the epistemic status of the beliefs involved:
In giving us faith, the Holy Spirit enables us to see the truth of the main lines of the
Christian gospel as set forth in Scripture. The internal invitation of the Holy Spirit is
therefore a source of belief, a cognitive process that produces in us belief in the main
lines of the Christian story. Still further, according to the model, the beliefs thus
produced in us meet the conditions necessary and sufficient for warrant; they are
produced by cognitive processes functioning properly (in accord with their design
plan) in an appropriate epistemic environment (both maxi and mini) according to a
design plan successfully aimed at truth; if they are held with sufficient firmness, these
beliefs qualify as knowledge, just as Calvin's definition of faith has it.70
This is the essential structure of the extended A/C model. After introducing its basic
contours, Plantinga proceeds to discuss at length the noetic effects of sin: the
implications of our fallen state for our knowledge both of God and of the world. The
details of his exposition on this subject need not detain us here. Instead, I wish to
turn immediately to Plantinga's exposition of how, according to the extended model,






plays in that process, for this will serve as the foundation for my later discussion of
Christian doctrines.
Plantinga recognises that the extended model he proposes is one prompted by a
particular Christian tradition, namely, that of Calvin and the Reformers.
Nevertheless, he maintains that alternative models can be constructed, in accordance
with other traditions, for which Christian belief turns out to be just as warranted as
on his favoured model.1 As Plantinga explains, according to his own model there are
three main elements involved in a person coming to know 'the great things of the
gospel' (as Jonathan Edwards put it):
First, he arranged for the production of Scripture, the Bible, a library of books or
writings each of which has a human author, but each of which is also specially
inspired by God in such a way that he himself is its principal author. Thus the whole
library has a single principal author: God himself. In this library, he proposes much for
our belief and action, but there is a central theme and focus (and for this reason this
collection of books is itself a book): the gospel, the stunning good news of the way of
salvation God has graciously offered. Correlative with Scripture and necessary to its
properly serving its purpose is the second element of this three-tiered cognitive
process: the presence and action of the Holy Spirit promised by Christ himself before
his death and resurrection, and invoked and celebrated in the epistles of the apostle
Paul. By virtue of the work of the Holy Spirit in the hearts of those to whom faith is
given, the ravages of sin (including the cognitive damage) are repaired, gradually or
suddenly, to a greater or lesser extent. Furthermore, it is by virtue of the activity of the
Holy Spirit that Christians come to grasp, believe, accept, endorse, and rejoice in the
truth of the great things of the gospel. It is thus by virtue of this activity that the
Christian believes that "in Christ, God was reconciling the world to himself in Christ,
not counting men's sins against them" (2 Corinthians 5:19).72
While the first two elements are external to the believer, the third is internal.
According to John Calvin, the principal work of the Holy Spirit is the production (in
the hearts of Christian believers) of the third element of the process, faith. ... Faith
therefore involves an explicitly cognitive element; it is, says Calvin, knowledge —
knowledge of the availability of redemption and salvation through the person and
work of Jesus Christ — and it is revealed to our minds.73
As Plantinga describes things here, it appears that the role of Scripture is to supply
the content of belief— the propositions to be believed — while the role of the Holy
Spirit is to produce the belief itself (as a component of faith) in the mind of the







74 Cf. Plantinga's comparison of his model with the account of Christian belief suggested by Aquinas:
'Here we have (embryonically, at any rate) the same trio of processes: there is belief, there is the
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totality of scriptural teaching. It is restricted to 'the main lines of the Christian
gospel': the content of faith is 'just the central teachings of the gospel'.75 On this
view, the formation of Christian belief is decidedly unnatural; indeed, it is
supernatural:
These beliefs do not come to the Christian just by way of memory, perception, reason,
testimony, the sensus divinitatis, or any other of the cognitive faculties with which we
human beings were originally created; they come instead by way of the work of the
Holy Spirit, who gets us to accept, causes us to believe, these great truths of the
gospel. These beliefs don't come just by way of the normal operation of our natural
faculties; they are a supernatural gift.76
With this tri-partite process in hand, Plantinga sketches the typical scenario by which
a person comes to believe the gospel through an encounter with Scripture:
We read Scripture, or something presenting scriptural teaching, or hear the gospel
preached, or are told of it by parents, or encounter a scriptural teaching as the
conclusion of an argument (or conceivably even as an object of ridicule), or in some
other way encounter a proclamation of the Word. What is said simply seems right; it
seems compelling; one finds oneself saying, "Yes, that's right, that's the truth of the
matter; this is indeed the word of the Lord." I read, "God was in Christ, reconciling
the world to himself'; I come to think: "Right; that's true; God really was in Christ,
reconciling the world to himself!" And I may also think something a bit different,
something about that proposition: that it is indeed a divine teaching or revelation, that
in Calvin's words it is "from God." What one hears or reads seems clearly and
obviously true, and (at any rate in paradigm cases) seems also to be something the
Lord is intending to teach.77
Two things should be observed at this point. The first is that Plantinga's model
allows for the production not only for first-order beliefs about the gospel (for
example, that Christ died for our sins) but also for second-order beliefs about those
first-order beliefs (for example, that the belief that Christ died for our sins comes to
me by way of the very teaching of God). The second point to note is that, on the
basis of Plantinga's exposition thus far, it appears that the reading or hearing of
Scripture is needed only to provide (i) the propositional content of Christian belief
and (ii) the occasion of coming to believe that content. The idea seems to be that on
encountering the biblical declaration that 'God was in Christ reconciling the world',
a person entertains (presumably in a natural way) the proposition expressed by that
divine teaching (as given in Scripture) which is the object of that belief, and there is also special









claim; the Holy Spirit may then affect the mind of the person so as to induce belief in
that proposition. This understanding of the role of Scripture in Plantinga's model
seems to be confirmed by the following passage:
This process can go on in a thousand ways; in each case there is presentation or
proposal of central Christian teaching, and by way of response, the phenomenon of
being convinced, coming to see, forming of a conviction. There is the reading or
hearing, and then there is the belief or conviction that what one reads or hears is true
and a teaching of the Lord.78
If this interpretation of Plantinga's model is correct, then I suggest that many would
find this account of Christian belief somewhat at odds with Christian tradition. For
the Bible has usually been understood by believers to serve not merely as a conduit
for true propositions, but also as a testimony to their truth. Indeed, this appears to be
the view promoted by Christ and by Scripture itself:
'You diligently study the Scriptures because you think that by them you possess
eternal life. These are the Scriptures that testify about me, yet you refuse to come to
me to have life.'79
This is the disciple who testifies to these things and who wrote them down. We know
that his testimony is true.80
But now a righteousness from God, apart from law, has been made known, to which
the Law and the Prophets testify.81
To the law and to the testimony! If they do not speak according to this word, they have
no light of dawn.82
However, according to the model as presented thus far by Plantinga, even if Scripture
is a testimony to God's plan of salvation through Christ, this feature seems to play no
role in the formation of Christian belief. As such, God might equally well have used
a set of writings with no testimonial value whatsoever — for example, documents
that were written in ignorance, in jest, or as an inspiring work of fiction — but which
just so happened to express (unbeknown to the authors and contrary to their
intentions) the true propositions of the gospel.83 Furthermore, not only is this







87 Of course, scriptures with such origins would introduce myriad other problems. The point here is
only that they would be equally adequate in supplying the content and occasion of Christian belief.
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point, it even appears to be explicitly ruled out, because according to Plantinga's
earlier statement Christian belief does not come by way of any of our normal
cognitive faculties, including those devoted to the acceptance of testimony.84
The apparent exclusion of the testimonial value of Scripture is a surprising aspect
of Plantinga's opening discussion of the formation of warranted Christian beliefs.
Still more surprising is that Plantinga suddenly changes tack at this point in his
treatment and affirms that the Bible is indeed testimony, as if this were in fact an
important feature of the extended A/C model:
According to the model, this conviction [that what one reads or hears is true and a
teaching of the Lord] comes by way of the activity of the Holy Spirit. Calvin speaks
here of the internal 'testimony' and (more often) 'witness' of the Holy Spirit; Aquinas,
of the divine 'instigation' and 'invitation'. On the model, there is both Scripture and
the divine activity leading to human belief. God himself (on the model) is the principal
author of Scripture. Scripture is most importantly a message, a communication from
God to humankind; Scripture is a word from the Lord. But then this just is a special
case of the pervasive process of testimony, by which, as a matter of fact, we leam
most of what we know. From this point of view, Scripture is as much a matter of
testimony as is a letter you receive from a friend. What is proposed for our belief in
Scripture, therefore, just is testimony — divine testimony. So the term 'testimony' is
appropriate here. However, there is also the special work of the Holy Spirit in getting
us to believe, in enabling us to see the truth of what is proposed.85
Continuing on this theme, Plantinga writes:
So Scripture is, indeed, testimony, even if it is testimony of a very special kind. First,
the principal testifier is God. It also differs from ordinary testimony in that in this
case, unlike most others, there is both a principal testifier and subordinate testifiers:
the human authors. There is still another difference: it is the instigation of the Holy
Spirit, on this model, that gets us to see and believe that the propositions proposed for
our beliefs in Scripture really are a word from the Lord. This case also differs from
the usual run of testimony, then, in that the Holy Spirit not only writes the letter
(appropriately inspires the human authors) but also does something special to enable
you to believe and appropriate its contents. So this testimony is not the usual run of
testimony; it is testimony nonetheless. According to the model, therefore, faith is the
belief in the great things of the gospel that results from the internal instigation of the
Holy Spirit.86
I suggest that the picture painted in these latter passages of the way in which
Christian beliefs arise is substantially different from the one presented by Plantinga
in his earlier exposition. On this latter view, Scripture contributes more than mere








in itself to bring about Christian belief in accordance with God's plan; thus, the
additional intervention of the Holy Spirit is required in order to enable and
encourage belief in the central gospel message. Just how much of the belief
production is to be attributed to the testimony of Scripture and how much to the
witness of the Spirit is unclear (and perhaps unimportant). The point, however, is that
on this picture the testimonial value of Scripture does play some role in the
appropriation of its truth.
How should this ambiguity regarding the role of Scripture in Plantinga's
exposition be resolved? Before attempting to address it, I wish to introduce into the
discussion another potential problem in his account — a problem that, as it turns out,
suggests a way of resolving this curious ambiguity along with the problem itself.
On Plantinga's model, Christian belief arises by way of the 'internal instigation of
the Holy Spirit' (IIHS) — that is, the supernatural operation of the Holy Spirit, the
third Person of the Trinity, on the cognitive and volitional faculties of a person so as
to bring about belief in the testimony of Scripture (at least regarding 'the great things
of the gospel'). Plantinga characterises this belief formation as a process, rather than
in terms of the operation of a faculty. He does so primarily, it would seem, because
of the crucial contribution of the Holy Spirit: because the Spirit is not part of the
cognitive apparatus of the Christian, the IIHS cannot be straightforwardly thought of
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as either a faculty or the operation of a faculty. Thus it seems more accurate to
speak of it as a process of belief-formation.
But there is a difficulty here. For while it makes sense to speak of a faculty as
'functioning properly', it is rather less clear that it makes equal sense to speak of a
process as 'functioning properly'. A process qua process is just not the sort of thing
that intrinsically possesses a function; a fortiori, it is not the sort of thing that can be
said to function properly. For example, the freezing of water is a process — but what
sense does it make to ask whether this process as such is functioning properly or not?
Richard Gale has identified and commented on the problem as follows:
In regard to basic religious beliefs that are internally instigated by the Holy Spirit, it is
obvious that the notion of proper functioning could have no application to them since
they are supernaturally caused directly by God. Such instigation, furthermore, is not a
87 Recall Plantinga's earlier comment that Christian beliefs do not come by way of any of our natural
cognitive faculties. Plantinga (2000): 245.
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faculty but a process and thus cannot be said to have any function and therefore cannot
be said to malfunction or be subject to a pathology; for there is no correct way for God
to supernaturally cause worldly occurrences. Plantinga recognizes this difficulty: "A
caveat: as Andrew Dole points out in 'Cognitive Processes, Cognitive Faculties, and
the Holy Spirit in Plantinga's Warrant Series' (as yet unpublished), it is not obvious
that one can directly transfer necessary and sufficient conditions for warrant from
beliefs produced by faculties to beliefs produced processes." (257) Plantinga gives no
response to this caveat, nor do I think one can be given.88
Although I would take issue with Gale's claim that 'there is no correct way for God
to supernaturally cause worldly occurrences' — after all, proper function is a
teleological notion rather than a nomological one — his basic criticism is justified.
Unlike faculties, processes as such do not have functions; and though Plantinga
seems aware of this, he does nothing to address it.
89I suggest that there are at least two ways for Plantinga to resolve this issue. The
first would be to treat the combination of the cognitive apparatus of the believer and
the action of the Holy Spirit as a system of belief-formation: a system intended or
designed to bring about that process of belief-formation which Plantinga labels the
'internal instigation of the Holy Spirit'. While not every system is a faculty,90 a
system is nonetheless the sort of thing that can be naturally thought of as having a
function. Moreover, there seems to be nothing objectionable about viewing the action
of the Holy Spirit on the mind of a human being as part of a system by which
Christian beliefs are produced.91 If this system is designed in such a way as to bring
88 Gale (2001). A similar complaint is raised by Le Morvan and Radcliffe (2003).
89 A third solution, proposed by Dole (2002), involves 'a readjustment of the central paradigm for
knowledge' along self-consciously theistic lines. On this view, God's knowledge provides the
paradigm for human knowledge, leading to a deeper analysis of warrant in terms of the 'epistemic
credentials' of the source of a belief. Divine beliefs, naturally enough, have maximally good epistemic
credentials. Human beliefs, however, ultimately depend on divine knowledge for their credentials and
consequently on the way in which those beliefs are produced: either immediately, by the direct
supernatural operation of the Holy Spirit, or mediately, by way of cognitive faculties functioning
according to a divine design plan (as in Plantinga's account of warrant). Dole's basic point about
epistemic credentials seems plausible, but I do not adopt his solution here because it fails to
incorporate the testimonial aspect of Scripture. By his own admission, on his view the Bible is only
essential to Christian knowledge to the extent that God decides to make the reading of Scripture the
occasion of Christian belief. Dole (2002): 43-44.
90 As Plantinga uses the term 'faculty', the reverse is true: cognitive faculties are systems (or perhaps
subsystems) of belief production.
91 As far as I can tell, there is nothing incoherent about treating an intentional agent as a component of
a system, designed to bring about a certain result. For example, the UK Passport Service has a system
for producing passports that includes both human agents and non-intentional elements (such as
computers and printing presses). It makes perfect sense to speak of this system, as a whole,
functioning properly — that is, operating according to a good design plan aimed at reliable passport
production.
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about a preponderance of true beliefs in a congenial epistemic environment, then
beliefs produced in such circumstances would appear to meet Plantinga's conditions
of warrant.
Although this response would seem to address Gale's objection, it does nothing to
resolve the ambiguity in Plantinga's account of the role of Scripture and tends to
reinforce the notion that the testimonial value of Scripture does not contribute to the
warrant of Christian beliefs. For this reason, I think another solution is preferable. In
the earlier stages of Plantinga's discussion, although the testimonial aspect of
Scripture passes without mention, neither is it explicitly denied; yet in his later
comments, as we have seen, it is explicitly affirmed. It seems therefore that while
there is an element of inconsistency here, on the whole Plantinga does mean to
acknowledge that the testimonial aspect of the Bible is an important component of
his extended A/C model. If so, it would be natural to assume that the model should
involve, at least in part, the operation of those human cognitive faculties designed for
the formation of belief based on testimony. Following Thomas Reid, Plantinga
defends these faculties at length in Warrant and Proper Function, arguing that
testimony 'is the source of an enormously large proportion of our most important
beliefs'; that we are 'dependent upon testimony for most of what we know'; and that
Q9
testimony is 'a crucially important part of our noetic arsenal'. It is a key feature of
the design plan of our cognitive faculties that we naturally form beliefs on the basis
of the testimony of others; thus, according to a proper function account, testimonial
beliefs can be warranted to a degree sufficient for knowledge.
How then might these faculties play a role in the extended A/C model? Various
plausible options present themselves. One possibility is that Christian beliefs are
formed in the same basic way as other testimonial beliefs on encountering the
witness of Scripture, but the Holy Spirit acts so as to considerably strengthen these
beliefs (which would otherwise lack the degree of warrant required for knowledge).
The regenerative work of the Holy Spirit might well feature here: no doubt the
presence of sin in our own lives and those of others has caused us generally to treat
testimony with greater scepticism; perhaps therefore the Spirit acts so as to overcome
this subversive and (in the case of divine testimony) inappropriate doubtfulness.
92
Plantinga (1993a): 77-78, 87.
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Alternatively, the activity of the Holy Spirit might be thought of as bringing about a
congenial epistemic environment for the formation of testimonial beliefs based on
Scripture. On this view, the natural recognition and acceptance of divine testimony is
actually part of the proper operation of our cognitive faculties, although its operation
(like that of the sensus divinitatis) has been affected by the human sin and the
correlative withdrawal of the divine presence in our lives.
A third, but similar, account could take the recognition and acceptance of divine
testimony, where that testimony is associated with a certain range of phenomena, to
be part of the original design plan for the human cognitive apparatus. This faculty
has been rendered inoperative by sin, yet the Holy Spirit gracious acts so as (i) to
repair the faculty (at least to the extent that beliefs in the 'great things of the gospel'
are formed) and (ii) to fortify the beliefs produced in this manner. In fact, this belief-
producing component need not be part of an original cognitive design plan at all, but
could be implemented by way of the supernatural modification or adaptation of
existing faculties (primarily, one would assume, those involved in the formation of
testimonial beliefs). As Plantinga elsewhere explains, beliefs can be warranted
according to new design plans as well as original ones; provided that beliefs are
formed in accordance with the relevant segments of a current design plan
successfully aimed at true belief production, such beliefs can still be warranted.93
Perhaps the best option here will incorporate aspects of several of the above.
Indeed, just such a multifaceted view is suggested by what the Westminster Larger
Catechism has to say on the matter:
The Scriptures manifest themselves to be the Word of God, by their majesty and
purity; by the consent of all the parts, and the scope of the whole, which is to give all
glory to God; by their light and power to convince and convert sinners, to comfort and
build up believers unto salvation: but the Spirit of God bearing witness by and with
93
Plantinga (1993a): 26. Prior to the publication of Warranted Christian Belief, it appears that
Plantinga envisaged just such a scenario: '[I]n Warranted Christian Belief, the third and (I devoutly
hope) last in the Warrant series, I follow John Calvin and much of the rest of the Christian tradition in
arguing that Christian faith is produced by way of the Internal Testimony of the Holy Spirit; I also
mean to hold, of course, that Christian faith so produced can constitute knowledge. ... What happens
in this case, we can suppose, is that there is a smallish revision in the design plan governing the
relevant parts of my cognitive architecture, as well as the architecture of will and what Jonathan
Edwards calls "affections," in particular the religious affections. The relevant cognitive powers are, so
to say, mildly redesigned, and they work properly according to his new design pland Plantinga
(1996): 337-38, final emphasis added.
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the Scriptures in the heart of man, is alone able fully to persuade it that they are the
very word of God.94
Here the natural faculties concerned with the acceptance of testimony are involved,
yet there are also features unique to Scripture that indicate its divine origin;
furthermore, the work of the Holy Spirit is needed to internally enable, induce, and
strengthen the resultant beliefs. Whatever the details here, the basic picture is clear
enough: (i) those natural faculties normally involved in the formation of testimonial
beliefs are also involved in the formation of Christian belief; (ii) even so, the
gracious activity of the Holy Spirit is essential for those beliefs to be formed at all
(because of the noetic effects of sin) and with sufficient psychological firmness as to
meet the conditions of knowledge, such that Christian faith may rightly be deemed a
divine gift; (iii) all of this proceeds in accordance with a divine design plan and thus
involves human cognitive faculties functioning properly (i.e., operating as intended),
well aimed at truth, and in a congenial epistemic environment. As such, Christian
beliefs meet all of the conditions of warrant and can be warranted to a degree
sufficient for knowledge. I suggest that this second solution, by casting matters in
terms of faculties, avoids the objections invited by talk of 'properly functioning
processes'; moreover, unlike the first solution, it also nicely accommodates the
traditional Christian recognition of the testimonial value of Scripture.
One final point is worth noting with regard to Plantinga's extended A/C model. It
might well be asked why this relatively elaborate scheme, with its appeal to
supernatural intervention, should be required in order for Christian beliefs to be
warranted. Could these beliefs not simply be warranted through normal historical
investigation into the reliability of the biblical documents? Is it not possible to build
a solid evidential case for the basic claims of the Christian gospel — that Jesus of
Nazareth was the divine Messiah, that he was crucified for our sins but rose from the
dead, that he founded the church and commissioned the writing of the New
Testament, and so on — along the lines proposed by Richard Swinburne?95
Plantinga's answer is, first of all, that such methods are beyond the grasp of the
average believer; yet the Christian faith is surely not the property of intellectual
94 Westminster Larger Catechism, Question 4.
95 Swinburne (1992).
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sophisticates.96 Moreover, a predominantly inferential strategy could never deliver
the goods in any case. Its inevitable failure is due to the 'principle of dwindling
probabilities': each stage in the evidential argument will only be probable with
respect to the conclusions of the preceding stage, and the probability of the final
conclusion must be calculated by multiplying the probabilities involved in each stage.
Thus, for an argument of any complexity (as this one would indeed be) the overall
probability will be rather lower than 0.5 — in other words, the target propositions
will turn out to be less probable that their denial with respect to any uncontroversial
stock of background knowledge.97 For this reason, Plantinga contends, a model in
which warranted Christian beliefs are formed in a basic way is to be preferred —-
and, as a matter of historical fact, has been preferred among thinkers in the Reformed
tradition.
5.6 Revelation, Scripture, and Doctrine
I have thus far explicated and defended Plantinga's extended Aquinas/Calvin model
for warranted Christian beliefs. By Plantinga's own admission, the model does not
cover every teaching of Scripture: beliefs formed by way of the IIHS concern only
'the main lines of the Christian story.'98 Concerning his use of the label 'Christian' in
the description of his project, and the beliefs he associates with it, Plantinga makes
the following claims:
However we propose to use that term, my project is to inquire into the epistemological
status of a certain set of beliefs: the ones embodied, say, in the Apostle's [sic] Creed
and the Nicene Creed. (Alternatively, we could identify the beliefs in question as
belonging to the intersection of those expressed in the creeds of more specific
Christian communities [the New Catholic Catechism, the Heidelberg Catechism, the
Augsburg Confession, the Westminster Catechism, and so on].)99
96 Cf. Matt. 11:25; 1 Cor. 1:26-27. William Alston, also advocating an externalist view of religious
knowledge, makes a similar point: 'Even at the most optimistic estimate the average person in the
pew, or even the average sophisticated theologian or religious philosopher, would be hard pressed to
show that the Bible contains revelations from God that carry a divine guarantee of truth, or that the
church is guided by the Holy Spirit in its doctrinal pronouncements. At least any claims to be able to
show this will be highly controversial. Thus from an internalist justification approach to knowledge,









[T]he prepositional object of faith is the whole magnificent scheme of salvation God
has arranged. To have faith is to know that and how God has made it possible for us
human beings to escape the ravages of sin and be restored to a right relationship with
him; it is therefore a knowledge of the main lines of the Christian gospel. The content
of faith is just the central teachings of the gospel; it is contained in the intersection of
the great Christian creeds.100
I've argued that Christian belief — the full panoply of Christian belief, including
trinity, incarnation, atonement, resurrection — can, if true, have warrant, can indeed
have sufficient warrant for knowledge, and can have that warrant in the basic way.
There are no cogent philosophical objections to the notion that these beliefs can have
warrant in this way. It is easily possible to work out an account — for example, the
extended Aquinas/Calvin (A/C) model — of how it is that beliefs of these sorts do
indeed have warrant.101
Despite these statements, however, the extended A/C model does not cover belief in
the Trinity and the Incarnation — at least, not if we understand that to involve assent
to the orthodox doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation formulated in the fourth
and fifth centuries. The model does not at all include belief in 'the intersection of the
great Christian creeds' if by that phrase Plantinga means to include at least (as one
would reasonably assume) the Nicene-Constantinopolitan trinitarian statements and
the Chalcedonian christological statements. The reason for this is clear: such
doctrines are not explicitly stated in the Bible, even if they nonetheless faithfully
express biblical teaching. If the text of Scripture were such that belief in the doctrines
of the Trinity and the Incarnation could arise just as the extended A/C model
suggests, there would have been no need for such creeds to be formulated in the first
place. As such, Plantinga's account of warranted Christian beliefs as it stands does
not go so far as to explain how Christian doctrines can also be warranted. It will
therefore be necessary to explain how the extended A/C model might reasonably be
developed so as to cover these 'higher level' articles of the Christian faith.
Now there is considerable disagreement, of course, among professing Christians
as to the epistemological foundation of doctrines such as those of the Trinity and the
Incarnation. There exist disparate views in competing traditions about the
relationship between Scripture and doctrine, the historical development of doctrine,
the criteria of doctrinal criticism, and so forth. These issues cannot be treated in great






Christian doctrine, and to select one of the four to provide the basis of a model for
warranted Christian doctrines, giving reasons for that choice. These four perspectives
may be distinguished with respect to their understanding of divine revelation and the
consequent relationship of revelation to doctrine.102 I should emphasise that by
focusing on this aspect of doctrine (i.e., the source and ground of its content) I do not
mean to suggest that Christian doctrine is nothing more than summary statements of
the theological beliefs of the church. Clearly doctrine serves other important
functions, such as establishing the identity of a religious community (as I noted in
Chapter 4) and providing an interpretive framework for the church's experiences and
103
praxis. My concern here, however, is with a specific epistemological issue, which
can be distilled into two questions: given that Christian doctrines do affirm certain
propositions about God and his actions within human history, what is the source of
the propositions expressed in those doctrines and how could anyone come to know
that those propositions are true?
5.6.1 Four Perspectives on Christian Doctrine
By far the majority opinion within the church has been that the content of Christian
doctrines is grounded in divine revelation — this belief being motivated by a firm
conviction that if finite human beings are to know anything about their transcendent
Creator then that knowledge must come by way of God graciously revealing himself
102 There is a fifth view, which I do not include here, but which certainly needs to be acknowledged
given its recent popularity. This is the so-called postliberal account, associated primarily with the
work of George Lindbeck (The Nature of Doctrine, 1984), according to which doctrines are not so
much statements about an extra-linguistic reality as claims about how Christian discourse ought to be
conducted. On this view, doctrinal statements are better understood as second-level statements about
other statements, rather than first-level statements about non-linguistic entities; in short, they function
as the 'grammar' of Christian theology. As I remarked earlier, in my judgement this view effectively
adopts an anti-realist (or at best non-realist) stance with respect to Christian doctrinal claims and is
therefore subject to the difficulties raised in Chapter 4; regardless of its other merits or demerits, it
fails to provide a satisfactory solution to the problem of theological paradox. For a balanced critique
of Lindbeck's thesis, see McGrath (1990): 14-34.
103 Alister McGrath has argued that as a matter of historical fact, Christian doctrine has been
understood as exhibiting four major dimensions: (1) doctrine as social demarcator; (2) doctrine as
interpretation of the Christian narrative; (3) doctrine as interpretation of Christian experience; and (4)
doctrine as truth claim. McGrath (1990): 35-80. In light of the specific epistemological question being
addressed in this section, I am focusing only on the second and fourth dimensions: given that
Christian doctrines make truth claims, my concern is to give an account of how those truths might be
known by way of the Christian narrative (i.e., Scripture).
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to us by some means or other, rather than through our own unaided investigations.104
This much is generally agreed; the disagreement concerns the precise character,
location, and appropriation of this divine revelation. I propose to consider four broad
camps in the debate: (1) the 'Reformed' perspective; (2) the 'Catholic' perspective;
(3) the 'Neo-Orthodox' perspective; and (4) the 'Liberal' perspective.
As a first candidate, there is the Reformed perspective on doctrine associated with
Calvin and the Protestant tradition and encapsulated in the Reformation slogan 'sola
scriptura'. On this view, God reveals himself (indeed, God speaks) through the text
of the Bible, by way of inspiring the human authors to write just those things he
wishes to communicate.105 Since the Bible is the only collection of human writings
inspired by God, so the thinking runs, true Christian doctrine should derive from the
teaching of Scripture alone. Representing the Reformed school, the Westminster
Confession ofFaith affirms:
The Supreme Judge, by which all controversies of religion are to be determined, and
all decrees of councils, opinions of ancient writers, doctrines of men, and private
spirits, are to be examined, and in whose sentence we are to rest, can be no other but
the Holy Spirit speaking in the Scripture.106
A second candidate deserving due consideration is the Catholic perspective on
doctrine.107 This view shares with the Reformed tradition an affirmation of
propositional revelation through Scripture,108 but differs from it by locating this
revelation not only in the Bible but also in extra-biblical church tradition. According
to this perspective, the total content of special revelation (and therefore the basis for
Christian doctrine) is either (a) found partly in the teaching of the Bible and partly in
104 'For the first eighteen centuries of the Christian era, while there were certainly different
understandings of the precise nature and intermediate sources of revelation, and while revelation itself
as a source and norm for theology was various correlated with other relevant factors, there was
nonetheless general agreement that "revelation" was both a necessary and a central feature of the
religious and theological encounter with God. God was to be "known", that is to say, and
subsequently spoken of only as and when God rendered the form and substance of such "knowing",
establishing humans in a knowing relationship otherwise inaccessible to them.' Hart (2000): 37.
105 The Reformed tradition also affirms a limited knowledge of God through general revelation, a
form of revelation taken up, of course, in Plantinga's defence of the sensus divinitatis. For a robust
defence of the idea that God can speak, and indeed has spoken in Scripture, see Wolterstorff (1995).
106 Westminster Confession ofFaith, 1.10.
107 The general view of the character and location of revelation expressed under this heading, and the
consequent view of the basis of doctrine, is shared by the Eastern Orthodox tradition, although there is
considerable difference of opinion over (among other things) the particular ecclesiastical traditions
and bodies through which the divine revelation is to be appropriated.
108 Likewise, it affirms a general revelation through nature.
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oral traditions passed down from the apostles (the partim-partim or two-source view)
or (b) found wholly in the teaching of the Bible but can only be appropriated when
the biblical text is properly interpreted in the light of an extra-canonical body of
apostolic tradition (the material sufficiency or one-source view).109 Either way, the
divine revelation on which Christian doctrines are grounded is to be found in the
conjunction of Scripture and ecclesiastical tradition; moreover, the latter enjoys a
degree of priority over the former insofar as the Bible is to be interpreted in
accordance with that tradition, under the teaching authority of the Roman
Magisterium. Thus, according to the Second Vatican Council:
[I]t is not from Sacred Scripture alone that the Church draws her certainty about
everything which has been revealed. ... Sacred tradition and Sacred Scripture form
one sacred deposit of the word of God, committed to the Church. ... [Sjince Holy
Scripture must be read and interpreted in the sacred spirit in which it was written, no
less serious attention must be given to the content and unity of the whole of Scripture
if the meaning of the sacred texts is to be correctly worked out. The living tradition of
the whole Church must be taken into account along with the harmony which exists
between elements of the faith. ... For all of what has been said about the way of
interpreting Scripture is subject finally to the judgment of the Church, which carries
out the divine commission and ministry of guarding and interpreting the word of
God."0
A third account of the relationship between revelation and doctrine is represented
by the Neo-Orthodox perspective, associated primarily with the theology of Karl
Barth. Although it has much in common with the traditional Reformed perspective,
there are some notable differences. According to this view, the divine revelation that
roots Christian doctrine is to be identified with the person ofChrist, who is the Word
of God in the flesh;111 more generally, God has revealed his character, plans and will
in the events that constitute the redemptive ministry of Jesus Christ. The Christian
believer appropriates this revelation by way of the Bible, which is given by God to
serve as an authoritative witness to those events. As such, there is no straightforward
identity between revelation and Scripture, since the Bible is in itself merely a
collection of human writings. Nonetheless, the Bible is unique in being a human
book graciously used by God to communicate to us the revelation of Jesus Christ.
109 Dulles (2003). Debate persists over which view, if either, the Council of Trent meant to endorse in
opposition to the Reformers, but more recent pronouncements (e.g., Dei Verbum) deliberately allow
for both.
110
Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation: Dei Verbum (1965), 9, 10, 12.
111 'Revelation in fact does not differ from the person of Jesus Christ, nor from the reconciliation
accomplished in Him. To say revelation is to say "The Word became flesh.'" Barth (1975): 119.
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Whereas in the traditional Reformed and Catholic perspectives, Scripture is
intrinsically both the word of man and the Word of God — it is literally authored by
God, regardless of whether anyone comes to know or experience it as such — for
Barthian neo-orthodoxy the Bible is not the Word of God per se\ rather, it becomes
the Word of God for a particular individual when that person encounters the living
God through faith (where that faith is, in deference to Reformed tradition, a
supernatural gift of the Holy Spirit). Any identity between the Bible and the Word of
God is merely indirect and strictly occasional. As Barth puts the matter:
The Bible is God's Word to the extent that God causes it to be His Word, to the extent
that He speaks through it. ... The Bible, then, becomes God's Word in this event [of
faith], and in the statement that the Bible is God's Word the little word "is" refers to
its being in this becoming. It does not become God's Word because we accord it faith
but in the fact that it becomes revelation to us."2
Neo-orthodoxy thus prefers a 'dynamic' view of revelation through Scripture, in
contrast to what it sees as the 'static' view of traditional orthodoxy — a preference
motivated in part by a concern to uphold at all costs the absolute freedom of God in
revelation.113 Despite these differences, however, in practice the formulation of
doctrine proceeds in much the same way, given the fact that God's self-revelation is
mediated by Scripture: Christian doctrines such as those of the Trinity and the
Incarnation, though not explicitly stated in the Bible, are nonetheless to be grounded
in what it teaches implicitly about God revealed in Christ.114
Finally, we may note the so-called Liberal perspective on doctrine inspired by
Friedrich Schleiermacher. Although he was raised in a devoutly Protestant family,
and is considered by some to represent an alternative Reformed tradition which
restores a neglected emphasis on personal piety, Schleiermacher's approach to
theology is more plausibly construed as a deviation from the orthodox tradition. A
reaction to the critical philosophy of Kant, the conclusions of which seemed to rule
out both natural theology and divine revelation in history, this fourth perspective
differs radically from the other three by locating revelation not in inspired texts
112 Barth (1975): 109-10.
113 Runia (1962): 189ff.
114 While I take this to be a fair summary the general position of Barth and his followers, 1 recognise
that there are many further subtleties in each of their discussions of revelation and Scripture. For more
detailed treatments of Barth's understanding of this subject, see Runia (1962); Bromiley (1979): 3-53;
Brown (1998): 30-76; Hart (2000); Watson (2000).
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(either by identity or by mediation) but in the subjective experience of the religious
believer.115 Christian doctrine is thus not the elucidation of propositional truths
revealed in Scripture, but rather the human verbal expression of God-consciousness,
manifested in that community known as the Christian church. In essence, 'Christian
doctrines are accounts of the Christian religious affections set forth in speech.'116 In
Schleiermacher's own exposition of this perspective on revelation and doctrine, the
primary emphasis is placed on the self-consciousness of 'absolute dependence' on
some being which transcends the self. Countless variations on this basic liberal
theme have been propounded in the last two centuries; my purpose here is simply to
acknowledge this as one perspective on doctrine that has enjoyed some currency
among Christian theologians.
5.6.2 Evaluating the Four Perspectives
Which of these four basic perspectives on divine revelation and its relationship to
doctrine would be most suitable as a basis for extending Plantinga's account of basic
Christian belief? It ought to be evident that the Liberal perspective is the least
promising of all, given its proposal to ground doctrine in the subjective experience of
the church rather than in Scripture. On this view, the Bible is at best a flawed record
of other people's experiences of God (even if that domain includes the consciousness
of one unusually enlightened Jewish individual), which may indirectly provide data
in support of certain doctrines. It is certainly not to be treated as a divinely authored
set of writings intended to furnish us with (among other things) propositional content
for Christian beliefs. Hence, it is hard to see how this perspective could
accommodate, or be accommodated by, Plantinga's extended A/C model.
Consider next the Neo-Orthodox perspective. This account might be thought more
suitable inasmuch as it attributes a central and exclusive role to the teaching of
Scripture and, furthermore, insists that the illuminative activity of the Holy Spirit is
necessary for Christian faith. Even so, on this account Scripture is not divine
testimony as such; it is merely human testimony to divine revelation, however
privileged. In this regard it does not square immediately with the extended A/C
115 In fact, it may be legitimately questioned whether Schleiermacher held to anything like 'divine
revelation' in the traditional Christian sense. Hart (2000): 39-40.
116 Schleiermacher (1928): 76.
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model, in which Scripture is treated as divine testimony prior to and independent of
the internal instigation of the Holy Spirit (which is the closest thing in Plantinga's
account to the Barthian 'encounter with the living God'). It might be argued in
response that according to the Neo-Orthodox perspective, the biblical text certainly
becomes divine testimony at the point of faith and therefore the extended AJC model
could be modified so as to fit this scheme. Perhaps so, but this would reintroduce the
problem of the redundancy of our normal cognitive faculties in the formation of
Christian belief. Moreover, a further difficulty arises from the neo-orthodox denial of
the infallibility of Scripture (based on the insistence that the biblical texts are, as
such, only human testimony and therefore susceptible to error at any point)."7 In its
refusal to endorse even a qualified doctrine of infallibility, according to which
118
Scripture is at least (say) wholly reliable in matters of faith and practice, one
suspects that such a stance cannot support an account of warranted Christian
doctrines according to which belief in the doctrines of the Trinity and the
Incarnation, based on objective exegesis of the biblical texts, can be warranted to a
high degree. It may well be that the Barthian in practice treats every Scripture
passage on the assumption that it reliably conveys God's self-revelation when
expounding and defending these doctrines, but this assumption is hardly in accord
with his conception of the Bible as a flawed human witness to divine revelation. It is
one thing to suppose that God could use selected statements from a set of fallible
human writings as a vehicle for essential Christian beliefs (i.e., those basic beliefs
covered by Plantinga's extended AJC model and required for saving faith); but it is
quite another to maintain that God could use the entirety of those fallible human
writings as a foundation for warranted Christian doctrines, when those writings are
acknowledged by the Christian believer (at least in theory) to be an inseparable
mixture of truth and error about their subject matter.119 Compounding matters
further, it appears Barth would have us suppose that God freely (but conveniently)
117 'The prophets and apostles as such, even in their office, even in their function as witnesses, even in
the act of writing down their witness, were real, historical men as we are, and therefore sinful in their
action, and capable and actually guilty of error in their spoken and written word.' Barth (1975): 528-
29. See also Runia (1962): 57-80; Bromiley (1979): 37, 43; Brown (1998): 59-62, 146.
118 Cf. Davis (1977); Bloesch (1978): 64-70; Rogers and McKim (1979).
119 Runia notes that Barth rejects outright any attempt by the exegete to separate the divine wheat from
the human chaff. Runia (1962): 122-23.
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chose for Scripture to become the Word of God for him, and therefore divine
testimony, just as often as he sat down to write the exegetical sections of the Church
Dogmatics — and likewise for every other Christian theologian's exposition of
doctrine. On this supposition, one has to wonder whether the celebrated distinction
between a 'dynamic' and a 'static' understanding of revelation actually bears any
weight. In conclusion, I suspect that the extended A/C model would require
considerable modification in order to accommodate the neo-orthodox view of
Christian faith; and even then, it is not clear that the model could be successfully
extended to account for warranted Christian doctrines.
Of the remaining two, it is not difficult to see that ceteris paribus the Reformed
perspective offers a simpler basis than the Catholic perspective for extending
Plantinga's model of warranted Christian belief. This is hardly a surprising
observation, since it is precisely this tradition with which Plantinga aligns himself
and from which he has drawn considerable inspiration in developing the
epistemology expounded earlier in the chapter. The additional complexity that would
be required in order to extend the model to accommodate the Catholic perspective is
reason enough to favour the first position over the second, given that both traditions
purport to reach the same conclusions regarding the orthodox doctrines of the Trinity
and the Incarnation (i.e., concurrence with the ecumenical statements). Among other
concerns, Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox qualms about the private
interpretation of Scripture do not sit comfortably with Plantinga's model of
warranted beliefs formed in a basic way on reading the biblical text alone,
independent of any ecclesiastical teaching. Nevertheless, it is plausible to suppose
that an alternative model for warranted Christian beliefs and doctrines could be
developed on the basis of Plantinga's proper function epistemology yet in accordance
with the Catholic commitment to both Scripture and tradition as essential
components in the appropriation of propositional revelation. I therefore tentatively
suggest that if my defence of the rationality of paradoxical doctrines is successful,
then a parallel defence based on an alternative Catholic model for warranted
Christian doctrines would likely also be successful. It is the traditional Reformed
perspective on doctrine, however, that I propose to adopt in the remainder of this
thesis.
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5.7 Warranted Christian Doctrine
So then, according to that stream of Christian tradition represented by the Reformers
and their heirs, Christian doctrines (including those expressed in the ecumenical
creeds and confessions) are only warranted insofar as they are grounded on God's
special revelation through the Holy Spirit speaking in Scripture alone. I noted earlier
the view expressed by the Westminster Divines, whose convictions on this point
mirror the earlier remarks of Calvin:
Let this be a firm principle: No other word is to be held as the Word of God, and given
place as such in the church, than what is contained first in the Law and the Prophets,
then in the writings of the apostles; and the only authorized way of teaching in the
church is by the prescription and standard of his Word.120
I should not seem too quarrelsome because I insist so strongly that the church is not
permitted to coin any new doctrine, that is, to teach and put forward as an oracle
something more than the Lord has revealed in his Word.121
Regarding the Christian's warrant for believing (and the church's warrant for
teaching) the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation, as formulated by the early
councils, Calvin's position is quite clear:
[W]henever a decree of any council is brought forward, I should like men first of all
diligently to ponder at what time it was held, on what issue, and with what intention,
what sort of men were present; then to examine by the standard of Scripture what it
dealt with — and to do this in such a way that the definition of the council may have
its weight and be like a provisional judgment, yet not hinder the examination which I
have mentioned. ...
Thus councils would come to have the majesty that is their due; yet in the meantime
Scripture would stand out in the higher place, with everything subject to its standard.
In this way, we willingly embrace and reverence as holy the early councils, such as
those of Nicaea, Constantinople, Ephesus I, Chalcedon, and the like, which were
concerned with refuting errors — in so far as they relate to the teachings of faith. For
they contain nothing but the pure and genuine exposition of Scripture...122
Likewise, the Belgic Confession recognises that knowledge of God can come via
both general revelation in nature and special revelation in Scripture, but contends that
the latter alone functions as the source and standard of Christian doctrine:
We know [God] by two means: First, by the creation, preservation, and government of
the universe, since that universe is before our eyes like a beautiful book in which all
creatures, great and small, are as letters to make us ponder the invisible things of God:
120 Calvin (1960), IV, 8.8.
121 Calvin (1960), IV, 8.15.
122 Calvin (1960), IV, 16.8.
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his eternal power and his divinity, as the apostle Paul says in Romans 1:20. ... Second,
he makes himself known to us more openly by his holy and divine Word, as much as
we need in this life, for his glory and for the salvation of his own.
We include in the Holy Scripture the two volumes of the Old and New Testaments.
They are canonical books with which there can be no quarrel at all.
We receive all these books and these only as holy and canonical, for the regulating,
founding, and establishing of our faith. And we believe without a doubt all things
contained in them — not so much because the church receives and approves them as
such but above all because the Holy Spirit testifies in our hearts that they are from
God, and also because they prove themselves to be from God.123
How then might Plantinga's extended A/C model be further extended, in line with
this Reformed perspective, so as to account for warranted belief in Christian
doctrines? The first point to recognise is surely this: if doctrines such as those of the
Trinity and the Incarnation are epistemically warranted by virtue of being affirmed
by Scripture, either explicitly or implicitly, it follows that a person must be warranted
in believing that whatever is affirmed by Scripture is true (or something close) in
order to be warranted in believing the doctrines themselves. Plantinga himself
suggests that this belief could be warranted in various ways, each of which is
consistent with the extended A/C model and all of which involve a person coming to
believe that the Bible as a whole is God's Word (and not merely that certain
individual claims are of divine origin).124 One typical way in which this belief could
be warranted is 'by way of ordinary teaching and testimony': thus, Reverend Green
tells his Sunday School class that the Bible is a book from God and young Timothy
consequently believes it. 126 However, the warrant of beliefs based on testimony is
strictly derivative. Such beliefs cannot be any more warranted that the corresponding
beliefs of the testifier.126 It cannot therefore be the case that every Christian's belief
that Scripture is divinely inspired is warranted by way of testimony — at least, not
by way of human testimony. Still, this need be no great obstacle, for a proper
function epistemology conjoined with Christian theism allows for this belief to be
warranted in various other ways. Plantinga notes two in particular, both of which are
suggested by the fifth article of the Belgic Confession:
123
Belgic Confession (1618), Articles 2, 4, 5.
124
Plantinga (2000): 375, 380.




The first is that the Holy Spirit testifies in our hearts that this book is indeed from
God; the Holy Spirit doesn't merely impel us to believe, with respect to a given
teaching of this book, that it is from God but impels us as well to believe that the
Gospel of John itself is from God. The second is that the book "proves itself' to be
from God. Perhaps here the idea is that the believer first comes to think, with respect
to many of the specific teachings of that book, that they are, indeed, from God; that is,
the Holy Spirit causes her to believe this with respect to many of the teachings of the
book. She then infers (with the help of other premises) that the whole book has that
127
same status.
According to the first option, the belief arises by way of the internal instigation of the
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Holy Spirit in much the same manner as belief in 'the great things of the gospel'.
On this view, the Spirit induces a person reading the Bible (perhaps over a period of
time, but not necessarily) to the belief that it is God's Word. Although Plantinga does
not say so, this would most plausibly occasioned by the reading of particular claims
that the Bible makes about itself (e.g., 2 Tim. 3:16; 2 Peter 1:21), thus involving
those cognitive faculties normally concerned with the acceptance of testimony (albeit
in a supernaturally enhanced way).129 On the second view, a person comes by way of
the IIHS to believe with warrant that many individual teachings of the Bible are of
divine origin and thereafter infers that the entire Bible is of divine origin. This could
involve a straightforward inductive inference, perhaps bolstered by premises such as,
for example, God would be unlikely to inspire only some parts of the Bible (or of a
book of the Bible) rather than inspiring the whole (especially given that God has
apparently provided no extracanonical means of distinguishing inspired teachings
from uninspired teachings). Even if this would otherwise be a weak inductive
conclusion, provided that the belief is formed in accordance with a design plan aimed





Although Plantinga rightly notes that the inspiration of Scripture 'is not an essential element of
Christian belief — that is, it is not part of the propositional content of saving faith — it is arguably so
fundamental for Christian doctrine and practice, and so ubiquitous a conviction among Christians
throughout the history of the church, that belief in it would most likely be warranted by way of the
IIHS if it were to be warranted at all.
129 Note that this does not involve the believer reasoning in a vicious circle (e.g., the Bible claims to be
divinely inspired, therefore the Bible is true) because the believer here does not infer the inspiration of
Scripture from any of its teachings; rather, the belief is formed in a basic way on the occasion of
reading those teachings.
130 As Plantinga elsewhere notes, according to a proper function theory of knowledge there is no
simple relationship between warrant and the general reliability of a belief-forming process: '[0]n a
rough and ready version of reliabilism, a belief has warrant only if it is produced by reliable cognitive
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There are further possibilities beyond these two.131 One scenario involves the
perception (perhaps in a way analogous to normal sense perception) of certain
characteristics of Scripture, or phenomena encountered upon reading it, that are
indicative of divine inspiration. As the Westminster Confession ofFaith has it:
[T]he heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style,
the consent of all the parts, the scope of the whole (which is to give all glory to God),
the full discovery it makes of the only way of man's salvation, the many other
incomparable excellencies, and the entire perfection thereof, are arguments whereby it
doth abundantly evidence itself to be the Word of God; yet, notwithstanding, our full
persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority thereof, is from
the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the Word in our
hearts.132
This spiritual perception of the inspiration of Scripture need not involve any
inference, as if the Christian were to reason like this: the Bible displays X, X is
indicative of divine authorship, therefore the Bible is the Word of God. Rather, it
may only involve a certain distinctive phenomenology associated with the occasion
of belief in the inspiration of Scripture, according to a divine design plan for belief
formation. In this respect, the belief would parallel other types of beliefs (e.g.,
memory beliefs and a priori beliefs) that come packaged with a distinctive
phenomenology, but are warranted in a basic way and not via a dubious inference
from that phenomenology.133 In any event, the precise details are not crucial to the
argument here and the best model may involve a combination of some or all of the
above possibilities. The important point is simply this: there appears to be no good
reason to doubt that, given the truth of Christian theism, the belief that Scripture is
God's Word, furnishing the believer with information about God and his works,
could be formed by human cognitive faculties functioning properly in accordance
with a design plan successfully aimed at truth. Thus there is no reason to suppose
that the belief could not be warranted; indeed, given God's purposes in arranging for
faculties or processes; on my view, however, it is possible that a belief have warrant even if it isn't
produced by a reliable faculty: if, for example, it is produced by a faculty that is unreliable overall
(overall produces too few true beliefs), but has an area of operation in which it functions reliably and
in which it is aimed at the production of true beliefs. What really counts is not the reliability of the
faculty or process involved, but the specific module of the design plan governing the production of the
belief in question.' Plantinga (1995): 428, fn. 2.
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Plantinga adds two other suggestions to those I mention here. Plantinga (2000): 380.
132 Westminster Confession ofFaith, 1.5.
133
Plantinga (1993a): 57-64, 103-8. Consider too the parallel with Plantinga's view of the sensus
divinitatis: theistic beliefs are properly formed on the occasion, but not the inferential basis, of the
experiences in question. Plantinga (2000): 173-77.
191
the Bible to be written, it is most likely that this belief would be warranted in normal
cases and to a considerable degree.
I have argued to this point that if the basic contours of the Christian narrative are
correct then biblical teaching can indeed function as the basis for warranted belief in
Christian doctrines. It remains for me to explain how individual Christians would be
warranted in believing, for example, the statements of the Nicene Creed or the
Definition of Chalcedon. I propose that there are, broadly speaking, four
paradigmatic ways in which doctrinal beliefs can be warranted. In practice, the
boundaries between these cases are somewhat blurred, and individual believers may
reflect the characteristics of more than one case; some doctrines will be warranted in
one fashion, some in another, still others by a mixture of means. Moreover, the way
in which an individual Christian's doctrinal beliefs enjoy warrant is liable to shift
over time, as that person matures both intellectually and spiritually. Such
qualifications aside, I maintain that these four paradigm cases cover the ground well
enough.
In the first paradigm case, which provides the epistemic foundation for the other
three, a Christian with a warranted belief in the inspiration of the Bible carefully
studies its teachings, accurately interpreting its texts, and comes to the warranted
conclusion that a certain set of propositions, corresponding to the content of some
Christian doctrine, is affirmed by Scripture and therefore true.134 No doubt the Holy
Spirit can graciously assist in the process — if nothing else, to counter the sinful
tendency to reject divine truth and to fortify those true beliefs that will prove of
greater importance to the ongoing spiritual life of the individual and the church —
but otherwise the reasoning involved in reaching these conclusions goes by way of
the normal operation of the believer's cognitive faculties. Moreover, although the
Reformed perspective holds that only those truths revealed in Scripture should
provide the propositional basis of Christian doctrines, it does not follow that
additional background knowledge — lexicons, textual critical data, other ancient
documents, liturgy, church tradition, historical research, scholarly commentaries,
personal experience, logic textbooks, and the like — cannot provide appropriate
134 Of course, the person in question need not be aware that the propositions in question constitute
some Christian doctrine; this is the case, at the very least, for those who initially discover and
formulate doctrines.
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assistance in determining the overall teaching of Scripture on any particular topic.
Indeed, the greater the quantity (and quality) of available background knowledge
adduced and employed, the more warranted the doctrinal conclusions are likely to be,
just as in any other scholarly discipline.
On a similar note, the idea that the content of doctrine is fundamentally derived
from and warranted by the biblical text does not demand that the relationship
between the formulation of doctrine and the interpretation of Scripture be thought of
as simple and unidirectional; on the contrary, it must be acknowledged that there will
be a significant element of 'epistemic feedback' to the degree that doctrine is used as
an interpretive framework in the reading of the Bible.13" The presence of a
hermeneutical spiral need in no way diminish the warrant of the exegetical
conclusions reached, provided the process of interpretation is appropriately self-
conscious and self-critical — after all, a ball-bearing cast into a funnel can be
directed just as accurately as one dropped through a pipe. It could be argued, in fact,
that the critical attention (directed toward both text and interpreter) invited by this
dynamic relationship will ultimately tend to increase the warrant of doctrinal
conclusions.136 Likewise, the warrant of those conclusions can be further enhanced
through interaction with other believers engaged in the same project, even when
those conclusions are challenged — for if the challenge is met, then potential warrant
defeaters will have been eliminated.137 This first case, then, corresponds principally
to those great minds of the Christian church that have contributed to the recognition
and development of central Christian doctrines.
One relevant issue to raise briefly at this point concerns the precise logical
relationship of properly interpreted biblical affirmations to those doctrinal beliefs
reached in the way described above. Is the relationship one of logical entailment or is
it merely probabilistic? Drawing guidance from the Westminster Confession once
again, we find the following principle expressed:
135 McGrath (1990): 55-61.
136
Compare, in this regard, Vanhoozer's proposal for a 'hermeneutic of humility and conviction'.
Vanhoozer (1998): 455-68.
137 The topic of epistemic defeaters is discussed in more detail in §5.8.
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The whole counsel of God, concerning all things necessary for his own glory, man's
salvation, faith, and life, is either expressly set down in Scripture, or by good and
necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture...138
According to this principle, even if the Nicene-Constantinopolitan doctrine of the
Trinity is not explicitly stated in Scripture, it may still be known to be true if it can be
logically deduced from biblical teaching. This certainly seems sensible and provides
an effective constraint on speculative theology. It may, however, be needlessly
restrictive. If I know that there is a one-in-a-million chance of my winning the
lottery, my belief that I will not win the lottery (despite having bought a ticket) can
be warranted to a very high degree even though that belief cannot be deduced by
anything I know prior to the draw. It is therefore reasonable to add that some
doctrines could be warranted on the basis of probabilistic reasoning — by either
inductive or abductive inference — from the direct affirmations of the Bible.
Moreover, even if many Christian doctrines do turn out to be deducible from the
teaching of Scripture, a modest probabilistic factor will be introduced inevitably by
way of the interpretive process of reading the texts. In other words, although the
belief that Scripture explicitly affirms p and q may be warranted to a very high
degree, that belief will never enjoy the same certainty as a belief in some logical or
conceptual truth (e.g., that there are no married bachelors). Consequently, any
deductive belief from p and q that Scripture implicitly affirms r will inherit that
limitation. Just the same, doctrines secured by logical deduction will still be more
warranted (all else being equal) than those reached by a probabilistic inference. But
most doctrines, of course, will rely on a combination of the two.
So, according to the first paradigm case, a person may form warranted beliefs
corresponding to cardinal Christian doctrines by way of the scholarly study of
biblical texts, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. Such a person will be in a
position to state and explain to others the reasoning by which his conclusions were
reached; for example, to make the case, as Calvin held, that the affirmations of Nicea
and Chalcedon 'contain nothing but the pure and genuine exposition of Scripture.'
This observation provides a foundation for the second paradigm case of warranted
belief in Christian doctrines. In this instance, a Christian with a warranted belief in
the inspiration of the Bible is presented with an exposition of some doctrine,
138 Westminster Confession ofFaith, 1.6.
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detailing its scriptural basis, by someone falling into the first case (or even this
second case). On careful reflection, with a sufficient understanding of the reasoning
involved, the person forms a warranted belief in that doctrine. This manner of
obtaining warranted beliefs is a common one and by no means unique to this
scenario. To take an example from another discipline: while I almost certainly lack
the cognitive ability (let alone the patience) to have discovered Godel's
incompleteness theorems myself, I am nonetheless able to understand and appreciate
a well-reasoned exposition of those theorems and can thereby be warranted in
believing them. In much the same way, by comprehending a well-reasoned
exposition of the exegetical basis for the doctrine of the Trinity, I can be warranted in
believing that Scripture implicitly teaches the doctrine; coupling this with a
warranted belief that the Bible is divinely inspired, I can be warranted in believing
that the doctrine is true. Furthermore, as in the first case the degree of warrant may
be enhanced — and the hindrance of spurious warrant defeaters arising from sinful
psychological tendencies may be countered — by the consolidating activity of the
Holy Spirit.
The third paradigm case, though still dependent on instances of the first, is
simpler still: a Christian with a warranted belief in the inspiration of the Bible
accepts on the basis of trustworthy testimony (e.g., the teaching of a parent,
professor, or church leader) that a certain doctrine is taught in Scripture and thereby
infers that the doctrine must be true. As I noted earlier, the warrant of beliefs formed
by way of testimony is derivative of the warrant of the corresponding beliefs of the
testifier; but provided the testimony comes from someone whose own doctrinal
beliefs are warranted and there is no reason to doubt the reliability of that testimony,
139
a person may gain a warranted belief that the doctrine in question is true. Once
more, the influence of the Holy Spirit may be determinative in the both the initial
acceptance of doctrines and the strength with which the relevant beliefs are held; to
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Although testimony plays a crucial role in this case and the following one, basic beliefs formed by
way of testimony will also play a significant part in the first two cases, by way of the contribution of
expert opinion. In the first case, testimonial beliefs come into play in the use of scholarly reference
works such as lexicons and commentaries; in the second case, the person will be relying to some
extent on the testimony of the one supplying the argument for the doctrine in question (e.g., that their
appeals to reference works are appropriate). As Plantinga notes, the extent to which we rely on
testimony to some degree or other for most of our beliefs is rarely appreciated. Plantinga (1993a): 77-
82.
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the extent that all of the belief-inducing factors form part of a divinely-instituted
cognitive design plan aimed at the production of true beliefs about God and his
redemptive work, they can only contribute to the warrant of the resultant beliefs.
The fourth and final paradigm case is the simplest of all. In this scenario, a
Christian accepts that some doctrine is true purely on the basis of reliable testimony
from another Christian who believes (with warrant) that same doctrine. Here the
belief is held basically, without inference from any other beliefs (including beliefs
about Scripture), but it is warranted nonetheless. This case would be most applicable
to young children for whom even inferences of the form the Bible teaches X, the
Bible is God's Word, therefore X would not come naturally and confidently enough
to secure warranted beliefs. If such persons are able to believe Christian doctrines
with warrant at all, it will be by way of straightforward catechizing.140
These four paradigm cases can be summarised as follows:
WDp S's belief in doctrine D is warranted via personal scholarly study of the biblical
texts, coupled with warranted belief in biblical inspiration.
WD2: S's belief in doctrine D is warranted via understanding and agreement with a
scholarly exposition and systematisation of biblical teaching, coupled with
warranted belief in biblical inspiration.
WD3: S's belief in doctrine D is warranted via reliable testimony that Scripture teaches
D, coupled with warranted belief in biblical inspiration.
WD4: S's belief in doctrine D is warranted via reliable testimony that D is true.
WDi is the foundational case, of course; instantiation of the others will be dependent
on instances of lower-level cases. Taken together, I suggest these four cases account
for the principal ways in which warranted beliefs in Christian doctrines are formed,
on the assumption that belief in the divine inspiration of Scripture is also warranted.
Other than this assumption (which I have argued is very likely, given the truth of
140 Consider, for example, an excerpt from the Westminster-based Catechism for Young Children:
'Q6. Are there more gods than one? A. There is only one God. Q7. In how many persons does this one
God exist? A. In three persons. Q8. What are they? A. The Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.' Of
these three statements, only the first finds explicit affirmation in the Bible (e.g., Rom. 3:30).
Nevertheless, it is plausible to suppose that with sufficient explanation a child could form some true
(albeit rudimentary) trinitarian beliefs; if those beliefs were formed on the basis of testimony, then
they would also be warranted.
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Christian theism) and the warrant-strengthening activity of the Holy Spirit, there is
nothing novel about the warrant-conferring factors to which I have appealed in each
of the four cases. In principle, they could apply equally well to any summary
statement taken to be representative of the central claims of a written text: say, the
'doctrine' of transcendental idealism expressed in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.
Some people believe that Kant taught this doctrine on the basis of their personal
scholarly study of his seminal tome; others believe it on the basis of arguments put
forward by the first group; still others believe it simply on the basis of testimony,
having read neither the Critique nor any analytical commentary on it; and some
might even believe the doctrine itself purely on the testimony of a trusted professor.
The main difference between this analogous scenario and my proposed model for
warranted belief in Christian doctrines is, of course, that the biblical text has the
advantage of being divinely inspired (though some Kant enthusiasts might demur).
Moreover, knowledge of this fact arises by way of a combination of natural and
supernatural belief-producing factors in order to secure a high degree of warrant.
I therefore conclude that if fundamental Christian beliefs can be prima facie
warranted according to Plantinga's extended A/C model, then so in principle can
more sophisticated Christian doctrinal beliefs such as those expressed in the Nicene
Creed and the Definition of Chalcedon. As for the question of whether the orthodox
doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation are in fact taught in Scripture, albeit
implicitly, I do not propose to reproduce here the supporting arguments developed
over the course of two millennia; representative expositions can be found, among
other places, in the works of the great systematic theologians of the Reformed
tradition.141
5.8 Defeaters
In the preceding sections I have explicated and defended Plantinga's proper function
epistemology and his extended Aquinas/Calvin model for warranted Christian
beliefs. According to this model, if the basic contours of the Christian narrative are
true, then there is good reason to suppose that the Christian's beliefs are warranted,
141 In Chapter 7, however, I will draw attention to those biblical passages I consider supportive of the
paradoxical interpretations defended in Chapters 2 and 3 when I discuss various biblically-motivated
concerns about the model for theological paradox set out in the next chapter.
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in an epistemically basic way, and to a degree more than sufficient for knowledge. I
have further argued that the model can be naturally developed to encompass belief in
higher-level Christian doctrines not explicitly stated in Scripture, such as the
doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation. Given the same proviso, that the central
propositions of the Christian narrative are true, belief in such doctrines can be
warranted in a variety of ways, depending on the intellectual sophistication of the
believer, and warranted to a degree quite sufficient for knowledge.
Plantinga recognises, however, that his defence of the prima facie rationality of
Christian beliefs does not say all that needs to be said about whether most Christians
living in the 21st century actually are warranted in their beliefs — especially those
whom Philip Quinn designates the 'intellectually sophisticated adults in our
culture'.142 The problem is that while Christian beliefs might be initially or
potentially warranted in the way Plantinga describes, such beliefs may nonetheless
face epistemic defeat by other beliefs that are likely to be formed in today's
intellectual climate; in fact, many would suggest that they nearly always will be
defeated in any rational noetic structure. As Plantinga explains:
Someone might put it like this: "Well, perhaps these [Christian] beliefs can indeed
have warrant, and perhaps (if they are true) even warrant sufficient for knowledge:
there are circumstances in which this can happen. Most of us, however — for
example, most of those who read this book — are not in those circumstances. What
you have really argued so far is only that theistic and Christian belief (taken in the
basic way) can have warrant, absent defeaters. But defeaters are not absent." The
claim is that there are serious defeaters for Christian belief: propositions we know or
believe which make Christian belief — at any rate, Christian belief held in the basic
way and with anything like sufficient firmness to constitute knowledge — irrational
and hence unwarranted.143
The relevance of this issue to the foregoing discussion should be clear. If warranted
Christian beliefs face the prospect of epistemic defeat, then so do warranted Christian
doctrines. Moreover, the paradoxicality of certain Christian doctrines is exactly the
sort of feature that might be thought to serve as a defeater for belief in those
doctrines; in other words, even if Christian doctrines could in principle be believed
with warrant, those that apparently involve logically irreconcilable claims are open to
the objection that they cannot be rationally believed for precisely that reason. Indeed,
142




I suggest that this is precisely how the problem of theological paradox ought to be
framed: even granting that some Christian doctrines can be rational or warranted,
how can paradoxical Christian doctrines be rational or warranted, given that their
logical difficulties seem to function as obvious defeaters? As Plantinga himself
notes, Frege might have been rational to believe the conclusions of his Foundations
ofArithmetic prior to Russell's letter pointing out the contradiction at the heart of his
axiomatic system, but once appraised of this fatal flaw the rational course of action
was for him to acknowledge the defeater and abandon some of his prior beliefs.144
Does not the same go for belief in the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation? In
Chapters 6 and 7, I will attempt to address this problem by arguing that contrary to
initial suspicions, the paradoxicality of these doctrines need not provide a defeater
for belief in them. Before doing so, however, it will be necessary to say something
about different kinds of defeaters and to establish which kind of defeater theological
paradox is alleged to be.
A warrant defeater is essentially something that precludes, removes, or at least
substantially reduces the warrant of a belief. Defeaters commonly arise in the form of
other beliefs, but need not always be doxastic in character. For example, a defeater
can be introduced by way of a person's immediate experiences or his cognitive
environment, the latter being external to his cognitive apparatus.145 To take up a
well-worn example: suppose I look at the mantelpiece clock and form the belief that
it is 3:24pm. Unbeknown to me, the clock stopped days ago; yet by sheer
coincidence, the time is 3:24pm. In this situation, my belief is rational — since I am
not flouting any epistemic duties and all the relevant cognitive faculties involved in
the production of the belief are functioning properly — and furthermore the belief is
true. However, it is not warranted and I therefore lack knowledge. The malfunction
of the clock acts as a warrant defeater for my belief.
Other non-doxastic defeaters can be due to cognitive malfunction within the
believer with respect to the formation of experience. Consider Robert, who suffers
from a rare type of brain lesion one of the effects of which is that whenever he hears
the doorbell ring it appears to him quite vividly that there is a fly buzzing in front of
144
Plantinga (2000): 361.
145 Recall that according to Plantinga's analysis, the presence of a conducive cognitive environment is
a necessary condition of warrant.
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his nose. On one particular occasion, the doorbell rings and Robert forms the belief,
in response to his experience, that there is a fly in the room; moreover, it just so
happens that there is indeed a fly in the room (though resting in a corner out of
Robert's sight and range of hearing). Even though Robert's belief is true, and rational
insofar as it is based on his experience in the appropriate way, it is not warranted.146
The interference of the lesion amounts to a warrant defeater for Robert's belief that
there is a fly in the room.
If the phenomenon of paradox is a warrant defeater for belief in Christian
doctrines, then it is not a defeater in either of the two ways described above: if there
is any irrationality involved in such belief, it will not be due to elements in the
believer's cognitive environment or to pathology in those parts of her cognitive
apparatus involved in the formation of experience.147 Rather, it will be doxastic in
nature: it will present in the form of some other belief (or conjunction of beliefs). In
Plantinga's terminology, beliefs that defeat the warrant for other beliefs are known as
rationality defeaters:
[Gjiven belief in the defeating proposition, you can retain belief in the defeated
proposition only at the cost of irrationality. ... A defeater for a belief b, then, is
another belief d such that, given my noetic structure, I cannot rationally hold b, given
that I believe <i.148
Rationality defeaters can be either rebutting or undercutting.149 A rebutting defeater
is a belief that is inconsistent with some other belief, thereby giving reason to think
the latter belief false. For example: Susan believes on the basis of testimony that her
friend will be arriving from Paris this evening but then hears a report that all flights
from Paris today have been cancelled due to a security threat. In this case, the latter
belief (that the flights have been cancelled) serves as a rebutting defeater for the
former. On the other hand, a belief will be an undercutting defeater if it reveals the
146 In terms of Plantinga's distinction between internal and external rationality, noted earlier, Robert's
belief is internally rational (which requires proper function 'downstream from experience') but not
externally rational (which requires the proper function in sources of experience).
147 It would be a mistake to argue, as some might be tempted to do, that the necessary falsehood of
paradoxical doctrines (entailed by their logically incoherence) amounts to an external warrant
defeater, for two reasons: first, it begs the question against the model I will present in the next chapter,
according to which those doctrines are not really contradictory; and second, the mere fact that some
belief is false (though that fact is, strictly speaking, external to the believer) cannot count as a warrant
defeater for that belief, for otherwise warranted but false beliefs would be impossible in principle.
(Examples of warranted but false beliefs can be easily generated.)
148
Plantinga (2000): 359, 361.
149 This distinction can be traced to Pollock (1986): 38-39.
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grounds or reasons supporting some other belief to be inadequate. Consider Professor
Hamilton, who believes that one of her students is extremely gifted based on the
essays he has submitted over the course of two terms. In the third term, however, she
receives an essay from the student which she realises is the product of blatant
plagiarism. Here the belief that the student has been cheating all along is not
incompatible with the belief that he is a bright spark, but it certainly undermines the
evidential connection between that belief and the quality of his submitted work,
rendering it unwarranted.
In both of these examples, rationality demands that some of the person's beliefs
be given up once a defeater has been acquired. However, in some cases epistemic
disharmony within the person's noetic structure can be avoided by rejecting the
potential defeater, instead of the potential defeatee. Take Archie, who has been
married for several years and believes, with good reason, that his wife is completely
faithful. One day, to his great surprise, he happens to see her in a restaurant holding
the hand of some dark, handsome stranger. Archie can respond in at least two ways
here: he can either believe the proposition that his wife is having an affair on the
basis of his perceptual experiences (with the consequence that his former belief is
defeated) or he can reject that proposition on the basis of his knowledge (as he sees
things) that his wife is faithful, believing instead that there must be some other
alternative explanation for what he has seen. Just which of these is the rational
course will ultimately depend, according to a proper function account of warrant, on
those parts of Archie's cognitive design plan relevant to the production and revision
of the beliefs in question (in conjunction with the precise details of Archie's noetic
structure, experiences, cognitive environment, etc.) and the extent to which those
parts are aimed at true belief (rather than, say, psychological comfort). It is true that
we do not possess a detailed blueprint of our cognitive design plan, but in most cases
the rational response to potential defeaters (i.e., what proper function would require
in any particular instance) is intuitively clear and uncontroversial. For example, if I
come to believe (due to absentmindedness) that I parked my car on the left side of
the street, but return to find it parked on the opposite side, it would hardly be rational
of me to conclude that someone must have moved it while I was away, particularly if
I am well aware of being prone to lapses of memory. The portion of the design plan
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covering the 'defeater system' will thus place a premium on those sorts of qualities,
such as coherence and simplicity, which normally accompany true beliefs. In some
cases, however, precisely what proper function rationality requires with respect to
belief revision will not be entirely obvious.
One further point should be mentioned. Beliefs can still function as defeaters if
those beliefs are themselves irrational — and the resultant relinquishing of defeated
beliefs may still be considered rational in a qualified sense. Imagine a man suffering
from paranoia, utterly convinced that everyone is trying to do him great harm. Due to
his illness, this belief simply seems as obvious as that the sky is blue (it exhibits, as
Plantinga puts it, a great deal of 'doxastic experience').150 Reminiscing one
afternoon, he recalls a time several years ago when a relative apparently did him a
good turn. Although he believed at the time that the deed was genuine, this belief is
now defeated by his far stronger belief that everyone has always had it in for him and
so he concludes instead that the relative was simply trying to lure him into a false
sense of security. In this scenario, the defeat considered alone is quite rational, for
his belief revision is precisely that which should occur if the defeating belief were
warranted. The problem, of course, is that this defeater is far from warranted; neither
therefore is the resultant set of beliefs. In such cases the distinction between internal
and external rationality is crucial: the paranoiac is internally rational — his defeater
system is functioning properly with respect to the beliefs he forms and the strength
with which they are held — but he is externally irrational, due to the dysfunction in
the way his beliefs form in response to experience. Since warrant requires both
internal and external rationality, his beliefs about his relative's apparent kindness
ultimately lack warrant.
After discussing the nature and varieties of defeaters, Plantinga devotes the final
chapters of Warranted Christian Belief to addressing four alleged defeaters for
Christian belief: projective theories of religious belief, the results of so-called higher
biblical criticism, postmodernist theory and religious pluralism, and the problem of
evil and suffering. He concludes that none of these 'presents a serious challenge to




Christian belief, is, in fact, true.'151 In other words, these potential defeaters would
only function as actual defeaters on the prior assumption that Christian belief is false
(in which case, it is unlikely to be warranted even in the absence of defeaters). One
potential warrant defeater that Plantinga does not address, however, is the problem of
theological paradox — and it is the burden of this thesis, in part, to fill that lacuna.152
How then should the alleged defeat of doctrinal beliefs by the phenomenon of
paradox be characterised in light of the distinctions identified above? I have already
indicated that the problem of paradox involves a purported rationality defeater, that
is, a belief that defeats other beliefs. The belief in question would be something like
the propositions affirmed by doctrine D are implicitly contradictory or the
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propositions affirmed by doctrine D appear to be implicitly contradictory.
Furthermore, the alleged defeater would be better categorised as a rebutting one
rather than an undercutting one, for the apparent incoherence of the relevant
doctrines does not merely indicate that the putative grounds or reasons for believing
the doctrine are in fact inadequate (leading to the conclusion that belief is
unwarranted but may still be true) but suggests that the doctrine is false (leading to
the conclusion that outright cfobelief is warranted).154 Thus the objection to
paradoxical Christian doctrines amounts to this: 'Even if the component claims of
such a doctrine can be individually warranted for S according to a proper function
epistemology, once S grants that the doctrine seems to involve a logical
contradiction, even an implicit one, proper function rationality will require that S not




Plantinga does twice briefly acknowledge the charge that certain Christian doctrines are incoherent,
but not in the context of warrant defeaters. In the first instance, he notes it as a potential de facto
objection to Christian belief without further comment. Plantinga (2000): viii-ix. In the second, it is
mentioned as a potential de jure objection to the rationality of Christian belief (where rationality is
here construed as consistency with the 'deliverances of reason'). Plantinga (2000): 115. In this latter
passage, Plantinga responds by claiming that formulations of the doctrines of the Trinity and the
Incarnation are available that 'clearly are not inconsistent.' This is certainly true; but as I contended in
Chapters 2 and 3, these formulations only secure consistency at the expense of orthodoxy. In my
judgement, Plantinga's cursory response does not adequately address the challenge of doctrinal
paradox.
153As I will argue in Chapter 6, these two beliefs are by no means equivalent, nor do they enjoy the
same epistemic status.
154 Recall the example of Russell's letter to Frege. Russell's observation about Frege's axioms was a
rebutting defeater: the rational conclusion for Frege was not that the axioms were merely inadequately
supported, but that at least one of them must be false.
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Now it goes without saying that for the problem of paradoxical doctrines to be of any
epistemological interest, the potential defeater must itselfbe held rationally.1'" I have
argued in Chapters 2 and 3 that it is indeed reasonable to believe that the doctrines of
the Trinity and the Incarnation, interpreted in an orthodox manner, are paradoxical.
In the next chapter, I present a model for understanding theological paradox
according to which this belief remains warranted, but nevertheless fails to provide a
rationality defeater for belief in the doctrines themselves.
155 If the belief that the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation are apparently contradictory were
merely a product of (say) mental illness or drug ingestion, then the problem of paradox would be
better addressed by psychiatrists (or policemen) than by philosophical theologians.
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6 A Model for the Rational Affirmation of
Paradoxical Theology
6.1 Introduction
'It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon
insufficient evidence,' insisted William Clifford.1 This robust evidentialist dictum
has been brought into question by recent writers, many of whom are motivated (at
least in part) by Christian convictions.2 One gets the impression, however, that an
equally robust rationalist dictum still holds sway among many contemporary
Christian thinkers: It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe
anything that appears contradictory. A. P. Martinich typifies this mindset in his
analysis of the doctrine of the Trinity:
Reason and revelation seem to have engaged forces in civil war. Reason cannot accept
revelation's seeming contradiction, while revelation cannot allow reason to abandon
any article of faith. In deciding which side to support, one must consider that, if faced
with the alternatives of being a heretic and asserting a contradiction, the rational
person will always choose heresy and trust himself to the mercy of God. A rational
man can put no faith in contradiction.3
I have argued that the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation, as expressed in the
ecumenical creeds, do indeed present us with seeming contradictions (and I have
intimated that other Christian doctrines may well share this feature). None of the
models of the Trinity and the Incarnation proposed to date — social trinitarianism,
kenoticism, 'two minds' christology, and so on — have proven successful in
reconciling orthodox convictions with logical perspicuity. Even if belief in biblical
doctrines can be warranted absent defeaters, as I argued in the last chapter, many
would take it as a given that only doctrines free from any appearance of logical
conflict can be ultimately warranted. Accordingly, doctrines that exhibit seeming
1 Clifford (1998).
2
Plantinga and Wolterstorff (1983); Van Inwagen (2003).
3 Martinich (1978): 172. Note that according to Martinich, reason cannot accept even a seeming
contradiction.
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contradiction must either be modified so as to eliminate these logical difficulties or
else be deemed rationally untenable and abandoned altogether. In this chapter I
intend to challenge this view by presenting a model for understanding theological
paradox according to which Christians can be entirely rational in believing certain
apparently contradictory doctrines. This model for rational affirmation of paradoxical
theology (hereafter, the RAPT model) will involve claims about the character and
origin of theological paradox, as well as the epistemic circumstances in which it
would be legitimate to affirm, and rational to believe, a paradoxical doctrine. I will
defend the model against a range of objections that might be levelled against it in
Chapter 7.
Before setting out the model, I ought to say a few things about models in general
and to clarify what is and is not being claimed about the model presented here. In the
last chapter I explicated and defended Plantinga's 'extended Aquinas/Calvin model'
for warranted Christian beliefs: belief in God and in the basic tenets of the Christian
story. The construal of theological paradox I propose to develop and defend here is a
model in precisely the same sense as Plantinga's extended A/C model. (Indeed, it
may be taken as a further extension of this extended model, although it could also be
adapted for use with other models of warranted Christian belief.) Plantinga explains
his use of the term as follows:
The rough idea is this: to give a model of a proposition or state of affairs S is to show
how it could be that S is true or actual. The model itself will be another proposition (or
state of affairs), one such that it is clear (1) that it is possible and (2) that if it is true,
then so is the target proposition. From these two, of course, it follows that the target
proposition is possible.4
For the model I develop here, then, the target proposition or state of affairs may be
taken as: Christians who affirm paradoxical doctrines (such as the Trinity and the
Incarnation) are normally warranted and rational in so doing.
Plantinga makes four further claims about his extended A/C model: (1) it is
epistemically possible, that is, its constituent propositions are consistent with
everything else we think we know; (2) there are no cogent objections to the model, or
at least none that are not also objections to the truth of Christian theism itself; (3) the




range of different but similar models for warranted Christian belief, at least one of
which is correct (on the assumption that Christian theism is true). I wish to make
parallel claims about the RAPT model. I maintain first that it is epistemically
possible, consistent with what we otherwise know;5 second, that there are no cogent
objections to it that are not also objections to Christian doctrines as suck, third, that
the model (or something close) describes how things actually stand with regard to
paradoxical Christian doctrines; and fourth, that this model is one of a family of
similar models, one member of which will be true if (i) the central claims of
Christianity are also true and (ii) some essential Christian doctrines are indeed
paradoxical. There is an important correlative to these claims: just as Plantinga
contends that there are no good objections to the warrant of Christian belief that are
independent of its truth, I maintain that there are no good objections to the warrant
of Christian doctrines (based on their paradoxicality) that are independent of their
truth. In other words, there are no grounds for arguing along these lines: 'Well,
perhaps God is a Trinity, and maybe God the Son did become fully human, but it's
irrational nonetheless to claim or believe that such things are the case, just so long as
they appear to be logically contradictory.'6
Before proceeding, it will also be worth listing the desiderata for such a model.
Ideally: (i) the model should avoid denying or revising the law of non-contradiction
or any other classical rules of logic; (ii) it should obviate the need to abandon the
orthodox interpretations of central Christian doctrines; (iii) it should not conflict with
other traditional Christian doctrines; (iv) better still, it should derive positive support
from other Christian doctrines; (v) it should spell out the circumstances in which it
would be rational to affirm paradoxical doctrines; and (vi) it should uphold a robust
distinction between orthodoxy and heterodoxy, such that the distinction (and its
application to specific doctrines) can be articulated and defended. I trust it will be
5
Following Plantinga, 'what we know' should be understood as restricted to what all (or most) of the
participants in the discussion agree on. It would be question begging, of course, for someone to object
to the RAPT model on the grounds that (say) Christianity is known to be false.
6 Cf. Plantinga (2000): 191. '[Atheologians] can't any longer adopt the following stance: "Well, I
certainly don't know whether theistic belief is true — who could know a thing like that? — but I do
know this: it is irrational, or unjustified, or not rationally justified, or contrary to reason or
intellectually irresponsible or ..." There isn't a sensible de jure question or criticism that is
independent of the de facto question.'
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clear after reading this chapter and the next that the RAPT model satisfies all of the
above.
6.2 The Character of Paradox
In Chapter 4, I distinguished two basic types of strategy for deflecting the charge of
irrationality aimed at certain Christian doctrines: the first recommends revising our
conception of the classical laws of logic — either the law of non-contradiction or
some other basic principle of deduction — while the second approach eschews any
tinkering with logic and focuses instead on the meaning of the statements that
together comprise the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation. I examined
representative strategies of each type, arguing that none comes close to offering a
wholly satisfactory solution (with most being highly unsatisfactory). Nevertheless, I
suggested that the second type of approach offers greater promise than the first; and
furthermore that the complementarity strategy, which purports to retain the orthodox
interpretation of doctrines, is the most promising of all, even though it ultimately
fails to provide a workable solution — either in general or with respect to the Trinity
and the Incarnation. The model I propose here shares a number of features with the
complementarity approach, but the criteria it specifies for rational belief in paradox
are more amenable toward these two doctrines. It also draws on elements of other
Christian doctrines, resulting in a more integrated and coherent approach to the
phenomenon of theological paradox.
6.2.1 Apparent Contradiction
I have argued that the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation, interpreted in such
a way as to satisfy orthodox convictions, at least appear to be contradictory. On the
one hand, Christians want to affirm the strict monotheism of the Old Testament (and
indeed the New Testament); on the other, they want to confess that Christ is no less
than God whilst maintaining that he is distinct from the divine individual whom he
called 'Father'. But after ruling out polytheism, subordinationism and modalism,
what logical space is left for orthodoxy? Similarly, while confessing the
undiminished divinity of Christ along with his undivided personhood, Christian
believers want to do justice to scriptural claims regarding Jesus' genuine humanity:
his weakness, his limitations, his ignorance, his suffering. Yet if docetism,
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kenoticism, Apollinarianism, Eutychianism, and Nestorianism are all deemed
unacceptable, what possibilities remain? For both doctrines, the joint denial of all
heterodox alternatives seems to lead inevitably to logical inconsistency.
In my earlier discussion of these doctrines, I scrupulously restricted my
conclusions to claims about the appearance of contradiction. I did so in order to
avoid begging the question as to whether these doctrines, properly understood, are
really contradictory or not — and thus, in the eyes of those who (rightly) take
consistency to be one of the hallmarks of truth, to avoid begging the question as to
whether the doctrines are false or not. Now the distinction between apparent
contradiction and real contradiction is both intelligible — as evidenced by the fact
that you, the reader, presumably grasped the point expressed in the previous two
sentences — and is crucial to the model I develop here. Moreover, as later discussion
will show, this is no empty or trivial distinction. For the appearance of contradiction
does not entail the actuality of contradiction any more than, say, the appearance of
contrition entails the actuality of contrition. Taking the point further, it is worth
reminding ourselves that appearances are always in the eye of the beholder: what
appears contradictory to one person might not appear contradictory to another. Just
how things appear to a person will depend on an array of factors such as background
knowledge, comprehensional ability, prior experience, preconceptions, and so forth.7
If a genuine distinction can be made between apparent contradiction and real
contradiction, it follows that one can be made between apparent-and-real
contradiction and apparent-but-not-real contradiction. Fet us refer to an instance of
the latter as a merely apparent contradiction (MAC). If certain Christian doctrines
appear contradictory (as they do) but the notion that they involve real contradiction is
logically and theologically anathema (as it is) then the only acceptable option for
Christians is to treat these doctrines as MACs. Whether they are rational in doing so
is a question to be tackled in due course. For now, I wish to explore what this view
would entail and how the phenomenon of apparent contradiction might arise in the
first place.
7 Some writers on theological paradox have made a point of denying the distinction between apparent
contradiction and real contradiction — or at least denying that it is of any utility. I will address this
objection in Chapter 7.
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How should one construe a doctrinal MAC? By virtue of what, precisely, is the
contradiction merely apparent? Aristotle famously stated that something cannot be
both X and non-A at the same time and in the same sense. The temporal qualifier is
surely of no utility in this context: no one wants to claim, for example, that
sometimes only the Father is God and at other times only the Son is God, or that
Christ was non-divine during the period he lived on earth as a human. We are
therefore left with the semantic qualifier. Aquinas (doubtless inspired by Aristotle)
famously stated that when one is faced with a contradiction, one should make a
distinction. Of course, when one can make the appropriate distinctions, one should
do so; but one may not always be in a position to specify those distinctions.
Nevertheless, knowing that the relevant distinctions could in principle be articulated
and explicated is sufficient grounds for distinguishing a MAC from a genuine
contradiction. MACs of this kind are thus accounted for by the presence of
unarticulated equivocation among key terms involved in the claims. For brevity's
sake, I will hereafter refer to an instance of this phenomenon as a MACRUE (Merely
Apparent Contradiction Resulting from Unarticulated Equivocation).9
It will be best to introduce some examples at this point to establish that the notion
of a MACRUE is unobjectionable in principle and of general utility quite apart from
any association with paradoxical Christian doctrines. Consider first the following two
claims:
(Al) I am concerned about my wife's operation.
(A2) I am not concerned about my wife's operation.
These statements certainly appear to be contradictory. Yet if you were to overhear
me making both claims within a short space of time you might well think (if you
took me to be an honest, straightforward fellow) that there must be some alternative
explanation for this contradiction than that I was speaking falsely on one or other
occasion; you might thus conclude that the contradiction is merely apparent, even if
8 It has been claimed, of course, that this is in effect what the kenotic solution advocates. Swinburne
(1994): 233; MacLeod (1998): 205. Still, no kenoticist would want to express it in such terms.
9
It is important to note from the outset that not all equivocation is mere equivocation (as between
'bank' referring to a financial institution and 'bank' referring to a river's border). Analogy and
metaphor are also forms of equivocation, but involving a substantial element of meaning-
commonality.
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you could not immediately see why. And you would be correct, too, because both
(Al) and (A2) were true but involved an unarticulated equivocation on the term
'concerned': I was concerned in the sense that I care about my wife's welfare, but I
was not concerned in the sense that I was not anxious about the outcome (since I
knew that the operating surgeon is one of the best in the world). Naturally, once the
distinction is articulated and grasped the appearance of contradiction vanishes; yet
both of my original claims were true, despite the seeming inconsistency.
As a second example consider the case of Harry, a Christian layman who has been
invited by a friend to attend a lecture given by an eminent Continental theologian.
Due to a combination of factors — a previous late night, the stuffiness of the lecture
theatre, the monotony of the speaker's voice — Harry's attention drifts in and out
during the course of the presentation. At one point, he hears the following claim:
(B1) God's kingdom has arrived.
Soon afterwards, he dozes off— only to awaken to catch this second claim:
(B2) God's kingdom has not arrived.
Harry's immediate thought is that the lecturer has flatly contradicted himself. Still,
being a charitable chap by nature, and working on the assumption that an eminent
Continental theologian would be unlikely to exhibit such flagrant illogicality, he
quickly concludes that the speaker has in mind a distinction according to which
God's kingdom has arrived in one sense but has not arrived in another sense. Having
tuned out for most of the lecture, Harry lacks the information needed to specify just
what distinction is operative here, but nonetheless he is justified in believing that
some distinction is operative and therefore that this is a MACRUE. He reasons that
the crucial distinction could be explicated (by the source of the claims if by no one
else) and the appearance of inconsistency thereby removed.
One final, subtler example. Reflect on the situation faced by Susan, who is
presented with the following two claims about one and the same human individual:
(CI) Jamie has an XY chromosome pair.
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(C2) Jamie is an attractive teenaged girl.10
Although (CI) and (C2) do not explicitly conflict in the way illustrated in the
previous two examples, there is nonetheless an appearance of contradiction: an
implicit contradiction. (CI) implies that Jamie is male, while (C2) implies that Jamie
is not male. Yet if the source of the claims were someone who knew Jamie well and
in the relevant respects (e.g., Jamie's family doctor), and Susan had good reason to
believe that this person intended to speak truthfully, then she would be justified in
taking this to be a MACRUE.
The actual state of affairs lying behind claims (CI) and (C2) is this: there exists a
rare medical condition known as male pseudohermaphroditism in which an embryo
with an XY genotype nonetheless develops physiologically as a female." Thus the
apparent contradiction can be fully resolved once it is understood that there are
various distinct senses in which a person can be male or female. In this case, Jamie is
'genotypically' male but 'phenotypically' not male. Nevertheless, Susan need not be
aware of this phenomenon (let alone have any medical understanding of how it
occurs) to believe with good reason that (CI) and (C2) constitute a MACRUE.
There are two further points to recognise about a person S who finds herself in a
cognitive situation such as this, the relevance of which will become evident later on.
First, it does not follow from the fact that (CI) and (C2) appear to contradict (albeit
implicitly) that these statements are meaningless for S. Secondly, the appearance of
contradiction arises from the fact that S's concepts of being male and being female
are not sufficiently discriminating to enable her to resolve the contradiction: the
relatively 'coarse' concept of gender applied by S in her everyday thinking does not
distinguish, but rather subsumes, the more 'refined' notions of genotypic gender and
phenotypic gender (which turn out to be only contingently coincident, even if
ubiquitously so). As S sees things, then, being male implies having an XY
chromosome pair and also not being a girl. Moreover, this limitation in S"s
conceptual palette does not affect in the slightest her ability to interact appropriately
10 The adjective 'attractive' is intended to convey that there is nothing in Jamie's physical appearance
that would suggest any abnormality, while the adjective 'teenaged' is meant to exclude the possibility
of Jamie having undergone gender reassignment treatment. Both of these constraints could have been
specified explicitly so as to bring out more acutely the phenomenon of apparent contradiction, albeit at
the expense of simplicity and rhetorical impact.
" Sadler (1985): 273-76. At present, the aetiology of this condition is only partially understood.
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with family and friends in the course of everyday life or prevent her from passing an
introductory course in human biology.
These examples show that the notion of a merely apparent contradiction resulting
from unarticulated equivocation is cogent and applicable in a range of plausible
scenarios. I now turn to consider how this notion can be applied to the phenomenon
of theological paradox.
6.2.2 Equivocation: Unarticulated and Articulated
At the heart of the RAPT model is the claim that the paradoxical doctrines of the
Trinity and the Incarnation are best treated as merely apparent contradictions
resulting from unarticulated equivocation. Indeed, I suggest that all genuinely
paradoxical Christian doctrines should be construed along these lines. These
doctrines are rarely stated in such a way that the seeming contradiction is explicit
(e.g., 'Christ is omniscient and Christ is not omniscient'), though in some cases may
be expressed so as to present a formal contradiction (as with certain formulations of
the doctrine of the Trinity). Generally speaking, however, the perceived contradiction
12will be merely implicit — but no less awkward for that. Moreover, these apparent
contradictions in the expression of Christian doctrines are the product of theological
theorizing from source data that also strikes us as implicitly contradictory. For the
Bible nowhere makes any explicitly or formally contradictory statements about
God's triune nature or the hypostatic union, but rather supplies copious data about
God and Jesus Christ from which we infer the sort of neat, succinct set of claims
which serves as a formal statement of orthodox belief such as the Athanasian Creed
or Definition of Chalcedon. Furthermore, these doctrinal inferences are not
conducted in an epistemic vacuum, so to speak; they draw on a considerable amount
of extra-biblical background knowledge and prior experience about the concepts and
categories employed by the biblical text, including natural intuitions about
conceptual entailments and metaphysical necessities. As we will see, this has
significant epistemic consequences.
12 Recall that an explicit contradiction arises when some statement and its negation are both affirmed;
a formal contradiction arises when a set of statements is affirmed from which an explicit contradiction
can be logically deduced (typically via first-order logic with identity); and an implicit contradiction is
a set of propositions to which some necessary truth(s) may be added so as to yield a formal
contradiction. I contended earlier (§4.1) that the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation are best
construed as giving the appearance of implicit contradiction.
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So what implications following for our doctrinal statements if paradoxical
doctrines are construed as MACRUEs? By way of example, suppose that a particular
expression of the doctrine of the Trinity includes the following two statements — or,
13
more plausibly, either includes or implies these statements:
(Tl) God is one divine being.
(T2) God is three divine beings.
According to the RAPT model, these two statements must involve an
equivocation on one or more of the terms employed: 'God', 'one', 'three', 'is',
'divine', or 'being'.14 This being the case, the apparent contradiction is merely
apparent; and furthermore, it follows that equivalent but formally consistent
expressions of trinitarian theology can be constructed simply by articulating
distinctions between one or more terms. For example:
(T1A) God isi one divine being.
(T2a) God is2 three divine beings.
Or:
(T1b) God is one divinei being.
(T2b) God is three divine2 beings.
Or:
(Tic) God is one divine beingi.
(T2C) God is three divine beings2.
Simple examples such as these serve to illustrate the principle, but more
sophisticated and informative strategies are available for augmenting our
terminology so as to render the concealed equivocation explicit and thereby permit
formally consistent expressions of trinitarian doctrine. We could, for instance,
reconfigure our notion of identity so as to accommodate the 'exceptional' cases
13
Arguably, the first of these claims is implied by statements 3 and 16 of the Athanasian Creed, the
second by the conjunction of statements 4, 5, and 15.
14 In the case of 'one' and 'three', the equivocation would be with respect to a natural deduction from
either (Tl) or (T2): 'God is not three divine beings' or 'God is not one divine being', respectively.
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raised by the metaphysics of divine personhood. This could be accomplished by
either (a) qualifying our concept of identity to allow for exceptions to the transitivity
principle with respect to the divine essence and the divine persons, or (b) bifurcating
the identity relation so as to distinguish two distinct species of identity (which turn
out to be conflated by our intuitive notion of numerical identity): one species (call it
'owsm-identity') obtaining between the divine persons, the other (call it 'hypostasis-
identity') not obtaining. If the second route were taken, the doctrine of the Trinity
could be expressed symbolically, and entirely consistently, along the following lines:
(1) bOoII [read: the Father is ousia-identical to God]
(2) S=og [read: the Son is ows/a-identical to God]
(3) h =0 g [read: the Floly Spirit is ows/a-identical to God]
(4) ~(/=h*) [read: the Father is not hypostasis-\&QnX\ca\ to the Son]
(5) ~(/=H h ) [read: the Father is not /zy/jostoz's-identical to the Holy Spirit]
(6) ~(s=kh) [read: the Son is not hypostasisA&enixcal to the Holy Spirit]
The crucial point with regard to systematic consistency is that according to this
'Trinitarian Calculus' the following rule of inference does not hold:
(x=0y)->(x=hy)
On the other hand, the following rules do hold:
(x=hy) -> (x=0y)
(x=0z)&(y=0z)-+(x=0y)
(x =h z ) & (y =h z ) -> (v =h y )
Consequently, deductions such as the following (which presumably captures the
crucial Nicene homoousios claim) are entirely valid:
(7) /=o 5 [read: the Father is ousia-identical to the Son]
A full explication of this approach would require a corresponding adaptation of
Leibniz's Law, so as to accommodate a distinction between ousza-properties (aseity,
eternality, omnipotence, etc.) and hypostasis-properties (begottenness, procession,
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etc.). Note also that the resultant propositional apparatus will be perfectly capable in
principle of expressing everything we want to say about 'regular' identity relations
between non-divine things, on the understanding that our intuitive notion of identity
(symbolized by '=') effectively conflates ousia-identity and hypostasis-identity. Put
formally:
(x=y)->(x=0y)&(x=hy)
The apparatus is thus better thought of as a refinement of first-order logic with
identity, tailored to handle the sensitivities of revealed trinitarian metaphysics, than
an alternative to it. Hence with one formalism we can accommodate not only the
claim that 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' but also the Athanasian Creed — and all without
formal contradiction.
Alternatively, and perhaps still more profitably, we could reconfigure our notion
of numerical oneness (and thus our enumerative procedures) so as to handle the
oddities of trinitarian theology. Inspired by supervaluationist solutions to paradoxes
of vagueness,15 we could introduce the notion of superone: something is superone
with respect to some sortal F just in case it can be enumerated as both one F and
three Fs (following typical definitions of 'one' and 'three' expressed in first-order
predicate logic with identity). It would then be a matter of adapting our enumerative
terminology — our definitions of 'one', 'two', 'three', etc. — so as to accommodate
the biblical conviction that God is superone divine being, such that numerical claims
about divinity ('there is one omniscient being', 'there are three omniscient beings',
'there are ten omniscient beings', etc.) evaluate to true or false as appropriate. We
would thus have at our disposal a vocabulary in terms of which we could (i) express
trinitarian monotheistic orthodoxy (and exclude heterodoxy) without formal
contradiction and (ii) still say all that we normally want to say about counting non-
divine things, without having to tinker with any laws of logic in the process.16
Among other virtues, this approach would seem to enjoy some Patristic support.
Basil of Caesarea, for one, appears to have accepted that our enumerative procedures
need to be attuned for service in trinitarian theorizing:
15 See, for example, Fine (1975).
16
Arguably the numerical definitions resulting from this procedure would merely systematize the way
most Christians already speak and think about God and the persons of the Trinity.
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In delivering the formula of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, our Lord did not
connect the gift with number. ... But, O wisest sirs, let the unapproachable be
altogether above and beyond number, as the ancient reverence of the Hebrews wrote
the unutterable name of God in peculiar characters, thus endeavouring to set forth its
infinite excellence. Count, ifyou must; but you must not by counting do damage to the
faith. Either let the ineffable be honoured by silence; or let holy things be counted
consistently with true religion. There is one God and Father, one Only-begotten, and
one Holy Ghost. We proclaim each of the hypostases singly; and, when count we
must, we do not let an ignorant arithmetic carry us away to the idea of a plurality of
Gods.17
Whatever the nuts and bolts of such strategies, the underlying point is
straightforward enough: if the doctrine of the Trinity is taken to be a MACRUE then
a formally consistent statement of the doctrine can be generated by explicitly
articulating appropriate distinctions within whatever terminology is used to express
the doctrine.
A question naturally arises at this point. Between just which terms should these
distinctions be articulated? Which of the formulations suggested above (or further
alternatives) properly captures the truth about God's triunity by locating the crucial
distinctions on the correct terms? At the very least, we can say that if we are
warranted in taking the doctrine to be a MACRUE then at least one of these formally
consistent statements must be correct. (Whether we are warranted in taking the
doctrine this way is a question to be taken up in due course.) This implication alone
is sufficient to deflect the anti-trinitarian charge of falsity due to logical
inconsistency; for if the doctrine is a MACRUE then it must in the nature of the case
be susceptible to formally consistent expression.18
17 Basil of Caesarea, On the Spirit, 18.4, emphasis added; in Schaff and Wace (1890), Vol. 8.
Contemporary philosopher Timothy Mahoney gestures toward the same conclusion in his treatment of
trinitarian orthodoxy: 'Christians do not claim "One God is Three Gods," or "One Person is Three
Persons." Rather Christians claim God is one in one respect and three in a different respect.
Nonetheless, although formal contradiction is avoided, we cannot understand how what is expressed
can be true. In other words, the Trinity does not so much violate logic as it transcends logic. In both
our experience and natural conceptual schemes if there are three persons, then there are three beings,
three instances of the same nature. Likewise, if there is one being, then there cannot be more than one
person. The Trinity fractures these categories of thought in irremediable ways.' Mahoney (2002).
18 This dialectical move is one frequently employed in defences of the coherence of Christian theism,
i.e., arguing that at least one logically consistent model can be constructed for the claims in question,
but withholding judgement on whether that particular model is in fact correct. For example, consider
Plantinga's claim, as part of in his Free Will Defence, that the mere possibility of all natural evil being
due to the free actions of non-human spirits is sufficient to rebut the deductive atheistic argument from
evil. One need not be committed to the truth of that proposition, only to its possibility. Plantinga
(1974): 192-93. So with defences of the Trinity and the Incarnation: the Christian need not argue that
any particular consistent formulation of the doctrine is correct, only that a consistent formulation is
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It may be possible to take matters further, however, should there turn out to be
philosophical or exegetical grounds for rationally preferring one formulation over
against another. Moreover, it is plausible to suppose that some formulations will be
materially equivalent to others. By way of analogy, consider this geometric example
of a merely apparent contradiction:
(51) The object O is shaped triangularly.
(52) The object O is not shaped triangularly.
Given that the object in question is a three-dimensional cone, the resolution of this
apparent contradiction is obvious (see Figure 5). However, the statements (SI) and
(S2) can be rendered formally consistent in (at least) two ways:
(SI A) The object O is shaped] triangularly.
(S2a) The object O is not shaped2 triangularly.
Or:
(S1B) The object O is shaped triangularly,.
(S2b) The object O is not shaped triangularly2.
In each case, the meaning of one term is refined so as to remove any inconsistency
between the two statements. Hence, 'shaped,' will convey something like the
meaning 'horizontally-shaped' while 'shapeda' will signify something like
'vertically-shaped'; likewise, 'triangularly,' will convey something like the meaning
'
horizontally-triangu\ar\y' while 'triangular^' will signify something like
'vertically-triangularly'. It thus turns out that the semantic distinction (which is
grounded in a real geometric dimension) can be cashed out in multiple ways: the
conjunction of (S1A) and (S2A) effectively captures the same facts about the object as
the conjunction of (S1b) and (S2b). Accordingly, if a dimensionally-impoverished
Flatlander were to receive a trustworthy revelation from a Spacelander that included
the statements (SI) and (S2) about some 'transcendent' object O, he might
reasonably conclude that (SI) and (S2) amount to a merely apparent contradiction
possible. The burden is shifted to the naysayer, who must argue that this is false, i.e., that there could
not be such a formulation.
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and might render them formally consistent as either (SIa) and (S2A) or (S1b) and
(S2b).19 It seems to me that something parallel may well hold for alternative
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Figure 5: Geometric Example of Merely Apparent Contradiction
I have focused here on the doctrine of the Trinity, but the principles apply equally
to other paradoxical doctrines. Consistent expressions of the doctrine of the
Incarnation and its implications can be likewise generated by formally articulating
distinctions which are, by default, concealed:
(11) Christ was awarei of the date of the Parousia.
(12) Christ was not aware2 of the date of the Parousia.
Conundrums raised by the Reformed tradition's robust view of providence, coupled
with biblical convictions about human culpability for sin, can be treated in similar
19 Abbott (1998).
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fashion by drawing appropriate distinctions within our intuitive notion of causal
determination:
(PI) God determinedi that the people would conspire to have Jesus killed.20
(P2) God did not determine2 that the people would conspire to have Jesus killed.21
On a closely related point, the Reformed distinction between God's decretive will
and God's preceptive will arguably exemplifies precisely the strategy advocated
here: positing distinctions that are not articulated in the biblical text itself, so as to
resolve the apparent contradiction between sets of scriptural statements regarding
divine volition (e.g., Rom. 9:19 and Eph. 1:11 contrasted with Rom. 12:2 and 1
Thess. 4:3; 5:16-18).22
One final remark before moving on. By claiming that paradoxical Christian
doctrines construed as MACRUEs can be rendered formally consistent by the
systematic augmentation of the terminology with which they are expressed, I am not
at all suggesting that this strategy should be implemented in every expression of
those doctrines. I hardly wish to recommend, for example, that henceforth the
Athanasian Creed be printed with subscripted numbers on key terms or that it be
prefaced with a system of numerical definitions according to which its claims are
formally consistent. Religious vocabulary, just as in any other domain of discourse,
should be tailored toward the contexts in which it is employed and the purposes to
which it is directed. In some circumstances, where the demands of the analytic mind
are uppermost, precision of expression will be a priority. On the other hand, when
dealing with (say) liturgy and catechism, where simplicity and intuitive appeal are of
greater value, it is better by far to leave the formal distinctions unarticulated and
thereby avoid fruitless complication. In each case the terminology used, and the
thoughts induced, will be adequate for the ends intended. The point is simply this:
one can dance, and one can rock-climb, and one can do both well; but one cannot do
both at the same time.
20 Cf. Acts 2:23; 4:27-28.
21 A deduction from the fact that those who conspired against Jesus freely chose to do so and were
morally culpable for their actions.
22 Turretin (1992): 220-22; Piper (1995).
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6.2.3 Paradox and the Doctrine of Analogy
The understanding of paradoxical doctrinal statements advocated above raises
another question. If such doctrines are to be construed as MACRUEs, does this not
imply that at least some of the terms in our theological statements about the Trinity
and the Incarnation are not being employed in their regular senses? Quibbles about
what constitutes linguistic regularity aside, the short answer here is: yes, it does. If
one were to claim (to take a simplistic example) that there is 'one' divine being yet
also 'not one' divine being, while maintaining that there is an unarticulated
equivocation on the term 'one', it would follow that at least one of the instances of
the term 'one' does not carry precisely the same sense as it does in the sentence,
'There is one clock on the mantelpiece.' Even so, for most traditional Christian
theists this implication should not be too bitter a pill to swallow — in principle, at
least. On the contrary, it comports nicely with what believers have traditionally
wanted to say about religious language, inspired by the biblical theme that God so far
transcends the creation in his perfection and profundity that no comparison with any
created thing can capture his divine qualities without some residual imprecision. As
the Book of Isaiah rhetorically puts it: 'To whom will you compare me or count me
equal? To whom will you liken me that we may be compared?'
This conviction about God-talk finds its theological expression in the linguistic
version of the doctrine of analogy. According to its most famous proponent, Thomas
Aquinas, words predicated of creatures (such as 'good') cannot be applied univoeally
to God on account of the vast ontological difference between the Creator and the
creation; consequently, while objects in the natural order reflect the likeness of their
transcendent cause, they do so only imperfectly — and very imperfectly. Thus when
we affirm that 'Socrates is wise' and 'God is wise' we do not employ the predicate
'is wise' in precisely the same sense: among other differences, the quality said to be
exemplified by Socrates exists independently of him — for there could have been
wisdom even if Socrates had never existed — yet the same cannot be said of God's
wisdom.24 But neither are these words used in a 'purely equivocal' sense, for then we
could say nothing meaningful about God. All reasoning from the creation to the
23 Isa. 46:5; cf. 40:18, 25.
24 ST 1 a. 13.5.
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Creator would commit the logical fallacy of equivocation. The solution here is to
adopt a via media: words are used of God in analogous senses, such that there is both
commonality and divergence of meaning. When we affirm that 'God is wise', the
predicate 'is wise' is analogous to that in the affirmation 'Socrates is wise'; there is
both similarity and difference of meaning, since Socrates' wisdom resembles God's
wisdom in some respects but by no means all.
Although Aquinas's explication of the doctrine of analogy has intuitive appeal,
few philosophical theologians today would wish to endorse his classical theory
without substantial modification, encumbered as it is with questionable metaphysical
25and psychological theses (e.g., the Thomistic doctrine of the analogy of being).
However, sophisticated contemporary versions of the doctrine have been developed
which avoid such unappetizing attachments. Prominent among them is the account
developed by James Ross, who argues persuasively that analogy is a ubiquitous
linguistic phenomenon, explicable independent of any theological or metaphysical
theories, which is best understood as 'adaptation of meaning to contrast of context
and environment.'26 Differentiation of meaning between identical terms arises in a
law-like way based on two principles underlying the structure of language: the
principle of linguistic inertia, according to which same words 'recur in the same
meanings if nothing differentiates them,' and the principle of linguistic force,
according to which 'words resist concatenating into unacceptable expressions by
making step-wise meaning-adaptations, comparative to other occurrences, to avoid
27
doing so.' In short, words and sentences make the best sense that they can, given
the forces exerted by the linguistic corpus in which they occur; among other things,
meanings naturally adapt so as to avoid inconsistency and contradiction, to the extent
that a 'hard-core' contradiction will only arise if the linguistic environment mandates
28it. According to Ross, every word in a sentence stands in a meaning matrix:
roughly, a pattern of affinities ('is entailed by', 'is a type of, etc.) and oppositions
('is the contrary of, 'is precluded by', etc.) of meaning to other words. Whenever a
term is used in an analogous sense with respect to some other instance of that term,
25 For some incisive criticisms of the classical theory, see Ross (1981): 17-32.
26 Ross (1998).
27 Ross (1981): 3, 9-11.
28 Ross (1981): 79, 172.
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there will be regions of both commonality and divergence between the meaning
9Q
matrices of those terms. Consequently, the statements 'Socrates is wise' and 'God
is wise' will share certain patterns of implication ('Socrates is no fool' and 'God is
no fool') but not others ('Socrates is fortunate' and 'God is fortunate') in light of
everything else we take to be acceptably or unacceptably attributable to Socrates and
to God.
Ross's general theory of analogy accounts for meaning differentiation between
terms that feature both in ordinary discourse and also in some specialist domain of
discourse — whether medicine, mathematics, or metaphysics — and thus it naturally
supplies an account of analogous usage in the domain of religious language.30
Consider then the application of Ross's analysis to the phenomenon of paradoxical
doctrines construed as MACRUEs. With respect to the statements (Tl) and (T2)
discussed above, we can say something along these lines: whatever meaning ought to
be conveyed by the same terms between which distinctions are articulated — 'is',
'divine', 'being', etc. — those terms will be such that (i) there remains substantial
commonality of meaning with same terms used in ordinary discourse and yet (ii)
there is difference of meaning at least in those regions where genuine contradiction
would otherwise arise with respect to all the other things we want to say about God's
nature — most fundamentally, with respect to the things God says about himself in
Scripture.
Thus, to take one example, when Christians affirm with the Athanasian Creed that
'there are not three gods but one God', each of the words exhibits substantial
similarity (and in some cases identity) of meaning with the same word used in other
contexts, such that the statement can be approximately paraphrased using near-
synonyms (e.g., 'there exists not a triple of deities but a single deity'), yet there is
sufficient differentiation of meaning that one cannot properly infer from this
statement (in conjunction with other biblical data) that God the Father took on flesh
and bore our sins. The analogous senses of the relevant terms will not permit such a
conclusion to be deduced; indeed, it is just because the conclusion is denied by
29 Ross (1981): 107, 170-71.
30 Ross (1981): 158-78. Ross refers to ordinary discourse as unbound discourse: discourse that is not
bound (with respect to the acceptability conditions of utterances) to the practice of some 'craft' (such
as medicine, law, or theology). Ross (1981): 165-67.
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Christians that terms are to be considered analogous and not univocal.31 Similarly, it
is just because genuine contradictions are unacceptable that some pairs of same terms
within formal statements of the doctrine of the Trinity (or the implications thereof)
are to be understood as related analogously to one other.
Parallel conclusions follow with respect to other paradoxical Christian doctrines.
The central point here is that while construing such doctrines as MACRUEs entails
that some of the words involved in the expression of those doctrines are used
equivocally with respect to their use in ordinary discourse, the meaning
differentiation involved is not that of mere equivocation but analogy — and the
notion that much (if not all) of what is said about God employs terms analogously is
something that Christians have historically embraced rather than eschewed. If
analogy can be explicated as meaning adaptation controlled by linguistic forces
exerted through the context and domain of discourse, then the model of theological
paradox presented here fits hand-in-glove with at least one contemporary exposition
of the Christian doctrine of analogy in religious language.
6.3 The Origin of Paradox
In the previous section, I introduced and defended the notion of a merely apparent
contradiction resulting from unarticulated equivocation and discussed what it would
mean to construe paradoxical Christian doctrines along such lines. But given that
some doctrines are paradoxical, why should Christians construe them in this way?
31 In fact, the analogy involved in our systematic formulations of trinitarian doctrine is derivative of
analogy (or approximation) found in Scripture itself, on the assumption that God is the primary author
of the biblical corpus and God cannot contradict himself. For whatever meaning is conveyed by the
affirmation, 'The Lord our God, the Lord is one' (Mark 12:29; cf. Rev. 4:11), it cannot be such as to
contradict (whether taken alone or conjoined with other biblical statements) the affirmation, 'There is
but one God, the Father ... and there is but one Lord, Jesus Christ' (1 Cor. 8:6). The same principle
applies for all biblical data adduced in support of paradoxical doctrines.
32 Dan Stiver notes that while a univocal paradigm dominated the philosophy of language until the
early twentieth century, subsequent to the later Wittgenstein's influential contributions there has been
an increasing appreciation of the ubiquity of analogy and metaphor in all domains of discourse. He
comments: 'In terms of the philosophy of religious language, language philosophy in general is
moving from a univocal paradigm toward an analogical or even equivocal paradigm. Whereas the
analogical has been dominant in the Western religious tradition, the univocal has been dominant in
terms of language in general. An interesting kind of "merger" is occurring with important implications
for the relationships between the two. One implication is that less suspicion about religious language,
with its mystery and inexactitude, should exist since all language is pervaded by similar dynamics.'
Stiver (1996): 200. Perhaps it is too much to hope that such developments can provide a philosophical
atmosphere in which the RAPT model proves plausible to the non-religious as a defence of the
rationality of Christian doctrines.
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Three reasons have already been indicated: it avoids the inherent irrationalism of
denying classical laws of logic; it provides the groundwork for a defence of the
logical possibility of such doctrines; and it comports with the traditional doctrine of
analogy. Still, a further question arises as to just what might account for the presence
of such paradoxes in Christian theology. Is there any aspect of orthodox Christian
that might lead us to expect such a phenomenon? Indeed there is: the doctrine of
divine incomprehensibility. In this section, I outline the doctrine and some of its
implications before discussing its significance for the RAPT model.
6.3.1 The Doctrine of Divine Incomprehensibility
With a few notable exceptions, Christians traditionally have wanted to maintain that
God is apprehensible: that is, we humans can attain genuine knowledge of God. This
certainly seems to be the consistent conviction of the biblical writers, who speak
frequently and emphatically about the importance of seeking knowledge of God,
apparently taking for granted that this endeavour is not in vain, and who just as often
claim to possess such knowledge themselves. In the last chapter, I defended the claim
that Christians can know things about God and can systematically formulate
doctrines on the basis of that knowledge. However, Christian believers have also
insisted (notably, with no notable exceptions) that God is incomprehensible: although
God can be known in part, he cannot be known fully and exhaustively.33 This
conviction, expressed emphatically at various places in Scripture,34 is hardly
controversial when stated in this basic form, although Christian thinkers have
differed in their interpretations of the doctrine. Pseudo-Dionysius and John Scotus
Erigena maintained that we can have no positive knowledge of God, that is, we can
only know what God is not and never what God actually is. Aquinas contended that
our positive knowledge of God (at least in this life) is restricted to knowledge of his
effects within nature; we cannot know God's essence, God in se.35 Moreover, even if
the divine nature may be apprehended by a human intellect in the hereafter, it can
33 It is worth noting that the doctrine of incomprehensibility presupposes that God is apprehensible,
for it suggests that we know enough about God to recognise that he cannot be comprehended. The
orthodox conviction that God is apprehensible yet incomprehensible is neatly expressed in Isaiah
40:28.
34 Ps. 145:3; Job 11:7-9; 36:26; 37:5; Isa. 55:8-9; Rom. 11:33-36; 1 Cor. 2:10-11; Phil. 4:7.
35 ST la. 12.11.
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36
never be perfectly comprehended on account of God's infinitude. Calvin concurs,
writing that God's 'essence is incomprehensible; hence, his divineness far escapes all
human perception.' It is futile, he suggests, to try to penetrate God's inner being with
our puny creaturely minds.37 Rahner takes matters further still: considering the
doctrine of divine incomprehensibility to be 'obvious in itself as well as
'dogmatically assured', he insists that not only is God permanently and inherently
incomprehensible, but also that an unhindered perception of divine
incomprehensibility is an essential aspect of the beatific vision (rather than merely a
10
limitation upon it).
Such divergences regarding the scope of the doctrine merit careful consideration,
but rather than endorse a particular construal of the doctrine I propose to explicate its
central conviction in a way that ought to be plausible to Christians of all theological
traditions. The notion that God is incomprehensible — that he cannot be known
perfectly and exhaustively — follows straightforwardly from the classical conception
of the divine attributes and the recognition that we are mere creatures. To
comprehend God one would have to know everything there is to know about God,
which in turn would require knowing everything that God knows. Since only God is
omniscient, it follows that no one but God can comprehend God.39 A full
understanding of God's power would require knowledge of every possible state of
affairs that God is able to bring about; something clearly beyond human ken.
Similarly, on the assumption that God's actions are constrained by his goodness, a
perfect comprehension of God's nature would involve knowing what God would or
would not do in any given situation. As the Psalmist concedes, 'Such knowledge is
too wonderful for me, too lofty for me to attain.'
36 ST 1 a. 12.7.
37 Calvin (1960), I, 5.1; I, 5.9. Some interpreters have taken Calvin to be using the term
'incomprehensible' in a sense more akin to inapprehensible and thus they read him as making the
stronger claim that nothing at all can be known about God's essence. No doubt Calvin had a robust
view of divine incomprehensibility, but charity would suggest that it stopped short of self-referential
absurdity.
38 Rahner (1966): 41. Rahner effectively treats incomprehensibility as a divine attribute; thus he takes
it to be a consequence of divine simplicity that God is identical with his incomprehensibility (which
explains his remarks about its place in the beatific vision).
39 Cf. 1 Cor. 2:10-11.
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Of course, the doctrine of divine incomprehensibility is as much a teaching about
us as about God.40 It asserts that by nature the human intellect is ill equipped to attain
perfect and exhaustive knowledge of God. While our present ignorance may result in
part from our sin,41 it is also a consequence of our finitude; even redeemed and
glorified creatures are creatures nonetheless. The inherent limitations in our
knowledge of God are certainly quantitative: however much we might learn about
God in the short span of our lives, there will always remain a incalculable number of
facts about him that elude us. But it makes sense to suppose that there are also
considerable qualitative constraints on our understanding. For example, although we
might have some grasp of God's goodness, the concept of goodness that each of us
applies to God will surely be limited and imperfect at points; indeed, the fact that
many Christians disagree about what God's goodness entails suggests that most, if
not all, suffer from qualitative conceptual inaccuracies. Furthermore, to have a
perfect grasp of divine goodness would require one to have a maximally precise
concept of goodness, such that one could accurately deduce what God's goodness
would entail in any context whatsoever; and likewise for God's power, wisdom, love,
knowledge, transcendence, perfection, and every other divine quality. While our
concepts of such qualities are may be entirely adequate for the knowledge of God
(and of the creation) that he intends for us to acquire, they are relatively 'coarse'
nonetheless.42 Cognitive realism, coupled with Christian theism, implies that human
concepts are approximations to those concepts (or whatever the divine analogue may
be) by which God comprehends himself. Indeed, it is reasonable to presume that we
lack altogether some of the concepts required in order to perfectly comprehend
God's essence and his relationship with his creation. The doctrine of divine
incomprehensibility thus suggests that our minds are limited in terms of both
40 Cf. Rahner on Aquinas's version of the doctrine: 'Any interpretation of the Thomist doctrine of the
incomprehensibility of God should not overlook the fact that this doctrine is primarily a statement
about man, about his finite nature and its positive quality.' Rahner (1979): 252, emphasis added.
41 For treatments of the noetic effects of sin, cast in a contemporary epistemological context, see
Plantinga (2000): 199-240; Moroney (2000).
42 As Plantinga points out, however good the design plan for our cognitive faculties may be, it will
inevitably involve trade-offs and compromises. Even if the designer's overall aim is that of producing
true and accurate beliefs, there will also be other desiderata (such as efficiency and material
realizability) that will impose constraints on the design. Plantinga (2000): 38-40.
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epistemic capacity and conceptual accuracy: considered both quantitatively and
qualitatively, our cognitive apparatus is simply not on a par with God's.
Divine incomprehensibility, as I have teased it out here, has obvious implications
for our doctrines of revelation and Scripture. According to Christian tradition, God is
the primary author of the Bible; nevertheless, God still speaks through human
authors, in human language, employing (whether by affirmation or negation) the very
concepts and categories by which we cognize our experiences of one another and the
natural world around us. Hence whatever information God might reveal to us about
himself and his activities and purposes, it will be revealed in a manner
accommodated to our human limitations. This does not at all imply that what is
revealed is not true, any more than Newton's laws of force should be thought untrue
in light of post-Einsteinian physics. It merely indicates that what is revealed is not
the whole truth; while adequate for our needs, it will inevitably lack precision to a
greater or lesser degree.43 Furthermore, if we interpret the concepts and expressions
Scripture uses with inflexible univocality then we will invite, rather than inhibit,
doctrinal error. As Calvin famously remarked:
For who even of slight intelligence does not understand that, as nurses commonly do
with infants, God is wont in a measure to 'lisp' in speaking to us? Thus such forms of
speaking do not so much express clearly what God is like as accommodate the
knowledge of him to our slight capacity. To do this he must descend far beneath his
loftiness.44
Such observations naturally lead us back to the doctrine of analogy, pointing to an
appealing internal coherence in the model for rational theological paradox proposed
here.45
43 Klaas Runia comments: 'As to the extent of the knowledge of God, the view generally held was that
God, although he can be known, remains incomprehensible, not only as to his innermost being but
also in his revelation itself. This incomprehensibility of God is due to our human limitations on the
one hand, and to the nature of revelation on the other. ... The inadequacy of all our knowledge of God
does not mean, however, that this knowledge is not true or trustworthy.' Runia (1988): 370.
44 Calvin (1960), I, 13.2.
45
According to G. L. Prestige, the Western pioneers of trinitarian doctrine recognised this connection
between paradox, analogy, and divine incomprehensibility. 'They owned that there was something
paradoxical in the attempt, necessary as it was, by finite human intellects to give expression to the
nature of the infinite mystery of God. This recognition enabled them to grasp that any doctrine of God
is only a human allegory, true enough in so far as it presents a faithful picture of the revelation
disclosed by God for man's practical apprehension, but quite inadequate to convey a complete account
of what God is in His own perfect nature. On this understanding, they were ready to allow that two
different definitions of the being of God might well be equally true to fundamental divine fact. Both
were based upon analogy, and analogies must not be pressed in detail beyond the points which they
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6.3.2 Divine Incomprehensibility and Paradox
How then does this modest construal of divine incomprehensibility contribute to the
RAPT model? Just in this: the doctrine of divine incomprehensibility should lead us
to anticipate paradox in some of our theological knowledge. As such, Christians
ought not to be in the least surprised to find MACRUEs arising in their systematic
theorizing about God — and particularly so when enquiring into realms as profound
as God's triune nature and the incarnation of God the Son. The reasoning here runs
as follows. The doctrine of incomprehensibility informs us that our understanding of
God is limited by the finitude and imprecision of our human conceptual apparatus;
the concepts and categories by which we acquire partial knowledge of God are
strictly speaking approximations of those perfect concepts and categories required to
accommodate comprehensive and maximally precise knowledge of God. It is likely
then that at certain points in our reasoning about God the concepts we employ,
though precise enough when applied in our logical analysis of created things, will be
insufficiently refined to support those distinctions required to render our theological
theorizing free from all appearance of logical conflict. For while we can formally
articulate the existence of such distinctions, as discussed earlier, we still lack the
conceptual precision to be able to clearly grasp the content of those subtle
distinctions: to see just how God can be F in one respect but not-F in another respect.
Some of the examples employed in my earlier discussion of MACRUEs can serve
as helpful analogies here. Recall the case of Jamie, statements about whom seemed
to imply that Jamie is both male and not male. To a person holding an
unsophisticated, indiscriminating notion of gender — a notion that simply subsumes
the finer notions of 'genotypic gender' and 'phenotypic gender' — the claims made
about Jamie will be paradoxical, even though that person may still reasonably
conclude that this is an instance of MACRUE. Of course, such a person will usually
be susceptible to education on this topic; they will able to grasp the relevant
distinctions and to understand how, in exceptional cases, an individual can be male in
one respect and not male in another respect. But the point here is simply one of
conceptual precision: when applying insufficiently discriminating concepts in one's
are intended to cover.' Prestige (1952): 236-37. The two different definitions mentioned here are, in
effect, characterizations of God as 'one divine individual' and as 'three divine individuals'.
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analysis of some state of affairs, apparent contradictions can arise. Whether or not
one is in a position to attain a grasp of the requisite distinctions is another matter.
Returning to a second example, consider an inhabitant of Flatland, who utterly
lacks the concepts of depth and volume. Given that he conducts his life exclusively
within a two-dimension realm, we may suppose that he is simply not cognitively
equipped to accommodate such notions — nor does he need to be, for all practical
purposes. Thus, if he were to receive a revelation from Spaceland concerning a three-
dimensional object such as a cone he would inevitably conceptualise this revelation
in two-dimensional terms; and depending on the extent of revelation, this may well
lead to paradox in the Flatlander's theorizing about transcendental conic reality. In
this example, unlike the previous one, the prospects for conceptual refinement are
slim: on a theistic view, the Flatlander has been created to live in Flatland and unless
the Creator has specifically intended for him to attain (or have the capacity to attain)
a perspicuously consistent understanding of cones, he will never do so, however
much he may desire it.
Divine incomprehensibility does not give us reason to think that most of our
theorizing about God and his interaction with the world will be paradoxical, nor does
it entail paradox in our theology, but it does give us reason to think that some of our
theorizing might well be indissolubly paradoxical. We could be confident in
presuming that our noetic apparatus is adequate for us to systematize God's self-
revelation in a manner free from all seeming contradiction only if that fact had been
divinely revealed to us. But we have no such revelation and thus we have no reason
to presume that things stand so. In the absence of such a guarantee, we should treat
matters on a case-by-case basis. Where we are able to express Christian doctrines
without generating any logical oddities and without twisting or neglecting any
revelational data, we can reasonably conclude that our creaturely minds are equipped
to that end; where we are not able to do that, we must rest (at least provisionally)
with paradox.46
46 In defending Kierkegaard against the charge of irrationalism, Stephen Evans endorses a similar
analysis to the one recommended here: 'A paradox is an apparent contradiction. In general the
discovery of a paradox is the result of an encounter with a reality which our concepts are inadequate to
deal with, a reality that ties us in a conceptual knot. When we try to understand it we find ourselves
saying self-contradictory things, but of course this does not mean that the reality we have encountered
is itself self-contradictory. It means that there is a problem with our conceptual equipment.' Evans
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Two further points may be briefly made. First, any paradoxes that might arise
when systematizing revelational data concerning an incomprehensible divine reality
will be paradoxes incipient in that very source; for as I have noted, it is not only our
doctrines derived from revelation, but also revelation itself that is accommodated for
human cognition. Secondly, the reasoning spelled out above suggests that the
presence and location of doctrinal paradoxes (i.e., at what points in our theological
theorizing they arise) will be a function of (i) the specifications of our cognitive
apparatus and (ii) the scope and content of revelation (i.e., what subject matters God
wishes to reveal to us and to what extent).
6.4 The Rationality of Paradox
The term 'mystery' has often been employed by Christians to describe the doctrines
of the Trinity and the Incarnation, as well as various other important doctrines. Peter
van Inwagen remarks that the Trinity 'has always been described as a mystery, as
something that surpasses human understanding,' while Stephen Davis concedes that
the doctrine is indeed a 'mystery'.47 Karl Barth insists that care must be taken to
ensure 'the mysterium trinitatis remains a mystery.'48 John Calvin uses the term with
reference to both the Trinity and the Incarnation, as does Karl Rahner, while Donald
Baillie declares that 'the mystery of the Incarnation is the climax of all the Christian
paradoxes.'49 Other theologians have gone even further in their ascription of mystery
to theological theorizing: 'Mystery is the vital element of Dogmatics,' insists
Herman Bavinck, before explaining that Christian doctrine is 'concerned with
nothing but mystery, for it does not deal with finite creatures, but from beginning to
end raises itself above every creature to the Eternal and Endless One himself.'50
Since my project here is to explicate and defend the notion of theological paradox,
it will come as no surprise that I propose to carry on this venerable terminological
tradition. I concur that doctrines such as the Trinity and the Incarnation are
mysterious; but I wish to go further by arguing that the mystery at the heart of these
(1989): 353. If Evans' interpretation of Kierkegaard is correct, then perhaps the model I develop here
could be renamed the 'extended A/C/K (Aquinas/Calvin/Kierkegaard) model'!
47 Van Inwagen (1988): 242; Davis (1983): 141.
48 Barth (1975): 368.
49 Calvin (1960), I, 13.7; II, 14.1; Rahner (1970): 46ff; Rahner (1966): 64ff; Baillie (1961): 110.
50 Bavinck (1977): 13.
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doctrines, rather than threatening the rationality of Christian belief in the doctrines,
actually helps to explain their rationality. A central claim of the RAPT model is that
the Christian's affirmation of paradoxical doctrines can be warranted via an appeal
to mystery. In this section, I specify the precise sense of 'mystery' intended before
explaining the role it plays in the model.
6.4.1 Mystery Defined
The term 'mystery' has been employed in theological discussions with a variety of
senses. Some of those usages are incompatible with others, while some carry
implications that I wish to avoid rather than endorse. It is important therefore that I
make quite clear what is meant when I speak of theological 'mystery'.
In a recent and highly pertinent article by Dale Tuggy, in which he assesses
(unfavourably, as it turns out) the prospects for defending the orthodox doctrine of
the Trinity via an appeal to mystery, five different senses of the term are identified:
(i) the New Testament sense, that of 'a truth formerly unknown'; (ii) 'something that
we don't completely understand, something whose entire essence we can't grasp';
(iii) some fact that we can't fully or adequately explain; (iv) an unintelligible
doctrine whose meaning we can't begin to grasp; and (v) a truth which one ought to
believe 'even though it seems, even after careful reflection, to be impossible and/or
contradictory'.51 Now which of these types of 'mystery' do I have in mind? At first
glance, the last appears most appropriate: I maintain that the doctrine of the Trinity is
an apparent contradiction (though the contradiction is merely apparent) but is true
nonetheless and ought to be believed. However, this does not quite get to the root of
the matter. For as I have indicated, if the doctrine is a 'mystery' in the fifth sense it is
due to the presence of a 'mystery' in something like the second sense (a species of
mystery that Tuggy himself takes to be ubiquitous even within the created universe).
The doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation are mysterious because they appear
to be logically inconsistent, but this phenomenon is merely a symptom of a deeper
mystery residing in the incomprehensibility of God — in the fact that (to understate
matters considerably) we lack a complete understanding of God's essence and




The phenomenon of paradox is thus a consequence both of what God is and of what
we are. Combining these two senses, then, I propose to adopt the following definition
of'mystery':
A mystery is a metaphysical state ofaffairs the revelation of which appears implicitly
contradictory to us on account ofpresent limitations in our cognitive apparatus and
thus resists systematic description in a perspicuously consistent manner.52
This definition thus draws together two threads commonly found in discussions of
theological mysteries: the appearance of logical conflict and the inherent limitations
of human cognition. Note that on this definition it is the subject matter of certain
doctrines (e.g., the Trinity or the Incarnation) that is mysterious, rather than the
doctrines themselves. If any Christian doctrine is said to be a 'mystery' then this is
meant in a derivative sense, strictly speaking: the doctrine is mysterious by virtue of
describing a mystery.
6.4.2 Defeaters Revisited: Defeater-Defeaters and Defeater-lnsulators
At the close of the last chapter I suggested that the problem of theological paradox is
best understood as the presence of a purported rationality defeater for belief in
certain Christian doctrines: a belief that would diminish, or remove altogether, any
warrant that such Christian doctrinal beliefs might otherwise enjoy. As I explained,
this defeater is of the rebutting kind, for it allegedly gives one reason to disbelieve
the doctrines in question (or at least elements of those doctrines). It remains for me to
explain, therefore, how the RAPT model construes the relationship between divine
mystery and this purported defeater. To do that, I will need to briefly augment my
earlier overview of epistemic defeaters by introducing two further concepts:
53
defeater-defeaters and defeater-insulators.
A defeater-defeater, as the name suggests, is a belief that defeats a defeater for
some other belief. Suppose that D is a defeater for person S of some belief B, giving
S reason to abandon B or at least to hold B less firmly; a further belief D* is a
52 Note that this definition deliberately avoids any claim about the permanency, or otherwise, of
mystery. The RAPT model leaves open the possibility that any doctrine that is paradoxical for S at
time t\ may be non-paradoxical for S at some later time t2. For all I know, the doctrines of the Trinity
and the Incarnation may be less mysterious post-mortem or post-glorification.
53 For a fuller discussion of these concepts in the context of Plantinga's epistemology, see Sudduth
(1999a); Sudduth (1999b).
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defeater-defeater for S if D* gives S reason to think that B is not defeated by D. Just
as D may defeat B by way of either undercutting or rebutting, so D* may defeat D's
defeat of B by either undercutting or rebutting. Note, however, that strictly speaking
it is the defeat ofB by D that is eliminated or brought into doubt by D* rather than
the belief D itself. For while D* may provide reasons for abandoning D, it need not
do so; it need only reveal that the rationality of B is compatible with belief D. Thus,
£>*' s being a defeater-defeater for D may be consistent with S rationally believing D
as well as D* and B.
Some examples will make things clear. Suppose I believe my car is parked in the
street outside my house, because I parked it there myself earlier in the day.
Answering a knock at the door late in the afternoon, I am told by a policeman that
my car has just been found abandoned and burned out in a ditch several miles away.
Naturally enough, I form the belief that my car is not in the street outside; my earlier
belief B has been defeated (specifically, rebutted) by a belief D that I am the victim
of a joy-rider, formed on the basis of the policeman's testimony. Suddenly, however,
a smirk breaks out on the man's face and he confesses all; it turns out that he is not a
real policeman but the employee of a friend who has been enlisted to play a cruel
practical joke on me. I now have a new belief D* that this fellow is a prankster, and
this belief acts as a defeater-defeater with respect to D, such that my belief B is
restored. In this case, D* functions as a defeater-defeater by defeating D itself so that
D can no longer serve as a defeater for B.
Contrast this with a second example. Suppose again that I believe my car is
parked in the street outside. Later in the day, I happen to look out of the kitchen
window and notice that the vehicle is no longer there; consequently, my belief B that
the car is parked in the street outside is defeated by my belief D that I cannot see it
any more (and I may even form the new belief that it has been stolen). Just at that
moment, the front door opens and my wife enters. She quickly explains to me that
having spotted a band of pigeons with malicious intent perched on a cable above the
car, she moved it to a space further down the street (and just out of view from the
kitchen window). At this point, my belief that the car has been reparked functions as
a defeater-defeater D* with respect to D, and the original belief B is restored.
Moreover, in this case the original defeater D is not itself defeated by D*, for I still
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believe (rightly) that I cannot see the car. What has changed is that in light of new
information, D no longer functions to defeat B.
The existence of defeater-defeaters suggests a certain constraint on the rationality
of our beliefs, namely, that a belief B will only be rational for S if any defeaters S has
for B are themselves defeated. Recalling that belief-revision in the face of defeaters is
governed by the operation of one's defeater system,54 and furthermore that the
rationality of such belief-revision is determined in a proper function epistemology by
the design plan for one's defeater system, this defeater-defeater requirement can be
expressed as follows:
(DD) A person S who acquires an undefeated defeater D for a belief B at some time t\
is rational in holding B at some later time t2 (when D is at least accessible fairly
readily upon reflection) only if S has a defeater-defeater D* for D at t2.55
Let us turn now to the closely related concept of defeater-insulators, the character
of which can be best explained by contrasting it with defeater-defeaters. Return to
the first example above, but suppose instead that just before the knock at the door I
receive a phone call from another (better) friend, forewarning me of the imminent
prank. As a consequence, I form the belief D* that someone will very soon attempt to
trick me into thinking something unpleasant has happened. Consequently, when I am
presented with the theft story by the man dressed in uniform, my belief B that my car
is outside is not defeated by a potential defeater D (i.e., a belief that my car has been
stolen). D* functions here to insulate my belief B from a certain range of potential
defeaters; as a result, my belief B is never actually defeated (and thus never
relinquished).
Now consider an alternative version of the second example, in which my wife
arrives home and tells me of her pigeon-thwarting measures before I look out of the
window and form the belief D that I cannot see the car any longer. In this scenario,
the beliefD* that the car has been moved further down the street does not function as
a defeater-defeater, since my original belief B is not subject to defeat. Rather, D*
insulates B from defeat by D. Because I believe D*, I realise that D does not give me
54 See §5.3.3.
55 Cf. Sudduth (1999a): 174-75.
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reason to doubt B, even though I believe D nonetheless. Moreover, if it were not for
my holding D* in advance, B would have been defeated by D.
The notion of defeater-insulators leads to the recognition of a constraint on
rationality to parallel that suggested by the concept of defeater-defeaters. This
defeater-insulator requirement may be expressed thus:
(DI) A person S who acquires a potential defeater D for a belief B at some time t is
rational in holding B at t (when D is at least accessible fairly readily upon
reflection) only if S has a defeater-insulator D* for D at t.
One further point should be noted before I turn to apply these concepts to the topic
of paradoxical doctrines. There is an important sense in which most warranted beliefs
function as defeater-insulators against their own potential defeat by certain other
beliefs. Put another way, such beliefs are intrinsically insulated, to a certain degree,
against defeat. By way of example, consider Plantinga's 'Case of the Disappearing
Letter':
I apply for a National Endowment for the Humanities fellowship; realizing I am not
really qualified, I offer you five hundred dollars to write a glowing if inaccurate letter
of recommendation. Perhaps, as they say, everyone has a price; as it turns out, yours is
definitely more than five hundred dollars. You indignantly refuse, and write a
blistering letter to the chair of my department. The letter mysteriously disappears from
her office. One of the most respected members of the department, however, reports
having seen me apparently trying to enter her office through a second story window. I
have means, motive, and opportunity. Further, I am known to have done this sort of
thing before. But I clearly remember being on a solitary hike in the mountains the
entire afternoon during which the letter disappeared. I believe that I did not remove
that letter, and that belief has warrant for me.56
The point here is that while there may be considerable evidence against the
proposition that Plantinga did not steal the letter — and Plantinga may himself accept
that this evidence cumulatively renders his guilt more probable that not, objectively
speaking — he is nonetheless warranted in believing that he is innocent, the reason
being that his memory belief is sufficiently warranted as to be insulated from defeat
56
Plantinga (2000): 371. The example was first introduced by Plantinga in his exchange with Philip
Quinn concerning defeaters for theistic belief. Plantinga (1986). Plantinga speaks in this context of
'intrinsic defeater-defeaters'. Michael Sudduth suggests that such terminology is misleading, given
that no defeat actually occurs; he therefore recommends that such scenarios be characterized in terms
of defeat 'insulation', a recommendation that I have followed here. Sudduth (1999a): 182.
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by these other beliefs. Whether or not a belief B is insulated against defeat by some
potential defeater D will depend on such factors as how the belief is warranted, to
what degree it is warranted, the evidential relation of D to B, the presence of other
defeater-insulators, and so forth. And the interaction of all these factors in the
process of rational belief maintenance and revision will ultimately depend on the
design plan for one's defeater system.
6.4.3 Mystery as Defeater-Defeater and Defeater-lnsulator
With the concepts of defeater-defeat and defeater-insulation in hand, let us finally
consider how such matters bear on the rationality of belief in doctrines such as the
Trinity and the Incarnation. I have argued that these doctrines exhibit merely
apparent contradiction, but it is apparent contradiction nonetheless. Can it ever be
rational to believe a set of claims that strike one as logically inconsistent, despite
long and careful reflection, even if those claims turn out to be truel
Stephen Davis suggests that a seemingly contradictory set of theological
statements can be rationally believed provided that two criteria are met: first, there
must be good reason for thinking the contradiction to be merely apparent; and
second, there must be strong, independent reasons for believing the component
statements (considered apart from the question of their coherence when taken
jointly).58 Dale Tuggy essentially agrees with Davis, although he reverses the order
of the criteria:
It seems to me that one can [reasonably believe an apparent contradiction] if two
somewhat hard-to-specify conditions are met. First, one must have very strong
grounds for believing the claim or claims in question. Second, one must have some
reason to suspect that the contradiction is only apparent. Unless these two conditions
are met, one ought not believe any apparent contradiction, for what is apparently
contradictory is for that reason apparently false.59
I concur with the Davis-Tuggy line on the necessary conditions for rationally
embracing a paradox, but would add that arguably one of these conditions may be
57 It does not follow, however, that Plantinga's belief in his innocence is absolutely immune to defeat.
For example, he may be presented with compelling evidence that his memory has played tricks on him
on several occasions in recent months.
58 Davis (1983): 142-43.
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Tuggy (2003b): 176. The agreement between Davis and Tuggy on this point is particularly
noteworthy given that while both conclude that the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity involves an
apparent contradiction, Davis maintains that it is rational to believe the doctrine while Tuggy
maintains that it is not rational to believe it.
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fulfilled (at least in part) by way of the other. After all, if I have very strong grounds
for believing each member of a set of claims that seem inconsistent then I thereby
have good reason to suspect that the inconsistency is merely apparent. This principle
is certainly supported by the examples of MACRUEs I offered earlier.60 In each case,
the one to whom the statements appear to conflict is nonetheless warranted in
believing them to be jointly true, given that each statement is individually warranted
to a substantial degree. I argued in Chapter 5 that belief in the component claims of
central Christian doctrines derived from biblical revelation may be warranted in a
number of ways; in favourable circumstances, such doctrines may enjoy a high
degree of warrant. If this is the case, then these doctrinal beliefs will be intrinsically
insulated against defeat by certain other beliefs: for instance, a warranted belief that
the universe was created ex nihilo may be insulated against defeat by the intuition
that something cannot be created out of nothing.
It is therefore quite plausible to suppose that warranted beliefs in the doctrines of
the Trinity and the Incarnation are intrinsically insulated against defeat by the belief
that these doctrines seem logically inconsistent when systematically formalised. Now
it might be objected that the appearance of contradiction is such a formidable
potential defeater that no belief could be intrinsically insulated against it (at least to
the degree necessary to withstand defeat) but it is difficult to see how a compelling
argument could be made to support this charge. After all, whether or not defeat is the
rational outcome here will be determined by the design plan of the believer's defeater
system, and according to Christian theism, the author of this design plan is God.
There is thus an intriguing dialectical circle at work here: for if Christianity is true,
then (i) the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation are also true, even if
apparently contradictory, and (ii) our cognitive faculties will most likely have been
designed so that beliefs in these doctrines are normally rational and warranted, which
will in turn entail a design plan for our defeater systems such that these doctrinal
beliefs ought not to be defeated by the mere appearance of contradiction. As such,
one cannot prove that the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation are irrational
(because defeated by their seeming inconsistency) without thereby assuming that the
doctrines are false. We are confronted here with a close relative of Plantinga's thesis
60 See §6.2.1.
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that the de jure question regarding Christian belief is not independent of the de facto
question.61 Any disagreement on this point boils down to a clash of intuitions about a
particular case of defeat — and appeals to intuition in such controverted areas are
notoriously inconclusive.
Nevertheless, let us suppose for the sake of argument that no matter how
warranted the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation might be for a Christian, it
will not be enough (epistemically speaking) to resist defeat by the belief that these
doctrines are extremely difficult, if not impossible, to logically harmonise. Are there
other considerations that might be taken into account? Indeed there are: namely, the
considerations raised by the doctrine of divine incomprehensibility as discussed
above. As Davis and Tuggy suggest, one can be rational in believing a paradoxical
set of claims provided one has grounds for thinking that the contradiction is merely
apparent. Careful reflection on these doctrines certainly provides grounds for the
belief that they are apparently contradictory; it follows from this belief that the
conflict in question is either apparent-and-real or apparent-but-not-real. All else
being equal, one is normally warranted in concluding from X appears to be the case
that X is really the case. But if one has adequate grounds for doubting the reliability
of this inference, then the rational course is to withhold the inference. Furthermore, if
one has positive grounds for denying that X really is the case then one ought to
conclude that X merely appears to be the case. This is precisely how things stand
regarding paradoxical Christian doctrines, I propose, because the doctrine of divine
incomprehensibility should lead us to expect that certain revelational truths about
God may strike us as difficult, even impossible, to conceptualize and systematize in a
perspicuously consistent manner. It thereby serves to undermine any inference from




62 Peter van Inwagen comes close to making this point in his analysis of apparent contradiction in the
doctrine of the Trinity. 'The world may abuse us for believing in God and revelation if it will, but I
think the world should admit that once we have accepted something as a revelation, it is reasonable for
us to retain it even if we cannot answer all the intellectual difficulties it raises; or at least the world
should admit this if the subject matter of the putative revelation is one that it is plausible a priori to
suppose we should find it very difficult to understand.' Van Inwagen (1988): 244.
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With these considerations in mind, consider two concrete examples. Until
recently, Sam believed that Jesus Christ was both fully God and fully man, having
been taught it in Sunday school as a child and never having reflected on his
christological beliefs to any great degree since then. However, a sceptical colleague
has lent him a copy of The Myth ofGod Incarnate and on reading it Sam realises that
there are grave logical difficulties in explicating this central Christian claim. For one
thing, the claim that Jesus was fully divine implies that he was omniscient, yet the
Gospels record that he professed ignorance on some subjects. Sam thus comes to
believe that the Chalcedonian doctrine of the Incarnation appears implicitly
contradictory; he consequently infers that it is likely to be false for that reason and
thereby acquires a defeater for his original set of beliefs. (Let us suppose that he
relinquishes the belief that Jesus was literally and fully God rather than that he was
authentically human.) Shaken, Sam turns to prayer — and in so doing, he finds
himself reflecting in humility on the limitations of his human understanding in the
face of a divine reality that he can only begin to grasp. He reasons that if a
transcendent, illimitable deity were to take on a human nature and live among us, it is
more than likely that aspects of that state of affairs would far surpass our
comprehension and might even strike us as logically irreconcilable on account of
limitations in our cognitive apparatus. In short, it would hardly be surprising if that
remarkable event were a mystery (in the sense defined earlier) and thus resisted our
attempts to comprehend it and express it without some residue of apparent systematic
inconsistency. Sam thus acquires a defeater-defeater with respect to his defeated
belief in the full divinity of Christ and his original belief in the orthodox doctrine is
restored and warranted once again. Sam's belief that the doctrine seems
contradictory will remain, but will no longer function as a defeater.
Sam's friend Helen, on the other hand, has always had a healthy sense of
epistemic humility. Although she has never read any theological treatise on the
doctrine of divine comprehensibility, she realised early on in her Christian life that
there would always be elements of her knowledge of God that she might find
difficult to reconcile either with other teachings of Scripture or with her natural
63 Indeed, it may even be more warranted than before, since the confidence with which one holds
some belief B may be increased as intellectual challenges to 5's truth or rationality are understood and
overcome.
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intuitions about what is possible. Furthermore, she has read some introductory texts
on basic Christian doctrine and is persuaded that the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity
faithfully reflects the testimony of Scripture about God the Father, Son, and Holy
Spirit. In the course of her studies, however, she becomes aware that there is
something logically perplexing about the doctrine. How can it be that the Father is
God and the Son is God but the Father is not the Son? An entry on 'perichoresis' in a
theological dictionary increases her appreciation of the unity of the Godhead, but
ultimately only accentuates the paradoxicality of it all. Still, she reasons that the
doctrine must be true nonetheless — after all, it follows from the clear teaching of
God's self-revelation in Scripture — and that any appearance of contradiction must
reside merely in the eye of the beholder, given her cognitive situation vis-a-vis her
Creator's. In this case, Helen's belief that the doctrine of the Trinity describes a
divine mystery functions as a defeater-insulator and thus her belief in the doctrine is
never actually defeated. The warrant enjoyed by this belief depends both on its initial
warrant (with any intrinsic defeat-insulation that might entail) and also on the
rudimentary doctrine of incomprehensibility that she holds as a prior belief.
These illustrations show that the recognition of theological mystery can serve as a
defeater-defeater, or better still as a defeater-insulator, in the face of the intellectual
challenge posed by the paradoxicality of various Christian doctrines. In a similar
way, objections to the rationality of adhering to these doctrines can be deflected by
appealing to mystery and thereby undercutting the objector's inference from the
appearance of contradiction to the actuality of contradiction. In fact, I believe an
illuminating parallel can be drawn between the reasoning employed here and recent
responses by Christian philosophers to the problem of evil. According to the
evidential (or inductive) atheological argument from evil, there are instances of
suffering in the world which certainly appear to be gratuitous; we cannot begin to
imagine what morally sufficient reason God could have for allowing such suffering.
On the assumption that appearances are not normally deceptive, it follows from the
appearance of gratuitous evil that probably there is gratuitous evil; ergo, probably no
omnipotent and omnibenevolent deity exists (since such a being would not allow evil
of this kind without good reason). A popular and effective line of response to this
argument has been to undermine the inference from appearance to reality by
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appealing to other features of theism.64 Given the vast epistemic disparity between
God and us, should we expect that for any particular instance of evil God's reasons
for allowing it would likely be evident to us? Is our understanding of good and evil
so extensive that we are aware of every kind (or at least most kinds) of greater good,
not to mention every way (or at least most of the ways) in which evil can be
permitted for a greater good? Surely not. On the contrary, we ought not to be in the
least bit surprised to discover that some of God's reasons for allowing evil and
suffering elude us.
I contend that something similar applies with respect to paradoxical Christian
doctrines. The appearance of gratuitous evil is often taken to be a defeater for theism,
while the appearance of contradiction is frequently thought to be a defeater for belief
in the Trinity and the Incarnation. Yet both conclusions are mistaken, because both
inferences are unwarranted. Just as acknowledging the epistemic distance between
Creator and creature undercuts any inference from the appearance of gratuitous evil
to the actuality of gratuitous evil, so it also undercuts any inference from the
appearance of contradiction (among claims based on special revelation about God's
transcendent nature or incarnational status) to the actuality of contradiction.
According to the RAPT model, where paradoxical doctrines are construed as
MACRUEs originating in divine mystery, if adherence to such doctrines is warranted
absent defeaters (by being grounded in divine revelation) then it can also remain
warranted even in the face of potential defeat by the recognition of paradox.
After discussing the role of defeater-defeaters in the preservation of rational
Christian belief (with particular reference to the utility of natural theology), Michael
Sudduth concludes:
Among other things, I should think that the defeater-defeater requirement permits a
broad range of considerations both external and internal to the Christian tradition to
count as potential defeater-defeaters. In this way, the positive epistemic status of
theistic and Christian belief can plausibly be viewed as often depending on evidential
considerations drawn from within the tradition itself. The Christian doctrines of
creation, the fall, and redemption provide potentially rich resources for reasons that
can defeat putative defeaters against theistic and Christian belief.65
64
Wykstra (1984); Alston (1991); Van Inwagen (1991); Plantinga (2000): 465-81.
65 Sudduth (1999b): 231, emphasis original.
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This is a valuable insight, for there are indeed rich resources within the Christian
tradition for neutralising potential defeaters to Christian belief. This has certainly
proved to be the case with respect to the problem of evil. I have argued that similar
considerations can and should be acknowledged when handling the problem of
paradox.
6.4.4 Warranted Belief in Paradoxical Christian Doctrines
Let us pause momentarily and take stock. According to the RAPT model,
paradoxical Christian doctrines are merely apparent contradictions resulting from
unarticulated equivocation in our systematic formulations of special revelation.
These doctrinal paradoxes originate in genuine theological mysteries, that is,
metaphysical states of affairs the revelation of which strikes us as contradictory on
account of present conceptual limitations in our cognitive apparatus (thus resisting
systematic description in a perspicuously consistent manner). By drawing on a
proper function account of warrant, and building on Plantinga's extended
Aquinas/Calvin model of warranted Christian belief, the RAPT model also indicates
how belief in Christian doctrines in general can be known (on the assumption that
Christian theism is in fact true). Furthermore, since the component claims of two
central paradoxical doctrines — the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation —
are well supported by biblical teaching, beliefs in these claims can be warranted to a
high degree for Christians. It is plausible to suppose that for many Christians these
beliefs are warranted in such a manner as to be intrinsically insulated from defeat by
the belief that they appear to contradict; precisely which course of belief-
maintenance or belief-revision would be the rational one in such a situation will be
governed by the design plan of one's defeater system (a plan shaped primarily by the
designer's concern for truth-directedness). Even if this were not enough to preserve
the rationality of belief in these doctrines, any Christian holding a modest doctrine of
divine incomprehensibility will possess a defeater-defeater or defeater-insulator
against defeat by the appearance of contradiction. Thus the rationality of adhering to
a paradoxical doctrine can be defended via an appeal to theological mystery, drawing
on other elements of Christian theological tradition that enjoy substantial biblical
support.
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The foregoing examples of Sam and Helen illustrate two ways in which warranted
belief in a paradoxical doctrine might be typically instantiated. However, not only
are there various different ways in which doctrinal beliefs may be warranted, but
there are also a range of stances a Christian might take with respect to the
paradoxicality or otherwise of some particular doctrine. Let us therefore consider the
most likely permutations of doxastic stance and determine in each case how things
cash out vis-a-vis the epistemic status of the doctrinal beliefs. I outlined earlier four
paradigm cases of warranted belief in a Christian doctrine:66
WD,: £"s belief in doctrine D is warranted via personal scholarly study of the biblical
texts, coupled with warranted belief in biblical inspiration.
WD2: S's belief in doctrine D is warranted via understanding and agreement with a
scholarly exposition and systematisation of biblical teaching, coupled with
warranted belief in biblical inspiration.
WD3: S's belief in doctrine D is warranted via reliable testimony that Scripture teaches
D, coupled with warranted belief in biblical inspiration.
WD4: S's belief in doctrine D is warranted via reliable testimony that D is true.
In the following analysis, I assume that the Christian believer takes a realist stance
with respect to whatever doctrine is affirmed and I consider only those cases in
which a paradoxical interpretation of the doctrine is held (e.g., with respect to the
doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation, those interpretations defended in
Chapters 2 and 3).
Consider then the following possibilities. Any person S who believes paradoxical
doctrine D will fall into one of these four categories:
Category I: S believes that D involves no apparent contradiction.
Category II: S believes that D involves a merely apparent contradiction.
Category III: S believes that D involves an apparent contradiction but withholds
judgement on whether this is due to a real contradiction.
66 See §5.7.
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Category IV: S believes that D involves a real contradiction.67
Treating the options in reverse order, I suggest that Category IV can be swiftly dealt
with: I take it as obvious that if S believes that some genuinely contradictory state of
affairs obtains, then S is irrational in so believing. Category III can be handled with
comparable efficiency, as follows: if S withholds judgement on whether D describes
some genuinely contradictory state of affairs, then S must (at least) withhold
judgement on whether genuinely contradictory states of affairs can obtain in
principle. But surely withholding belief in such an irreproachable metaphysical
axiom cannot be considered rational (even if it is psychologically possible, which is
doubtful); it is on a par with withholding belief in one's own existence or belief in
other minds.
Leaving II aside for the moment, consider now Category I. D is ex hypothesi a
paradoxical doctrine; properly understood it involves an apparent contradiction, yet S
z:o
does not believe that this is so. Is S irrational here? It might seem so at first glance,
but this is not necessarily the case. It may be that S has not reflected on D long
enough and carefully enough to see the logical difficulty; even so, cognitive proper
function need not require that S do this. Prior to Russell's famous letter, Frege was
unaware that a contradiction lay at the heart of his axiomatic system, but it would be
harsh to suggest that Frege was thereby irrational in thinking his theory to be
consistent and substantially correct at that point in time. Of course, it was a different
matter after the problem was revealed to him; if he had grasped Russell's objection
but continued to believe firmly that his system avoided any hint of inconsistency,
that belief would likely not have been warranted. Similar considerations stand with
respect to paradoxical doctrines. If S is presented with a cogent case for the
paradoxicality of D, S may thereafter be irrational if he stubbornly persists in
believing it to be clearly consistent. To summarise: the rationality of S's belief that D
is non-paradoxical will depend on the extent to which S has reflected on D and also
the extent to which S has been exposed to evidence for D's paradoxicality. Where
67
Strictly speaking, for completeness one might also consider the case in which 5" withholds
judgement on whether D involves an apparent contradiction. However, this stance seems unlikely to
arise in practice simply because appearances, by virtue of their immediacy, are not normally the sort
of things about which one can withhold judgement; either it appears to me that something is the case
or it does not so appear.
68 That is, S either (a) disbelieves it or (b) neither believes nor disbelieves it.
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there has been limited reflection and exposure, the cognitive design plan may well be
such that S is proper function rational in believing D at that juncture.
Turn lastly to Category II, where S takes the contradictory aspects of D to be
merely apparent. Here some consideration must be given towards the manner in
which the component doctrinal beliefs are warranted. I have already explained that
S"s warrant for treating the inconsistency as merely apparent, and thus not
relinquishing belief in D, may be supplied simply by way of 5"s warrant for believing
the individual component claims of D. In each of the four paradigm cases of
warranted doctrinal beliefs, S's epistemic situation may be sufficiently favourable
that these beliefs are warranted (absent defeaters) to a high degree. (Recall that
according to a proper function epistemology, if a belief meets the basic conditions of
warrant — roughly, it has been produced by properly functioning truth-directed
cognitive faculties operating in a conducive epistemic environment — the degree of
warrant will depend on the firmness with which the belief is held. In the case of
Christian beliefs, the internal instigation of the Holy Spirit will play an important
role in determining the degree of warrant.) If the component claims of D are
adequately warranted, 5"s belief in D can be insulated against defeat by the
appearance of contradiction. As I noted above, the rational course for S will be
determined by the design plan for S's defeater system; thus if D is true (and
assuming it is important in the divine scheme of things for D to be believed by S)
then it is highly probable that this design plan will favour «o«-defeat in these
circumstances.
Beyond these considerations, there is the question of the role played by some
notion of divine mystery in S's reasoning. If S"s belief in D is warranted according to
WDi or WD2, commensurate with an average or advanced degree of theological
sophistication, it is likely that S will also hold to at least a modest version of the
doctrine of divine incomprehensibility. If this is the case, and if S reflects on the
implications of divine incomprehensibility for the systematic formulation of
Christian claims about God derived from biblical revelation, then S may well
conclude that D expresses a mystery (in roughly the sense defined earlier). S will
thereby acquire a further defeater-insulator (or a defeater-defeater, depending on the
chronology of 5"s beliefs) against defeat by S's belief that D is paradoxical.
246
What about WD3, where S's belief in D is warranted in a less sophisticated
manner? It would be quite wrong to assume that the degree to which a belief is
warranted is proportioned according to the complexity of reasoning employed in
forming the belief; indeed, the opposite principle may often hold. (Consider: the
person who believes in the existence of the moon by seeing it in the sky will be more
warranted that the person who holds the same belief purely on the basis of a
scientific theory explaining tidal movements.) Even so, since the doctrinal beliefs of
Christians in WD3 depend on human testimony derived from WD] and WD2, £"s
belief in D will not normally enjoy greater warrant than in these foundational cases.
Still, whatever warrant it does possess may nonetheless be sufficient to insulate S's
belief in D against defeat by S"s belief that D seems logically inconsistent.
As for the contribution made to S"s epistemic situation by an appreciation of
mystery, it is likely that any notion of divine incomprehensibility embraced by S will
be more rudimentary than that entertained by Christians falling into WDi and WD2.
Nevertheless, my impression is that those with a simpler approach to doctrinal
commitment often possess a greater sense of the incomprehensibility of God than
many theological sophisticates. Accordingly, it is entirely plausible to construe such
believers as typically thinking along the following lines:
Well, doctrine D is certainly a head-scratcher and I don't pretend for a moment that I
can spell it out in a way that shows it to be logically consistent. But doesn't the Bible
say that God's ways are far beyond our human understanding? So wouldn't it be quite
presumptuous for me to think that I could get my head around every doctrine in such a
way that it makes perfect logical sense — not least those doctrines concerned with
God's inner being and the way he relates to his creation? Perhaps this is just one case
in which we don't know (and maybe can't know) enough about heavenly matters to
grasp and explain just how these things can be so. For all I know, God alone is in a
position to see how it all fits together logically. Yet it seems clear to me that D
faithfully expresses the teaching of Scripture, so it must be true nonetheless and I'll
continue to believe it so far as my limited understanding allows.69
69 Note that although expressed informally and without technical terminology, all of the important
components are present: (i) a conviction that D is warranted by scriptural testimony; (ii) an
acknowledgement that D is apparently contradictory; (iii) a presupposition that real contradiction
entails falsehood, thus any appearance of contradiction must be mere appearance; (iv) an appreciation
of biblical support for a doctrine of divine incomprehensibility; (v) a recognition that divine
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Now where, I would ask, is the irrationality in that?
This leaves us only WD4 to consider in conjunction with Category II. This fourth
case concerns those who hold their doctrinal beliefs purely on the basis of reliable
testimony, without any inference involving beliefs about Scripture. This is how
things typically go, I suggested, for young children and those with limited
intellectual ability (albeit sufficient to possess a rudimentary appreciation of the
doctrines in question). For such believers, the notions of formal and implicit
contradiction will not normally be well understood, let alone the distinction between
apparent and real contradiction; and since the paradoxical doctrines I have been
considering do not involve explicit contradiction, a certain degree of critical
reflection on these doctrines is required in order to recognise the logical difficulties
involved and the implications thereof. Such reflection is not characteristic of
Christians in WD4 and therefore I doubt that many (if any) of these doctrinal
adherents would fall into Category II. Most will fall into Category I and thus the
epistemic status of their beliefs would depend on the factors indicated above. Of
those who are cognizant of the paradoxicality of the doctrines they confess, should
any such exist, the best we can say is that they could in principle be rational in their
doctrinal beliefs; for it is at least possible that such beliefs would be intrinsically
insulated from defeat by the recognition of apparent contradiction.
I therefore conclude that no matter how 5"s beliefs in the component claims of a
paradoxical doctrine obtain warrant, provided that S believes the doctrine does not
constitute a real contradiction (i.e., does not posit a genuinely contradictory state of
affairs) then it is likely that S"s belief will not be defeated on account of the
doctrine's paradoxicality. Of course, it does not follow that S's doctrinal belief
cannot or will not suffer defeat from other potential rationality defeaters — but that
is a topic for another occasion.
incomprehensibility would likely lead to the phenomenon of doctrinal paradox; (vi) a realisation that
the state of affairs described by D could well be a divine mystery; (vii) an implicit inference that if D
is true then it is consistent and hence that warrant for believing D to be true is also warrant for
believing it to be consistent when fully comprehended; and (viii) a self-conscious conclusion that
belief in D should therefore not suffer epistemic defeat on account of its paradoxicality.
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6.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I have set out what I take to be a viable model for rational belief in
paradoxical Christian doctrines. In the next chapter I will complete my case by
addressing a range of objections and anxieties invited by the model, but for now I
will summarise why the RAPT model should be preferred to any of the approaches to
the problem of paradox discussed in Chapter 4.
Among those strategies taking a theologically realist approach to doctrine, I
distinguished two types: (i) those that recommend abandoning or revising standard
rules of logic (either the law of non-contradiction or principles of deduction) and (ii)
those that prefer to focus on the meaning of doctrinal claims. Questioning strongly
intuitive logical principles (the upshot of anti-deductivism and dialetheism) is not a
promising strategy and threatens to derail the projects of theological definition and
exploration. Fortunately, the RAPT model offers a way of honouring orthodoxy
without relying on such drastic moves. At the other extreme, doctrinal revisionism
sacrifices orthodoxy on the altar of received rationality, but the RAPT model shows
that a Christian can be epistemically warranted (and therefore rational) in believing a
set of theological claims even when those claims give the appearance of
inconsistency. The refuge of semantic minimalism has superficial appeal but
ultimately glosses over the constraints placed on trinitarian and christological
orthodoxy; in contrast, the model proposed here frankly acknowledges the presence
of paradox and tackles it head on. Lastly, the complementarity solution has much to
recommend it (since it purports to avoid both logical and theological deviance) and
comes closest to the approach I defend, but it either turns out to be too restrictive in
its criteria to accommodate the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation or else
winds up advocating some form of doctrinal revisionism. While the RAPT model
also places constraints on what types of paradox may be deemed rational (as I
explain in the next chapter), it avoids the pitfalls faced by the complementarity route.
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7 The Model Defended
7.1 Introduction
The orthodox Christian doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation are paradoxical,
so I have argued. Nevertheless, Christians who believe these doctrines (even
conceding their paradoxicality) are not necessarily — or even usually — irrational in
so believing, because epistemic models can be developed according to which such
doctrinal beliefs can be warranted to a degree sufficient for knowledge despite the
logical tension between component claims. In Chapter 6, I set out a plausible
explication of one such model, which I dubbed the RAPT (Rational Affirmation of
Paradoxical Theology) model. According to this model, paradoxical doctrines do not
involve real contradiction, that is, they do not posit logically impossible states of
affairs. Rather, they are instances of merely apparent contradiction resulting from
unarticulated equivocation between terms employed when formalising and
explicating the doctrines. This phenomenon is, moreover, a consequence of divine
incomprehensibility: our cognitive apparatus is limited in such a way that we lack the
concepts and categories of thought that would enable us to grasp (as God does)
precisely how the metaphysical states of affairs affirmed by these doctrines can
obtain. Furthermore, if a Christian is warranted in believing the component claims of
the doctrines (by way of, e.g., the inspired testimony of Scripture and the internal
witness of the Holy Spirit) and implicitly accepts a modest doctrine of divine
incomprehensibility, then her beliefs need not suffer epistemic defeat on account of
the paradoxicality of the doctrines. In short, if she has good epistemic grounds for
taking those doctrines to be revelational MACRUEs, she can be rational in affirming
them.
Following the lead of Plantinga's extended Aquinas/Calvin model for warranted
Christian beliefs, I maintain that the RAPT model (or a close relative) is probably
true given the truth of Christian theism, and, correlatively, that there are no good
objections to the model that do not require the objector also to argue that one or more
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of the central tenets of the Christian faith are false. In this chapter, I attempt to make
good on this claim by addressing a range of objections to the model and concerns
about its viability. Some of these are drawn from writings which speak directly to the
issue of paradox and mystery in Christian doctrines, particular with reference to the
Trinity and the Incarnation. Others I have attempted to anticipate in advance; my
rebuttals here may be thought of as pre-emptive strikes. For want of a better
structure, I have arranged the objections into three categories. In the first place, there
are several biblical concerns. How does the model fare in light of Scripture and how
does Scripture fare in light of the model? Secondly, there are a number of theological
concerns. What implications does the model have for theological theorizing and
doctrinal development? Does the model have implications that conflict with other
beliefs about God typically held by Christians? Finally, I consider an array of
philosophical concerns: analytical objections to the cogency or plausibility of the
model that do not depend (at least, not overtly) on any specific religious convictions.
The responses I provide in this chapter could be developed in greater detail, if space
permitted, but I am confident nonetheless that they are sufficient to establish the
viability of the RAPT model and to counter any suggestion that it is implausible or
obviously wrong.
There is one general anxiety, however, that should be alleviated at the outset.
Since I have argued that it can be perfectly rational to believe paradoxical claims,
some readers may be concerned that this offers carte blanche to all manner of
doctrinal nonsense. In advocating the RAPT model, do I not run the risk of opening a
Pandora's box of contradictory and irrefutable religious claims? If we allow that
Christians can be warranted in believing that God is both one divine being and three
divine beings, and that Jesus Christ exhibited both divine omniscience and human
ignorance, what basis for objection remains when someone claims that, for example,
God is both identical to the world and distinct from the world?
Others may harbour a related concern that the RAPT model sanctions facile
solutions to difficult exegetical and theological problems. Take the alleged
discrepancies between the Gospel accounts. If one can rationally believe that the
number of divine beings is both one and three, why cannot one rationally believe that
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the number of angels attending the empty tomb was both one and two?1 Similarly, it
might be argued that any doctrinal dispute can be trivially resolved by treating it as a
paradox. Perhaps five hundred years of Protestant-Catholic polemics have been just
so much wasted ink; Christians should simply conclude that, paradoxically, we are
justified by faith alone yet also not justified by faith alone. If this is how things stand,
it would seem that appealing to mystery in defence of paradoxical religious claims is
a recipe for ecumenism on a unparalleled scale!
Were these genuine implications of the RAPT model, it would have little to
recommend it. Yet it ought to be evident even from what has been already said that
the model does not licence belief in just any paradoxical doctrine or set of claims.
The thrust of my argument has been that provided certain conditions are met, an
apparently contradictory set of claims can be warranted. What is needed then is a set
of criteria for distinguishing genuine paradoxes such as the Trinity and the
Incarnation, for which an appeal to mystery is warranted, from spurious paradoxes
such as the following:
(PI) God is identical to the world and God is distinct from the world.
(P2) There was exactly one angel at the tomb and there were exactly two angels at
the tomb.
(P3) We are justified by faith alone and we are not justified by faith alone.
Let me therefore spell out what I take to be the criteria for a legitimate appeal to
mystery, based on the claims of the RAPT model. Consider a formulation of some
doctrine D, consisting of a set T of component claims (Ci, C2, ... Cn) which appear to
be logically inconsistent — typically, some members of T taken in conjunction seem
to imply the falsity of one or more of the remaining members. If the rationality of
affirming D is to be defended via an appeal to mystery (in the sense defined in
Chapter 6) then, above all else, every member of T must be individually warranted;
more specifically, according to the RAPT model, warranted by way of special
1 Mark 16:5; Luke 24:4.
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2revelation (i.e., grounded in the testimony of Scripture and the witness of the Spirit).
The rationale for this requirement is clear enough: if God alone is in a position to
know how some state of affairs X that strikes us as metaphysically impossible is
nonetheless possible (and indeed actual) then only an implicit assurance from God to
that effect could warrant the belief that X is a mystery rather than an absurdity. Only
divine revelation has the epistemic authority to 'trump' our natural intuitions about
what is metaphysically possible and what is not.
Moreover, the claims in question must be warranted to a significant degree: at a
minimum, to a degree sufficient for knowledge. Crucially, there must be available no
alternative, «o«-paradoxical set of claims T* based on an interpretation of the biblical
data that is of comparable plausibility (linguistically speaking) to the paradoxical
reading from which T is derived.
Now these revelational constraints clearly rule out an appeal to mystery in defence
of (PI) above. Scripture teaches unambiguously that God is not identical to the world
and offers no support for the opposite view. Rejecting (P3) on the same basis may
not be quite so straightforward, but a good case can be made that the New Testament
affirmations about justification harmonize in ways that satisfy linguistic norms of
grammar, semantic range, context, and so forth. In short, Christians can appeal to
non-paradoxical interpretations of the data that avoid doing hermeneutical violence
to the inspired text.3
Beyond the basic requirement of substantial revelational warrant, there is a second
criterion for legitimate appeals to mystery. As I discussed in Chapter 6, the RAPT
model draws on the doctrine of divine incomprehensibility in explaining how the
phenomenon of paradox can arise; it follows that an appeal to mystery in defence of
some paradoxical doctrine D will only be legitimate if the appearance of
contradiction can be plausibly attributed to divine incomprehensibility. In general,
this suggests that the relevant component claims of D ought to involve metaphysical
2 As I noted earlier, although I have explicated the RAPT model in line with one particular perspective
on how Christian doctrinal claims are warranted (the Reformed tradition), alternative models could be
developed in accordance with other perspectives.
3
See, for example, Moo (1985): 101-17. Solutions to the apparent contradiction between Paul's and
James's statements on justification are typically resolved by arguing that the two authors employ
certain terms, such as 'justified' and 'faith', in distinct senses. While these explanations involve
positing equivocation between key terms, no appeal to mystery is required, since the semantic
distinctions in question can be cognized and communicated.
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affirmations about God: his nature, his actions, his relationship to the creation, and
suchlike. This additional constraint on appeals to mystery explains why (P2) should
not be considered a genuine paradox — defenders of biblical inerrancy must look
elsewhere for a solution. It also casts further doubt on the credentials of (P3), for it is
difficult to see why this apparent contradiction would arise as a consequence of a
metaphysically mysterious state of affairs.
Taken together, these two criteria rule out rational appeals to mystery in defence
of spurious paradoxes such as (PI), (P2), and (P3), while permitting such appeals in
the case of doctrines that many Christians thinkers have taken to be genuinely
paradoxical. Thus the fear that the RAPT model throws a lifeline to any apparently
contradictory set of claims whatsoever is without foundation.
7.2 Biblical Concerns
Following the example of Christ and the apostles, Christians have typically
considered the Bible — that collection of historic texts deemed to be divinely
inspired — to be a moral and epistemic authority of the highest order. Its teachings
are generally taken as normative for Christian belief and practice. As such, it behoves
any philosophical model which purports to account for the rationality of certain
Christian doctrines to be consonant with the Christian view of Scripture: its
character, its interpretation, and its content. In this section, I address three objections
to the effect that the RAPT model falls short in this regard.
7.2.1 The Fount of Doctrinal Paradox: Creeds or Scripture?
It will not have passed notice that in my earlier arguments for the paradoxicality of
the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation, I focused on the credal statements of
these doctrines developed by the early church rather than the biblical basis of the
doctrines. According to my explication of the RAPT model, however, the warrant for
believing the component claims of Christian doctrines is grounded in Scripture rather
than in church tradition (though alternative models could be developed in accordance
with other theories of doctrinal warrant). One might therefore raise the following
objection. Suppose we grant that the credal formulations are paradoxical;
nonetheless, these classical expressions of trinitarian and christological orthodoxy
are (on the Reformed view) merely fallible human restatements of biblical teaching.
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Is it not possible that the biblical documents alone do not make (or imply) any
paradoxical theological claims? If so, it follows that the credal formulations can be
refined or reinterpreted so as to massage away all logical tension, resulting in
doctrinal expressions that are more, not less, faithful to Scripture. In sum, if the fount
of doctrinal paradox is human error rather than divine revelation, then the RAPT
model is redundant.
I opted to focus on credal formulations in the earlier chapters for several reasons.
The Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed, the Definition of Chalcedon, and the
Athanasian Creed are rightly held in high esteem throughout the Christian church,
and believers aware of their historical pedigree are understandably resistant to the
idea that they are seriously flawed. Indeed, those who adhere to them normally do so
on the basis of a firm conviction that they are grounded in divine revelation. For this
reason, the paradoxicality of these statements is a philosophical problem in itself for
the Christian community.4 Moreover, in spite of the political and personal agendas
that complicated the early theological controversies, the tacit assumption by each of
the various parties in the trinitarian and christological debates was that their position
was the one with superior biblical support and hence the debate frequently turned on
the interpretation of key scriptural texts.5 Since the controversies were driven (at
least on the theological level) by a desire to be faithful to divine revelation, the very
fact that these heated controversies arose in the first place, and that compromise
positions had to be struck in order to resolve them, is strong evidence that the biblical
documents which supplied the source data do indeed support paradoxical doctrines of
the Trinity and the Incarnation.
These considerations constitute an indirect argument for the claim that doctrinal
paradox originates in the biblical data and not merely in the conciliar interpretations
of it.6 Nevertheless, the same conclusion can be directly argued from Scripture
4 As evidenced by the fact that those Christian scholars who have defended the logical consistency of
the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation, such as Richard Swinburne, Cornelius Plantinga,
David Brown, Ronald Feenstra, Thomas Morris, and Peter van Inwagen, typically allow the
ecumenical creeds to set the parameters of the problem.
5 Pelikan (1971): 173ff, 243ff.
6 At the risk of over-egging the cake, one might add an 'argument from providence'. On the
reasonable assumption that God superintended the doctrinal developments of the church so as to
promote correct theological beliefs among the community of the redeemed, it follows that the
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(though space forbids more than an outline here). Consider first the doctrine of the
Trinity. It is not difficult to argue that there is strong biblical support for the
following claim:
(Tl) There is more than one divine person.
It goes without saying that the Bible teaches the existence of at least one divine
person. Moreover, Jesus and the New Testament writers speak of 'the Father' and
'the Son' in a manner implying that these names denote numerically distinct persons
(e.g., Matt. 11:27; 24:36; John 5:19-23; Gal. 4:6; Col. 1:12-13; 1 John 2:22-24). The
Father is said to be God (e.g., John 6:27; 20:17; Rom. 1:7; Gal. 1:3; 1 Peter 1:2; Jude
1:1) and the Son is also spoken of in terms that imply deity (e.g., John 1:1; 5:18;
10:30; Rom. 9:5; Col. 1:15-20; 2:9). The additional data regarding the Holy Spirit
(e.g., Matt. 28:18-20; Luke 3:21-22; Acts 5:3-4) lends further support to (Tl).
Remarkably, however, there is equally strong biblical support for a second claim:
(T2) There is only one divine person.
The consistent witness of the Old Testament is that of a monotheistic faith. The
classic expression of this Hebrew conviction is that of the Shema: 'Hear, O Israel:
The LORD our God, the LORD is one.'7 There is one and only one God: Yahweh.
Yet in the same context, this one God is spoken of in explicitly personal terms: he
self-refers with a singular personal pronoun; he issues commands; he expresses a
desire for us to have a loving relationship with him. Other unequivocal Old
Testament affirmations of monotheism are couched in similarly personalistic
language (Deut. 32:39; 2 Sam. 7:22-24; Ps. 86:8-10; Isa. 44:6-8; 45:5-6, 21-22).8
Such robust monotheistic convictions are carried over, as one might expect, into the
New Testament (Rom. 3:30; 1 Cor. 8:6; Eph. 4:6; James 2:19).
These data alone provide sterling support for (T2), but still more striking is the
fact that the New Testament writers reinforce this by apparently identifying Christ
with 'Yahweh' of the Old Testament: Matt. 3:3 and Mark 1:3 (cf. Isa. 40:3); John
8:58 (cf. Ex. 3:14); John 12:41 (cf. Isa. 6:1); Luke 2:11 (cf. v. 9); Rom. 10:9, 12-13
ecumenical declarations forged by the early church fathers are likely to be a faithful systematic




Tuggy (2004) makes this feature of the OT characterisation of Yahweh a central plank in a 'biblical-
moral' argument against social trinitarianism, citing Deut. 6:4 (along with other texts) in support.
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(cf. Joel 2:32); Eph. 4:8 (cf. Ps. 68:18); Phil. 2:9-11 (cf. Isa. 45:22-24); 1 Cor. 2:16
(cf. Isa. 40:13); 1 Cor. 10:4 (cf. Ex. 13:21); Heb. 1:10-12 (cf. Ps. 102:25-27); 1 Pet.
2:8 (cf. Isa. 8:13-14).9 This is not identification in a weak sense (e.g., 'Jesus
identified himself with sinners by being baptized') but in a stronger, numerical sense:
two proper names (or rigid designators, to use the Kripkean terminology) are treated
as co-referential. Similarly, while Paul reaffirms the 'one Lord' creed of the Old
Testament (Eph. 4:5), he feels at liberty to identify Christ as the 'one Lord' (1 Cor.
8:6). Indeed, the theological significance of the New Testament authors' liberal
application of the title o icupio<; (familiar to readers of the Septuagint as the favoured
translation of the Tetragrammaton) to Jesus is widely acknowledged among biblical
scholars.10
Thus, even the briefest examination of the biblical data reveals strong support for
a paradoxical doctrine of the Trinity. Similar considerations can be marshalled with
regard to the doctrine of the Incarnation. One of the simplest ways to appreciate the
logical tensions introduced by the biblical testimony to Christ's dual nature is by
considering the claims in the Gospel accounts pertaining to the extent of Jesus'
knowledge. On the one hand, there are statements that assert or imply his
omniscience (Matt. 9:4; 12:25; 17:27; Mark 2:8; John 1:47-50; 2:24-25; 4:29; 6:64;
11:11-14; 13:19; 16:30; 21:17)." This direct biblical evidence thus confirms a
9 Consider also Acts 20:28, Rev. 22:13 (cf. 1:8), Jer. 23:5-6, and Ezek. 34:11-24. The christological
implications of the Ezekiel passage are particularly striking. Yahweh states, 'I myself will search for
my sheep and look after them. ... I myselfwill tend my sheep' (vv. 11, 15). Yet he immediately goes
on to declare, 'I will place over them one shepherd, my servant David [i.e. Christ], and he will tend
them ... and be their shepherd' (v. 24).
10
See, for example, Hurtado (2003): 108-18.
11 These texts also serve as evidence against the adequacy of kenotic models of the Incarnation.
Further evidence is supplied by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, whose theology of Christ's
eternal priesthood presupposes his ongoing post-ascension humanity. (As I argued in §3.3.1, the
Definition of Chalcedon also reflects a commitment to Christ's post-ascension humanity.) Kenoticists
must either claim that the exalted Christ still lacks omniscience or admit that Scripture gives no
sanction to the assumption that Jesus could not be simultaneously omniscient and fully human. Evans
(2002) considers the 'radical' option of grasping the first horn of the dilemma and rejecting the
assumption that the glorified Christ must be omniscient. However, even leaving aside the biblical data
supporting Christ's omniscience during his earthly sojourn, this uncompromising kenoticism is
difficult to reconcile with John 17:5 (which seemingly equates Christ's post-glorification status with
his pre-incamate status) and Col. 2:2-3. In the latter passage, part of Paul's defence of the sufficiency
and deity of Christ in the face of proto-gnostic heresy, Christ is said to be the repository of 'all the
treasures of wisdom and knowledge'. Paul's appeal would fall flat if Christ were forevermore
constrained by human noetic limitations.
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natural inference from the extensive biblical witness to his deity.12 Yet on the other
hand, the Gospel authors testify to his lack ofknowledge on certain matters and what
appear to be genuine expressions of surprise (Matt. 8:10; 24:36; Mark 6:6; 13:32;
Luke 2:52; 7:9; 8:45). Moreover, these texts will not permit the paradox to be
resolved by introducing a distinction between a divine person (God the Son) and a
human person (Jesus ofNazareth) since one and the same individual is manifestly the
subject in each case. As the orthodox have always insisted, Jesus Christ is one
person, one individual. The biblical text thus presents us directly with paradoxical
aspects of the doctrine of the Incarnation. The implicit logical tensions in the
christological confessions of the church are begotten, not created.
This survey of the biblical data has been admittedly cursory, but nonetheless it
casts doubt on the suggestion that the post-apostolic development of the doctrines of
the Trinity and the Incarnation drifted into a paradoxicality foreign to the scriptural
texts. On the contrary, it is because these statements of orthodox belief are well
grounded in the biblical data that they exhibit the conceptual difficulties commonly
attributed to them.13
7.2.2 Logic as a Hermeneutical Tool
Texts, religious or otherwise, cannot be interpreted in an epistemic vacuum. In order
to understand an author's claims, we inevitably have to appeal to a broad range of
background knowledge, which in turn suggests a set of hermeneutical principles:
rules or guidelines to which we appeal when trying to establish the meaning of a
series of linguistic tokens. One of these principles, plausibly enough, is the principle
12 As I noted in §3.3.1, some kenoticists have maintained that omniscience simpliciter should not be
considered an essential divine attribute; instead, the relevant divine attribute must be some suitably
qualified property such as omniscient-unless-kenotically-incarnate. As far as I am aware, no direct
biblical support has been adduced for this move. Moreover, it would seem to be contradicted by
Isaiah's polemic against false gods (Isa. 41:21-23; 44:6-8; 46:9-10), in which the prophet, speaking on
behalf of Yahweh, argues from the following premise: if S does not know the future, then 5 is not
divine.
13 It might be objected that my approach to the scriptural data here is nai've, lacking sensitivity to the
kind of issues raised by higher biblical criticism. In my defence, I should emphasise that my purpose
in this section has been merely to make a prima facie case that the biblical affirmations about God and
Jesus Christ give rise to paradoxical implications; this requires no assumptions about the reliability or
veracity of those affirmations. Furthermore, I would contend (following Plantinga) that the
methodology of higher criticism typically involves epistemological assumptions (often left unargued)
at odds with the model for warranted Christian beliefs defended in Chapter 5. See Plantinga (2000):
374-421. As an objection to the RAPT model, an uncritical appeal to the results of higher criticism is
question begging.
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of logical charity: we do well to assume that an author does not exhibit self-
contradiction unless we have good reason to think otherwise. The principle is
especially apt when the author in question is none other than God, as Christians have
historically taken to be the case when interpreting Scripture.14 Yet this observation
gives rise to a concern about the RAPT model. How can the claim that biblical
theology presents us with apparent contradictions (albeit implicit ones) be reconciled
with the principle that the God who inspired the Bible does not contradict himself?
David Basinger raises this objection in concluding his critique of the claim that there
are genuine biblical paradoxes:
[T]he real issue of import here is not simply one of terminology. It is hermeneutical in
nature. If no real contradiction from a human level is meaningful and God would not
reveal nonsense, then the primary purpose for attempting to determine whether certain
Biblical statements are self-contradictory should not be, as it appears to be for the
theologians of paradox, to determine the logical status of undeniable Biblical truths. It
should be to attempt to identify the tmth. For, given my analysis, if two seeming truths
are really incompatible, then reinterpretation or suspension ofjudgment is necessary.15
In response to Basinger's concern, it must be immediately granted that the conviction
at the heart of this objection — namely, that the law of non-contradiction functions
as a necessary hermeneutical principle — is wholly justified. It will not do to accept
that Scripture may contradict itself, not least because contradictory statements cannot
both be true. Nonetheless, this principle is quite compatible with acceptance of the
RAPT model. For in the first place, the model distinguishes between real
contradictions (which it denies) and merely apparent contradictions (which it
allows). Indeed, it is precisely because real contradictions in revelation are
unacceptable that any seeming contradictions are to be deemed merely apparent.16
One can therefore accept Basinger's claim that 'if two seeming truths are really
incompatible, then reinterpretation is ... necessary' while maintaining that if two
14 'That God does not speak in contradictions is both the most fundamental and the least controversial
of the prior convictions about God's nature and purposes that the church, down through the ages, has
used for interpreting divine discourse.' Wolterstorff (1995): 206-7.
15
Basinger (1987): 213.
16 This principle of interpretation applies equally well to statements in other contexts, as indicated by
the examples of MACRUEs offered earlier (§6.2.1).
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seeming truths are apparently incompatible then reinterpretation is not necessary
(though it may be appropriate in the majority of cases).
On similar grounds, we should distinguish between the law of non-contradiction
as such (which is a necessary truth) and our application of the law of non¬
contradiction (which is fallible). Our ability to identify a real contradiction depends
on the extent to which we grasp the meaning of the sentences in question: crucially,
we must have good grounds for taking it that same terms are being used univocally.
Thus while Christians should certainly apply the law of non-contradiction in their
interpretation of Scripture, when faced with a seeming violation of the law they
should be open to the possibility of the law being misapplied due to the presence of
unarticulated equivocation and semantic imprecision. The upshot of these
considerations is that while the presumption of discernible logical consistency is an
indispensable hermeneutical principle, it should not be wielded as an absolute;
rather, it should be applied with due sensitivity to the limitations of human language
and human cognition in the face of divine mystery. If a plausible alternative
interpretation of the biblical data is available, all well and good. But if it becomes
clear that any reinterpretation would stretch norms of vocabulary and grammar to
breaking point, then resting with paradox and appealing to mystery will be the most
17rational course.
7.2.3 Paradox as Defeater for Biblical Inspiration
Earlier I specified two necessary conditions for a warranted appeal to mystery in
defence of a paradoxical doctrine D: first, the component claims of D must be
strongly warranted by divine revelation; and second, the phenomenon of
paradoxicality must be plausibly attributable to divine incomprehensibility. Clearly
the application of the first criterion depends on the divine revelation in question
being properly identified as such. However, one might argue that the paradoxicality
ofD serves as a defeater for the belief that the putative epistemic ground of D (in the
RAPT model, biblical testimony) is in fact divine revelation. God, presumably, is a
paragon of truth and consistency; so if the Christian doctrines of the Trinity and the
17 Of course, it is always possible that ongoing creative reflection will shed new light on the problem
and allow the paradox to be resolved. The point here is that until such a time, there is no intellectual
shame in accepting that our best interpretation of the data points to a paradox occasioned by divine
mystery.
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Incarnation are apparently contradictory, and these doctrines are taught in the Bible,
should not one rationally conclude that the Bible (or at least those portions from
which the doctrines are drawn) is not divinely inspired after all?
It is important to recognise the inferential structure of this objection, since this
proves to be its undoing. I argued in Chapter 5 that the component claims of
Christian doctrines can be warranted on the basis that they are taught in Scripture,
coupled with a warranted belief that the Bible is divinely inspired (hereafter, BI). In
such circumstances, the belief that doctrine D is true is normally held by way of an
10
inference from the belief that D is taught in Scripture conjoined with BI. The
inference thus has the following form:
(1) If doctrinal source DS is divinely inspired, and DS teaches doctrine D, then D is
true.
(2) DS is divinely inspired.
(3) DS teaches D.
(4) Therefore, D is true. [from (1), (2), (3)]
Now if the objection above is cogent, then the conclusion it proposes (that the Bible
is not divinely inspired) must also be reached inferentially. It is not that the
paradoxicality ofD is directly a defeater for BI. Rather, it is that the paradoxicality of
D indicates the falsity of D, which in turn functions as a defeater for BI. Put
formally:
(1) If doctrinal source DS is divinely inspired, and DS teaches doctrine D, then D is
true.
(3) DS teaches D.
(5) IfD is paradoxical, then D is not true.
(6) D is paradoxical.
18 The main exception here is the case in which a doctrine is held non-inferentially, purely on the basis
of reliable testimony. With respect to that particular case, the present objection is irrelevant; for if S
does not hold D on the basis of inference from a conviction about Scripture, then S is unlikely to infer
from the paradoxicality of D that such a conviction is in error.
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(7) Therefore, D is not true. [from (5), (6)]
(8) Therefore, DS is not divinely inspired. [from (1), (3), (7)]
Set out in this way, it becomes clear that the objection begs the question against the
RAPT model. For according to the model, premise (5) is unwarranted (considered as
a general claim about paradoxical doctrines). The paradoxicality of D is not
necessarily a defeater for D; and if it is not a defeater for D, then neither will it serve
as a defeater for BI. Consequently, this objection to the model can only succeed by
riding piggyback on some other objection (specifically, an objection challenging the
contention at the heart of the model that in some instances the inference from
apparent contradiction to actual contradiction is unwarranted).
It is worth noting that the flaw in this objection is twinned with the flaw in the
previous objection from the hermeneutical role of logic. The difference is that
whereas the present objection assumes that D is taught by Scripture and infers from
the paradoxicality of D that Scripture is not divinely inspired, the previous objection
assumes that Scripture is divinely inspired and infers from the paradoxicality of D
that D is not taught in Scripture. In both cases, however, the pivotal inference begs
the question against the RAPT model.
7.3 Theological Concerns
7.3.1 The Practice of Systematic Theology
Systematic theology is generally understood as that discipline which attempts to
develop an orderly, coherent, comprehensive, thematically arranged exposition of
Christian belief and confession. Its practitioners, moreover, usually manifest a
special concern to relate the fruits of their work to contemporary issues and problems
both in the church and in wider society. At any rate, whatever disagreements there
might be over the aims and methods of systematic theology, it is reasonable to
suppose that logical principles ought to play a central role in its practice simply by
virtue of the systematic character of the discipline. Systematic theologians will
typically be found arguing for constructions of the form 'biblical data B implies
doctrine D\ , 'doctrine £>2 is incompatible with doctrine D3', 'doctrines D4 and £>5
lend support to doctrine ZV, and the like. It is therefore possible that the RAPT
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model presented here will cause offence to such scholars. If apparent violations of
the laws of logic are permitted (perhaps even unavoidable) in our doctrinal
formulations, how can we maintain that any doctrine should (or should not) be held
on the basis of its logical relation to some body of revelational data or to some other
doctrine? Indeed, would not acceptance of the RAPT model render altogether futile
the project of developing a clear and consistent system of Christian theology?
Such anxieties are misplaced. My argument has been that in certain epistemic
circumstances one can be rational in affirming a paradoxical doctrine; yet
circumstances are liable to change, and it is always possible that one's understanding
of that doctrine may improve in such a way as to allow rational penetration of the
paradox (for example, by recasting it in terms of a novel conceptual framework).19
The drive toward greater consistency and comprehension in systematic theology is
no more hindered by the legitimacy of an appeal to mystery in the face of paradox
than, say, the desirability of a university education is hindered by the legitimacy of
an appeal to expert authority. Furthermore, even if developing a comprehensive and
systematic expression of revelational data without any hint of paradox were to prove
impossible, it still remains that theologians ought to strive to express their
conclusions with as much consistency, clarity, and precision as the data will
reasonably permit.
It is crucial to recognise that the RAPT model does not rule out the use of
deduction and inference in theology, but merely implies certain constraints on the
application of logical principles. If it were known in advance that no apparent
contradictions should arise in our theological theorizing, then we could allow any
valid inference whatsoever from propositional revelational data (or our best
interpretation of that data). But if we grant that some elements of divine revelation
could strike us as paradoxical on account of limitations in our noetic apparatus, then
we can permit any valid inference from revelational data provided its conclusion
does not explicitly negate other revelational data. By far the majority of theological
inferences will be unaffected if the RAPT model is correct, but whenever we are
presented with an inference from biblical data B\ that requires a dismissal or
19 While I think it is ultimately unsuccessful, for the reasons given earlier, the application of the
Aristotelian notion of 'numerical sameness without identity' to the oneness-threeness problem of the
Trinity by Brower and Rea (2004) is provides one example of innovative thinking.
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suppression of biblical data Bi we should be alerted to the fact that there may be
more going on than meets the eye; consequently, we should be prepared to withhold
the inference in question and to reassess our interpretation of the data overall. By
withholding the inference we are not positing an exception to the laws of logic, but
merely acknowledging an element of imprecision in our systematic comprehension
of the data. According to the RAPT model, if we were to fully grasp (as God does)
the metaphysical state of affairs represented by the data, we would understand why
such an inference is invalid; as it is, however, we can only understand that it is
invalid.
By way of illustration (and offering something of a change of doctrinal scenery)
consider the range of biblical statements pertaining to the divine will. According to 1
Thess. 4:3, for example, the following statement is true:
(9) God wills that Christians avoid sexual immorality.
Given that adultery is a form of sexual immorality, we might well infer:
(10) God wills that Christians avoid adultery.
Moreover, on the reasonable supposition that God's will is ethically normative for
Christian behaviour, we might further infer:
(11) Christians ought not to commit adultery.
Since there are no biblical statements that contradict (11), we can conclude that these
inferences are entirely legitimate.
Consider now a second inference. As a matter of regrettable historical fact,
numerous Christians have committed adultery. It is therefore tempting to deduce in
conjunction with (10) that the following claim is true:
(12) God's will is not always fulfilled.
However, the problem with this deduction is that it appears to contradict a substantial
20
body of biblical data supporting the unrestricted efficacy of God's will:
(13) God's will is always fulfilled.
20 A sampling of relevant texts: Job 42:2; Prov. 16:9; 19:21; 21:1; Isa. 14:24; 46:9-10; Lam. 3:37-38;
Rom. 9:19-21; Eph. 1:11; James 4:15.
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We are thus alerted to a complexity in the divine volition that renders invalid the
inference of (12) from (10). More precisely, the inference is invalid if corresponding
terms in (12) and (13) are taken univocally; the apparent contradiction (brought into
sharp relief by the process of systematic theorizing) indicates the presence of an
unarticulated equivocation. Hence an inference along these lines can only be
admitted if a distinction is posited (at least formally) between same terms: for
example, as the Reformed tradition has recommended, a distinction between God's
21
decretive (or 'secret') will and God's preceptive (or 'revealed') will. The lesson
here for systematic theologians is that whenever a potential inference from some
body of revelational data leads to a conflict with some other body of revelational data
(by negating it or rendering it inexplicable), either the inference should be withheld
altogether or else formal distinctions should be introduced to signal the recognition
of a mystery and to insulate against unwarranted interpretations and implications (for
example, that it is ethically permissible to cheat on one's spouse). By observing the
modest constraints on theorizing indicated above, systematic theology can make its
peace with apophatic theology.
Thus it should be evident that the RAPT model does not undermine the project of
theological systematization and deduction by flouting the logical principles which
direct that project. On the contrary, it presupposes those principles, while at the same
time imposing certain methodological constraints on the process of systematisation
and deduction, with a view to accommodating the source data as faithfully as
possible.
21 Turretin (1992): 220-25; Helm (1993): 130-37. It is difficult to specify satisfactorily (i.e., in terms
other than those of the explanandum) just what the substantial difference is between these aspects or
dimensions of divine volition, which suggests that the distinction is little more than a formal device
for attaining systematic consistency. The connotations of 'decretive' and 'preceptive' are useful for
indicating how one ought to draw implications and applications (e.g., ethical norms should be deduced
from the latter rather than the former) but do not really shed light on how these diverse aspects of
God's will can be reconciled with our intuitive notions of volition. It is noteworthy that Calvin, in
expounding the doctrine of comprehensive divine providence, defended his position against the charge
of contradiction (i.e., positing 'two contrary wills' in God) by arguing that the divine will merely
appears manifold to us due to 'our mental incapacity' and 'the sluggishness of our understanding'.
Calvin (1960), I, 18.3. One thus finds in Calvin an appeal to mystery along the lines of the RAPT
model.
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7.3.2 Defining Orthodoxy and Excluding Heterodoxy
From the inception of the church, the historical development of Christian doctrine
has been driven by a conviction that orthodoxy matters. There are certain claims
about God and his redemptive activity that are right, which ought to be believed and
acted upon; there are also correlative claims that are wrong and ought to be rejected.
Indeed, some instances of the latter are to be vehemently repudiated, because they
involve or imply a serious distortion of the truth about God and the message of
salvation through Jesus Christ. The principle established by the apostles and New
Testament writers, that 'sound doctrine' should be guarded and 'false teaching'
condemned,22 was upheld by the early church fathers. Accordingly, the trinitarian
controversies of the fourth century culminated in the condemnation of heresies such
as Sabellianism and Arianism, while the christological debates of the fifth led to the
denunciation of Apollinarianism and Nestorianism.
One of the tasks of systematic theology is thus to articulate orthodox Christian
doctrine and to set it apart from heterodox alternatives. Faithful expositions of the
doctrine of the Trinity, for instance, ought to distinguish it from the deviations of
modalism, subordinationism, and tritheism. Any epistemic model of Christian
doctrinal beliefs that would serve to undermine this task will be anathema to the
Christian community.
It might be thought that the RAPT model, which allows for appeals to mystery in
defence of paradoxical sets of claims, faces this very difficulty. Dale Tuggy, for
example, suggests as much in his critique of appeals to mystery in the context of
trinitarian theology. According to Tuggy, many trinitarians are muddled in their
thinking and fail to take a clear stance on the issue that divides social trinitarians
(who claim in effect that God is numerically three divinities, not one) from
modalistic trinitarians (who claim in effect that God is numerically one divinity, not
three). Instead, they settle for some conciliatory claim such as the following:
(14) The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are in some sense one and in some sense three.
Now while (14) is not clearly inconsistent, and thus avoids the spectre of logical
contradiction, Tuggy considers it a 'shadowy and vaporous claim' which fails to do
22 Acts 20:28-31; 1 Tim. 1:3; 2 Tim. 1:13-14; Titus 1:9; 2:1; 2 Pet. 2:1; Jude 3.
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any useful work. It is far from clear that (14), even when conjoined with the
following claims, rules out either modalism or polytheism:
(15) The Father is divine.
(16) The Son is divine.
(17) The Holy Spirit is divine.
(18) Whatever is divine is identical to at least one of these: Father, Son, Holy Spirit.
While this stance may avoid paradox, it does so at the expense of obscuring the
distinction between orthodoxy and heterodoxy. Clearly this will not do. But does not
my defence of a paradoxical interpretation of the Trinity, according to which God is
one divine being in one sense and three divine beings in another sense, face precisely
this problem?
There are two issues to address in response to this objection. The first concerns
the problem of meaning: specifically, whether or not claims such as (14) actually tell
9"!
us anything of significance about God. Since I treat this question later on, I will
refrain from doing so here and simply ask that the reader grant for now that a
paradoxical set of claims can still convey meaningful information. The second issue
concerns the problem of distinction: that is, how one should go about distinguishing
orthodoxy from heterodoxy when faced with a paradoxical doctrine. As it turns out,
that there is no great difficulty in doing so; and illustrating this point, moreover, can
shed considerable light on the epistemic roots of heterodoxy.
As I noted in Chapter 6, any doctrinal MACRUE can be rendered formally
consistent by articulating distinctions on one or more terms. For example, the
trinitarian claims that God is one divine being and God is three divine beings can be
reformulated as follows:24
(T1a) God isi one divine being.
(T2a) God is2 three divine beings.
23 See §7.4.5.
24 The subsequent discussion applies mutatis mutandis any alternative formulations in which
distinctions are posited (or terminology expanded) so as to avoid formal contradiction.
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Now the question at hand is this: according to this formulation, how would one
censure the errors of modalism and tritheism? At first it might seem that one should
simply repudiate the following two claims, taking them to represent the modalist
position and the tritheist position respectively:
(HIA) God is2 one divine being.
(H2a) God isi three divine beings.
But suppose that some alleged modalist were to reply thus: 'The fact is that I do not
affirm (H1A) at all; I have merely been claiming (T1A) all along!' How could one
refute such a reply, given that (according to the RAPT model) the relations signified
by 'isf and 'is2' are conceptually indistinguishable from our cognitive perspective?
The solution here is to admit that this alleged modalist is no heretic at all (at least,
not on this count). For what the bona fide modalist claims is the following:
(HI) God isi one divine being and God is2 one divine being.
More precisely, the modalist denies altogether that there is any unarticulated
equivocation to be acknowledged: God is one divine being and that is the end of the
matter; in no comparable sense should we also say, 'God is three divine beings.'
Similarly for the bona fide tritheist, who insists that God is three divine beings,
period; in no comparable sense is it correct to claim, 'God is one divine being.'25
We are now in a position to see what genuinely distinguishes trinitarian orthodoxy
from heterodoxy: it is that the latter will have no truck with paradox, insisting instead
on throwing in its lot with one side of the tension at the expense of the other.
Rejecting outright an appeal to mystery in the face of apparent contradiction, the
anti-trinitarian must opt for either oneness over threeness (modalism) or threeness
over oneness (tritheism). Likewise for christological heterodoxy: either the unity of
Christ's personhood must be sacrificed in order to preserve his full divinity and full
humanity (Nestorianism) or vice versa (Apollinarianism and kenoticism). Any
solution will be deemed preferable to the scandal of paradox. And what this analysis
suggests, perhaps, is an affinity between doctrinal heterodoxy and theological
25 It thus follows that the characterisation of heterodox positions is independent of which terms in the
doctrinal formulations bear equivocal senses.
26 Subordinationism also opts for oneness over threeness, in effect, but departs from modalism on the
question of whether the Son and the Spirit are divine in the same sense as the Father.
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rationalism: a reluctance to subordinate human intuitions to the control of revelation
and to acknowledge that our minds may not be conceptually equipped to resolve
27
every logical puzzle thrown up by our systematization of the biblical data.
7.3.3 Alternative Cognitive Design Plans
The RAPT model specifies that the paradoxical aspects of certain Christian doctrines
are attributable to divine incomprehensibility (a function of both God's ontological
profundity and human noetic finitude). Specifically, our cognitive apparatus is
insufficiently equipped to grasp the metaphysical distinctions that would enable us to
see just how the logical tensions in these doctrines could be eliminated and to refine
our theological formulations accordingly. One might well ask, however, why things
should have to be this way. After all, Christian theists typically take the view that
human beings (our mental faculties included) are the product of divine design. Could
not God, in his infinite wisdom, have given us cognitive faculties sufficiently
advanced for us to avoid encountering paradoxes in our theological theorizing?
Indeed, is that not precisely what we would expect to find? For if God wished to
reveal his triune nature to us, presumably he would also want to arrange things so
that we would not find it so logically perplexing.
It certainly seems true that God could have opted for alternative cognitive design
plans. The question is whether we have good overall grounds for supposing (on
Christian assumptions) that he would opt for a design that did not give rise to the
occasional paradox when systematizing his self-revelation. All things considered, I
doubt that we are in a position to answer affirmatively here. Although we might
prefer such a design, we can hardly presume on that basis alone that God would
share our preference. Besides, as Plantinga observes in his discussion of cognitive
design plans, no matter how well designed our noetic faculties may be, the design
plan will inevitably involve trade-offs and compromises, as any engineer can
90
appreciate. While the designer's primary aim is presumably that of producing
predominantly true beliefs, there will also be other desiderata that will impose
constraints on the design: accuracy, efficiency, flexibility, simplicity, material
27 One other lesson to take is that Christians ought to be more circumspect about charging this or that
thinker with unorthodox views on the Trinity or the Incarnation, in light of the complexities thrown up




realizability, and so forth. Now for all we know (and that is the crucial qualifier) the
optimal design for our cognitive apparatus, given God's purposes for us, does not
involve the capacity to rationally penetrate some of the finer aspects of trinitarian and
christological metaphysics. It may be that if this capacity were added, it could only
be at the expense of some other, more important feature of our cognitive apparatus.
Yet given that we are not privy to such details of the divine design plan, we are
hardly warranted in assuming that God ought to have done things one way rather
than another.
In any case, the notion that the phenomenon of paradox in our theological
theorizing is an intrinsic evil may well be misplaced, for it is plausible to think that
God would have positive reasons for placing us in the epistemic situation posited by
the RAPT model. Theological paradox reminds us of our creaturely limitations and
of the transcendence of God. It confronts us with divine incomprehensibility and
9Q
fosters reverent awe and epistemic humility. Furthermore, in keeping with a central
thread in the Christian narrative, paradox (with its attendant notion of divine
mystery) invites faith, requiring us to trust God's self-revelation despite the fact that
it disaccords at points with our rational intuitions (about identity, unity, personhood,
etc.). We are thus faced with a stark choice: on the one hand, to conform the
phenomena of divine revelation to our human intuitions about what must be the case,
or on the other, to conform our human intuitions about what must be the case to the
phenomena of divine revelation. Just as Abraham trusted God's self-revelation in the
face of seeming absurdity — the pregnancy of a pensioner and the sacrifice of a son
— and was commended for his faith, so it is possible that God means us trust the
self-revelation of his triunity and his incarnation in the face of seeming illogicality,
as opposed to leaning on our own understanding.30
Such suggestions might be dismissed (perhaps too hastily) as mere speculation,
yet surely they are no more speculative than the claim that God would not place us in
the epistemic situation posited by the RAPT model — and that is enough to conclude
that this objection presents no serious threat.
29 Cf. Job 11:7-9; Isa. 55:8-9; Rom. 11:33-34.
30 Rom. 4:18-21; Heb. 11:11-12, 17-19; Prov. 3:5.
271
7.3.4 The Apologetic Mirror Problem
One of the virtues of the approach to paradox defended here is that it offers resources
for defeating a range of objections to Christian theism based on its alleged
incoherence. It is commonly alleged that Christianity is false or irrational because it
involves claims that are logically incompatible — and not surprisingly, the doctrines
of the Trinity and the Incarnation often find themselves first up against the wall in
this regard. My argument has been that at least some of these alleged contradictions
are merely apparent, and, moreover, that Christians can be quite rational in believing
this to be the case. However, this strategy is a double-edged sword. For if
Christianity can avail itself of this form of defence, why not other religious or
philosophical systems? Historically, apologists for Christianity have often taken the
line that the best defence is a good offence, arguing that competing religious
perspectives are untenable due to internal contradictions. But if the RAPT model is
cogent, it would appear to pull the rug out from under such attacks. What is sauce for
the goose is sauce for the gander: if Christianity can be insulated against critiques of
this type, so can any other religious faith.
Dale Tuggy has drawn attention to this problem for defenders of 'mystery':
Even after one appreciates these problems [faced by the doctrine of the Trinity] and
tries to address them, there is an almost irresistible temptation to spin a vice as a
virtue. Many protest that the doctrine is 'supposed to be a mystery'. ... In any case,
most Christian philosophers would not accept this sort of cop-out from members of
other religions defending their distinct theses about God, Brahman, the Absolute,
Nirvana, the Real, etc. They wouldn't applaud such moves, but would consider them
an opportunity, a chance to point out insoluble problems with the world-view in
question and the superior coherence of Christian theism. What is an intellectual vice
for non-Christians can't be an intellectual virtue for Christians.31
It must be admitted that this objection has some bite — though it should be noted
that even if the Christian's appeal to mystery can be mirrored by adherents of other
religions, it does not follow that such appeals are illegitimate or irrational for the
Christian. The most one need concede is that a non-Christian could also be rational
in believing that the paradoxical doctrines of his religion are true. Furthermore, the
rationality of those beliefs would still be contingent on the truth of the religion in
question; for according to the RAPT model, the rationality of Christian doctrinal
beliefs depends on whether or not biblical theism is, in fact, the case. Thus the issue
31
Tuggy (2003b): 175. Cf. Burson and Walls (1998): 97.
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is purely an apologetic one: it is the dialectical problem of debating which set of
religious claims (if any) are true and rationally tenable, given that paradoxicality is
not necessarily an indication of falsity.
Even so, Christianity is not fated to a stalemate with every competing religion
with paradoxical doctrines. As I noted earlier, there are certain conditions that must
be fulfilled in order for an appeal to mystery to be warranted, yet not every religious
perspective has the metaphysical and epistemic resources to mirror the Christian's
defence of paradox. In the first place, the RAPT model presupposes a robust Creator-
creature distinction, giving rise to a doctrine of divine incomprehensibility which can
account for the phenomenon of paradox. It also depends on the availability of a
divinely authored propositional revelation, which alone can warrant the qualification
of strong metaphysical intuitions when faced with a set of claims that strike us as
incompatible. Moreover, for any particular paradox to be defended via an appeal to
mystery, the set of claims in question must be warranted by divine revelation and the
appearance of contradiction plausibly attributable to divine incomprehensibility.
Given these constraints, it would seem that in principle only theistic religions whose
teachings are grounded in special revelation from a personal deity can avail
themselves of the RAPT model (or a similar model). In practice, that leaves us with
species of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. If it turns out that adherents of the latter
two religions can mirror the Christian's appeal to mystery in defence of their own
paradoxical teachings, then this is the price to be exacted for reconciling orthodox
Christian doctrines with the rationality of Christian faith. In my estimation, it is a
price worth paying.
7.4 Philosophical Concerns
7.4.1 Contradictions: Real and Apparent
The cogency of the RAPT model depends crucially on the distinction between real
contradiction and apparent contradiction among theological claims. Not only must
this distinction be formally coherent, it must also be plausibly instantiated; which is
to say, it must be reasonable to suppose that there are, or could be, instances of
merely apparent contradiction.
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As I noted in Chapter 6, the fact that this issue can be raised and debated at all
indicates that the distinction itself is intelligible, and the examples of MACRUEs
provided there show that the phenomenon of apparent contradiction resulting from
unarticulated equivocation is entirely credible. Nevertheless, some writers on the
topic of theological paradox have maintained that the distinction between real
contradiction and apparent contradiction is vacuous or misguided. Consider, for
example, David Basinger's analysis of the 'theologians of paradox':
[P]erhaps their real argument is the following. The Bible does present us with sets of
truths that initially strike us as humans as incompatible and that some people believe
are actually contradictory. However, it has not been demonstrated conclusively that
such truths are really contradictory. Moreover since God would not have given us
truths that are truly contradictory from a human perspective, we may be assured that
no logical incompatibility in fact exists. Such logical tensions are only apparent
contradictions.32
Basinger grants that this position is coherent, but questions whether it is sensible to
construe this as a logical difficulty (as the label 'apparent contradiction' would
connote) since proponents of this view maintain that no real contradiction between
biblical claims has been conclusively demonstrated.
If the truths in question have not clearly been shown to be contradictory, then no
'logical solution' or 'defiance of logic' is required. Nor need the authority of
revelation be evoked. If the truths are not clearly contradictory there is no logical
problem as of yet to worry about.
[A]s long as Biblical concepts are defined and applied in such a way that no logical
incompatibility can be conclusively demonstrated, no logical apologies of the kind
given by [the theologians of paradox] are necessary, for no logical etiquette has been
disturbed.33
Basinger's thesis seems to be that either we are faced with a real contradiction, such
that the contradiction has been 'conclusively demonstrated', or we are not, and only
the former presents us with a logical problem. But this is an oversimplification of the
range the epistemic situations that can obtain. It does not follow from the fact that no
contradiction has been proven that there is no appearance of contradiction; indeed, it
is usually the latter that motivates a deeper assessment of whether or not there is
genuine logical inconsistency. Arguably it is precisely such a situation — a set of






may be subject to revision — that has prompted such scrutiny of the doctrines of the
Trinity and the Incarnation in recent decades. In short, if there appears to be
contradiction between some set of claims, then there appears to be logical problem;
and an apparent logical problem is a problem nonetheless.34 The way to address such
a problem is to consider whether what appears to be the case is actually the case.
Basinger's dismissal of the appearance-reality distinction is far too hasty.
Another writer who finds fault with the notion of apparent contradiction is David
Ciocchi. Analysing what he dubs 'the appeal to paradox' as a response to the tension
between divine sovereignty and human freedom, he comments:
To call a paradox an 'apparent contradiction' is very common, but not logically
correct because it implies a distinction between types of contradiction. I follow David
Basinger in maintaining that there is nothing ambiguous about the concept of
contradiction or, more generally, the concept of logical inconsistency. A statement or
set of statements either is or is not logically consistent, and hence there can be no
genuine distinction between 'real' and 'apparent' contradictions.35
According to Ciocchi, the qualifier 'apparent' indicates that there are different kinds
of contradiction. But in general, this is false: to say that 'A is an apparent F' is simply
to say that there is something, X, which appears to be an F — and this entails nothing
about whether or not there are different kinds of F.
In the context of the RAPT model, the notion of apparent contradiction implies
only that some sets of claims appear to involve contradiction, while others do not;
and the notion of merely apparent contradiction implies only that some sets of claims
appearing to involve contradiction do not actually involve contradiction (on account
of unarticulated equivocation). Both implications are entirely compatible with the
notion that there is but one type of contradiction and furthermore that this concept of
contradiction is quite clear to us. I have not claimed that we lack understanding of
what 'type' of contradiction is involved in paradoxes or of what it means for two
claims to contradict; on the contrary, I take it for granted that we do. Rather, my
claim is that we lack understanding of how certain revelational data that strike us as
34 Consider the following parallel. I am presented with evidence according to which it appears that my
father has committed a serious crime. You try to comfort me by way of the following argument: 'The
fact that it appears your father has committed the crime is strictly irrelevant. Ultimately, either he has
or he hasn't. But it hasn't been conclusively demonstrated that he's a criminal — and until that has
been proven, there's no "legal problem" as of yet to be worried about!' Clearly appearances count for
something, regardless of whether matters ultimately turn out to be as they appear.
35 Ciocchi (1994): 397.
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inconsistent can nonetheless be logically harmonised by drawing relevant
36
distinctions, on account of certain conceptual imprecisions in our noetic apparatus.
7.4.2 Consistency as Intellectual Virtue
'A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds,' averred Ralph Waldo
Emerson, adding for good measure that 'with consistency a great soul has simply
nothing to do.'37 On this point Emerson arguably stands in a minority, for it is
commonly held that logical consistency is the epitome of rationality and
commendable epistemic practice. Above all else, goes the sentiment, one should
strive to eliminate contradictions from one's set of beliefs; indeed, even the toleration
38of apparent contradiction is to be discouraged by the same principle.
Life is never quite so straightforward, however, and there are rare instances where
believing a set of incompatible propositions can strike us as more rational than
withholding belief in one or more of those propositions. Consider the 'Paradox of the
Preface', for example. Sean writes a book on a certain subject in the confidence that
each statement in the book is correct; thus, for each statement S in the book, on
reflection Sean believes that S is true. Nevertheless, in humble acknowledgment of
his own fallibility Sean also thinks it reasonable to suppose that there are one or two
errors in the book (and he therefore writes a pre-emptive apology in the preface of
36 Somewhat perplexingly, Ciocchi goes on to explain that there is a sense in which we can speak of
an 'apparent contradiction' after all, by distinguishing 'logical paradoxes' (real contradictions) from
'epistemic paradoxes'. As he explains: 'I will stipulate that a theological claim is a statement or set of
statements employing vague, ambiguous, nontechnical language to express a Biblical teaching [and] a
theological formulation is a statement or set of statements employing clear, precise, even technical
language to spell out the supposed meaning of a claim. ... With these stipulations I can define an
epistemic paradox, or "apparent contradiction," as a theological claim for which it is (humanly)
impossible to create any logically consistent formulations. Due to its imprecise language the
theological claim itself is not logically inconsistent, but all of its formulations are logically
inconsistent.' Ciocchi (1994): 397-98. By distinguishing epistemic paradoxes from logical paradoxes,
Ciocchi effectively concedes that there is a genuine distinction between real contradiction and
apparent contradiction. As it turns out, Ciocchi's notion of epistemic paradox is similar to the analysis
of paradox specified by the RAPT model. Nevertheless, he proceeds to criticise appeals to epistemic
paradox by arguing that we have no reason to think that all future attempts at logical reconciliation
will fail, i.e., that consistent formulations are impossible (for us). Yet the RAPT model does not
involve this strong claim. Rather, it claims that: (i) we are presently unable to produce any consistent
formulations of certain key doctrines (and for this very reason the doctrines appear to involve
contradiction); (ii) while we have may no reason to think that all future attempts at logically
reconciliation will fail, neither are we in a position to predict eventual success; and (iii) meanwhile
Christians can be rational in believing such doctrines, despite their apparent logical tensions.
37 Emerson (1841).
38 Rescher's characterization of the epistemic burden presented by paradoxes is typical in this respect.
'The prime directive of rationality is to restore consistency... [Inconsistency tolerance should be
viewed as a position of last resort, to be adopted only after all else has failed us.' Rescher (2001): 10.
276
the book). Accordingly, Sean believes that the conjunction of all the statements in the
book is likely to be false, which appears to conflict with his other beliefs about the
book. Strict consistency seems to demand that Sean believe this conjunction to be
true, but given what he knows about his own abilities, that belief is quite unjustified.
Such anomalies notwithstanding, it remains an intuitively appealing axiom that
inconsistency in one's beliefs should be avoided at all reasonable costs. To strive for
systematic consistency in one's theorizing — theological or otherwise — is
considered an intellectual virtue. If such is the case, then it suggests that there is
something distasteful or shabby about defending paradoxical doctrines by appealing
to divine mystery and thus it follows that the RAPT model is misguided in principle.
Dale Tuggy, for one, expresses a view along just these lines: while we may derive a
certain kind of intellectual pleasure by meditating on nonsensical or contradictory
claims (such as Carroll's 'Jabberwocky' or the koans of Zen Buddhism), he
maintains that 'an important intellectual virtue involves habitually refraining from
this ... pleasure'.39
Is the advocate of the RAPT model obliged to reject this principle — perhaps
even taking the contrary view that inconsistency is an intellectual virtue? Not at all.
Provided that certain important qualifications are made, the spirit of this counsel can
be wholeheartedly embraced. I concur that one should never approve theories that
one takes to be genuinely contradictory; this is consistent with the claim of the RAPT
model that paradoxical doctrines merely appear contradictory, since real
contradictions cannot be true. There is nothing virtuous about pure, unashamed
irrationalism. Moreover, I would add that theories which avoid apparent
contradiction should be preferred over theories that do not, all else being equal. It
follows that Christians ought, as a rule, to strive to formulate their doctrines in a non-
paradoxical manner. And for most such doctrines this is an attainable goal.
So in these significant respects, the sentiment expressed above can be endorsed.
Still, if the argument of the preceding chapter is sound then it is plausible to think
that in some instances the most rational course for a Christian is to favour a
paradoxical interpretation of a revealed doctrine over a non-paradoxical




claims of this formulation are adequately warranted by appeal to revelational data
and (ii) one can plausibly account for the presence of a MACRUE on the basis of
divine incomprehensibility. I venture that in such epistemic circumstances the
intellectually virtuous course is to grant divine revelation 'right of way' over
presumptions about our cognitive capacities, rather than the reverse. For on a
thoroughgoing Christian theistic epistemology, what constitutes epistemic good
practice will presumably be determined in part by what sort of things God means for
us to know about himself and in what fashion. Consequently, if the state of affairs
posited by the RAPT model is plausible then arguing that intellectual virtue demands
a blanket rejection of all apparent contradiction amounts to begging the question
against the model; for if the model is correct, intellectual virtue (by divine mandate)
will demand otherwise.
7.4.3 Alternative Notions of Rationality
In Chapter 5, I endorsed Plantinga's proper function analysis of epistemic warrant
(defined as that property which, in sufficient measure, distinguishes knowledge from
mere true belief). According to this account, a belief is warranted if it is formed by
way of properly functioning cognitive faculties successfully aimed at the production
of true beliefs. A warranted belief must be rational in two important senses. First, it
must be externally rational, that is, any sensuous or doxastic experience associated
with the belief must not be attributable to cognitive malfunction.40 Secondly, it must
be internally rational, that is, the faculties responsible for producing the belief must
be operating appropriately with respect to the believer's experience and other beliefs:
thus, if it appears to S that the sky is blue, then S"s belief that the sky is blue will be
internally rational (absent any relevant defeaters). In particular, internal rationality
requires that the relevant portions of one's defeater system, which governs belief
acceptance and revision in light of experience and other beliefs, be functioning
properly — as Plantinga puts it, there must be proper function 'downstream from
40
Simplistically put, everything must be proceeding normally with regard to how things 'seem' to the
believer. In Plantinga's terminology, sensuous experience refers to that imagery in response to which
perceptual beliefs are formed, while doxastic experience refers to the distinctive phenomenology
which accompanies those basic beliefs that simply strike us as 'right' and 'obvious' (e.g., memory
beliefs and a priori beliefs). Plantinga (2000): 110-11.
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experience'.41 I proceeded to defend Plantinga's extended Aquinas/Calvin model for
warranted Christian belief and subsequently argued, in Chapter 6, that a model can
be developed according to which even belief in paradoxical Christian doctrines can
be warranted. If such beliefs can be warranted, then it follows that they can be proper
function rational, i.e., both externally and internally rational.
Now it could be objected that even if such beliefs can be rational in the above
respects, there are still other important types of rationality, and beliefs in paradoxical
doctrines will invariably fail to be rational in these further respects. Even if this is so,
I submit that the warrant question is by far the most important, given that warrant
involves precisely that kind of rationality necessary for knowledge. Since other kinds
of rationality are demonstrably not necessary for knowledge, one might ask how
concerning it is for a belief to lack rationality in these respects. Nevertheless, it is
worth briefly considering two other influential conceptions of rationality if only to
show that neither raises a problem for the RAPT model.
First of all, one could argue that assent to a paradoxical doctrine cannot be
epistemically justified, construed in a broadly deontological sense.42 On this view, S
is justified in believing p just in case S fulfils every relevant epistemic duty or
obligation in so believing: S flouts no epistemic norms or responsibilities, so to
speak. Hence the pertinent question would be to ask just what epistemic regulation
might be transgressed by a Christian who holds to a paradoxical interpretation of the
doctrine of the Trinity, say, in the manner specified by the RAPT model. Intuitively,
one ought not to believe what one takes to be a contradiction, no matter what other
epistemic grounds one might have. But the Christian considered here does no such
thing, since she takes the logical conflict involved in the doctrinal claims to be
merely apparent (and with good reason).
Perhaps then the relevant norm is something more subtle, such as the following:
one ought not to believe a set of claims that one is unable to reconcile logically, even
if one has reason to think that they could in principle be reconciled. Yet it is far from
obvious that our reasoning is duty bound to this much stronger principle; so unless a
good argument can be marshalled to this effect, there is no reason for an advocate of
41
Plantinga (2000): 110-13.
42 For a discussion of deontological justification in Descartes, Locke, and various contemporary
epistemologists, see Plantinga (1993b): 3-29. See also Alston (1989).
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the RAPT model to feel intimidated by it. Indeed, it is difficult to see what alleged
epistemic norm could be enlisted here that is both defensible and problematic for the
construal of paradoxical doctrines that I have advocated. I conclude that the notion of
epistemic justification, construed deontologically, offers no cogent basis for
objection to the RAPT model.
Consider secondly the notion of evidential justification. According to this
perspective, S is justified or rational in believing p just in case the truth of p is
probable with respect to 5's total evidence, where this evidence consists of the set of
S"s basic beliefs (those beliefs, such as perceptual beliefs or a priori beliefs, which
are not held on the basis of inference from other beliefs).43 This kind of rationality
has been championed most notably by Richard Swinburne, who has objected to
Plantinga's defence of the intellectual propriety of Christian belief on the basis that
while such belief may be proper function rational, as Plantinga contends, a far more
pressing question (apologetically speaking, at any rate) is whether it is evidentially
rational in the sense outlined above.44 It is precisely this flavour of rationality with
which non-believers (and doubt-stricken believers) are most concerned, suggests
Swinburne. In my view, Plantinga is correct to respond by arguing that this strongly
evidentialist conception of rationality is rather less interesting and important than
Swinburne thinks; for example, the deluded beliefs of a madman can be 'rational' in
this sense, while other perfectly respectable beliefs (such as the memory that I was
dealt a particular hand in a poker game last night) must be judged 'irrational'.45 Such
counterintuitive results indicate that the aetiology of belief is far more relevant to our
commonsense notions of rationality than Swinburne acknowledges, while evidential
probability calculations, though undoubtedly of great importance in certain epistemic
contexts (such as the evaluation of scientific theories), stand in no simple relation to
the propriety of beliefs per se.46 Consequently, I am little concerned if it turns out
that belief in paradoxical doctrines must be judged 'irrational' in a Swinburnian
sense. Moreover, I suspect that few Christian beliefs — let alone full-blown
43 For a detailed explication of this understanding ofjustification, see Swinburne (2001a).
44 Swinburne (2001b): 207-8.
43
Plantinga (2001a): 218-19; Plantinga (2001b): 238.
46 A number of difficulties with Swinburne's account of epistemic justification are identified in
Bergmann (2004), including the observation that few believers have cognitive access to the sort of
information needed to make the relevant probability judgements.
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doctrines (paradoxical or otherwise) — can be evidentially justified in the manner
envisaged by Swinburne (including those held by Swinburne himself).47 But surely
they are none the worse for that.
There are, of course, various other conceptions of rationality that might be
considered, though I believe the two treated above are those most likely to be
employed in objection to the RAPT model. While there is no space for an exhaustive
treatment here, my conclusion is that any notion of rationality wielded to this end
will either be too weak to exclude the beliefs in question (as with appeals to
uncontroversial epistemic norms) or too strong to be taken seriously as a general
constraint on the propriety of beliefs (as with Swinburne-style notions of evidential
justification).
7.4.4 Intuitional Inertia
Intuition — roughly, the power to immediately apprehend certain truths or concepts
or relationships — is arguably one of the most valuable human cognitive faculties.
Many of our most foundational beliefs are such that we are unable to prove them by
philosophical argument, yet they simply seem to us to be true — even obviously true.
The belief that 1 + 1 = 2, the belief that the inferential principle modus ponens is
valid, and the belief that there exist other minds than our own, would be just three
examples. Similarly, while many of the concepts we possess are less than wholly
distinct, others strike us as paradigmatically clear and precise: for instance, the
concepts of individuality and plurality. Given the prominence and centrality of these
a priori elements of human thought, our evaluation of proposed theses or theories is
subject to what one might call 'intuitional inertia': a natural resistance to
counterintuitive claims, to proposals that bring into question what naturally strikes us
as true, or possible, or necessary.
Now one of the more problematic aspects of the model I defend here is that it
seems to run up against some of our most strongly held metaphysical intuitions.
According to my proposal, the phenomenon of theological paradox arises because of
present limitations and imprecisions in our cognitive apparatus: we simply do not
grasp those metaphysical distinctions that would allow us to see how the apparent
47 Recall Alston's remarks on the prospects for internalist justification of religious beliefs. Alston
(1993b): 22.
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contradictions can be fully resolved. In the case of the doctrine of the Trinity, the
difficulty seems to be located in our understanding of identity or numerical unity, at
least in the application of these concepts to divine beings. The doctrine of the
Incarnation, on the other hand, apparently runs into problems when we bring our
intuitive notion of personal unity to bear on it, along with the various implications
for mentality and consciousness that accompany that notion.48 If the RAPT model is
correct, however, it follows that these concepts are susceptible to refinement and
qualification (at least in principle) in such a way that the relationship between the
divine ousia and the divine hypostases, and the relationship between God the Son
and Jesus of Nazareth, can be cognized without any logical difficulties. Yet many
will find such claims dubious, to say the least. What could be clearer to us than the
concepts of identity, singularity, and personal unity? How could notions so central
and indispensable to our conceptual schemes, and thus to our understanding of the
world, ever be thought 'coarse' in the manner posited by the RAPT model?
As a matter of historical fact, however, even elementary concepts such as these
have been subject to considerable philosophical debate — and that in the absence of
any discernible theological motivation. Take first the concept of identity. Some have
argued that there is no such thing as absolute identity, as identity per se.49 On this
view, identity relations only hold relative to a sortal; it makes no sense to assert
simply that X is the same as Y, only that X is the same F as Y. Others have contended
(against the mainstream) that identity can be a contingent relation: hence in some
cases, although X and Y are actually one and the same object, things could have been
otherwise.50 With regard to the properties of identical objects, both the principle of
the identity of indiscernibles and the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals
have been called into question.51 Likewise, the notion that individuals are identical
across possible worlds has come under fire.52 Even the idea that there is a theory-
independent fact of the matter about what objects exist and in what quantity (with
48 Indeed, our notion of personal unity also raises difficulties for the doctrine of the Trinity, insofar as
the biblical texts frequently speak of God in singular personal terms.
49 Geach (1967); Geach (1968).
50 Gibbard (1975); Yablo (1987).
51 Black (1954); Adams (1979); French and Redhead (1988); French (1989). A. P. Martinich notes
that the indiscemibility of identicals has been doubted by such luminaries as Aristotle and Leibniz.
Martinich (1978): 179-80.
52 Chisholm (1967); Lewis (1986).
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ramifications for the metaphysics of identity) has been soberly challenged.53 Turning
to the notion of numerical unity, the knotty question of material constitution — is the
statue the same thing as the clay of which it is made, and if not, how many things are
there on the podium? — has prompted some somewhat counterintuitive
conclusions.54 The concept of personal identity, meanwhile, has enjoyed its fair share
of philosophical controversy. Is it analysable in terms of somatic continuity, or
psychological continuity, or neither?55 Is personal continuity a matter of degree?56 Is
it possible for a person to 'split' (via brain division or a process of instantaneous
cloning) such that each of two distinct persons in the present is the same person as
one in the past?57
My purpose in mentioning these ongoing debates is not to endorse any particular
side, still less to advocate a sceptical stance, but rather to suggest that since so many
aspects of these elementary concepts have been credibly contested we ought to be
somewhat more circumspect about our understanding and application of them — and
especially so when we apply the concepts to subject areas beyond our immediate
experience and expertise. While our intuitions about such things serve us perfectly
well in matters of everyday life, there are also 'grey areas': regions of theoretical
inquiry where it is not wholly clear and beyond all controversy just what conclusions
should be drawn. This being so, it is hardly unreasonable to take the view that our
intuitions about what is metaphysically possible ought not to be treated, generally
speaking, as the last word in doctrinal theorizing. Instead, Christians should be
prepared to allow revelational data, if it carries sufficient force, to inform and qualify
their understanding and application of a priori metaphysical convictions. Hence if
(for example) the biblical claims about Yahweh, the Father, the Son, and the Holy
Spirit prove extremely difficult to harmonize in terms of our 'natural' repertoire of
concepts, we may well be justified in concluding that our concepts and vocabulary
are in need of refinement (even if we are not in a position, cognitively speaking, to
specify how that refinement should cash out).
53
Quine (1969); Kraut (1980).
54 For a succinct statement of the problem, and a taxonomy of proposed solutions, see Rea (1995).
55 For an overview of the different camps, see Olson (2003).
56 Parfit (1971).
57
Wiggins (1967); Parfit (1971); Perry (1972); Lewis (1976); Parfit (1984).
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Ultimately, how one approaches this issue will depend on how one relates, and
weights, the contributions of natural intuition and special revelation to human
knowledge: one's conclusions thus depend on one's overall epistemology and,
furthermore, on one's underlying metaphysic. Hence a variation on Plantinga's
conditionality thesis, that the rationality of Christian belief crucially depends on the
truth of Christian belief, will once again come into play. For if the orthodox
Christian theistic view of the world is broadly correct, with its exalted conception of
God, its positive yet modest view of human cognition, and its conviction that
Scripture can furnish us with reliable information about the nature and activity of
God (albeit accommodated to human thought and language), it follows that
conclusions drawn on the basis of metaphysical intuitions will normally be warranted
but nonetheless could in principle be subject to revision or qualification on the basis
of revelational data which indicate we have run up against certain limitations in our
cognitive apparatus. Faced with the triple constraints of (i) logically necessity (the
law of non-contradiction), (ii) revelational perspicuity (the most natural
interpretation of biblical texts), and (iii) metaphysical intuitions (in effect, the
assumption that certain notions adequate for consistent theorizing about immanent
realities are likewise adequate for consistent theorizing about transcendent realities),
proper function rationality will demand that one of these 'give way' in cases of
conflict. If, as a matter of epistemic fact, we do lack the capacity to grasp various
fine metaphysical distinctions needed to express some Christian doctrines in a
transparently consistent way, it follows that (iii) is the point of weakness. I conclude
therefore that resistance to the RAPT model due to 'intuitional inertia' not only
underestimates the degree to which the sort of concepts in question are subject to
debate in «o/7-theological contexts, but also begs the question by assuming an
epistemology of intuition at odds with the model itself.
7.4.5 Comprehension and Conception
I turn finally to what I suspect many readers will consider to be the most serious
issue facing the thesis defended here; namely, the question of how Christian
believers should understand and assent to the theological claims involved in
paradoxical doctrines and, indeed, whether there can be any such understanding and
assent. I have argued that the paradoxical sets of claims typically involved in
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formulations of the doctrine of the Trinity and the doctrine of the Incarnation should
be interpreted as MACRUEs, that is, as merely apparent contradictions resulting
from unarticulated equivocation. On this view, some of the terms employed in those
claims should be construed as being related analogically rather than univocally. If
the relevant semantic distinctions could be identified, the logical consistency of the
claims could be demonstrated; but in the absence of information specifying these
distinctions, formally consistent expressions of these doctrines (and their
implications) can still be constructed by indicating their presence explicitly with a
suitable notation. To take an example, certain paradoxical implications of
Chalcedonian christology could be expressed thus:
(Kl) Christ did not know, every fact (by virtue of his humanity).
(K2) Christ did know2 every fact (by virtue of his divinity).
There is, however, an obvious problem with this. Supposing we can be warranted in
concluding that there are distinctions which could be made, perhaps even gaining
some idea of where the distinctions are to be located (and hence which of the
underlying concepts is subject to qualification), it remains that we are not in a
position to specify the content of the distinctions. Thus, to continue with the example
above, while we may have grounds for claiming that 'knowingi' is relevantly
different from 'knowing2', we are nonetheless unable to say just how they differ. But
if this is the case, how is one supposed to interpret claims like (Kl) and (K2)? How
can a Christian properly assent to claims he is unable to comprehend? And what is
the Christian who affirms both claims supposed in practice to believe, given that he
does not — indeed cannot — cognize the relevant distinctions?58
A number of points may be made in response, which taken together indicate that
the difficulties here are not nearly so serious as they initially appear. In the first
place, there is nothing incoherent about the idea of assenting to statements of which
one has only limited understanding. Imagine that Bruce, an Australian unfamiliar
with Scottish customs and cuisine, inquires of his friend Jock as to what Scots
5S As Richard Cartwright remarks regarding the doctrine of the Trinity: '[A] mystery [is not] supposed
to be unintelligible, in the sense that the words in which it is expressed simply cannot be understood.
After all, we are asked to believe the propositions expressed by the words, not simply that the words
express some true propositions or other, we know not which.' Cartwright (1987): 193.
285
typically do on Burns Night. 'We eat haggis, neaps, and tatties,' Jock replies. Now
even if Bruce is woefully ignorant of such delicacies, after accepting Jock's reply he
could nonetheless meaningfully assent to this statement:
(BN) Scots typically eat haggis, neaps, and tatties on Bums Night.
If asked whether he believed this statement to be true, he could sincerely reply in the
affirmative, despite lacking full comprehension of the terms used. In this connection
we may speak of the implicit meaning of a statement, namely, whatever it is that is
asserted by the statement when all of its terms are adequately understood (taking the
original context of the statement into account). In the example above, the implicit
meaning can be identified with what Jock understands it to mean; and by affirming
(BN) Bruce is effectively expressing his belief that everything this statement says to
be the case, when ascribed this implicit meaning, is in fact the case. Furthermore, he
is in a position to commend (BN) to others for acceptance, even though his
comprehension is lacking in important respects; and those who accept it are
consequently able to affirm (BN) on the same basis as Bruce, viz., by indirect
reference to its implicit meaning.
On similar grounds, we can think of formulations such as (Kl) and (K2) as also
having implicit meanings; specifically, those meanings that would be understood by
one who does grasp the relevant distinctions (and therefore comprehends enough of
the underlying metaphysics to see clearly how there is no genuine contradiction
involved). Christians who affirm such doctrinal statements are thus in effect
committing themselves to the idea that whatever these claims state to be the case,
when interpreted according to the relevant implicit meanings, is in fact the case. The
idea that there are implicit meanings follows directly from the conviction that the
doctrines in question are MACRUEs — for if the appearance of contradiction is due
to unarticulated equivocation, then there are in principle distinctions available and
hence there must be implicit meanings based on these distinctions.59
It is worth pointing out that the concept of implicit meaning arguably factors into
many theological claims other than those involved in paradoxical doctrines, at least if
59
Ultimately, of course, the presence of these implicit meanings is grounded in the divine testimony
from which the doctrinal statements derive their warrant. The divine authorship of Scripture is thus the
gold bullion which funds the claim that there are genuine metaphysical distinctions which resolve the
paradox, even though we do not presently have cognitive access to them.
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something like the linguistic doctrine of analogy is accepted. The wisdom attributed
to God is not the same as that attributed to Socrates, though it is similar in many
important respects; thus when I echo the biblical affirmation that 'God is wise', my
comprehension of that statement is partial and approximate. In making that
affirmation, so it seems, I am committing myself to the notion that God exhibits a
certain quality analogous to human wisdom — a quality that I understand and
appreciate only imperfectly. The statement 'God is wise' can be thought of as having
an implicit meaning grounded in a deeper comprehension of the divine attribute in
question; and my belief that the statement is true when ascribed that implicit
meaning is warranted by the biblical witness to God's character and by confirmation
in my own experience (even if that full meaning is not something that I directly
entertain).60 If this general observation about analogical terms in theological
statements is correct, it applies in no less measure to analogical terms employed in
paradoxical sets of doctrinal claims.
The doctrine of analogy can shed still further light on the meaningfulness of
claims such as (Kl) and (K2). In the illustration above, Bruce had a negligible
understanding of the terms 'haggis', 'neaps', and 'tatties'. Other than what he might
have been able to infer from the immediate context of his brief exchange with Jock
(e.g., that these terms identify items of food indigenous to Scotland) the statement
(BN) will have been largely uninformative to him. Now if the same cognitive vacuity
were to afflict statements such as (Kl) and (K2), that fact would invite serious
objection to the thesis that doctrinal paradoxes can be usefully construed as
MACRUEs. But this is not how things stand at all, precisely because each of the
terms involved in the statements is related either univocally or analogically to the
'ordinary' sense of that term: none of the terms is wholly (or even mostly) unrelated
in meaning to the sense it carries in ordinary discourse. Every word used is
semantically anchored in everyday language.61 In statements (Kl) and (K2), the
terms know\ and know2 are such that either both relate analogically, or one relates
univocally and the other analogically, to the term know in a statement such as 'John
60 What I do entertain directly in my own mind is an approximation of that meaning — on which,
more below.
61 Cf. Ross's defence of the meaningfulness of religious discourse in general. Ross (1981): 165-70,
175-76.
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knows where Anne lives'. Consequently, we can say that (Kl) and (K2) should be
treated as semantically approximate to what would be deemed the 'ordinary' reading
of those claims, i.e., those interpretations in which each term is ascribed a univocal
sense — just as the claim 'God is wise' should be treated as semantically
approximate to a reading in which the term wise is univocal with the same term in
'Socrates is wise'. With this baseline of continuity in place, it then becomes a matter
of judging how the analogical terms should be differentiated from their counterparts,
in light of what we know about the subject matter and the broader context of the
claims in view. This differentiation can be brought out in a number of ways — which
leads me to my second point.
The phenomenon of linguistic analogy delivers paradoxical doctrines from the
charge of logical inconsistency: words adapt in meaning to resist contradiction,
unless the context demands otherwise, and when the context in question is divine
revelation (or a systematic summary of some part of that revelation) it is reasonable
to assume that the linguistic tokens employed do so adapt. Nevertheless, a concern
remains that analogical meaning relationships can be stretched too far — so far,
perhaps, that the relevant terms are evacuated of any positive content. It will be
useful therefore to identify some semantic test that can be applied to sets of claims so
as to ascertain how meaningful they are in practice. Generally speaking, the
meaningfulness of a particular claim can be assessed by considering the extent to
which we can draw from it both implications (that is, what other claims follow from
the claim in question) and applications (that is, what practical difference should be
made by a commitment to the claim in question). The second criterion is particularly
relevant to the question of meaning in Christian theology insofar as its practitioners
have emphasised the inseparability of doctrine and praxis. The articles of the
Christian religion are as much concerned with behaviour as with belief, faith without
works is dead. James Ross rightly observes in his discussion of religious discourse
that Judeo-Christian literature such as bible stories, catechisms, creeds, stories of
saints, and so forth, are not concerned merely with inducing certain mental states, but
also with directing and regulating our actions:
[They] are designed to modulate one's conception of oneself and of one's relationship
to other people, to modulate one's judgments about the physical world, about the goals
and values of life and one's judgments about God (who is to be encountered through
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faith, in obedience to moral law and in the pursuit of holiness). The discourse is
inherently action-oriented, response, self-construal and judgment oriented. ... Living
in God, in the spiritual Word, is the object of the craft of Christian doing; and
Christian talking functions to prompt and modulate it.62
In judging the meaningfulness of such statements as (Kl) and (K2), therefore, we
should consider what implications and applications Christian believers could draw
from them. The answer, as it turns out, is reasonably straightforward in principle
(and has been indicated earlier in this chapter): the believer is warranted in drawing
any implications or applications that would also follow from an 'ordinary' reading of
the statements, except for those implications or applications ruled out by the body of
revelational data on which those statements are based (or by robust inferences from
those data). Accordingly, one may take as valid implications of (K2) that Christ is
divine and that Christ is worthy of our trust and our worship (indeed, these
conclusions would comport with how the attributions of omniscience to Jesus often
function in the theology of the New Testament writers). As a legitimate application
of (K2) one might take encouragement from the notion that Christ is fully aware of
our personal circumstances and knows what is best for us; moreover, one could offer
encouragement to others on the same basis. Another application would be that
Christ's teaching on both heavenly matters and earthly matters is trustworthy (cf.
John 3:11-13) and thus ought to be followed. However, (K2) should not be taken to
imply that Christ was less than fully human and is therefore unable to sympathise
with us in our human weaknesses and limitations (cf. Heb. 4:15). On the contrary,
the idea that Christ has genuinely experienced our human condition is a valid
implication of the balancing statement (Kl), while drawing comfort from that fact is
a proper application of it. Furthermore, when the two statements are taken together
they imply that Christ is a personal being (as opposed to, say, some kind of
impersonal supernatural force) since both indicate that knowledge is the sort of thing
that can be attributed to Christ; more significantly still, they should not be taken as
implying that Christ is a plurality of persons, because this flies in the face of other
revelational data.
Similar considerations can be applied to statements of trinitarian theology and to
other doctrinal MACRUEs. In short, meaning can be invested in those theological
62 Ross (1981): 167.
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statements that together express paradoxical doctrines (whether or not the
equivocation has been formally articulated) in accordance with the constraints
imposed by (i) standard linguistic and hermeneutic conventions, (ii) basic
philosophical intuitions, and (iii) the total body of revelational data from which the
statements are derived. No doubt particular care must be taken when interpreting
such doctrinal statements, but the suggestion that the doctrines are altogether
nonsensical or semantically vacuous is without foundation.
Finally, let us turn from semantics to doxastics. What does a Christian who holds
to paradoxical interpretations of the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation, for
example, actually believe about the Godhead and Jesus Christ? I have already
indicated that there can be a kind of indirect belief involved: a belief that certain
propositions, identified indirectly rather than entertained directly in the mind of the
believer, are true. It is in just this sense that Bruce believes that Scots typically eat
haggis, neaps, and tatties on Burns Night. Likewise, Carol may ascribe truth to
whatever propositions would be expressed by 'The Father is God and the Son is God
and the Spirit is God', 'The Father is not the Son and the Father is not the Spirit and
the Son is not the Spirit', and 'There is only one God' if each term were taken in the
sense understood by one who actually grasps the consistency of trinitarian
metaphysics — even if Carol herself lacks this deeper understanding of the terms and
the associated concepts.
Yet this alone is less than satisfactory. For presumably we also want there to be
some kind of direct belief involved; some conception in the mind of the believer as
to what state of affairs is said to obtain by the doctrinal claims in question. Put
crudely, the pertinent question is this: just how should the Christian think of God and
of Jesus Christ when reflecting on the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation?
The answer, I suggest, comes by way of distinguishing two ways in which we can
conceive of things. First, there is a sense in which we can conceive of something
concretely, for example, I can conceive how my bathroom will look once it has been
decorated. Concrete conception need not be perceptual in character; I can also
concretely conceive of a novel algorithm for solving a certain computational
problem, even though the algorithm itself is not a physical object. The rough idea
here is that of imagination, of being able to 'see' the state of affairs under
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consideration. In contrast to this, however, there is also a distinct sense in which we
can conceive of something in a purely formal manner. This is our capacity to reflect
on some proposed item or scenario, and to introduce it into discourse so as to invite
others to reflect on it, regardless of whether subsequent thought and discussion lead
to the conclusion that the item or scenario in question is coherent or metaphysically
possible. To take some examples: one can formally conceive of such things as square
circles, purple desires, and chocolate propositions, even though we recognise that
each of these is impossible and nonsensical (although not nonsensical in quite the
way that a 'fragmoss brimquack' is nonsensical). None of these is concretely
conceivable, but nevertheless our ability to conceive of them in this purely formal
sense is a precondition of our being able to deduce that there can be no such things
and to state that conclusion to others. Less trivially, some philosophers maintain that
libertarian free will is impossible because incoherent; but they are nonetheless able to
specify and entertain that view with which they disagree. In a similar way, modal
logicians can theorize in a meaningful way about 'non-normal worlds': possible
worlds where 'logic is not guaranteed to hold' and thus contradictions may be true
and impossibilities possible.63 No one, I dare say, can really imagine what it would
be like to inhabit such a world, but even that conclusion presupposes a capacity to
conceive of non-normal modality in some sense. We can therefore identify two
distinct ways in which something can be 'conceived': concrete conception and purely
formal conception. The former entails the latter, but not vice versa.
With this distinction in hand, let us now consider the question of belief in a
paradoxical set of claims. Recall the earlier illustration of the Flatlander who receives
a propositional revelation from a Spacelander about a three-dimensional object (a
cone) and suppose that the revelation includes the following two claims:
(51) The object O is shaped triangularly.
(52) The object O is shaped circularly.
As noted previously, even though these statements will appear contradictory to the
Flatlander, since his cognitive apparatus is such that he can only conceive of objects
two-dimensionally, he may nonetheless rationally conclude that they constitute a
63 Priest (2001): 58-73; Hughes and Cresswell (1996): 201.
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MACRUE if each of the statements is independently warranted to a sufficient degree.
In so concluding, he will have realised that there must be some sense in which an
object can be both triangular and circular, even if he cannot grasp how that might be
so. We may thus say that the Flatlander can formally conceive of the object O, even
though he cannot concretely conceive of it. The Spacelander may further explain that
this is rendered possible if the object exists in three spatial dimensions, inviting the
Flatlander to entertain the notion of three-dimensional space by extension from his
conception of two-dimensional space (just as we can postulate a four-dimensional
space by extension from our conception of three-dimensional space).64 Nevertheless,
the Flatlander will still lack the capacity to conceive concretely of three-dimensional
objects such as cones, to picture in his mind's eye how such a state of affairs would
obtain (just as our cognitive apparatus prevents us from picturing an object extended
in four spatial dimensions).65
Despite the element of paradox from the Flatlander's perspective, the notion of a
cone will not be semantically vacuous by any means. What his conceptual limitations
will entail in practice is an inability to think simultaneously and unitedly of object O,
the subject of the revelational claims, as being both triangular and circular (in the
senses familiar to him). At any point in time, he will either think of it as one or the
other. He cannot concretely conceive of 'conicality', but he can concretely conceive
of triangularity and circularity, each of which (in different ways) approximates the
state of affairs under description. Moreover, which of these two ways of thinking is
appropriate in any particular context is not an arbitrary matter, but rather depends on
what features of the underlying reality need to be emphasized (and perhaps acted
upon). Suppose the Spacelander wants the Flatlander to appreciate that due to a
cone's pointed end, it can hurt to fall upon it; in such a context, the Flatlander ought
to think of O in triangular terms. However, if it is also important for the Flatlander to
appreciate, in other contexts, that a cone can be rolled smoothly back and forth on a
64 Abbott (1998): 81-89.
65 In Abbott's tale, Square is 'miraculously' granted the ability to perceive his own two-dimensional
world from Sphere's point of view. After these revelations come to an end, however, he admits to
great difficulty in recalling these visions and communicating their content to his compatriots; on his
darker days, he is drawn back to his initial doubts about the very possibility of cubes and spheres,
even questioning his own mental well-being. Abbott (1998): 115-18. Square's predicament helps to
underline the relationship between conceivability (both formal and concrete) and cognitive capacities.
Despite his later concerns, of course, cognitive limitation by no means implies cognitive dysfunction.
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flat surface, it will clearly be most appropriate for him to focus on circularity instead.
Hence the Flatlander is able to attain after a fashion a concrete conception of object
O that is both meaningful and informative, albeit imprecise and unintegrated.
Furthermore — and here we must reintroduce the theistic dimension to our fictional
analogy — this combination of formal and concrete conceptions may be wholly
adequate for the Flatlander to relate to transcendental realities as his Creator intends.
The principles illustrated in this analogy apply equally to the situation faced by a
person S who affirms paradoxical formulations of the doctrines of the Trinity and the
Incarnation. Although S cannot concretely conceive of a deity who is one indivisible
being existing in three distinct persons, or a unified person who is omniscient yet
capable of learning and susceptible to surprise, S can formally conceive of such
things (and as I have pointed out, the latter claim is established by the very
intelligibility of the former). Nonetheless, in both cases S can concretely conceive of
either side of the paradoxical coin, on the understanding that such conceptions are
only approximations and thus care should be taken about what implications are
drawn. And depending on which aspects and implications of the doctrine are under
consideration in a particular theological context, one or other conception may be
more appropriate (even unavoidable). When reflecting on the Trinity in the light of
God's uniqueness and aseity, conceiving of the Godhead as a numerical unity rather
than a plurality of beings will be apropos. On the other hand, one naturally ought to
think of the Godhead as something like a threefold personality when theorizing about
the Trinity as the paradigmatic community of social relationships. Similarly with
conceptualizations of Christ held in conformity to Chalcedonian orthodoxy: a 'two
minds' perspective should take the fore when reflecting on (say) the pastoral
implications of Jesus' genuine humanity, while a 'one person' perspective ought to
assume prominence when expounding Christ's mediatory role as the agent of
reconciliation between God and humanity.
The points raised in this section invite further explication and defence, but enough
has been said to cast considerable doubt on the complaint that paradoxical doctrines
must be semantically and cognitively vacuous. The various notions and distinctions
to which I have appealed (implicit meaning, analogy rooted in ordinary discourse,
implication and application as indicators of meaningfulness, formal conception
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versus concrete conception) can help us to see how one's understanding of doctrines
such as the Trinity and the Incarnation can be informative and religiously significant,
both in theory and in practice, even if the claims involved strike one as logically
irreconcilable when subjected to analytical scrutiny.
7.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I have tried to address what I take to be the most serious biblical,
theological, and philosophical concerns that might be raised against the RAPT
model. No doubt each response could be expanded and strengthened, but nonetheless
I believe the discussion above is sufficient to show that the RAPT model is viable
and deserves serious consideration as a solution to the problem of doctrinal paradox
that successfully navigates between the Scylla of rationalism (e.g., advocating
theological models which avoid the appearance of implicit contradiction but distort
the revelational data) and the Charybdis of irrationalism (e.g., renouncing logic or
embracing anti-realism).
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8 Conclusion: The Prospects of Paradox
The two key questions identified at the outset have now received answers. As to the
first, it appears that certain central doctrines of the Christian faith are genuinely
paradoxical when interpreted according to the constraints of credal orthodoxy. The
doctrine of the Trinity, with its proscription of modalism, subordinationism, and
polytheism, seemingly rules out all logically consistent positions; likewise for the
doctrine of the Incarnation, with its claim that one undivided person, Jesus Christ,
took on a fully human nature, in all its physical, mental, and spiritual aspects, yet
without diminishing his divine nature. Attempts to excuse or evade these paradoxes
by abandoning theological realism, denying classical laws of logic, substantially
revising the doctrines, advocating 'semantic minimalism', or appealing to the notion
of complementarity, either fail to relieve the problem or else exchange it for
problems equally undesirable (or worse).
As to the second question, despite the paradoxicality of these doctrines, a
Christian who confesses them need not be irrational in doing so. There are plausible
models of Christian doctrinal belief available in terms of which the component
claims of the doctrines can be held rationally and, moreover, will not suffer epistemic
defeat on account of their apparent inconsistency provided certain plausible
conditions are met. The RAPT model is one such model; according to this scheme,
doctrinal paradoxes are best construed as merely apparent contradictions resulting
from unarticulated equivocation, which arise on account of divine mystery — that is,
a metaphysical state of affairs the revelation of which strikes us as contradictory due
to present cognitive limitations and conceptual imprecisions. The model draws on the
traditional Christian doctrines of analogy and divine incomprehensibility;
furthermore, if the basic tenets of Christian theism are true (and if some central
Christian doctrines are paradoxical) then I suggest that this model, or something
similar, is also true. Various theological and philosophical objections might be
levelled at the RAPT model, but none of those considered herein prove anywhere
near fatal.
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It remains for me to conclude by highlighting some of the implications of what
has been said in the course of answering these two questions and indicating areas for
further research.
8.1 Implications
The primary implication of the thesis is that Christians who hold paradoxical views
of the Trinity and the Incarnation (whether knowingly or unknowingly) can be
epistemically warranted in their doctrinal beliefs; this will be true for both
intellectually sophisticated and unsophisticated believers. Whether these beliefs are
in fact warranted will depend, of course, on whether the central Christian narrative is
true (including its trinitarian conception of God and its incarnational claims about
Jesus of Nazareth). But this conditionality applies equally to all distinctive Christian
doctrines. It follows, significantly, that the positive epistemic status of Christian
beliefs cannot be impugned by appealing to seeming contradictions implicit within
central doctrines without also arguing that the fundamental tenets of the faith are
outright false. For if they are true, and if the doctrines in question are paradoxical,
then the RAPT model (or something close) is also likely to be true. Consequently,
believers troubled by the phenomenon of theological paradox can breathe easy, while
those taunted by sceptics with cries of 'incoherence' and 'irrationality' need not be
intimidated.
There are also implications, as I have noted, for the disciplines of biblical
interpretation and systematic theology (and the interaction between the two).' Once it
is granted that the interpretation and systematization of revelational data could
present us with paradoxical conclusions, given what Christians believe about God
and human cognition, it follows that the use of logical inference and metaphysical
intuitions needs to be qualified accordingly, lest the (worthy) goal of systematic
consistency be pursued at the expense of fidelity to divine testimony. Furthermore,
the conclusions reached herein regarding the circumstances in which adherence to
paradox is epistemically acceptable can serve as a prophylactic against doctrinal
heterodoxy — for if apparent logical tensions within a theological position are not
necessarily the hallmark of falsity and irrationalism, then the typical objections
' See §7.2.2 and §7.3.1.
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raised against Nicene trinitarianism and Chalcedonian christology lose much of their
force.2 Theologians should recognise that one can shun rationalism without
sacrificing rationality.
The practice of apologetics — that is, the reasoned defence and commendation of
the Christian faith — also needs to be reassessed if the conclusions presented here
are accepted. As noted already, the RAPT model offers resources for vindicating the
rationality of belief in the Trinity and the Incarnation (and potentially other problem
areas in Christian theism). Moreover, the model can be employed in a dialectical
context to dissolve intellectual obstacles to accepting the Christian faith. For
example, the following line of resistance can no longer be sustained: 'If I were to
embrace Christianity, I would have to affirm the doctrine of the Trinity; but since this
doctrine strikes me (and many others) as internally contradictory, it would be
irrational for me to believe it, thus I cannot accept that Christianity is true without
abandoning my intellectual integrity.' If the RAPT model is cogent, then the fallacy
in this reasoning is evident, because it amounts to arguing that Christianity cannot be
reasonably believed because it is false.
The reverse side of the apologetic coin is that Christians must treat advocates of
other faiths as they themselves would wish to be treated. There can be no double
standard. If Christians can be warranted in appealing to mystery in defence of
paradoxical doctrines, so in principle can other religious believers. Nevertheless, as I
pointed out, not every belief-system is on an equal footing here; the RAPT model
involves specific theological and anthropological claims that do not comport with
many non-Christian religions (let alone secular ideologies).
8.2 Further Research
Such are some of the implications of this study of paradox in Christian theology. But
what does it suggest in the way of further research? In the first place, it invites
continued creative reflection on the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation in the
hope that deeper metaphysical insights will be uncovered, insights that allow us to
comprehend and explicate these doctrines in a perspicuously consistent manner. This
2
Fortunately for the Christian church, the Fathers were generally more tolerant of paradox than many
modern philosophical theologians.
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goal has not yet been reached, but it is still worthy of pursuit —fides quaerens
intellectum. My defence of paradox is not meant to derail this project, but merely to
show that the epistemic credentials of Christian beliefs do not stand or fall on its
success.3 Secondly, there is the question of paradox with respect to other Christian
doctrines. What about the relationship between divine transcendence and divine
immanence? God's self-sufficiency and his decision to create? The necessity and
freedom of the divine will? The relationship between divine sovereignty and
significant human freedom? The need to locate God both inside and outside time?4 If
one accepts the general principle that divine revelation may present us with
paradoxes, then these remain open questions.
Thirdly, I have suggested that while divine revelation may not provide us with
sufficient information to penetrate the paradoxes in certain Christian doctrines, it
might give some indication as to where the relevant distinctions are to be articulated
in our formulations of those doctrines.5 In our theorizing about the metaphysics of
the Trinity, for example, is the paradox-generating imprecision to be attributed to our
notion of identity, or numerical unity, or being, or personhood, or something else? If
such revelational hints are to be discerned, it will require careful exegetical
spadework.
Finally, there is room for a more detailed treatment of how the possibility of
theological paradox bears on the practice of biblical interpretation and systematic
theology. For those who continue in the tradition of formulating and justifying
doctrine on the basis of special revelation mediated by inspired texts, various
hermeneutical principles must be applied in the interpretation of those texts: norms
of logic, norms of grammar, norms of vocabulary, cultural presuppositions, historical
background, a priori philosophical intuitions, and so forth. These various factors
3
Compare, in this regard, the implications of 'Reformed epistemology' for natural theology. The
proper basicality of theistic beliefs does not render arguments for the existence of God superfluous or
impious; it merely follows that knowledge of God need not depend on the availability and cogency of
such arguments. See Sudduth (2003).
4 Consider the following recent comments by Richard Gale on the debate over divine eternality: 'What
we really want is a God who can have the advantages of both views, which would enable Him to
escape between the homs of the above dilemma argument. He would have the sort of self-sufficiency
and completeness that mystics admire but also be a suitable object of communion for the theistic
moral agent. We really want something like a doctrine of the Trinity in which God has both a timeless
and a temporal guise.'' Gale (2004): 234, emphasis added.
5 See §6.2.2.
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need to be appropriately weighted if the correct theological conclusions are to be
drawn, and in cases of purported paradox, these factors will pull the interpreter in
different directions. In some instances, the sheer force of certain factors will be
determinative; in others, it may be less clear whether a paradox doctrine is
revelationally warranted.6 I doubt that there are any cut-and-dried answers available
here, but nevertheless more attention might be applied to where the lines are to be
drawn.
8.3 Paradox: A Blessing in Disguise?
I began with a quotation from Kierkegaard extolling the virtues of paradox. The
scope of the thesis has been restricted to defending the claim that although two
central Christian doctrines are paradoxical, and all attempts to eliminate their
paradoxicality have been unsuccessful, the epistemic credentials of Christian beliefs
are none the worse for it. Could it be, however, that these paradoxes confer some
positive epistemic benefit on the Christian faith and its adherents?7 If nothing else, I
suspect that had the church's claims about the nature of God and his plan for
redeeming human beings been bereft of any logical perplexities, they would have
garnered rather less intellectual attention and critical reflection over the last two
millennia. (There is no such thing as bad publicity, so they say, and paradoxes seem
to exhibit a remarkable power to draw human curiosity.) Beyond such psychological
enticements, perhaps a case can be made that the presence of paradox adds some
evidential value to a religion. Suppose one were faced with two historically
established religions, Ri and R2. Ri involves several striking claims which, while not
explicitly contradictory, defy all attempts to express them in a manner that satisfies
human intuitions about what is possible, while R2 involves no such claims. All other
evidential considerations being equal, which would be thought to bear the mark of
transcendent origin and which the mark of human invention?
6 As I have indicated, I believe that the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation fall into the former
category; non-paradoxical interpretations of these doctrines (e.g., social trinitarianism and kenoticism)
are notoriously difficult to square with plausible readings of the relevant biblical texts.
71 have already remarked on some potential benefits of theological paradox in §7.3.3.
8 'I believe that Kierkegaard was right to insist that the incarnation was paradoxical, contrary to our
human expectations about what God could do and would do. However, I think he was also right to
insist that this paradoxicality is actually a mark of its truth: "Comedies and novels and lies must be
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probable", but one mark of the transcendence of God's revelation in Jesus Christ is precisely that it is
something that "could not have arisen in any human heart".' Evans (2002): 272.
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